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Judgment
Hon'Ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.
Heard Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Raghav Chandra and Ms. Aiman Kulsum Rizvi Advocates, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Mayank Sinha, the learned A.G.A. for the State.
By means of the present petition filed under Section 528, Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), the petitioners have sought quashing of FIR No. 205 of 2026 lodged in Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, on 24.09.2026, against the petitioners and more than 12 unnamed persons, for offences under Sections 3(5), 191(2), 109(1), 115(2), 352, 351(3), 324 and 333 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNS’).
The FIR alleges that the complainant (the opposite party No. 2) runs a boutique. The petitioner No. 1 runs a butcher shop, the petitioner No. 2 runs a tailoring shop and the petitioner No. 3 runs a barber shop, and all of them were threatening the complainant to vacate her shop. With this object, at about 2:00 p.m. on 21.09.2026 the petitioners and more than 12 unnamed professional criminals attacked the complainant with the intention of killing her and they damaged her shop. They abused her and damaged the goods kept in the shop and decorative items like plant pots etc. kept outside the shop. When the complainant raised a hue and cry and some persons gathered there, the accused persons went away while threatening her. The complainant called the police by dialing 112, but by the time the police came, the accused persons had already escaped.
While assailing the validity of the FIR, Sri. Prashant Chandra Senior Advocate has submitted that on the date of the alleged incident, i.e. on 21.09.2026 itself, the petitioner No. 1 had given an application to the Station House Officer, Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, stating that while the petitioner No. 1 was working at his butcher shop at about 2:30 p.m. on 21.09.2026, Namra Alameen (the opposite party No. 2) and one Akram, both of whom work in a cloth shop of Anees Ahmed, Advocate, started an altercation regarding a signboard put up outside his shop. They were bent upon committing some offence. The petitioner No. 1 gave information of the incident to the police by dialing 112, whereupon the police response vehicle came on the spot and called all the concerned persons to the police station and directed them to maintain status quo.
The learned Counsel for petitioners has submitted that although the petitioner no. 1 had given an information of the incident to the police on the same day and the police had come to the spot of the incident and had called all the concerned persons to the police station, the opposite party No. 2 did not lodge a complaint on that day and the FIR has been lodged after a delay of two days. He has further submitted that the FIR has been meticulously drafted apparently by an Advocate, which gives rise to a ground for quashing the same. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and Mahmood Ali and others v. State of UP and others: (2023) 15 SCC 488.
The learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that although the FIR alleges an attempt to kill the complainant, the complainant has not suffered any injury. He has submitted that the absence of injury gives rise to a ground for quashing of the FIR. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana: (2015) 11 SCC 366.
In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the following principles regarding exercise of the discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC: -
“102.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the present FIR is squarely covered by clauses 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102 of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), as the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; that the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the petitioners; that the allegations made in the FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners and that the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and it has been maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for getting vengeance on the petitioners, and with a view to spite them due to private and personal grudges.
Immediately after laying down the guidelines for exercising the inherent powers, the Hon’ble Supreme Court added a word of caution in the following paragraph of Bhajan Lal (supra): -
“103.We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”
In Google India (P) Ltd. v. Visaka Industries: (2020) 4 SCC 162, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the expression ‘rarest of rare cases’ occurring in Bhajan Lal (Supra), by stating that “The expression “rarest of rare cases” is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasise that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection.”
In Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 9 SCC 35, it was held that: -
“exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.”
In CBI v. Aryan Singh: (2023) 18 SCC 399, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that as per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial.
However, when we examine the FIR allegations in light of the aforesaid principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the FIR alleges that all the accused persons entered the complainant’s shop with an evil intention and they abused, threatened and attacked her. They damaged valuable goods in the shop. The FIR further states that the complainant has a video proof of the violent incident available with her.
Having gone through the aforesaid allegations leveled in the FIR, it cannot be said that the allegations leveled in the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioners. It is not a case where the allegations leveled in the FIR, if the same remain uncontroverted, do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the petitioners. It is also not the case that the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, as the FIR specifically states that the complainant has a video proof of the incident.
So far as the ground contained para 102(7) of Bhajan Lal, i.e., the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a complaint given by the petitioner No.1 to the police on 21.09.2026. He had also lodged a complaint on integrated grievance redressal system (IGRS) of the U.P. Government, wherein he alleged that the complainant (opposite party No. 2) and Akram, who work on the cloth shop of Anees Ahmad, started an altercation because of a sign-board put on the shop of the petitioner No. 1 one and they hurled dirty abuses and threatened him. This complaint was registered under the category “gunda gardi/gunda tax vasulna”.
