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High Courts(2026) 11 KAR CK 2975

M/s. Sentinel Adventures Vs The State Of Karnataka & Ors.

Karnataka High Court · Bengaluru Bench · 17 Nov 2026 · Suraj Govindaraj, J

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Judgment

1,221 paragraphs · 88,473 words
1.

WP No.29656 of 2024, the Petitioner is before this court seeking the following reliefs:

1.

Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order or direction quashing the notices dated 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024 and 10.09.2024 bearing No.A. Vva:/Hassan/Aranya Adisoochane/GL-09/2024-25 issued by The Forest Settlement Officer/ Respondent No.13, as per ANNEXURE G to G2 respectively, and notices dated 20.09.2024 and 18.10.2024 bearing No.Sakapu/UV/sakapu/Amo-08/2024-25 issued by the Asst Conservator of Forests, Hassan and Tumkur division, Hassan/Respondent No.7 ANNEXURE G3 & G4 respectively. As per

2.

Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction, directing the Respondents not to disturb/interfere with the possession of the Petitioner over the land in question.

3.

Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction that deems fit to grant in the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity.

2.

WP No.16251 of 2023, the Petitioners are before this court seeking the following reliefs:

1.

Issue writ in the nature of certiorari and quash the order dated 26/07/2022 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forest (Forest Mobile Squad), Hassan District in case number YOLESUM/ASUMDAL/HASSAN/HOTUVARI/AMO. 60/2022-23 vide Annexure-J and also the notice dated 18/07/2023 issued by the 8 Respondent, i.e., Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpur range vide Annexure- J-1;

2.

And consequently, issue a writ in nature of mandamus and direct the Respondents 1 to 8 to restore and not to further disturb the possession of the resort called “Stone Valley Nature Resorts” and also the dwelling house in the schedule land and all their Belongings;

3.

And grant such other order or direction as the case may be to protect the interest of the Petitioners with respect to the schedule lands owned by them, in the interest of justice and equity.

4.

Issue a Writ declaring that the Notification dated 05.02.1920 published in Mysore Gazette February 12, 1920 No.R 8806-Ft43-15-6 (Produced as Annexure “M”) has lapsed and has been abandoned;

5.

Issue a Writ of Certiorari and Quash the proclamation dated 09.11.2023 bearing No: A. VYA/Haasan/ ARANYA ADHISUCHANE/JL-10/2023-24 issued by Respondent No.4 (produced as Annexure-“S”);

3.

WP No.19980 of 2023, the Petitioner is before this court seeking the following reliefs:

I. Issue a Writ of Certiorari and quash the order dated 26.07.2022 bearing No. UTTUVARI/AM.60/2022-23 by UASM/ASMDL/HASAN/the 3 Respondent (Annexure-K) and

II. Issue a Writ of Certiorari and quash the Notice dated 18.07.2023 bearing No.SAKAPU/VAA/UTTUVARI01 /2023-24 by Respondent No.4 (Annexure-L);

(ii)

A. Issue a Writ declaring that the Notification dated 05.02.1920 published in Mysore Gazette February 12, 1920 No. R. 8806-Ft43-15-6 (Produced at Annexure-G) has lapsed, abandoned and not having any legal effect.

(ii)

B. Issue a Writ of Certiorari and quash the Proclamation dated 09.11.2023 bearing No. A. VYA/HASSANA/ARANYA ADHISUCHANE/GL-10/2023-24 issued by Respondent No.7 (Annexure-P).

III. Pass such orders as deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity.

4.

