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Judgment
(1) The petitioner who is carrying on a small-scale electro-plating industry has filed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the
order of the Government of Madras passed in G.O. Ms. No. 3825, Department of Industries, Labour and Co-operation, dated 16-7-1965
directing the petitioner to place the portion of the premises No. 304-A, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras, occupied by it at the disposal of the
Chingleput District Co-operative. Supply and Marketing Society Ltd., within three months of the date of the order. The impugned order has been
passed by the Government, the first respondent herein, in exercise of their powers conferred by sub-section (1) of S. 29 of the Defence of India
Act as they were of opinion that it was necessary to requisition the said premises for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the
community, namely, for the improvement of the consumer activities by the said society, the second respondent herein.
(2) The Chingleput District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Ltd., is registered as a Co-operative Society under Madras Act 6 of
1932. The objects of the Society, among other things, are to purchase the necessaries of life for distribution among the affiliated stores and
societies, to open depots or branches for wholesale stocking and distribution, to rent or own godowns within its jurisdiction and elsewhere, if
necessary to facilitate the storage and sale of agricultural and other produce belonging to it, its members and the members of its affiliated societies,
to act as agent of those members which are affiliated societies in the matter of receiving for sale custody the produce pledged with such societies
by their individual members, and to act as agent of Government for procurement, supply and distribution of agricultural and other produce or other
goods.
(3) The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras, by his letter dated 16-6-1962, addressed to the second respondent-society, informed the
Society that provision had been made in the Third Five-Year Plan for State contribution in the share capital of District Co-operative Supply and
Marketing Societies for the establishment of rice mills, and that for the year 1962-63, it was proposed to provide assistance to the second
respondent society, among others. The Society was asked to send proposals with plans and estimates. The second respondent. Society who
wanted to implement the scheme of marketing of agricultural produce, under which the Society purchased heavy stock of paddy, converted them
into rice and sold the rice in the City and who was in search of a suitable godown, came across the property in question, and took up the matter
with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies permitted the Society to purchase the building and land in
304-A. Thiruvottiyur High Road, for the purpose. The Society purchased the property on 23-6-1963 for Rs. 2,75,000 from one Remasami
Mudaliar. At the time when the second respondent purchased the property, various tenants were occupying portions of the property, and the
petitioner was one among them. The petitioner was carrying on business in the premises for the last 20 years paying a rent of Rs. 250 per month.
Premises No. 304-A. Thiruvottiyur High Road, comprises about 50 grounds whereof 14 grounds are roofed sheds and the remaining are open
spaces with a well. The second respondent-Society occupied a portion of the premises and began to take proceedings for the eviction of the
tenants, in order to enable them to stock rice and other food-grains and fertilisers under the scheme for the stabilisation of prices. Some of the
tenants vacated the premises, but the petitioner insisted upon continuing in the premises, as it had invested huge sums of money in acquiring and
installing machinery, for the purpose of carrying on its business, It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the expenses of
removing and installing the said machinery would amount to above Rs. 25,000, that it would be impossible to find suitable location elsewhere, and
that the reputation and custom acquired by the present location would thereby be irretrievably lost. It is also alleged in the affidavit that in order to
coerce the petitioner to quit the premises. The second respondent took proceedings under the Rent Control Act for eviction of the petitioner from
the portion occupied by it, on the ground that the Society required that portion for its bona fide occupation. The petitioner resisted that application
contending that there were several rooms in the premises which the Society could make use of for its work and business. The petition under the
Rent Control Act was filed in February 1964. The counter to the petition was filed in April 1964. It appears that during this period a
communication was received by the State Government from the Government of India that the Consumers'' Co-operative Stores were experiencing
great difficulties in getting suitable accommodation and that with a view to solve the difficulty, action could be taken under the Defence of India
Act, to requisition premises for providing accommodation, if and when persuasive methods failed. Naturally, taking advantage of this
communication, the second respondent-Society corresponded with the State Government, the first respondent herein, which eventually ended in
the passing of the order, which is impugned in this petition. It is alleged in the petition that the first respondent to maliciously invoke the
extraordinary provisions under the Defence of India Act, and the rules made thereunder, which could be exercised only to meet special and
temporary emergencies. It is further alleged that the resort to these powers by the respondents constitutes abuse of such a power vested in the first
respondent.
