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Judgment
T. Venkatadri, J.—The petitioner who is carrying on a small scale Electroplating Industry has filed this petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution to quash the order of the Government of Madras passed in G.O.Ms. No. 3825, Department of Industries, Labour and Co-operation,
dated 16th July, 1965 directing the petitioner to place the portion of the premises 304-A, Thiruvottiyur High Road, Madras, occupied by it at the
disposal of the Chingleput District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Limited within three months of the date of the order. The
impugned order had been passed by the Government, the first respondent herein in exercise of their powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of
Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, as they were of opinion that it was necessary to requisition the said premises for maintaining supplies and
services essential to the life of the community, namely, for the improvement of the consumer activities by the said society, the second respondent
herein.
The Chingleput District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society, Limited is registered as a Co-operative Society under Madras Act VI of
1932. The objects of the Society, among other things, are to purchase the necessaries of life for distribution among the affiliated stores and
societies, to open depots or branches for wholesale stocking and distribution, to rent or own godowns within its jurisdiction and elsewhere, if
necessary, to facilitate the storage and sale of agricultural and other produce belonging to it, its members and the members of its affiliated societies,
to act as agent of those members which are affiliated Societies in the matter of receiving for safe custody the produce pledged to such societies by
their individual members, and to act as agent of Government for procurement, supply and distribution of agricultural and other produce or other
goods.
The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras, by his letter dated 16th June, 1962, addressed to the Second Respondent Society, informed
the society that provision had been made in the Third Five Year Plan for State contribution in the share capital of District Co-operative Supply and
Marketing Societies for the establishment of rice mills, and that for the year 1962-63 it was proposed to provide assistance to the second
respondent Society, among others.
The Society was asked to send proposals with plans and estimates. The second respondent society, who wanted to implement the scheme of
marketing of agricultural produce, under which the Society purchased heavy stock of paddy, converted them into rice and sold the rice in the City
and who was in search of a suitable godown, came across the property in question, and took up the matter with the Registrar of Co-operative
Societies. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies permitted the Society to purchase the building and land in 304-A, Thiruvottiyur High Road for
the purpose. The Society purchased the property on 23rd June, 1963, for Rs. 2,75,000 from one Ramasami Mudaliar. At the time when the
second respondent purchased the property, various tenants were occupying portions of the property, and the petitioner was one among them. The
petitioner was carrying on business in the premises for the last 20 years paying a rent of Rs. 250 per month.
Premises No. 304-A, Thiruvottiyur High Road comprises about 50 grounds where of 14 grounds are roofed sheds and the remaining are open
spaces with a well. The second respondent Society occupied a portion of the premises and began to take proceedings for the eviction of the
tenants in order to enable them to stock rice and other foodgrains and fertilisers, under the scheme for the stabilisation of prices. Some of the
tenants vacated the premises, but the petitioner insisted upon continuing in the premises, as it had invested huge sums of money in acquiring and
installing machinery, for the purpose of carrying on its business. It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the expenses of
removing and installing the said machinery would amount to about Rs. 25,000 that it would be impossible to find suitable location elsewhere, and
that the reputation and custom acquired by the present location would thereby be irretrivably lost. It is also alleged in the affidavit that in order to
coerce the petitioner to quit the premises, the Society cut off electricity supply. In this petition it is unnecessary to consider, who was responsible
for the cutting off of electricity supply to the petitioner''s premises. The second respondent took proceedings under the Rent Control Act, for
eviction of the petitioner from the portion occupied by it, on the ground that the Society required that portion for its bona fide occupation. The
petitioner resisted that application contending that there were several rooms in the premises which the Society could make use of for its work and
business. The petition under the Rent Control Act was filed in February, 1964. The counter to the petition was filed in April, 1964. It appears that
during this period a communication was received by the State Government from the Government of India that the Consumers'' Co-operative
Stores were experiencing great difficulties in getting suitable accommodation and that with a view to solve the difficulty, action could be taken
under the Defence of India Act to requisition premises for providing accommodation, if and when pursuasive methods failed. Naturally, taking
advantage of this communication, the second respondent society corresponded with the State Government, the first Respondent herein, which
eventually ended in the passing of the order, which is impugned in this petition. It is alleged in the petition that the first respondent was influenced by
the second respondent to maliciously invoke the extraordinary provisions under the Defence of India Act and Rules made thereunder, which could
be exercised only to meet special and temporary emergencies. It is further alleged that the resort to those powers by the respondent constitutes
abuse of such a power vested in the first respondent.
