Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench(2026) 10 CAT CK 5079

Anmol Jain vs Staff Selection Commission (SSC) & Ors.

Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi · Decided on 27 October 2026 · Citation: 2026 INSC 232

HON’BLE JUDGES
Dr. Chhabilendra Roul, Member (A) · Rajveer Singh Verma, Member (J)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
OA No.4035/2023

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Judgment

107 paragraphs · 5,763 words

By Dr. Chhabilendra Roul, Member (A)

The instant Original Application has been filed by the applicant under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following relief:

“(i)

Set aside the impugned letter dated 23.11.2023, issued by the respondent No. 2, whereby the applicant has been offered appointment on the post of Accountant in Office of the Accountant General (A&E)-1 and Principal Accountant General (A&E)-II, UP Prayagraj & Lucknow;

(ii)

Set aside the impugned Notice dated Nil, issued by the respondent No.3, whereby the applicant was allotted the post of Accountant in the Office of the Accountant General (A&E)-1 and Principal Accountant General (A&E)-II, UP Prayagraj & Lucknow; (iii) Direct the respondents to allocate an appropriate post within the State of Delhi and at the nearest place to the applicant's residence in terms of Section 20 (2) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016;

(iv)

allow the present Application with costs m favour of the applicant; and

(v)

issue any other appropriate order or direction as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice and in the favour of the applicant.”

2. Factual Matrix

2.1

Vide Advertisement dated 17.09.2022, the Respondent No.1, i.e. The Staff Selection Commission (SSC) invited applications for conducting Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2022 (CGLE-2022) for filling up various vacancies pertaining to Group-B & C posts in various Departments and Ministries of Government of India. The present applicant applied for the same recruitment process under the PwD (PH), UR category. The applicant was successful in the said selection process. Prior to declaration of the results, SSC obtained the preference of candidates for various posts, and the present applicant submitted his preferences for posts. Vide Notice dated 31.05.2023, the SSC declared the allocation of States/Offices to candidates selected for various posts. The applicant was short-listed for the post of Accountant in IA&AD (Offices under CAG). Respondent No.2 issued notice to all shortlisted candidates to upload their bio-data and state preference. In the said notice, the vacancies of Accountants available in various states were also mentioned. It is claimed by the applicant that he wanted to be posted at Delhi, but there was no vacancy shown for Delhi. Initially, the applicant did not fill up the State preference. Instead, he made a representation dated 13.06.2023. However, in response to another Notice (Annexure-A22) the present applicant filled up his state preference on 15.06.2023 (Annexure-A 24). Applicant had given preference for (i) Haryana, (ii) Uttar Pradesh, (iii) Rajasthan and (iv) Punjab. Respondent No.3 allotted the post of Accountant in the office of Account General (A&E)-I and Principal Accountant General (A&E) -II, UP Prayagraj and Lucknow. The applicant was given time to join by 22.12.2023.

2.2

The applicant submitted a representation dated 30.11.2023, followed by reminder dated 04.12.2023., requesting the respondents to post him in Delhi considering the fact that he is a PwD (PH) having low vision problem. He further served a legal notice to the respondent on 06.12.2023. The respondents did not respond to his representation and legal notice. Being aggrieved he has filed the present OA seeking afore mentioned relief.

3.

Pursuant to the notices issued by the Tribunal, the respondents entered appearance and filed their reply. The applicant also filed his rejoinder. The learned counsel for the parties were also allowed to file their respective written submissions, which were taken on record.

4. Submissions by learned counsel for the applicant

4.1

The following is the summary of the oral as well as written submissions by the learned counsel for the applicant, which were based on his pleadings in the OA.

4.2

The applicant in his pleadings (Paragraph 5) and the learned counsel for the applicant in his oral as well as written submission has highlighted the statutory provisions contained under Section 20(2) of Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. It is contended that Section 20(2) of the said Act provides that every Government Establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and barrier free access and conducive environment to employees with disability. It is further contended that the DOP&T OM dated 08.10.2018 has clearly laid down that persons with disabilities must be posted nearer to his place of residence.

