Can the Six-Month Wait for Mutual Divorce Be Waived? The Story of Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur

Case at a Glance

A couple married in 1994 had lived apart since 2008, settled every dispute, and agreed on alimony and custody. All that stood between them and a mutual consent divorce was the six-month wait under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act. They believed only the Supreme Court could waive it. The Court held that the period is directory, not mandatory, and that the Family Court itself can waive it in a fit case.

The parties married in Delhi on 16 January 1994 and had two children, born in 1995 and 2003. They had lived separately since 2008, and civil and criminal disputes followed. On 28 April 2017 they settled: the wife was to receive permanent alimony of Rs 2.75 crore, and custody of the children was to remain with the husband.

They filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B before the Family Court (West), Tis Hazari, New Delhi; statements were recorded on 8 May 2017 and two cheques of Rs 50 lakh were honoured as part payment. They then approached the Supreme Court to waive the six-month period before the second motion, arguing that only it could do so under Article 142.

The Key Question Before the Court

Is the six-month cooling-off period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act mandatory, or can the court hearing the divorce petition waive it?

A Waiting Period Meant to Protect, Not to Prolong

The Court, per Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel, noted that in Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010) a two-judge Bench had held that Article 142 cannot be used to waive the statutory period, and that this view “holds the field” unless a larger Bench decides otherwise. Instead of waiving the period itself, the Court examined the nature of Section 13B(2).

The Court treated the waiting period as a safeguard against hurried decisions, not a means of prolonging the agony of parties whose marriage has already ended. The period is therefore “not mandatory but directory”, and the court dealing with the petition may waive it after considering whether: the statutory six months, together with the one-year separation under Section 13B(1), has already passed before the first motion; mediation and conciliation have failed with no likelihood of success; the parties have genuinely settled their differences, including alimony and custody; and the waiting period would only prolong their agony.

What the Court Actually Held

• The six-month period under Section 13B(2) is directory, not mandatory; the court hearing the petition may waive it in an appropriate case.
• The court must consider the four factors: elapsed time, failed reconciliation, genuine settlement of all issues, and needless prolongation of agony.
• An application for waiver may be filed one week after the first motion, giving reasons.
• Courts may use video conferencing and permit genuine representation through close relatives where a party cannot appear in person; the parties were given liberty to move the concerned court.

Why This Judgment Matters

• It allowed Family Courts to grant quick mutual consent divorces where the marriage has clearly ended and everything is settled.
• It shifted the decision from the Supreme Court under Article 142 to the trial court under the statute itself.
• Its practical directions on video conferencing and representation make the process easier for parties living in different cities or abroad.

What Should Advocates Take Away From the Judgment?

For Couples Seeking Mutual Divorce

• Settle alimony, custody and all pending cases before seeking a waiver.
• File the waiver application, with reasons, one week after the first motion.

For Family Court Practitioners

• Show that the one year of separation plus six months has elapsed before the first motion.
• Place the record of failed mediation or conciliation before the court.
• Ask for video-conference appearance where a party is abroad.

Key Takeaways

Frequently Asked Questions

No. The Court held that it is directory, and the court hearing the petition may waive it after considering the stated factors.

No. The Court held that the concerned court can exercise this discretion; it gave the parties liberty to move that court.

The Court said courts may use video conferencing and permit genuine representation through close relatives such as parents or siblings.

Conclusion