WP No.29690 of 2025, the Petitioner is before this court seeking the following reliefs:

a)

Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned Proclamations issued by the 5 Respondent dated 19/07/2023 bearing No. AA.VYA/HASSAN/ARANYA ADISUCHANE/JL-10/2023-24 vide Annexure ‘A’ to ‘C’ insofar as the lands owned by the Petitioners are concerned;

b)

Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the notices dated 11/08/2025 & 26/08/2025 both in proceedings bearing Nos. SAKAPU/VUU VE/SAKAPU/AAMO/-201/2021-22, issued by the 4 Respondent to the 1 Petitioner vide Annexure ‘D’ & ‘E’ and also the Enquiry Notice dated 30/06/2025 issued by the 5 Respondent to the 2 Petitioner bearing No. AA.VYA/HASSAN/ARANYA ADISUCHANE/JL-09/2024-25 VIDE ANNEXURE-F.

c)

Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents not to proceed with the enquiry proceedings, initiate penal action, etc. against the Petitioners in pursuance of the Mysore Government Notification dated 05/02/1920 bearing No. R. 8806-Ft-43-15-6-dated 5/2/1920 at Annexure-S and consequently declare that the Mysore, Government notification dated 05.02.1920 vide Annexure-S as not binding on the land of the Petitioner. (Amended as per court order dated 24.11.2025)

d)

Grant such other relief or reliefs that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interest of justice and equity.

5.

WP No.33767 of 2025, the Petitioners are before this court seeking the following reliefs:

i.

Issue a Writ of Certiorari and quash the Proclamations and Notices issued by the Respondent No.7 Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 dated 19.07.2023 produced at (Annexure-A-2) by Petitioner No.1; Bearing No. A. Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 and A. Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 19.07.2023 and 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexures-“B-3 and B-4”) by Petitioner No.2; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 19.07.2023 and 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexures-“C and C-1”) by Petitioner No.3; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“D-1”) by Petitioner No.4; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“E-1”)by Petitioner No.5; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“F-2”)by Petitioner No.6; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 13.02.2025 produced at (Annexure-“G-2”) by Petitioner No.7; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 04.06.2024 and 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“H-3 and H-4”) by Petitioner No.8 to10; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2023-24 dated 19.07.2023 and 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexures-“K-1 and K-2”) by Petitioner No.12; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“M-2”)by Petitioner No.16; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 04.06.2024 and 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexures- “N-2 and N-3”) by Petitioner No.17; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 dated 09.11.2023 produced at (Annexure-“P-1”) by Petitioner No.18; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 dated 09.11.2023 produced at (Annexure-“Q-1”) by Petitioner No.19; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 dated 19.07.2023 produced at (Annexure-“R-1”)by Petitioner No.20; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“V-1”)by Petitioner No.23 and 24; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 19.07.2023 and 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexures-“X-2 and X-3”) by Petitioner No.26; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“Z-1”)by Petitioner No.28; Bearing No. Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AA-3”)by Petitioner No.29; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AB-2”)by Petitioner No.30; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/AranyaAdisuchane/GL-09/2024-25and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 04.06.2024 and 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexures-“AC-2 and AC-3”) by Petitioner No.31; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AD-4”)by Petitioner No. 32; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AE-1”)by Petitioner No.34; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AF-2”) by Petitioner No.35; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AG-1”)by Petitioner No.36; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AH-1”)by A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Petitioner No.38; Bearing No. dated Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AJ-1”)by Petitioner No. 39 and 40; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AK-2”)by Petitioner No.41; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 26.06.2025 produced at(Annexure-“AL-1”)by A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Petitioner No.42; Bearing No. Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AM-3”) by Petitioner No.43; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AN-2”)by Petitioner No.44; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AP-1”)by Petitioner No.45; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya 19.07.2023 produced at (Annexure-“AQ-1”)by Petitioner No.46; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 and A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 19.07.2023 and 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AR-1 and AR-2”) by Petitioner No.47; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 dated 19.07.2023 produced at (Annexure-“AS-1”)by Petitioner No.48; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 30.06.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AT-1”)by Petitioner No.49; Bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 04.06.2024 produced at Adisuchane/GL-10/2023-24 dated (Annexure-“AV-1”)by Petitioner Bearing No.50; No.A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisuchane/GL-09/2024-25 dated 07.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AW-2”) by Petitioner No.51 and consequently quash all further proceedings pursuant thereto;

ii.