4.3

It is contended that as the applicant is presently residing at Delhi, he should have been posted at Delhi. Offering him a post at Prayagraj, UP is violative of the statutory provisions contained in aforementioned PwD Act as well as the guidelines issued by DOP&T. The applicant will not be in a position to manage alone at Prayagraj because of inherent handicap. Because the applicant’s nature of disability compels him to be assisted in successful performance of basic functions of day-to-day life, posting the applicant away from native place shall augment the difficulties and challenges faced by the applicant. It is contended that the competent authority amongst the respondents may create a suitable post at Delhi to accommodate the present applicant.

4.4

In support of the aforementioned averments, the learned counsel for the applicant has cited the judgment of the Apex Court in Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2022 SCC Online SC 1022. He referred to Paragraphs 5, 6 & 31 of the said judgment which are extracted as below:

“5. By an Office Order being Sl. No. Nishia/Ganga/ Sanstha; 1/93-94/1071 dated 10th August 1993 issued by the Office of the District Education Officer (Students Associations) Sriganganagar, the Appellant was appointed Senior Teacher of the Government Secondary School, Deeplana, in Hanumangarh, District Bikaner.

6.

From the aforesaid Government orders, it is patently clear that the Appellant was appointed in the category of handicapped candidates. Deeplana, where the Appellant was posted is located at a distance of about 550 kms away from Behror, the place of residence of the Appellant in Alwar District.

xxx xxx xxx

31.

One of the hindrances/disadvantages faced by the physically disabled persons is the inability to move freely and easily. In consideration of the obstacles encountered by persons with disabilities, the State has issued the said notification/circular dated 20th July 2000 for posting disabled persons to places of their choice, to the extent feasible. The object of this benefit to the physically disabled is to, inter alia, enable the physically disabled to be posted at a place where assistance may readily be available. The distance from the residence may be a relevant consideration to avoid commuting long distances. The benefit which has been given to the disabled through the Circular/Government Order cannot be taken away by subjecting the exercise of the right to avail of the benefit on such terms and conditions, as would render the benefit otiose.

32.

Since there is no challenge in the Writ Petition to the vires of the Explanation, we do not deem it necessary to interfere with the same in this appeal. We hold that the said Explanation can have no manner of application to handicapped candidates who seek transfer to a place near their ordinary residence in terms of a beneficial Office Order/Circular issued for their benefit.

33.

With the greatest of respect, both the Single Bench as also the Division Bench of the High Court have overlooked the scope and ambit of the Explanation which has no application in the State to seniority. In our view, the High Court should have been more sensitive and empathetic to the plight of a physically disabled. The High Court erred in law in overlooking the difference between physically disabled persons impaired in their movement and normal able-bodied persons. The High Court failed to appreciate that treatment of unequals as equals ignoring their special needs violates Article 14 of the Constitution.”

4.5

Referring to aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, the learned counsel for the applicant states that, the respondents should have posted the present applicant at Delhi or nearby places, though it is a fresh appointment.

4.6

The learned counsel for the applicant has further cited the judgment of Delhi High Court in Anju Mehra v. Canara Bank, 2020 SCC Online Del 3858. In the said case, the petitioner, who was initially appointed in 1989 was transferred to a far-off place from his existing place of posting in the year 2019. Considering the mandate of Disability Act (Paragraph 18 of the judgment), the Court granted relief to the petitioner and the transfer order was quashed (Paragraph 21).

4.7

The learned counsel for the applicant further cited the judgment of the Delhi High Court in IRCON Infrastructure V. Bhavneet Singh in LPA no. 133/2024 and CM No. 9793/2024 decided 18.07.2024. He referred to Paragraph 44.1 which is extracted below:

“44.1

Therefore, notwithstanding any provision in the employment contract concerning transfer, it will stand superseded and/or be subordinate to the provisions of the 2016 Act and the 2017 Rules in the event it is bedeviled with inconsistency. Thus, the argument advanced by Mr Bhadra that the impugned transfer order passed by IRCON IL should be dealt with by ascribing to the same legal standard applicable to a non-disabled person is a submission that we are unable to accept.”

4.8

The Hon’ble High Court has reemphasized the statutory provisions of the PwD Act, 2016 and the Rules thereof 2017 as regards to transfer of employees belonging to PwD category.

