Anil Kumar vs State of Bihar

Heard the parties.

The present quashing petition has been preferred to quash the cognizance order dated 24.07.2017 passed in Hayaghat P.S. Case No. 02/2016, where learned ACJM, Darbhanga took cognizance for the offence punishable under Sections 341, 323, 307 and 504/34 of the IPC against the petitioner.

Matter is of the year 2016.

The prosecution case, in brief, is that informant, Dunnilal Mandal, recorded his fardbeyan on 30.12.2015, alleging, inter alia, that while he was sitting in his courtyard, Ganga Mandal, Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar, armed with deadly weapons, entered into his courtyard. It is alleged that Ganga Mandal exhorted others to kill the informant, whereupon Anil Kumar assaulted him on the head with a farsa, causing him to fell down. Thereafter, Ganga Mandal allegedly assaulted the informant with a farsa while he was lying on the ground, causing an injury to his head. On hearing the alarm, the informant's wife came to his rescue, whereupon Sunil Kumar allegedly pointed a pistol at her and snatched her golden locket. It is further alleged that Ganga Mandal took away a briefcase containing necessary documents.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that without entering into the merits of the case, the matter between the parties has now undergone a complete change in its circumstances. It is submitted that, with the intervention of common relatives, friends and well-wishers of both sides, the parties have arrived at a family compromise and good relations have been restored between them.

It is further submitted that the aforesaid compromise was initially arrived between the parties outside the Court, whereafter the parties have also taken a further step by filing a formal compromise petition before the learned court below. It is submitted that the said compromise petition has been duly signed by the informant as well as the accused persons and their respective learned counsel.

Learned counsel further submitted that in view of the aforesaid settlement, the informant does not want to proceed with the criminal case any further and the prosecution also does not intend to lead evidence in support of the case. It is, therefore, submitted that continuation of the criminal proceeding, particularly in view of the subsequent settlement between the parties, would serve no purpose and would amount to abuse of the process of law.

Learned counsel has also drawn attention of this Court towards the second compromise petition, filed before the court below, wherein the parties have categorically stated that all disputes between them have been patched up and good feelings have been restored. It is further stated therein that the compromise has been entered into according to the free will of both parties and without any threat or coercion.

It is submitted that a separate petition seeking permission to compromise has also been filed by the informant, thereby demonstrating that the settlement is not merely a unilateral assertion on behalf of the petitioner, but has been consciously accepted by the informant also.

In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Naushey Ali and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292, particularly with regard to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in case where Section 307 IPC is also alleged.

Learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Shamsher Singh, 2025 INSC 503, with regard to the circumstances in which the nature of injury, weapon and intention/knowledge are relevant for determining the applicability of Section 307 IPC.

Learned APP appearing for the State, having regard to the subsequent development and the compromise arrived at between the parties, has opposed the prayer only on the ground that some of the offences alleged are non-compoundable in nature.

This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

At the outset, it would be apposite to take note of the legal position regarding exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of non-compoundable offences where the parties have settled their dispute.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali Case (supra), while considering the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in a case involving, inter alia, Section 307 IPC, noticed the principles laid down in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, [(2019) 5 SCC 688] & Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, [(2014) 6 SCC 466].

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, noticed that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences can be exercised where the dispute is overwhelmingly and predominantly of a civil, private, matrimonial or family character and the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves. At the same time, the Court has cautioned that such power should not ordinarily be exercised in respect of heinous and serious offences having a serious impact upon society.

So far as Section 307 IPC is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali Case (supra) has further clarified that the High Court should not rest its decision merely because Section 307 IPC finds mention in the FIR or charge-sheet. After investigation, the Court can examine the nature of injury, whether the injury was caused on vital or delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapon used and other surrounding circumstances, for determining whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is supported by sufficient material.

The aforesaid principle assumes relevance in the present case, as the investigation has already concluded and the material brought on record indicates that the petitioner was not sent up by the police for trial. The medical material relied upon by the petitioner also records simple injury.

