Abdul MajidWani vs Union Territory Of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors.

JUSTICE RITU TAGORE, MEMBER [JUDL.]

The present Original Application has been filed by the applicant, who is serving as Senior Driver in the Health and Medical Education Department, calling in question a series of orders issued by the respondent authorities concerning his place of posting. The impugned orders are Order No. BMO/GBL/2025/372-73 dated 11.07.2025, Order No. CMO/GBL/2025/5249-51 dated 08.08.2025, Order No. BMO/GBL/2025/460-61 dated 12.08.2025 and Order No. BMO/GBL/2025/477 dated 20.08.2025. The principal grievance of the applicant is that he has been subjected to repeated changes of posting within a short span of time, allegedly in violation of the transfer policy notified vide Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010 dated 28.07.2010, and that the impugned orders have been issued without any compelling administrative reason and, according to him, with an element of personal bias.

The applicant has been serving as Senior Driver and, according to the pleadings, has been discharging his duties at Primary Health Centre (PHC), Kachan. By Order No. BMO/GBL/2025/372-73 dated 11.07.2025, he was directed to report at his original place of posting, namely PHC Shuhama. The applicant states that he approached the concerned officer for being relieved, but instead of being relieved, he was directed to continue at PHC Kachan. Thereafter, vide Order No. CMO/GBL/2025/5249-51 dated 08.08.2025, he was directed to report at PHC Tulmulla. A further order dated Central Administrative Tribunal^{12.08.2025 was issued concerning his continuation at} PHC Kachan, which was subsequently rescinded. Thereafter, vide Order No. BMO/GBL/2025/477 dated 20.08.2025, he was again directed to report at PHC Tulmulla. These orders constitute the immediate factual backdrop of the present proceedings.

The applicant contends that the sequence of orders demonstrates that he was subjected to repeated transfer/posting orders within a period of about forty days. It is his case that such frequent movement is contrary to the minimum tenure contemplated under Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010 dated 28.07.2010. He further asserts that the concerned respondents were not competent to issue such transfer orders in the circumstances of his case and that no administrative exigency or compelling reason has been disclosed for disturbing his existing place of posting. The applicant has also alleged that the impugned orders are actuated by personal animosity and amount to harassment.

Central Administrative Tribunal^{04.The applicant has placed reliance upon Government Order} No. 861-GAD of 2010 dated 28.07.2010 and has contended that the policy contemplates a minimum tenure of two years and regulates premature transfers. The said Government Order indeed prescribes the policy framework for transfers/postings of Government employees. The applicant submits that the respondents could not have repeatedly altered his posting without adherence to the safeguards contemplated under the said policy.

The respondents have opposed the Original Application. Their stand, in substance, is that the application is misconceived and that transfer is an incident of service. According to the respondents, the impugned orders have been issued bona fide in the interest of administration and public service and that the applicant has no vested right to remain posted at a particular place. It is specifically asserted that the applicant had been serving at PHC Kachan for a very long period, having been posted there Central Administrative Tribunal^{since December, 2009, initially as Junior Driver and} thereafter as Senior Driver from March, 2015. The respondents state that although an order dated 17.03.2015 had transferred/posted him to PHC Shuhama upon his appointment/promotion as Senior Driver, he continued at PHC Kachan on account of administrative exigencies. The respondents, therefore, submit that the applicant has in fact enjoyed an exceptionally long tenure at PHC Kachan. This stand is also reflected in the service/posting position placed on record by the respondents.

The respondents have further denied the allegation of mala fides and contend that no specific particulars or supporting material have been furnished by the applicant to establish any personal bias or improper motive on the part of the authorities. It is also their case that the applicant being a senior driver in the Health Department, is duty bound to serve wherever his services are required in the interest of administration and public service. The orders were issued in the interest of administration and Central Administrative Tribunal^{patient care and that the applicant cannot question the} administrative decision merely because he does not find the new place of posting convenient. The respondents have also referred to the applicant's failure to comply with the subsequent direction to report at PHC Tulmulla and have maintained that the various orders were issued in the course of routine administrative functioning.