4.9

The learned counsel for the applicant has further referred to the judgment of the Apex court in Vikash Kumar V. UPSC and Ors., (2021) 5 SCC 370. He refers to Paragraphs 63 and 65 which are extracted here: “63. In the specific context of disability, the principle of reasonable accommodation postulates that the conditions which exclude the disabled from full and effective participation as equal members of society have to give way to an accommodative society which accepts difference, respects their needs and facilitates the creation of an environment in which the societal barriers to disability are progressively answered. Accommodation implies a positive obligation to create conditions conducive to the growth and fulfilment of the disabled in every aspect of their existence – whether as students, members of the workplace, participants in governance or, on a personal plane, in realizing the fulfilling privacies of family life. The accommodation which the law mandates is ‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored to the requirements of each condition of disability. The expectations which every disabled person has are unique to the nature of the disability and the character of the impediments which are encountered as its consequence. xxx xxx xxx

65.

Failure to meet the individual needs of every disabled person will breach the norm of reasonable accommodation. Flexibility in answering individual needs and requirements is essential to reasonable accommodation. Flexibility in answering individual needs and requirements is essential to reasonable accommodation. The principle contains an aspiration to meet the needs of the class of persons facing a particular disability. Going beyond the needs of the class, the specific requirement of individuals who belong to the class must also be accommodated. The principle of reasonable accommodation must also account for the fact that disability based discrimination is intersectional in nature. The intersectional features arise in particular contexts due to the presence of multiple disabilities and multiple consequences arising from disability. Disability therefore cannot be truly understood by regarding it as unidimensional. Reasonable accommodation requires the policy makers to comprehend disability in all its dimensions and to design measures which are proportionate to needs, inclusive in their reach and respecting of differences and aspirations. Reasonable accommodation cannot be construed in a way that denies to each disabled person the customization she seeks. Even if she is in a class of her own, her needs must be met. While assessing the reasonableness of an accommodation, regard must also be had to the benefit that the accommodation can have, not just for the disabled person concerned, but also for other disabled people similarly placed in future.”

4.10

In the said case, the petitioner, who is suffering from writer’s cramp asked UPSC to allow a writer for him. UPSC, however, did not accede to his request stating that only blind candidates were allowed writers. The applicant approached the Administrative Tribunal and the Hon’ble High Court, but the Supreme Court granted him the relief.

4.11

Again, the learned counsel for the applicant reiterates that the respondents should have accommodated the present applicant considering his disability.

4.12

The learned counsel for the applicant also referred to the Apex Court judgment in Ravindra Kumar Dhariwal and Anr. V. Union of India and Ors, (2023) 2 SCC 209 wherein the appellant who was Assistant Commandant serving in CRPF was suffering from mental illness (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder-OCD). He was declared permanently disabled to the extent of 40-70% disability. The Apex Court granted him special relief considering his mental state (disability). Learned counsel for the applicant referred to paragraph 141 of the said judgment which is extracted below:

“141.

In light of Section 20(4) and the general guarantee of reasonable accommodation that accrues to persons with disabilities, the appellant is entitled to be reassigned to a suitable post having the same pay scale and benefits. The CRPF may choose to assign him a post taking into consideration his current mental health condition. The suitability of the post is to examined based on an individualised assessment of the reasonable accommodation that the appellant needs. The authorities can ensure that the post to which the appellant is accommodated does not entail handling or control over firearms or equipment which can pose a danger to himself or to others in or around the workplace.”

4.13

Finally, the learned counsel for the applicant referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sudhanshu Kardam V. CA&G India & Others, diary No.43728/2025 decided on 12.3.2026, wherein a mentally disabled candidate was given the relief for fresh appointment. Earlier the respondents have rejected his candidature stating that the petitioner was not eligible for the post of Auditor because of disability. The Apex Court not only granted relief, but also directed the respondents to create a supernumerary post, if required. Relying on the said judgment, the learned counsel for the applicant states that even if there is no post of Accountant at Delhi, the Respondents may adjust him at Delhi by creating a supernumerary post.

5. Submissions by learned counsel for the Respondents

5.1

The learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 states that the SSC (Respondent No. 1) has discharged its responsibilities. It has accepted the candidature of the applicant, given him the benefit of being a PwD candidate, and shortlisted him for the Post of Accountant in the Office of Accountant General (A&E)-I and Principal Accountant General (A&E-II, U.P. Prayagraj and Lucknow. Hence, they have no role in respect of the relief sought by the applicant.