It is contended that for the second respondent that the said power was exercised by the first respondent in the interests of the public, to secure
proper and equitable distribution of essential commodities by central agency, and that the order of the Government has been issued after satisfying
itself about the dire necessity and urgency, and having regard to the acute food problem existing in the country.
On behalf of the Government, it is contended that the Government passed the impugned order only after careful consideration of all the materials
before it. It is stated that the exercise of the power under the Defence of India Act is bona fide besides the fact that it is a fit and proper case
warranting the exercise of the power, in view of the gravity of the food problem and the public purpose that is sought to be served, viz., the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the rent control petition was finally withdrawn by the second respondent. According to the
petitioner this conduct of the second respondent, taken along with the action of the first respondent in issuing the impugned order, would go to
show that the first respondent-Government of Madras was influenced by the second respondent-Society and this ultimately ended in invoking
maliciously the extraordinary powers vested in the Government under the Defence of India Act.
The question, therefore, for consideration in this writ petition is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the resort to the special powers under
the Defence of India Act by the first respondent would amount to a mala fide use of such a power or abuse of such a power.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the requisitioning is not for the State Government but for the land-owner, i.e., the Society,
which has not been able to get possession of the building in the normal course. Having filed a petition under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent)
Control Act, invoking the provisions of that Act for getting the portion occupied by the petitioner for the Society''s additional occupation, the
Society should have pursued the proceeding. Instead the Society made the Government exploit the provisions of the Defence of India Act, in order
to enable the Society to get possession of the portion of the premises for its purpose.
No doubt, the contention advanced on behalf of the tenant-petitioner appears to be impressive. Still, we have to consider whether the State
can requisition the building for the Society, under the provisions of the Defence of India Act, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the
life of the community. The Society owns the building. The Society is a statutory body. It is not a private institution or person. The main object of
the Society is to purchase paddy, mill it into rice and store it in its godown, in order to maintain regular supply of rice to consumer and other
societies, and to act as agent of Government for procurement, supply and distribution of agricultural and other produce. The State Government, in
the best interests of the public, is devising various ways and means maintaining a continuous supply of foodgrains to the Societies who cater to the
needs of the public. The second respondent is one such society. It is the duty of the Government to come forward and help the Society in getting
their own building under their full control. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot complain that the requisitioning is not for the State but for
the Society.
In Satpal Chopra Vs. State of Punjab and Another, , the question for consideration was whether the requisition of house for residence of the
wife of a Serving Military Officer was within the ambit of Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962. The wife of the Military Officer
approached the Government stating that, since her marriage, her husband had been posted on field duties at non-family stations and overseas, that
she had no place to stay as her husband''s house was occupied by the tenant, and accordingly prayed that the house might be got vacated for her
residence. Her husband had also sent a similar petition. When the tenant failed to vacate it, the District Magistrate requisitioned the house in the
interest of affording bare essential amenities to the wife of a Serving Military Officer. When the tenant questioned the act of the State in a writ
proceeding, it was observed (at page 237):
...If the wife of an officer serving on the field or overseas, is without living accommodation, this fact is bound to distract his attention and weigh
over his mind, as a result of which human nature being what it is, he would not be able to discharge his duties as efficiently as he would if such a
distraction and weight over his mind were not there... To put it in other words, in order to bring the best out of a member of the defence services, it
is essential that he should be in proper frame of mind which would hardly be the case if he is conscious of the fact that his wife is stranded for want
of living accommodation.
In case an order is made with a view to afford that essential amenity to the wife of the serving officer, it is bound to bring him solace and peace of
mind and this fact must, as such, be conducive to greater efficiency on the part of the officer... In the circumstances the impugned order for
requisition of the house in question falls within the ambit of Section 29 of the Defence of India Act...