Issue a Writ of Certiorari and quash the Notices issued by the Respondent No.5: Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SaKaPu/Ottuvari/A.Mo-164/2021-22 dated 04.07.2022 produced at (Annexure-“B-2”) by Petitioner No.2; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SaKaPu/A.Mo-165/2021-22 dated 12.08.2025 produced at (Annexure-“C-2”)by Petitioner No.3; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo-09/2024-25 dated 06.11.2024 produced at (Annexure-“J-2”) by Petitioner No.11; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo-136/2021-22 dated 11.08.2025 produced at (Annexure-“K-3”) by Petitioner No.12; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo-82/2022-23 and SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo-82/2022-23 dated 06.01.2025 and 02.05.2025 produced at (Annexures-“L-2 and L-3”)by Petitioner No.13 to 15; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo-250/2021-22 dated 22.05.2024 produced at (Annexure-“S-2”)by Petitioner No.21; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo- 45/2021-22 dated 11.08.2025 produced at (Annexure-“T-2”) by Petitioner No.22; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/A.Mo-247/2021-22 dated 08.09.2025 produced at (Annexure-“W-3”)by Petitioner No.25; Bearing No. dated SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/Ottuvari/A.Mo-249/2021-22 08.03.2022 produced at (Annexure-“Y-2”) by Petitioner no.27; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SakaPu/Ottuvari/A.Mo-92/2021-22 and SaKaPu/Uvi/SaKaPu/A.Mo-92/2021-22 dated 05.05.2022 and 29.08.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AD-2 and AD-3”) by Petitioner No.32; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SaKaPu/A.Mo-255/2021-22 dated 14.07.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AM-4”)by Petitioner No.43; Bearing No. SaKaPu/Uvi/SaKaPu/A.Mo-220/2021-22 dated 26.08.2025 produced at (Annexure-“AT-2”) by Petitioner No.49.

iii.

Issue a Writ declaring that the Notification dated 05.02.1920 published in Mysore Gazette February 12, 1920 No.R 8806-Ft43-15-6 (Produced as Annexure-“AAA-3”) has lapsed/abandoned and consequently delete the name of Forest Department from the revenue records in respect of the properties of the Petitioners;

iv.

And grant such other order or direction as the case may be to protect the interest of the Petitioners in the interest of justice and equity.

6.

WP No.700 of 2026, the Petitioner is before this court seeking the following reliefs:

I. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the notice dated 30.06.2025 bearing No. A.VYA/Hassan/Aranya Notification/GL-09/2024-25 issued by the 4 Respondent The Deputy Conservator of Forest vide Annexure-A;

II. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents not to proceed with the enquiry proceedings, initiate penal action, etc., against the Petitioner in pursuance of Mysore Government Notification dated 05.02.1920 at Annexure-D;

III. Grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interest of justice and equity.

FACTS IN WP NO.16251/2023:

7.

The Petitioners claim to be the absolute owners in possession of the land bearing original Sy. No. 95, subsequently re-surveyed as Sy. No. 92 and assigned new Sy. No. 148, which has since been subdivided into Sy. Nos. 148/1 and 148/2, measuring in all 5 acres and situated at Aachanahalli Village, Hanbal Hobli, Sakleshpura Taluk, Hassan District.

8.

Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 claim to have purchased the aforesaid property under a registered sale deed dated 28.01.2016, executed by the legal heirs of Sri Joseph Zakaria Vadakel. Following the said purchase, the Petitioners claim to have developed the property and established a resort under the name and style of “Stone Valley Nature Resorts”.

9.

According to the Petitioners, the property originally belonged to the Revenue Department of the State of Karnataka and was auctioned by the Revenue Department through the Amildar. It is their case that, pursuant to an auction advertisement dated 30.08.1924, an auction in respect of Sy. No. 95 was conducted on 20.09.1924, in which Sri Byregowda, son of Sri Annegowda, emerged as the successful bidder for a sum of Rs. 435/-. The Petitioners further contend that Sri Byregowda paid the bid amount, together with interest, aggregating to Rs. 475-12-6 (Rupees four hundred and seventy-five, annas twelve and pies six only), on 09.11.1924.

10.

The Petitioners further state that, subsequent to their purchase, the property was partitioned under a registered partition deed dated 02.06.2017. Following the partition, phodi proceedings were conducted, and the property was assigned the new survey numbers, namely, Sy. Nos. 148/1 and 148/2. According to the Petitioners, the resort and their dwelling house are situated in Sy. No. 148/1, whereas no construction has been put up in Sy. No. 148/2.

11.

The Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the sale deed and the subsequent partition deed, the necessary mutation entries were effected in their names on 27.02.2018 and that their names have been entered in the Record of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTC) from the agricultural year 2023–2024 onwards.

12.

The Petitioners further state that, by an order dated 12.06.2019, the property was converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use for the purpose of establishing a resort. In support of their claim, they rely upon the conversion order, which, according to them, refers to Sy. No. 148/1, measuring 3 acres and 4 guntas, inclusive of 4 guntas of A-Kharab land, and records its conversion for non-agricultural purposes, namely, the establishment of a resort.

13.

The Petitioners further contend that, pursuant to the conversion order, they obtained the requisite permission from the Zilla Panchayat, Hassan, and proceeded to construct the resort. They also rely upon the registration of Stone Valley Nature Resorts LLP, of which they are partners, under the Goods and Services Tax regime, in support of their claim that the resort is being operated as a business establishment.

14.

The grievance of the Petitioners is that Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 have been initiating proceedings and registering cases against them without lawful authority, on the premise that the petition schedule property belongs to the Forest Department. According to the Petitioners, the Forest Department has issued notices and registered First Information Reports alleging forest offences without duly considering the documents issued by the Revenue Department in respect of the property.

15.

In this regard, the Petitioners refer to an order dated 26.07.2022 passed by Respondent No. 6, the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Forest Mobile Squad, Hassan, pursuant to a complaint lodged by Respondent No. 8, the Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpura. By the said order, the Petitioners were alleged to have encroached upon forest land notified under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, vide Notification No. R.8806/Ft.43-15-6 dated 05.02.1920. A further notice dated 18.07.2023 was issued in furtherance of the said proceedings. The Petitioners state that similar notices were issued to other owners of lands situated in the vicinity.

16.

The Petitioners contend that the owners of the lands in the said area submitted representations to the Revenue Department, complaining that the Forest Department was asserting rights over their lands in disregard of the revenue records and seeking protection against such action.

17.

According to the Petitioners, the representations led to two district-level coordination meetings being convened at Sakleshpura under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division, attended by officials of both the Forest Department and the Revenue Department of Hassan District, to consider the disputes concerning lands situated in the Moorkangudda area.

18.

The Petitioners assert that, during the said proceedings, it was concluded that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, had been cancelled by the then Government of Mysore in the year 1924 itself, vide Government Order No. IC 4239-Ft. 296-22-7 dated 11.01.1924, and that the cancellation had been duly published in the Gazette.

19.

The Petitioners further rely upon an order dated 08.09.2022 passed by the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division, whereby, according to them, it was held that the cases initiated by the Forest Department on the basis of the aforesaid cancelled notification stood abated and directions were issued to withdraw the notices issued against the landowners on the same basis.

20.

On the strength of the aforesaid order, the Petitioners contend that the notification relied upon by the Forest Department had ceased to operate nearly a century ago and that the continued initiation of proceedings against them, notwithstanding the alleged cancellation of the notification and the revenue records relied upon by them, amounts to unlawful interference with their rights over the petition schedule property.

21.

The Petitioners further allege that, on 18.07.2023, at about 8.00 a.m., approximately 45 officials of the Forest Department, led by Respondent No. 8, the Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpura, and allegedly armed with firearms and lathis, entered the resort premises and the Petitioners’ dwelling house without prior notice. They contend that the officials seized articles found in the premises without drawing a mahazar and that valuables, including gold and silver articles, were forcibly removed and have not been returned to them.

22.

Aggrieved by the alleged entry into their premises, seizure of articles and interference with their possession and enjoyment of the property, the Petitioners caused a legal notice dated 21.07.2023 to be issued to the Respondents, calling upon them to restore possession of the resort and the dwelling house and to return the movable articles allegedly seized. The Petitioners state that the Respondents have neither complied with the demands made in the notice nor furnished any response thereto.