5.2

The learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 relied on the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. He further submitted his written submission which was taken on Record. Based on his Oral submission, as well as the written submissions, the following are the relevant extracts of his submissions.

5.2.1

The submissions of the Respondents may be summarised under the following heads, each of which is developed hereafter:

(i)

No post exists. The post of Accountant (Post Code D39) exists only in the offices of the Principal Accountant General / Accountant General (Accounts & Entitlement) [“A&E”] located in the States. No such office exists in Delhi. The law does not compel the impossible.

The Indian Audit and Accounts Department discharges two distinct functions through two distinct sets of offices and two distinct cadres. The Audit offices (such as the Office of the Principal Accountant General (Audit), Delhi, at A.G.C.R. Building, I.P. Estate) conduct audit; their Group ‘C’ ministerial cadre is that of Auditor. The Accounts & Entitlement (A&E) offices compile the accounts of a State Government and administer the entitlements (pension, GPF) of its employees; their Group ‘C’ cadre is that of Accountant. The post of Accountant — the post to which the Applicant was nominated — exists only in A&E offices.

Delhi being a Union Territory whose accounts are not compiled by the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, there is no A&E office of the IA&AD at Delhi. This was pleaded in terms in the counter-affidavit (paras 4.17– 4.19 and 4.20). It has never been denied. On the contrary, the Applicant’s Rejoinder expressly admits it and merely contends that it is an internal administrative matter of the CAG and irrelevant.

The Applicant asks this Hon’ble Tribunal to direct the respondents to allocate an appropriate post within the State of Delhi. To grant that relief the Respondents would have to: (a) create an A&E office at Delhi; (b) sanction cadre strength for it; (c) create a post of Accountant in it; and (d) fund it. That is not reasonable accommodation. It is the creation of a public office by judicial direction.

(ii)

The Applicant received, and was not denied, PwBD preference. Under the approved allocation policy, persons with disabilities are given preference in State allocation over other candidates. The Applicant received his second State preference (Uttar Pradesh). His first preference (Haryana) had exactly one PH-Others vacancy, which went to Shri Harsh Yadav (Roll No. 2201006889, Rank 32084), a candidate higher in merit. That is not discrimination; that is the operation of merit within the reserved category.

The result of that preference is on the record. Haryana, the Applicant’s first preference, carried exactly one vacancy under PH-Others. It was allotted to Shri Harsh Yadav, Roll No. 2201006889, Rank 32084. The Applicant’s rank is 32963 — 879 places lower. Uttar Pradesh, his second preference, carried two PH-Others vacancies, and the Applicant obtained one of them. The Applicant therefore obtained his second State preference in a cadre of 1,470 candidates spread over the whole of India.

(iii)

The Applicant’s own preferences produced the result complained of. The Applicant himself placed Post Code D39 (Accountant, offices under the C&AG) at Serial No. 3 of his twenty post-preferences, and himself placed Haryana and Uttar Pradesh at Serials 1 and 2 of his State preferences. He then accepted, in terms, that once a post is allotted, no change is made by the Commission for any reason whatsoever.

The Applicant himself placed D39 – Accountant, offices under the Comptroller & Auditor General of India at Serial No. 3 of his twenty post-preferences (Annexure A-18). He placed D35 (Auditor, offices under the C&AG) at Serial No. 5, and D40 (Accountant, Controller General of Accounts) was not among his preferences at all. Under merit-cum-preference the higher preference attainable at a candidate’s rank is allotted; the Applicant obtained his third post-preference.

Having done so, the Applicant subscribed on 01.05.2023 to the following declaration (Annexure A-18):

“I also understand that the SSC makes the final allocation of posts in accordance with merit-cum-preference of the candidate and once a post is allotted, no change is made by the Commission for any reason whatsoever … I understand that the post/department allocated to me would be final …”

(iv)

The statutory provisions invoked do not apply. Section 20(2) and Section 20(5) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 [“the RPwD Act”] operate upon employees with disability. The Applicant has never joined the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and is not its employee. Rule 8(3)(c) of the RPwD Rules, 2017 governs the Equal Opportunity Policy of an establishment in relation to transfer and posting of its employees.

(v)

The DoPT Office Memoranda expressly confined to persons already employed in Government, deals with exemption from rotational transfer, and is in terms made subject to administrative constraints. The four Office Memoranda of 03.07.2024, 30.01.2025, 28.02.2025 and 27.06.2025 are, on their face, letters forwarding a representation for consideration. None of them directs a posting at Delhi.

(vi)

The Applicant is in secure employment in Delhi. By his own pleading (para 4.3 of the O.A.) the Applicant was appointed Single Window Operator [SWO(A)] in Punjab National Bank on 03.07.2023 and is posted at its Malviya Nagar, Delhi branch — near his residence, with his support system intact. He is neither unemployed nor displaced.

The Applicant’s alternative formulation (para 9 of his Note of Arguments) — that he should have been reallocated to another post as per his preference where he can be stationed in Delhi — fares no better. Allocation of posts is the exclusive function of Respondent No. 1 (SSC), not of the answering Respondents. Further, Annexure A-2 @ page 40 of OA categorically mentions that the allocation of state/office to a candidate is final and no request for change of allocation shall be entertained, there is no challenge to this notification. The same is mentioned at Annexure A-22 @ page 247 of OA.

Further, the notice of SSC at A-15 Page 214 clearly mentions that option once given shall be final.

The allocation policy approved by the competent authority, as set out in the counter-affidavit, provides that:

“Further, while allocating the State to the nominated candidates for appointment to various Gr. ‘B’ & ‘C’ cadre posts, the Persons with Disabilities are given preference in allocation of State over the other candidates. This allocation is done using an online portal developed for this purpose by NIC without any manual intervention.”

The Authorities relied upon by the applicant are distinguishable and are discussed hereinbelow:

i)

Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1022

The only question before the Supreme Court was seniority. The only relief granted was restoration of seniority (para 34).

Why it does not assist the Applicant.

(a)

The appellant there was in service for nine years before the events complained of. The Applicant here has never joined.

(b)

The appellant there had already obtained the posting he wanted. His grievance was that a penalty had been attached to a benefit he had lawfully availed. Nothing has been taken away from the Applicant here.

(c)

No direction as to place of posting was sought or granted.

ii) Anju Mehra v. Canara Bank, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 3858 : 2020:DHC:3183

What the case was about. The petitioner was a Bank officer of thirty-one years’ standing (appointed 1989) with 90% locomotor disability, who had been posted in Delhi metro branches throughout her career. She challenged a rotational transfer to a rural branch at Teela Mod, Farrukh Nagar, U.P. The learned Single Judge quashed the transfer.

Why it does not assist the Applicant. The reasoning rests on five planks, none of which exists here:

(a)

The petitioner was an existing employee being uprooted from a settled posting.

(b)

The transfer was a rotational transfer, from which the DoPT O.M. dated 31.03.2014 grants exemption in terms (paras 6, 17–18). There is no rotational transfer here

(e)

Crucially, in Anju Mehra the Bank had branches in Delhi — indeed the petitioner had been deputed to the Patparganj branch. The Court was choosing between two possible postings. Here there is no second option to choose.

iii) Ircon International Ltd. v. Bhavneet Singh, LPA 133/2024 (Del.) : 2024:DHC:6908 (18.07.2024)

What the case was about. The respondent was an Assistant Manager (HRM) with 72% locomotor disability and cerebral palsy, who wore an ankle-foot orthosis requiring regular maintenance and supervision by a paramedic he had consulted for eight years in Delhi. He had been relocated twice in five years (Delhi → Noida → Delhi). The impugned order transferred him a third time, from Delhi to Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. Five non-disabled officers in the same section were available and were not moved. The Division Bench dismissed the employer’s appeal.

Why it does not assist the Applicant.