(4) It is contended for the second respondent, that the said power was exercised by the first respondent in the interests of the public, to secure
proper and equitable distribution of essential commodities by a Central agency, and that the order of the Government has been issued after
satisfying itself about the dire necessity and urgency, and having regard to the acute food problem existing in the country.
(5) On behalf of the Government, it is contended that the Government passed the impugned order only after careful consideration of all the
materials before it. It is stated that the exercise of the power under the Defence of India Act is bona fide, besides the fact that it is a fit and proper
case warranting the exercise of the power, in view of the gravity of the food problem and the public purpose that is sought to be served, viz., the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.
(6) It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the rent control petition was finally withdrawn by the second respondent. According to the
petitioner, this conduct of the second respondent, taken along with the action of the first respondent in issuing the impugned order would go to
show that the first respondent-Government of Madras was influenced by the second respondent-Society and this ultimately ended in invoking
maliciously the extraordinary powers vested in the Government under the Defence of India Act.
(7) The question, therefore, for consideration in this writ petition is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the resort to the special powers under
the Defence of India Act by the first respondent would amount to a mala fide use of such a power or abuse of such a power. Learned counsel for
the petitioner contends that the requisitioning is not for the State Government but for the land-owner, i.e., the Society, which has not been able to
get possession of the building in the normal course. Having filed a petition under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, invoking the
provisions of that Act for getting the portion occupied by the petitioner for the society''s additional occupation, the Society should have pursued the
proceeding. Instead, the Society made the Government exploit the provisions of the Defence of India Act, in order to enable the society to get
possession of the portion of the premises for its purpose.
(8) No doubt, the contention advanced on behalf of the tenant-petitioner appears to be impressive. Still, we have to consider whether the State
can requisition the building for the Society under the provisions of the Defence of India Act, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the
life of the community. The Society owns the building. The Society is a statutory body. It is not a private institution or person. The main object of
the Society is to purchase paddy, mill it into rice and store it in its godown, in order to maintain regular supply of rice to consumer and other
societies, and to act as agent of Government for procurement, supply and distribution of agricultural and other produce. The State Government in
the best interests of the public, is devising various ways and means of maintaining a continuous supply of foodgrains to the societies who cater to
the needs of the public. The second respondent is one such society. It is the duty of the Government to come forward and help the Society in
getting their own building under their full control. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot complain that the requisitioning is not for the State
but for the Society.
(9) In Satpal Chopra Vs. State of Punjab and Another, the question for consideration was whether the requisition of house for residence of the
wife of a serving Military officer was within the ambit of S. 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962. The wife of the Military officer approached the
Government stating that, since her marriage, her husband had been posted on field duties at non-family stations and overseas, that she had no place
to stay as her husband''s house was occupied by the tenant, and accordingly prayed that the house might be got vacated for her residence. Her
husband had also sent a similar petition. When the tenant failed to vacate it, the District Magistrate requisitioned the house in the interest of
affording bare essential amenities to the wife of a serving Military officer. When the tenant questioned the act of the State in a writ proceeding, it
was observed at p. 237:
......... if the wife of an officer serving on the field or overseas, is without living accommodation, this fact is bound to distract his attention and
weigh over his mind, as a result of which, human nature being what it is, he would not be able to discharge his duties as efficiently as he would if
such a distraction and weight over his mind were not there.............. To put it in other words, in order to bring the best out of a member of the
Defence services, it is essential that he should be in proper frame of mind which would hardly be the case if he is conscious of the fact that his wife
is stranded for want of living accommodation.
In case an order is made with a view to afford that essential amenity to the wife of the serving officer, it is bound to bring him solace and peace of
mind and this fact must, as such, be conducive to greater efficiency on the part of the officer............ In the circumstances the impugned order for
requisition of the house in question falls within the ambit of S. 29 of The Defence of India Act.................