At this juncture, this Court is also conscious of the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court through Shamsher Singh Case (supra). In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that for attracting Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the hurt caused must necessarily be grievous; what is required is proof of the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death. In that case, the accused had fired an AK-47 service weapon, resulting in four grievous injuries, and the circumstances clearly demonstrated the requisite intention.

The ratio of Shamsher Singh Case (supra), therefore, requires the Court to examine the surrounding circumstances rather than proceeding merely on the nature of injury. In the present case, however, the factual circumstances are materially different. Here, the medical material indicates simple injury; the petitioner was not sent up by the investigating agency; and, more importantly, the parties have subsequently resolved their entire dispute through two successive stages of settlement.

Thus, this Court is not proceeding on the premise that Section 307 IPC would stand excluded merely because the injury is simple. Rather, the question before this Court is whether, having regard to the entire factual matrix, the materials collected during investigation and the subsequent voluntary settlement between the parties, continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner would serve any useful purpose.

From the record, this Court finds that the parties have settled their dispute in two distinct stages.

Firstly, with the intervention of common relatives, friends and well-wishers of both sides, a family compromise was arrived at between the parties. The material placed on record specifically states that good relations between the parties have been restored and that the informant does not now want to proceed with the matter.

Secondly, the parties thereafter placed their settlement before the court below by filing a formal compromise petition, duly signed by the informant, the accused persons and their respective learned counsel. The said compromise records that the disputes between the parties have been patched up, good feelings have been restored and the parties do not want to proceed with the case any further.

The second compromise is of particular significance because the parties have not merely stated before this Court that the matter has been settled. They have also taken a formal step before the court below, where the compromise has been reduced into writing and the informant has filed a separate petition seeking permission to compromise.

The record, therefore, demonstrates a consistent course of conduct on the part of the parties. The first compromise resulted in restoration of their relationship and the second compromise represents the formal affirmation of the same settlement before the Court.

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that the dispute has essentially remained personal in nature and the parties themselves have chosen to bury their differences. The informant no longer desires to pursue the prosecution and there is no material before this Court to suggest that continuation of the prosecution would advance any overriding public interest.

It is also relevant that the occurrence is of the year 2015, whereas the cognizance order was passed in the year 2017. The parties have now, after passage of considerable time, voluntarily resolved their differences. The continuation of the proceeding, despite the two settlements, would consequently only prolong a dispute which the parties themselves have chosen to bring to an end.

In Naushey Ali Case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with allegations including Section 307 IPC, ultimately examined the nature of the weapon and injury and found that, on the facts of that case, the offence did not fall in category of cases where relief should be denied despite settlement. The Court thereafter gave effect to the settlement between the parties.

The present case also deserves consideration in the aforesaid factual and legal background. This Court has not overlooked the allegation under Section 307 IPC. Rather, after taking into consideration the nature of injury, the result of investigation, the fact that petitioner was not sent up by the police, and most importantly two successive compromises entered between the parties, this Court finds that continuation of the proceeding against the petitioner would not serve any meaningful purpose.

The inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is intended to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The same is required to be exercised carefully and not mechanically. In the present case, the subsequent conduct of the parties, their voluntary settlement and restoration of cordial relations, read with the material collected during investigation, persuade this Court that the continuation of the criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.

Accordingly, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the two compromises entered into between the parties, the nature of the injury, the result of investigation and the stand of the informant, this Court is of the considered opinion that the criminal proceeding against the petitioner deserves to be brought to an end to secure the ends of justice.

Accordingly, by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in Naushey Ali Case (supra) & Shamsher Singh Case (supra), impugned order dated 24.07.2017 as passed by the learned A.C.J.M., Darbhanga in Hayaghat P.S. Case No. 02 of 2016, G.R. No. 70 of 2016, alongwith all its entire consequential criminal proceeding qua the petitioner is hereby quashed/set-aside, to secure the ends of justice.

It is made clear that the present order is confined to the petitioner and shall not affect the criminal proceeding, if any, against the other accused persons.

Hence, this application stands allowed.

TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment.