Anand Katiyar & Ors. vs Union Of India & Ors.

Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)

In the present Original Application (O.A.) filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicants seek the following reliefs:-

The sum and substance of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the applicants is that the applicants are seeking age relaxation beyond the prescribed upper age limit of 35 years. The applicants have also challenged the aforesaid age limit and have sought relaxation thereof, on a one-time basis, pursuant to Advertisement No. 11/2026 issued by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) inviting applications for appointment to the posts of Assistant Public Prosecutor against Vacancy No.26091106212.

Learned counsel for the applicants further draws our attention to the order passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1633/2022, wherein, according to him, the issue relating to the prescribed age limit and the power to grant age relaxation had been considered. Learned counsel submits that the contentions raised in the said proceedings were dealt with in detail in the relevant paragraphs of the order dated 06.03.2024 passed in O.A. No. 1631/2022, which read as under:

Learned counsel submits that the applicants are essentially aggrieved by the prescription of the upper age limit and the consequent denial of their candidature on account of age.

Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that despite the vacancies having arisen in the year 2025, and despite the earlier recruitment having already been advertised and thereafter cancelled, the respondents did not issue the fresh advertisement immediately. However, the respondents took approximately 07 months for the same post, ultimately resulting in the issuance of Advertisement No. 11/2026 by the Union Public Service Commission on 12.09.2026 for the post in question.

Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that the issue has to be considered in the context of the relevant Recruitment Rules and the power vested in the competent authority to relax the prescribed age limit. He particularly draws our attention to Rule 6 of the Notification dated 19.01.2026, which reads as under:

Learned counsel further submits that the last date for submission of applications for the post in question is 02.10.2026. It is contended that, if the applicants are not permitted to participate in the selection process at this stage, they would lose the opportunity of participating in the examination and, even if they ultimately succeed in the present proceedings, the relief sought by them may become infructuous.

It is further submitted that no prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the applicants are permitted, provisionally, to participate in the selection process, without creation of any vested right in their favour. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the applicants may be permitted to participate provisionally, subject to the decision regarding grant of age relaxation by the competent authority.

Opposing the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the applicants are over the prescribed age limit. It is further submitted that the prescription of the age limit under the applicable Recruitment Rules cannot be interfered with at this stage.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. Without entering into the merits of the controversy at this stage, we notice that the power to grant relaxation in the prescribed age limit is vested with the competent authority under the applicable Recruitment Rules. The applicants have specifically drawn our attention to Rule 6 thereof, which confers power upon the Government to relax any of the provisions of the Rules, subject to the conditions stipulated therein.

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we deem it appropriate to leave the issue of grant of age relaxation to be considered by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable Rules. The competent authority shall take a holistic view of the matter and take a decision on the applicants' request for grant of age relaxation within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, after taking into consideration the relevant Recruitment Rules, the power of relaxation contained therein and the facts and circumstances of the present case.

In American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396, Lord Diplock opined that "The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial."

In Zenit Mataplast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 388 explained that an interim order is intended to protect the subject matter of the proceedings until disposal of the case, so that the ultimate relief, if the party succeeds, is not rendered meaningless.

In Dr Hedgewar Smruti Rugna Seva Mandal [(2017) 13 SCC 115], the Apex Court noticed its earlier decision in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust [(2000) 5 SCC 57], wherein it was stated that normally the court would hesitate to interfere with an interlocutory order, but was compelled to do so where prima facie it appeared that such an order could not be justified by any judicial standard; the ends of justice and the need to maintain judicial discipline required the court to do so and to indicate the reasons for such interference. The Apex Court adverted to the aspects of passing of orders relating to provisional admission, after quoting a passage from Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow [(1984) 1 SCC 307] which reads thus; "8. ... That whenever a writ petition is filed, provisional admission should not be given as a matter of course on the petition being admitted unless the court is fully satisfied that the petitioner has a cast-iron case which is bound to succeed, or the error is so gross or apparent that no other conclusion is possible."

In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1, the court's reluctance to decide difficult questions of law or fact at the interlocutory stage. In the appeal preferred by the complainant against the failure of the Commission to pass orders on the other three elements of the advertisement, it was observed that “in our view at this stage cannot be entertained and we record our concurrence with the finding of the Commission that without going through the evidence, it is neither feasible not proper in any event to pass any orders thereon at this juncture. We are dismayed however by the fact that after recording a finding on that score as noticed above, the Commission passed an order of injunction in regard to an issue without however any material on record.”

The three pre- conditions tests i.e. (I) a prima facie case in the form of a serious and substantial dispute requiring investigation (in the present case, the alleged challenge to RR’s, made immediately a few days before the last date of filing of applications, i.e., 30.09.2026) , (II) a balance of convenience in favour of preservation, and an injury that, if the applicants are not allowed to participate (the representations that have been made to the authorities, which are yet to be disposed of), (III) irreparable loss and injury in the relevant sense, ought to co-exist (The competent authority are within their discretion to extend the date of filing the application form for the applicant in the event the reasoning is found in favour of the applicants, since the competitive examination is to be held in future).

We notice that one of the main relief(s) and interim prayer(s) to allow the applicants to participate in the substantive same. The applicants have not at this stage been able to demonstrate prima facie case in their favor. Our current objective is not to hold a mini-trial at this stage, as doing so while evaluating the merits of the initial application would be equivalent to granting the primary prayer or other relief(s), rather than simply permitting provisional participation in the examination. The Rule making powers are vested in the executive domain. Entering the arena of adjudicating the substantive relief(s) vis the challenge to the Recruitment Rules at this stage, without there being any decision on the pending representation(s) will amount to prejudging the case of the respective side and will be too premature, as either side will be unable to come up with comprehensive grounds/defence that may be available to them to urge at a later stage, once a decision is rendered by the Competent Authority. Simultaneously, we must consider the perspective of the respondents, especially since the Recruitment Rules (RR) themselves are being contested. It goes without saying that whenever new RRs are established or existing ones are modified, public feedback in the form of objections is invariably solicited prior to their finalization and official notification.

We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the applicants' claim for age relaxation. Since the power to grant such relaxation is vested with the competent authority, we are not inclined, at this stage, to direct provisional participation of the applicants in the selection process. The competent authority shall, however, take a decision within the aforesaid time-frame

In the event age relaxation is granted to the applicants, needless to say, the consequential issue regarding extension of the closing date for submission of applications, i.e. 02.10.2026, shall also be considered by the competent authority in accordance with law.

The aforesaid exercise shall be undertaken in a time-bound manner.

With the aforesaid observations and directions, the O.A. is disposed of at the admission stage itself, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.

Pending M.A.(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.