In the rejoinder, the applicant has reiterated that the respondents have attempted to justify the frequent transfer orders by placing an incorrect factual position before the Tribunal. It is contended that the documents produced by the applicant demonstrate that he has been transferred from time to time and that the stand of the respondents regarding his continuous posting at PHC Kachan is incorrect. The applicant has also reiterated that the frequency of the orders itself demonstrates arbitrary exercise of power and that the impugned orders deserve to be quashed.

During the pendency of the present O.A., the applicant has Central Administrative Tribunal^{also placed on record an order bearing No.} BMO/GBL/2026/007-09 dated 05.02.2026, whereby he was directed to join at PHC Kachan. The applicant submits that, after he submitted his joining pursuant thereto, the said order was withdrawn shortly thereafter. The applicant has relied upon the said subsequent development in support of his allegation that the impugned orders were not actuated by genuine administrative considerations. The respondents' response to the said subsequent development, as also the effect thereof upon the legality of the orders impugned in the present O.A., shall be considered at the appropriate stage.

I have considered the rival submissions and examined the material placed on record.

The controversy essentially raises the question as to whether the impugned transfer/posting orders call for interference in exercise of the limited power of judicial review available in service matters relating to transfer. The answer requires examination of the nature of the Central Administrative Tribunal^{transfer policy relied upon by the applicant, the} competence of the authorities who issued the orders, the allegation of mala fides, and the circumstances placed on record by the respondents in justification of the change in posting.

It is well settled that transfer is an incident of service. The authority competent to administer a department is ordinarily better placed to assess the requirements of public service and to determine where the services of a particular employee are required. An employee holding a transferable post ordinarily has no vested right to insist upon continuance at a particular place of posting merely because he has been serving there for a particular period.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that judicial review in matters of transfer is limited. In Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659, Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, N.K. Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 98 and State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC Central Administrative Tribunal^{402, the governing principle is that an order of transfer,} being ordinarily an incident of service, is not to be interfered with in judicial review merely because the employee finds the same inconvenient or undesirable. Interference may, however, be warranted where the order is shown to be vitiated by mala fides, passed by an incompetent authority, or in violation of a statutory provision or other legally enforceable norm. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the permissible scope of judicial review in transfer matters in Sri Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 INSC 200, including where mala fides or infraction of a governing norm or principle is established.

It is equally well settled that the mere fact that a transfer is made before completion of the period indicated in an administrative transfer policy does not, by itself, render such transfer illegal. The Court or Tribunal is required to examine whether the policy relied upon by the employee has statutory force, whether any statutory provision has Central Administrative Tribunal^{been violated, and whether the impugned order is} otherwise vitiated on any recognized ground for judicial interference.

In the present case, the applicant has placed reliance upon Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010 dated 28.07.2010, whereby a policy governing transfer/posting of Government employees was issued and the departments were required to make transfers in conformity with the transfer policy contained therein. The applicant contends that the repeated orders issued against him within a short span of time are contrary to the said policy and, therefore, liable to be interfered with.

The legal status of the aforesaid transfer policy, however, has been considered by the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Syed Hilal Ahmad & Ors. v. State of J&K & Ors., 2015 (3) JKJ 398, wherein the Hon’ble Full Bench having regard to relevant judicial precedents and provisions of the Transfer policy/ Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010, held that it is in the nature of an Central Administrative Tribunal^{administrative/executive guideline and does not have the} force of a statutory rule. The Hon’ble Bench considered the statutory framework governing transfers, including Rule 27 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956 and in paragraphs 9, 11, and 14 held as under:

The same principle was reiterated by the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Abdul Hamid Rather v. State of J&K & Ors., (2011) 2 JKJ 695, wherein it was held that the transfer policy contained in Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010 was recommendatory in nature and did not confer an enforceable right upon an employee to insist upon continuance at a particular place for the prescribed period. It was nevertheless recognized that an order of transfer may be examined where it is Central Administrative Tribunal shown to have been passed in violation of a statutory provision, by an incompetent authority, or for mala fide purposes.

Thus, the applicant cannot succeed merely by demonstrating a departure from the administrative transfer policy. The question which nevertheless survives for consideration is whether the impugned orders, viewed in the light of the entire material placed on record, suffer from any legally sustainable infirmity, including want of competence, mala fides, violation of a statutory provision, or such arbitrary exercise of power as would warrant interference in judicial review.

