THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TIGHTROPE: WHY MARRIAGE PROMISES BY MARRIED MEN RESHAPE CONSENT IN CRIMINAL LAW
Analyzing the Delhi High Court’s Refusal to Quash FIR Under Section 376(2)(n) and the Thin Line Between Failed Romance and Fraudulent Inducement
How Systematic Concealment of Matrimonial Status Vitiates Legal Consent Under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code
By Legal Editor
New Delhi: July 18, 2026:
The intersection of romance, personal autonomy, and criminal jurisprudence has long been one of the most volatile areas of Indian criminal law. For decades, Indian courts have struggled to balance the protection of women against sexual exploitation with the preservation of adult autonomy in consensual relationships. A primary point of friction is the allegation of rape under the pretext of a "false promise of marriage." Traditionally, the legal system has attempted to distinguish between a "breach of promise"—where a pledge to marry was made in good faith but could not be fulfilled due to subsequent circumstances—and a "false promise"—where the accused never intended to marry the victim from the inception and used the promise solely as a deceptive tool to obtain sexual consent.
However, a highly distinct legal complexity emerges when the accused is a married individual who actively conceals their marital status or promises a future marriage conditional upon an impending divorce. This exact scenario formed the core of a pivotal decision by the Delhi High Court in a Delhi’s couple case. Presided over by Justice Saurabh Banerjee, the High Court flatly declined to quash a First Information Report (FIR) and subsequent charges framed against a married man under Sections 376(2)(n) (repeated rape) and 377 (unnatural offences) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The ruling serves as a vital case study on how a person’s existing legal status impacts the validity of "consent" under Indian law. It challenges standard arguments regarding long-term consensual relationships by highlighting that systemic deception alters the fundamental nature of the relationship, preventing it from being classified as a simple failed romance.
Anatomizing the Case: The Deceptive Courtship of Saurabh Banerjee v. State
To understand the legal ramifications of the High Court's ruling, one must first look at the facts that led to the dispute. The complainant and the petitioner initially connected in October 2020 through the popular matrimonial platform Jeevansathi. This detail is legally significant because the platform's explicit purpose establishes a mutual intention: seeking a permanent matrimonial alliance. Following their digital introduction, the petitioner travelled from Haridwar, Uttarakhand, to Delhi to formally meet the complainant and discuss a proposed marriage.
According to the prosecution, the relationship shifted from courtship to a physical relationship on January 11, 2021, at a hotel in Paharganj, Delhi. The complainant alleged that she initially resisted the petitioner's physical advances but eventually acquiesced based on his explicit assurances of marriage. Over the next two years, the couple maintained regular contact and engaged in physical relationships across various hotels.
The turning point occurred on March 5, 2023, when the complainant discovered that the petitioner had married another woman. When confronted, the petitioner allegedly attempted to sustain the relationship by introducing a fresh narrative: that he would secure a divorce from his wife to marry the complainant. Succumbing to this renewed inducement, another physical encounter took place on March 9, 2023. Realizing the deceptive nature of these ongoing promises, the complainant approached the police, leading to the registration of an FIR at the Paharganj Police Station under Sections 376 and 377 of the IPC. The trial court subsequently evaluated the evidence and framed formal charges under Sections 376(2)(n) and 377 IPC on November 30, 2023. The petitioner then challenged this order before the Delhi High Court.
The Legal Battlefield: Defence Arguments vs. Judicial Reality
Before the Delhi High Court, the defence counsel advanced several arguments designed to showcase that the relationship was entirely consensual:
Prolonged Duration: The defence emphasized that a relationship spanning nearly three years between two educated adults could not be retroactively labelled non-consensual.
Active Participation: To substantiate this, the defence produced hotel check-in records showing that the complainant willingly submitted her own Aadhaar card during their stays, proving her voluntary participation.
Post-Discovery Conduct: The defence placed substantial reliance on the fact that the complainant engaged in sexual intercourse on March 9, 2023—four days after learning about the petitioner’s marriage—arguing this destroyed any claim of a relationship based on a "misconception of fact."