(a)

It is, again, a transfer of a serving employee. The five-factor framework at para 4 of the judgment is expressly framed for an employer, while passing transfer and posting orders concerning a differently-abled person, and speaks of moving such a person at the time of transfer or promotion. Factor (iii) is itself qualified by the words subject to administrative constraints, if any.

iv) Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, (2021) 5 SCC 370

What the case was about. The appellant, who suffered from writer’s cramp (dysgraphia), was denied the facility of a scribe in the Civil Services Examination on the ground that a scribe was available only to candidates with benchmark disabilities. The Supreme Court held that the concept of benchmark disability under Section 2(r) cannot be conflated with disability under Section 2(s), and that reasonable accommodation is owed to the latter class as well. The subject-matter was an examination facility.

Why it does not assist the Applicant.

(a)

The case decides nothing whatever about place of posting, State allocation, or Section 20(5). Section 20 was discussed only as part of the general architecture of the Act.

(b)

The issue in Vikash Kumar was the denial of a facility to a sub-benchmark candidate. The Applicant here is a benchmark candidate who has received the full benefit of the reservation. The mischief the case addresses is absent.

v)

Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, (2021) 15 SCC 1 : (2023) 2 SCC 209

What the case was about. The appellant was a serving CRPF officer diagnosed with 40–70% mental disability, against whom disciplinary proceedings were initiated for conduct that was a manifestation of his disability. The Supreme Court held that continuing such proceedings amounted to indirect discrimination, and directed that if he was found unsuitable for his current duty he be re-assigned to an alternate post with the same pay and emoluments under Section 20(4).

Why it does not assist the Applicant.

(a)

The case concerns disciplinary proceedings and discharge, not posting. There is no disciplinary proceeding here.

(b)

The alternate post contemplated there is an alternate post/duty within the same establishment and at the same place, so as to preserve employment. It is not authority for relocating an establishment.

vi) Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2026 INSC 232 (12.03.2026)

This is the authority on which the Applicant places his strongest reliance (para 12 of the Note of Arguments), and the answering Respondents therefore deal with it at some length.

(a)

The subject-matter was the suitability of the POST, not of the PLACE. The controversy arose because the post of “Auditor” (Post Code D33) in CGLE-2018 had not been identified under Sections 33/34 of the RPwD Act as suitable for persons with benchmark disabilities in the categories of mental illness and specific learning disability. On that ground the C&AG returned the dossiers of Shri Amit Yadav and of the appellant to the SSC and declined to appoint them at all. The entire dispute turned on the Gazette Notification No. 38-16/2020-DD-III dated 04.01.2021, which subsequently identified the Group ‘C’ posts of Assistant (Audit) and Auditor-II as suitable for those categories. The words place of posting, native place, residence, transfer and State allocation do not appear anywhere in the order. Section 20(2) is not mentioned. Section 20(5) is not mentioned. No DoPT Office Memorandum is mentioned.

(b)

The relief granted was the opposite of what is claimed here. The operative directions (paras 21– 22) were: (i) that Respondent No. 2, the SSC, forward the dossiers of the appellant and of Shri Amit Yadav to the C&AG within two weeks; (ii) that upon receipt they be considered for appointment against Group ‘C’ posts identified as suitable; and (iii) that if the advertised posts stood filled, supernumerary posts be created. There is no direction as to where either candidate was to be posted. The relief was an appointment to a suitable post, not a posting at a chosen place.

(c)

The factual premise of Kardam is absent here. In that case the C&AG had refused appointment and returned the dossier. In the present case the C&AG has done the very opposite: it has accepted the SSC’s nomination, allocated a State ahead of general-category candidates, and issued a provisional offer of appointment dated 23.11.2023 which stands to this day (subject only to this Hon’ble Tribunal’s interim order). If Kardam demonstrates anything about the Respondents’ conduct in this case, it demonstrates that they have been more, and not less, accommodating.

The equities, moreover, are not one-sided. By virtue of the interim order dated 20.12.2023 a reserved PwBD vacancy in the Accountant cadre at the O/o the Pr. AG (A&E)-I, Prayagraj, has stood frozen for nearly thirty-three months. During the same period the Applicant has been in continuous, secure, pensionable employment in a nationalised bank in his own neighbourhood in Delhi. A person with a benchmark disability who might have filled that vacancy has been kept out of it.

6. Analysis

6.1

The primary relief sought by the applicant refers to the responsibilities of the respondents to discharge their function as per statutory provisions contained in the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The applicant has specifically drawn the attention of the Tribunal to the statutory provisions contained under Section 20(2) of the said Act. For better appreciation, the said Section is extracted below:

“20.