Coming to the chronology of events, the record shows that respondent No. 4 initially issued order No. BMO/GBL/2025/372-73 dated 11.07.2025, directing the applicant to report at his original place of posting at PHC Shuhama. Thereafter, respondent No. 3, vide order No. CMO/GBL/2025/5249-51 dated 08.08.2025, directed the Central Administrative Tribunal^{applicant to report at PHC Tulmulla. Subsequently,} respondent No. 4 issued order No. BMO/GBL/2025/460-61 dated 12.08.2025, whereby the applicant was shown to continue at PHC Kachan. The said order was thereafter rescinded. Finally, respondent No. 4 issued order No. BMO/GBL/2025/477 dated 20.08.2025, directing the applicant to report at PHC Tulmulla.

The aforesaid sequence undoubtedly demonstrates that the applicant was subjected to successive orders concerning his place of deployment within a relatively short period. However, the order dated 12.08.2025, having subsequently been rescinded and being an order concerning continuation at PHC Kachan, cannot be treated on the same footing as a completed transfer. The sequence, nevertheless, requires examination in the context of the authority competent to issue the respective orders and the administrative circumstances placed on record by the respondents.

The respondents have stated that the applicant had Central Administrative Tribunal^{remained posted at PHC Kachan for a considerably long} period. According to the respondents, the applicant had been working as Junior Driver at PHC Kachan since December, 2009 and, after being appointed/promoted as Senior Driver pursuant to Directorate Order No. 167-N of 2015 dated 17.03.2015, continued to remain at PHC Kachan notwithstanding the posting indicated in the said order. The applicant, however, disputes the respondents’ assertion regarding his continuous posting at PHC Kachan and has relied upon material concerning his deployment/duties at different places. The rival contentions in this regard, therefore, have to be considered on the basis of the actual posting/deployment record and cannot be determined merely on the assertion of either side.

At the same time, the respondents have justified the impugned orders by referring to the administrative requirements of the Health and Medical Education Department and the need for rational and effective Central Administrative Tribunal^{deployment of available drivers at different health} institutions. The respondents have placed reliance upon the statement/record regarding the existing deployment and stay position of drivers at the concerned health institutions, which, according to them, indicates the requirement for adjustment of drivers in order to ensure availability of requisite driving staff where their services are required. It is their specific stand that the applicant, being a Senior Driver posted in the Health Department, is liable to be deployed wherever his services are required in the interest of administration, patient care and public service. The respondents have also relied upon the applicant's prolonged association with PHC Kachan and the consequent need, in their assessment, to rationalize the deployment of drivers amongst the available health institutions.

Learned counsel for the applicant has, however, specifically contended that the repeated orders in the present case are not merely routine transfers but disclose Central Administrative Tribunal^{an arbitrary and mala fide exercise of power. In support of} the said contention, reliance has also been placed upon M.V. Muralidharan & N. Sadananda Singh v. State of Manipur & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 17 of 2022, decided on 06.06.2022, wherein, as relied upon by learned counsel, the Hon’ble High Court of Manipur examined a challenge to a transfer order founded upon allegations of bias, mala fide exercise of power and frequent transfers without justifiable reasons. The said decision, however, turns upon its own factual circumstances, and the principle emerging therefrom cannot be applied without first establishing comparable circumstances of mala fide or extraneous exercise of power in the present matter.

The allegations of mala fides made by the applicant are required to be examined with particular care. Mala fides cannot be inferred merely from the fact that an employee has been transferred more than once or that an order has subsequently been modified or withdrawn. There must be material demonstrating that the power of transfer was Central Administrative Tribunal^{exercised for an improper purpose or upon considerations} extraneous to the administration. In N.K. Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (1994) 6 SCC 98 decided on 25 August 1994 the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of relevant pleadings and supporting material where mala fides or an extraneous exercise of power is alleged. However, the material placed on record does not establish such a nexus merely from the sequence of the impugned orders.

The respondents, on the other hand, have attributed the successive orders to administrative requirements and deployment of drivers at different health Centres. The applicant's long association with PHC Kachan, as asserted by the respondents, has also been cited as a relevant administrative consideration. Even assuming that the applicant disputes the precise period or nature of his deployment at PHC Kachan, such dispute by itself does not establish that the subsequent orders were actuated by mala fides.