The High Court, however, looked past these arguments by focusing on the active concealment of the petitioner’s marital status. Justice Saurabh Banerjee noted that despite the relationship's extended duration, the petitioner "strangely" chose to keep his marriage a secret from the complainant. The court observed that this calculated silence cast doubt on the petitioner's intentions, making it impossible to quash the proceedings without a full trial.
| THE LEGAL BATTLEFIELD IN SAURABH BANERJEE V. STATE |
+------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Defence Contentions | Judicial Counter-Observations |
+------------------------------------+----------------------------------------------+
| • Relationship was consensual | • Act of marriage was hidden throughout, |
| and lasted nearly three years. | creating strong doubt about good faith. |
| | |
| • Complainant provided her own | • Initial consent was tied to a matrimonial |
| Aadhaar card at hotel check-ins. | intent via a matrimonial website. |
| | |
| • Intimacy continued even after | • State contended she was induced by a fresh |
| discovering his married status. | promise of him divorcing his wife. |
The High Court determined that whether the complainant's consent was completely voluntary or compromised by fraudulent misrepresentation was a matter that required a thorough examination of evidence. Consequently, the court dismissed the revision petition and sustained the charges, clearing the way for a full-fledged criminal trial.
Statutory Framework and Judicial Precedents
To properly analyze the judgment, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework governing rape and consent in India, alongside evolving judicial precedents.
The Mechanics of Misconception: Section 375 and Section 90 IPC
The offense of rape is defined under Section 375 of the IPC (now corresponding to Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023). The statute lists several circumstances under which sexual intercourse constitutes rape, with the primary criteria being "against her will" or "without her consent." Crucially, the concept of "consent" is qualified by Section 90 of the IPC (now Section 24 of the BNS), which states:
"A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception."
In cases involving marriage promises, the prosecution argues that the woman’s consent is given under a "misconception of fact." The misconception is her belief that the man intends to marry her, a belief directly manufactured by the man's promise. If it is proven that the man never intended to fulfill that promise, the consent becomes invalid under law, transforming the act into sexual assault without legal consent.
Divergent Paths: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. The Married Accused
The Supreme Court of India has routinely attempted to prevent the misuse of this law in failed relationships. In the landmark case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), the apex court laid down a clear test:
The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in early 2025 rulings, such as and , holding that a good-faith promise that fails later does not constitute rape. Similarly, in , the apex court quashed an FIR where a 16-year relationship could not be directly attributed to a continuous false promise.
However, the legal evaluation changes entirely when the accused is already married. A bachelor who promises marriage may face unexpected obstacles later, such as family opposition or financial crises, which could point toward a legitimate breach of promise rather than an initial fraud. Conversely, a married man is legally barred from marrying another person under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, making bigamy a criminal offense under Section 494 of the IPC.
Therefore, when a married man promises to marry a woman while keeping his existing marriage a secret, the promise is inherently false from the outset. He lacks the legal capacity to fulfil it. This crucial distinction explains why courts are hesitant to grant early relief to married men in these scenarios; their inability to fulfill the promise provides strong initial evidence of a fraudulent intention from the start.
Broader Socio-Legal Implications: From Matrimonial Sites to Unnatural Sex Charges
The decision in this case highlights several critical societal trends and complex legal challenges.
The Role of Digital Matrimonial Platforms
The fact that the parties met on a matrimonial app highlights the changing ways relationships begin and the legal obligations that come with them. Unlike casual dating applications, registering on a matrimonial platform signals a specific, legally binding intent: marriage. When individuals use these spaces to seek sexual relationships under false pretences, it adds weight to charges of cheating under Section 417 of the IPC, alongside rape charges. It demonstrates a calculated plan to exploit a platform designed for marriage to secure consent for sexual intimacy.
The Inclusion of Section 377 IPC
Another significant aspect of this case is the inclusion of charges under Section 377 of the IPC, which criminalizes "unnatural offences." Even after the Supreme Court partially decriminalized Section 377 in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) to protect consensual same-sex relationships, non-consensual unnatural sex remains a punishable offense. In this instance, the complainant alleged that she was forcibly subjected to these acts. By sustaining the Section 377 charges alongside Section 376(2)(n), the High Court underscored that consent in an intimate relationship is not a blanket authorization. A woman may consent to specific sexual acts under a particular premise while completely withholding consent for others, particularly those involving physical force or coercion.
The Legal Value of Fresh Promises of Divorce
The defence focused heavily on the complainant's choice to engage in a physical relationship on March 9, 2023, after discovering the marriage. However, the prosecution successfully countered this by showing that the accused offered a fresh inducement: a promise to divorce his wife. This raises a compelling question: Can a promise to obtain a divorce be treated as a valid basis for consent, or is it inherently speculative?
By sending the case to trial, the Delhi High Court determined that this question cannot be answered generally. Instead, the trial court must look at the specific facts to decide whether the promise of a divorce was an achievable, good-faith plan or simply another deceptive tactic used to prolong the exploitation.
Conclusion: Clarifying the Bounds of Consent
The Delhi High Court's refusal to close the case against the petitioner reinforces a vital boundary in Indian criminal law. While the judiciary remains careful not to criminalize failed relationships or genuine breaches of promise between consenting adults, it draws a firm line at systemic, calculated deception.