(1) No Government establishment shall discriminate against any person with disability in any matter relating to employment:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.

(2)

Every Government establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free and conducive environment to employees with disability.

(3)

No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability.

(4)

No Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his or her service:

Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(5)

The appropriate Government may frame policies for posting and transfer of employees with disabilities.”

6.2

A bare reading of Section 20(2) shows that it specifically mentions “employees with disability”, which implies a person first has to be an employee to invoke the statutory provision contained under Section 20(2). In the instant case, the applicant who is yet to become an employee wants to invoke the underlying statutory provision to get special treatment in the form of getting “employment linked to a specific station”. It is different matter that the posting sought by the applicant at particular location does not exist at all.

6.3

Learned counsel for the Respondents No. 2 to 4, referring to paragraph 4.20 of the counter affidavits filed by the said respondents has categorically stated that The Indian Audit and Accounts Department does not have any establishment or Office pertaining to Accounts & Entitlement (A&E) wing of the Department. The post of Accountant to which the applicant was selected exists only in A&E Offices. The National Capital Territory of Delhi’s accounts are not compiled by the Indian Audit & Accounts Department. When the applicant wants to be posted in Delhi, it amounts to four onerous tasks which comprise (i) creation of an A&E office at Delhi, (ii) sanctioning various cadres pertaining to accounting staff, (iii) create/sanction posts and (iv) budget for it. All these functions are beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, being part of the policy decision by executive and associated functions of the legislation (budgeting etc).

6.3

Under such circumstances, it would be appropriate to delve into case laws which have interpreted or expanded the scope of the statutory provisions under the said PwD Act, 2016.The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, as has been detailed under the contention of the applicant and the submissions by the learned counsel for the applicant mostly refer to situations/employees post-employment or transfers, except one judgment pertaining to Net Ram Yadav (supra) case. The Anju Mehra (supra) and the IRCON Infrastructure (supra) cases pertain to transfer of a serving employee. The Vikash Kumar (supra) case pertains to the request of the petitioner for allowing a writer as the petitioner was suffering from writer’s cramp. In Ravindra Kumar Dhariwal (supra) case, the issue was seniority of a mentally handicapped employee. In Sudhanshu Kardam (supra) case, it was the case of ineligibility of PwD candidate by the recruiting agency stating that petitioner was not eligible for the post of Auditor because of disability. The Apex Court granted relief and directed the administrative authorities to create supernumerary post, if the post has already been filled up. In the instant case, the applicant was duly selected under the Pwd (UR) category. Hence, this case is also distinguished as the facts and circumstances in the instant case are at variance with those obtaining in Sudhanshu Kardam (supra) case.

6.4

The only case which has initial appointment is Net Ram Yadav (supra) case. Again, the distinguishing factor in that case is that there were posts available at the locations sought by the PwD candidate. As it has been clearly demonstrated by the learned counsel for the Respondents, in the instant case, there is no Office of the Accounts & Entitlement Wing of the Indian Audit & Accounts Department at Delhi. Hence, the Net Ram Yadav’s case also does not help the applicant.

6.5

The applicant gave four preferences for his posting as Accountant with the Respondent Organisation i.e. Offices of the Accounts & Entitlement Wing of the Indian Audit & Accounts Department. His first preference was Haryana which could not be accommodated as other candidates having better merit have been accommodated there. Again, Haryana is not Delhi for which the applicant has sought relief. The concerned Respondents have offered the applicant his Second preference i.e. UP and accordingly offered his posting as accountant in Office of the Accounts & Entitlement Wing of the Indian Audit & Accounts Department at Prayagraj. In view of this we do not find any irregularity or illegality committed by the respondents in this respect.

6.6

As we have analysed, the respondents including Respondent no.1 have complied with the provisions of the Rights of Persons with disability Act, 2016, the relief sought by the applicant invoking the statutory provisions of this Act is farfetched and not permissible under law. It is different matter that the applicant is already employed as Single Window Operator in Punjab National Bank at Delhi.

7. Conclusion

7.1

In view of the above analysis, the present original application lacks merit and hence is dismissed.

8.

No order as to costs.

9.

Pending MAs, if any, shall also stand disposed of.