Following that reasoning, it can be said here that, in order to enable the Society to discharge its obligations and responsibilities to its affiliated
societies and the State, the State can requisition the building belonging to the Society invoking the provisions of the Defence of India Act.
But learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that, even assuming that the State Government can invoke the provisions of the Defence
of India Act for requisitioning the building in question, still the authority acting in pursuance of the Act should interfere with the ordinary avocations
of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence of the
country. In Tan Bug Taim Vs. Collector of Bombay, , requisitioning of Immovable property was made under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India
Act, 1939, which is analogous to the present Section 29 of the 1962 Act. It was contended by the tenant that Rule 75-A was ultra vires the power
of the Central Legislature. It was further contended that even if Rule 75-A was not ultra vires, the order of requisition was illegal, void and
inoperative in law as interfering with ordinary avocations of life and enjoyment of property. The learned Judge of the Bombay High Court held that
the enactment of Section 2(2)(xxiv) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and Rule 75-A is ultra vires in the absence of a public notification u/s 104 of
the Government of India Act. It was also held that the requisition order which directed eviction forth with was illegal, void and inoperative in law as
contravening the provisions of Section 15 of the said Act (analogous) to (section 44 of the 1962 Act) which directs that the authority shall interfere
with ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and
interest and defence of the country. But in the present case, the impugned order has given three months'' time to the petitioner to vacate the
premises. As observed in the above case, the petitioner here too may apply for compensation, if he is so advised. Further even if the petitioner is
compelled to remove the machinery and deliver possession of the premises under his occupation under the provisions of the Defence of India Act,
still he would be entitled to maintain the relationship of landlord and tenant. The petitioner is merely asked to place the portion occupied by it at the
disposal of the second respondent-Society. In Tarabai Jivanlal Parekh Vs. Lala Padamchand, , it is observed that an order under Rule 75(a) of the
Defence of India Rules, 1939, requisitioning a flat is essentially of a temporary nature and does not create in the Government any vested interest in
the tenancy, that it does not affect the relationship of landlord and tenant or extinguish the vested tenancy in the tenant and that it does not also
operate as surrender so as to terminate the tenancy. Applying the principle noted above, it can be said here too that even though the tenant has
been asked to place the premises at the disposal of the Society, still it can work out its rights after the termination of the emergency.
Another contention put forward by the petitioner is that the order is actuated by mala fide intention, that the order is made at the instance of the
Society, and that the society has influenced the Government to issue the order it did. From the correspondence that passed between the
Government and the Society, it is seen that the Society moved the Government to act under the Defence of India Act, to achieve their object of
getting possession of the building. But it is seen that the Central Government has also issued a communication to the State Government directing it
to take action under the Defence of India Act to requisition premises for providing accommodation to the Consumer Co-operative Stores. The
Society, therefore in its anxiety to get possession of their building, wanted the State Government to invoke their powers under the Defence of India
Act. Under those circumstances, I do not see any mala fide on the part of the Government, in invoking the said powers and issuing the order
impugned in this writ proceeding, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It is observed in Jute and Gunny
Brokers Ltd. and Another Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, , that in the absence of mala fides, the opinion of the Government is final and
the purpose indicated by it in the orders for making requisitions is one of the purposes for which an order of requisition can be made. Therefore,
once it is found that the impugned order is not vitiated by mala fides, then it is not open to the Court to go into the matter of correctness of the
opinion formed and expressed by competent authority.
For the reasons above-mentioned, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
The petitioner has been carrying on business in the premises for the last 20 years. Further, the petitioner has installed heavy machinery in the
premises. It is stated, that it would be impossible to find suitable accommodation elsewhere and that the reputation and custom acquired by the
present location would also be lost if it is asked to place the premises at the disposal of the Society. Under these circumstances it is but proper that
some reasonable time should be given to the petitioner to shift from that portion. I, therefore, direct the petitioner to place the portion occupied by
it at the disposal of the second respondent-society within three months from the date of this Judgment.