Active concealment of an existing marriage while pursuing an alliance on a matrimonial platform creates a strong presumption of initial bad faith. By sustaining charges under Sections 376(2)(n) and 377 of the IPC, the court affirmed that consent obtained through a calculated distortion of one's legal status is invalid under the law. This ruling sends a clear message: adult autonomy protects private relationships, but it does not shield individuals who use fraud and deception to bypass the legal requirement of free and informed consent.
DETAILED FAQ AND SEARCHABLE LEGAL INDEX
This index provides a structured reference guide detailing the key legal principles, statutory sections, and judicial standards governing cases of rape based on a false promise of marriage.
Index of Terms
Section 375 IPC (Rape) & Consent
Section 376(2)(n) IPC (Repeated Rape)
Section 90 IPC (Misconception of Fact)
Section 377 IPC (Unnatural Offences)
False Promise vs. Breach of Promise
The Legal Impact of Being Already Married
Evidentiary Value of Digital Evidence & Matrimonial Apps
Quashing of FIR under Section 482 CrPC
Detailed Frequently Asked Questions
1. What constitutes "Rape" under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, and how is consent defined?
Under Section 375 of the IPC, rape is defined as any sexual act falling under specific descriptions committed by a man against a woman under circumstances that include:
Against her will.
Without her consent.
With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt.
With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or multi-laterally believes herself to be lawfully married.
Consent must be an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures, or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, expresses willingness to participate in the specific sexual act.
2. What does Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC specifically penalize?
Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC deals with a aggravated form of sexual assault, specifically penalizing a person who commits rape repeatedly on the same woman. In cases involving an alleged false promise of marriage over an extended period, this section is applied because the physical relationship occurred multiple times across various dates and locations, based on a continuous deception.
3. How does Section 90 of the IPC relate to a false promise of marriage?
Section 90 of the IPC defines what does not amount to consent. It states that consent is vitiated if it is given under a "misconception of fact." In cases of a false promise of marriage, the court examines whether the woman gave her physical consent under the mistaken belief that the man would marry her. If that promise was a deliberate lie made to secure consent, it is considered a misconception of fact, making her consent invalid under law.
4. Is Section 377 IPC still applicable in consensual relationships after the Navtej Singh Johar judgment?
Yes, it remains applicable for non-consensual acts. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court decriminalized Section 377 only to the extent that it applied to consensual sexual acts between adults in private. Non-consensual unnatural sexual acts, such as those involving physical force or coercion without explicit consent, remain fully punishable under Section 377 IPC.
5. What is the difference between a "false promise of marriage" and a "breach of promise to marry"?
The judiciary maintains a clear distinction between the two to prevent injustice:
False Promise of Marriage: The accused never had any intention of fulfilling the promise from the very inception of the relationship. The promise was used strictly as a deceptive tool to satisfy his desires. This constitutes rape under Section 375/90 IPC.
Breach of Promise to Marry: The accused made the promise in good faith at the beginning but later faced unforeseen circumstances (such as family opposition, cultural differences, or personal crises) that prevented him from fulfilling it. This is treated as a civil or personal failure and does not attract criminal charges for rape.
6. Why does the marital status of the accused significantly change the case?
If the accused is a bachelor, he has the legal capacity to marry, meaning a failed relationship can easily be argued as a good-faith "breach of promise." However, if the accused is already married, he is legally barred from entering into another marriage under monogamy laws. If he conceals his marriage and promises a new matrimonial alliance, it shows he was legally incapable of keeping that promise from the start. This makes it much easier to infer a fraudulent intent from inception.
7. How do courts evaluate evidence like hotel logs, Aadhaar cards, and matrimonial app profiles?
Matrimonial Profiles: Registering on apps like Jeevansathi provides strong evidence of a clear intent to marry, making it harder for an accused to claim the relationship was understood to be purely casual from the start.
Aadhaar Cards and Hotel Logs: While the defence often uses hotel check-ins and identity submissions to argue that a relationship was long-term and consensual, courts look at the broader context. If that continuous consent was built on a foundation of deception (such as a hidden marriage), the hotel records do not automatically absolve the accused.
8. Can an accused get an FIR quashed easily if the relationship lasted for years?
Not automatically, as demonstrated in this case. While high courts possess inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to quash FIRs to prevent the abuse of legal processes, they will decline to do so if there is prime facie evidence of fraud or active concealment. If the dispute requires an evaluation of conflicting statements and intent, the court will dismiss the petition and order a full trial.