From the aforesaid complaint, it appears that some incident had taken place amongst the parties on 21.09.2026. Which of the party was the aggressor and who committed what acts during the incident, cannot be examined by this Court while examining the validity of the F.I.R. and it is better to leave it open to be done by the investigating officer during investigation. The allegations leveled in the F.I.R., taken on their face value, certainly disclose commission of offences and warrant investigation into correctness of the allegation.
So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the complainant has not suffered any injury in the incident, Section 109 BNS reads as follows: -
“109.Attempt to murder. - (1) Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
(2)When any person offending under sub-section (1) is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life.
Illustrations
(a)A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b)A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c)A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and, if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of sub-section (1).
(d)A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A's keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z's table or delivers it to Z's servants to place it on Z's table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.”
A bare perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision makes it manifest that it provides for a sentence of imprisonment for life in cases were hurt is caused and in other cases, i.e., where no hurt is caused, a sentence of imprisonment upto 10 years is provided. Therefore, the language of the statute makes it clear that injury is not a sine qua non for the offence of attempt to murder.
Sri. Prashant Chandra has placed reliance on the following passage from the judgment in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (supra):
“12.For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.”
Firstly, it is to be noted that the aforesaid judgment was given in an appeal filed against an order passed by the High Court confirming the conviction of the appellants made by the trial Court after a full-fledged trial and not while examining the validity of an F.I.R. before trial. Secondly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid case that the prosecution has to establish - (i) the intention to commit murder and (ii) the act done by the accused. The Court has to gather the intention of the accused from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused, and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. That stage is yet to arrive and this Court has no reason to believe that the trial Court will not the aforesaid aspects of the matter, in case the allegations are established in investigation, a charge-sheet is filed and the trial Court takes coginzance of the offences.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has laid much emphasis on the following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahmood Ali (supra): -
“11.At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
12.We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.
13.In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
These observations were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court after recording in para 10 that ‘the entire case put up by the first information, on the face of it, appears to be concocted and fabricated’.
In Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of A.P.: (2003) 12 SCC 306, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -
“7.… To imprint the fact situation of one decided case upon another or observations made in the peculiar facts of a given case to any or every other case notwithstanding the dissimilarity in effect and the distinctive features, is legally impermissible. * * *
9.Each case, more particularly a criminal case, depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough to warrant like treatment because a significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive...”
The observations made in Mahmood Ali (supra) were in light of the peculiar facts of that case, wherein the FIR allegations were that the informant was an illiterate person, he was employed by the accused persons and taking advantage of his helplessness, an accused had obtained his signatures on some blank papers and later he kept on compelling him to sign other papers and blank cheques without his consent and without bringing anything to his notice in regard to the cheques, bank papers, etc., and he was fraudulently appointed as a Director of a company. However, upon coming to know about the fake appointment, he resigned from the directorship of the company. The informant had also alleged that he was forced to work in the office of the accused persons virtually as a hostage and threats were administered to kill him and the accused persons were involved in illegal mining, etc., and were exploiting poor persons. Among other things, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that the FIR in question had been lodged after a period of 14 years from the alleged illegal acts of the appellants. The FIR did not disclose any specific date or time of the alleged offence. The FIR did not disclose any ingredient to constitute the offence alleged. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering the entire circumstances, particularly the registration of multiple FIRs, came to a conclusion that the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge was clearly attracted on the record and the entire case put up by the informant on the face of it was held to be concocted and fabricated.
In the present case, the FIR has been lodged after a delay of merely two days, as against the delay of 14 years in the case of Mehmood Ali (supra). The FIR mentions a specific date and time of the incident, which was not there in the case of Mahmood Ali (supra). In Mahmood Ali (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to a conclusion that there were multiple FIRs, whereas it is not the case here. One more thing which distinguishes the present case from the case of Mahmood Ali (supra) is that in that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had come to a conclusion that the FIR did not disclose any ingredients to constitute the offences as alleged, whereas in the present case, the ingredients of the FIR, as have been noted above, clearly make out commission of offences, and in case the same remain uncontroverted, at least a prima facie case of trial is made out.
I am of the considered view that the aforesaid differences in the facts of the present case and the facts of the case in Mahmood Ali (supra) clearly make the observations made in Mohammad Ali in light of the peculiar facts of that case, inapplicable to the facts of the present case.
The contents of the impugned FIR, taken on their face value, disclose commission of cognizable offences, the allegations warrant an investigation to examine their genuineness and, therefore, no ground for quashing of the FIR is made out. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the petition lacks merit and the same is hereby dismissed.