Central Administrative Tribunal^{25.This Tribunal must, therefore, distinguish between an} order which may appear administratively inconvenient or insufficiently explained from the standpoint of the employee and an order which is legally vitiated. Unless the latter is demonstrated by cogent material, interference merely because another administrative arrangement may appear preferable would amount to substituting the Tribunal's view for that of the competent administrative authority.

The applicant has also raised a specific objection regarding the competence of respondent No. 4 to issue the impugned orders. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Madurai Bench of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in M. Sundarrajan & Another v. The District Collector, Dindigul District, Dindigul & Others, W.P.(MD) Nos. 11513, 11514 & 11515 of 2011, decided on 31.01.2012, as Annexure A1, in support of the proposition that an order of transfer passed by an authority not vested with the requisite power is liable to be Central Administrative Tribunal^{interfered with. The principle relied upon is undoubtedly} relevant; however, the applicability of that principle in the present case depends upon the statutory rules, delegation and administrative orders governing the competence of the concerned authorities in the Health and Medical Education Department, UT of J&K.

In this connection, the applicant has relied upon SRO 307 of 2018 and Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010, besides departmental correspondence in which clarification regarding the successive orders and the competence of the Block Medical Officer is stated to have been sought. The said correspondence shows that the question of authority was raised at the departmental level; however, the mere seeking of clarification, by itself, cannot be treated as a determination that respondent No. 4 lacked competence to issue the orders.

The question, therefore, is whether any statutory rule, valid delegation or binding administrative arrangement placed on record expressly excludes respondent No. 4 Central Administrative Tribunal^{from exercising the power which was exercised through} the impugned orders. Unless such exclusion is demonstrated from the governing framework, the mere fact that the orders were issued by the Block Medical Officer cannot, by itself, render them void. The decision in M. Sundarrajan (supra) has to be understood in the context of the statutory scheme governing the authority concerned in that case and cannot be applied mechanically without examining the corresponding framework applicable here. On the contrary, the respondents have denied the allegations regarding lack of competence on the part of respondent Nos. 3 and 4, contending that the Chief Medical Officer and Block Medical Officer are duly competent to effect posting/deployment of ministerial and supporting staff under their respective control. The applicant, in the rejoinder, has not placed on record any material to establish that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 lack the requisite competence or authority to issue the impugned deployment orders. In the absence of any statutory Central Administrative Tribunal^{provision, rule or binding administrative instruction} having been brought to the notice of this Tribunal which expressly takes away such power from respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the objection as to competence cannot be sustained merely on the basis of the fact that the impugned orders were issued by the said authorities.

The applicant has also urged that the impugned orders contain no adequate reasons and that the absence of disclosed administrative reasons indicates arbitrariness. It is settled that a routine order of transfer or posting does not necessarily require a detailed recital of reasons in the order itself, particularly where the order is passed in the ordinary course of administrative deployment. Nevertheless, where an order is specifically challenged as mala fide, contrary to a statutory provision, or issued by an incompetent authority, the surrounding record may be examined to determine whether the stated administrative purpose is genuine.

The subsequent order dated 05.02.2026 issued by Central Administrative Tribunal^{respondent No. 4 also deserves notice. The said order,} bearing No. BMO/GBL/2026/007-09, is titled “Adjustment of Drivers” and records the adjustment of the applicant from PHC Tulmulla to PHC Kachan, while another driver, namely Riyaz Ahmad, was adjusted from PHC Kachan to PHC Tulmulla. The order records that the adjustment was made in the interest of administration and after the matter had been discussed with higher authorities. The subsequent withdrawal of the said order and the communication relied upon by the applicant explaining the circumstances surrounding such withdrawal have also been placed before this Tribunal.

The subsequent order and its withdrawal may indicate that the administrative arrangement concerning the two drivers was reconsidered; however, such subsequent development, by itself, does not establish that the earlier impugned orders were passed with mala fide intent or by an authority lacking jurisdiction. Likewise, the communication relied upon by the applicant, insofar as it Central Administrative Tribunal^{records the circumstances relating to the withdrawal of the} subsequent adjustment order, cannot by itself constitute conclusive proof of mala fides. The legality of the impugned orders must principally be determined with reference to the circumstances and authority existing when those orders were issued.