Following that reasoning, it can be said here that in order to enable the Society to discharge its obligations and responsibilities to its affiliated
societies and the State, the State can requisition the building belonging to the Society invoking the provisions of the Defence of India act.
(10) But learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that, even assuming that the State Government can invoke the provisions of the Defence
of India Act for requisitioning the building in question, still the authority acting in pursuance of the act should interfere with the ordinary avocations
of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence of the
country. In Tan Bug Taim Vs. Collector of Bombay, , requisitioning of immovable property was made under rule 75-A of the Defence of India
Act, 1939, which is analogous to the present Sec. 29 of the 1962 Act. It was contended by the tenant that R. 75-A was ultra vires the powers of
the Central Legislature. It was further contended that even if R. 75-A was not ultra vires, the order of requisition is illegal, void and inoperative in
law as interfering with ordinary avocations of life and enjoyment of property. The learned Judge of the Bombay High Court held that the enactment
of S. 2(2)(xxiv) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and Rule 75-A is ultra vires in the absence of a public notification under S. 104 of the
Government of India Act. It was also held that the requisition order which directed eviction forthwith was illegal, void and inoperative in law as
contravening the provisions of S. 15 of the said Act (analogous to S. 44 of the 1962 Act) which directs that the authority shall interfere with
ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest
and defence of the country. But in the present case the impugned order has given three months'' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. As
observed in the above case, the petitioner here too may apply for compensation, if he is so advised. Further, even if the petitioner is compelled to
remove the machinery and deliver possession of the premises under his occupation under the provisions of the Defence of India Act, still he would
be entitled to maintain the relationship of landlord and tenant. The petitioner is merely asked to place the portion occupied by it at the disposal of
the second respondent Society. In Tarabai Jivanlal Parekh Vs. Lala Padamchand, , it is observed that an order under Rule 75(a) of the Defence of
India Rules, 1939, requisitioning a flat is essentially of a temporary nature and does not create in the Government any vested interest in the tenancy
that it does not affect the relationship of landlord and tenant or extinguish the vested tenancy in the tenant and that it does not also operate as
surrender so as to terminate the tenancy. Applying the principle noted above, it can be said here too that even though the tenant has been asked to
place the premises at the disposal of the Society, still it can work out its rights after the termination of the emergency.
(11) Another contention put forward by the petitioner is that the order is actuated with mala fide intention, that the order is made at the instance of
the Society and that the Society has influenced the Government to issue the order it did. From the correspondence that passed between the
Government and the Society, it is seen that the Society moved the Government to act under the Defence of India Act to requisition premises, for
providing accommodation to Consumer Co-operative Stores. The Society, therefore, in its anxiety to get possession of their building, wanted the
State Government to invoke their powers under the Defence of India Act. Under these circumstances, I do not see any mala fides on the part of
the Government, in invoking the said powers and issuing the order impugned in this writ proceeding, for maintaining supplies and services essential
to the life of the community. It is observed in Jute and Gunny Brokers Ltd. and Another Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, , that in the
absence of mala fides, the opinion of the Government is final and the purpose indicated by it in the orders for making requisitions is one of the
purposes for which an order of requisition can be made. Therefore, once it is found that the impugned order is not vitiated by male fides, then it is
not open to the Court to go into the matter of the correctness of the opinion formed and expressed by competent authority.
(12) For the reasons above mentioned, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.
(13) The petitioner has been carrying on business in the premises for the last 20 years. Further, the petitioner has installed heavy machinery in the
premises. It is stated that it would be impossible to find suitable accommodation elsewhere and that the reputation and custom acquired by the
present location would also be lost if it is asked to place the premises at the disposal of the Society. Under these circumstances, it is but proper
that some reasonable time should be given to the petitioner to shift from that portion. I, therefore, direct the petitioner to place the portion occupied
by it at the disposal of the second respondent-Society within three months from the date of this judgment.
(14) VGW/D.V.C.
(15) Petition dismissed.