The applicant's grievance regarding the short interval between the impugned orders also has to be considered in the context of the respondents' assertion that he had remained at PHC Kachan for a substantially long period. It is further the case of the respondents that, being a Senior Driver in the Health Department, the applicant's services are required in the interest of administration, patient care and public service and that his deployment is liable to be made keeping in view the requirements of the concerned health institutions. Since the applicant disputes the precise period and nature of his deployment at the said stations, the issue cannot be determined merely on the basis of the competing assertions. However, even Central Administrative Tribunal^{assuming the applicant's case regarding the frequency of} the orders, such frequency by itself does not establish mala fides, statutory violation or want of competence. The fact that the applicant may have been subjected to successive orders within a relatively short period, therefore, has to be considered in the backdrop of the administrative requirements asserted by the respondents and, in the absence of any material demonstrating an extraneous or improper purpose, cannot by itself furnish a ground for judicial interference.

It is also significant that the respondents have not sought to punish the applicant by way of the impugned orders. The orders are administrative in character and concern his place of deployment. No material has been brought on record to establish that the transfer was intended to penalize him for any misconduct or that it was a disguised disciplinary action.

The applicant has referred to his personal/domestic difficulties in seeking continuation at PHC Kachan. Such Central Administrative Tribunal^{circumstances may certainly be brought before the} competent administrative authority for sympathetic and objective consideration. However, personal hardship, though relevant for administrative consideration, does not by itself create a legal right to remain at a particular station.

The aforesaid course would appropriately address the applicant's grievance while leaving the administrative authority free to take a decision in accordance with the applicable rules and administrative requirements. The applicant cannot claim a vested right to continue at PHC Kachan; at the same time, his representation, if any, setting out genuine personal or domestic difficulties may appropriately be considered by the competent authority without treating the present order as an expression of opinion on the merits of such representation.

On an overall consideration of the material on record, this Tribunal is unable to find that the impugned transfer/posting orders suffer from any statutory infirmity, Central Administrative Tribunal^{demonstrated mala fides, or any established lack of} competence on the part of the issuing authorities. The reliance placed upon M. Sundarrajan (supra) does not advance the applicant's case in the absence of material demonstrating that the statutory or delegated authority applicable to the respondents in the present case was similarly absent. The applicant's principal challenge rests upon the alleged violation of the minimum tenure contemplated by Government Order No. 861-GAD of 2010 and the frequency of the orders. The said Government Order, however, is administrative in character and does not confer an indefeasible right upon the applicant to remain at a particular place of posting.

The long period for which the applicant remained posted at PHC Kachan, coupled with the respondents' assertion of administrative requirements and the absence of material establishing mala fide exercise of power, does not warrant interference in judicial review. This Tribunal cannot undertake an assessment of which of the available stations Central Administrative Tribunal^{would be administratively preferable or more convenient} for the applicant. Such assessment of the requirement of personnel, their deployment and adjustment amongst different institutions ordinarily falls within the domain of the competent administrative authority. The Tribunal, while exercising judicial review, does not sit as an appellate authority over such administrative decisions or substitute its own assessment of the comparative requirement of drivers at different health institutions for that of the competent authority.

Consequently, the challenge to the impugned transfer/posting orders is not made out. The Original Application, to that extent, deserves to be dismissed.

At the same time, having regard to the sequence of orders issued between July and August, 2025 and the personal/domestic difficulties referred to by the applicant, it would be appropriate to observe that, if the applicant has already submitted or submits a representation to the competent authority seeking consideration of his Central Administrative Tribunal^{personal/domestic difficulties, the same may be} considered and disposed of by the competent authority, if not already dealt with, by a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with the applicable rules, administrative requirements and availability of posts. Such consideration shall not be construed as conferring any right upon the applicant to remain posted at PHC Kachan.

It is clarified that this Tribunal has expressed no opinion on the merits of any such representation. The competent authority shall remain free to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law and administrative exigencies.

In view of the foregoing, O.A. No. 968/2025 is dismissed. The interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.

Pending M.A.(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

The Registry shall consign the record to the Record Room after due compliance.