23.

In these circumstances, alleging that the actions of the Respondents are without lawful authority and contrary to the records and proceedings relied upon by them, the Petitioners have approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for in the petition.

FACTS IN WP NO.19980/2023:

24.

The Petitioner claims that he migrated to Sakleshpura in search of employment and has been engaged in plantation work since 1970. He states that he constructed a house in Sy. No. 92, situated at Hanubalu, Acchana Halli, Hassan District, and has been cultivating an extent of 4 acres of land in the said survey number. The Petitioner claims to have submitted an application in Form No. 57, read with Section 94 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, seeking regularisation of his unauthorised occupation of the aforesaid 4 acres of land. He further states that he submitted a separate application under Section 94C of the said Act seeking regularisation of the house constructed by him, measuring approximately 2,400 square feet.

25.

The Petitioner contends that his name is entered in the tax register maintained by the Devalakere Grama Panchayat. He further relies upon a letter dated 10.02.2021 issued by the Grama Panchayat, which, according to him, records that he has been residing in the property since 2011. He states that electricity has been supplied to the property pursuant to a No Objection Certificate issued by the Grama Panchayat and that he has been regularly paying the applicable taxes in respect of the property. On this basis, the Petitioner asserts that the land in Sy. No. 92 falls within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Department.

26.

The Petitioner further states that his sons, who are the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023, purchased land bearing original Sy. No. 95, re-surveyed as Sy. No. 92 and assigned new Sy. No. 148, presently subdivided into Sy. Nos. 148/1 and 148/2, and established a resort under the name and style of “Stone Valley Nature Resorts”. He alleges that the Forest Department has been subjecting both him and his sons to undue harassment by asserting that the lands occupied by them belong to the Forest Department.

27.

The Petitioner contends that the Moorkangudda block comprises eight villages in the erstwhile Manjarabad Taluk, presently falling within Sakleshpura Taluk, and extends over a total area of 7,938 acres and 38 guntas. According to him, a notification dated 05.02.1920 was issued by the erstwhile Maharaja of Mysore under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, in respect of the said area. He asserts that the aforesaid notification was subsequently withdrawn by the Government of Mysore vide Government Order dated 11.01.1924.

28.

On the strength of the alleged withdrawal, the Petitioner contends that the notification dated 05.02.1920 ceased to have effect and that the lands in question continued to remain revenue lands. He further asserts that, subsequent to the alleged withdrawal, the Forest Department did not issue any notification under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, declaring the lands in question as forest lands or undertake any forest settlement proceedings for determining and settling the rights of persons in occupation, including rights relating to occupation, cultivation, grazing, water, collection of minor forest produce, community rights and easementary rights. Accordingly, the Petitioner maintains that the lands continue to fall within the administrative control of the Revenue Department.

29.

The Petitioner claims to have been residing in the property for over three decades and cultivating an extent of 4 acres of land. However, Respondent No. 2, the Conservator of Forests, initiated proceedings against him under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, alleging unauthorised encroachment upon forest land. By an order dated 26.07.2022, Respondent No. 2 held that the land in question constituted forest land notified under the notification dated 05.02.1920 and that the Petitioner’s occupation thereof was unauthorised. The Petitioner states that, pursuant to the said proceedings, his house was sealed and he was evicted from the property on 18.07.2023.

30.

Thereafter, on 09.11.2023, the Forest Settlement Officer issued a proclamation notice under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, calling upon the Petitioner to appear before the Forest Settlement Officer on 04.12.2023 and produce documents in support of his claim of ownership over the property. The Petitioner states that he submitted the relevant documents before the Forest Settlement Officer pursuant to the said notice.

31.

In the meanwhile, the Assistant Commissioner, by an order dated 05.06.2025, rejected the Petitioner’s application for regularisation of his occupation of the land. Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, which, according to him, is pending consideration.

32.

The Petitioner further relies upon the proceedings of the second district-level coordination meeting held on 08.09.2022 under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division. According to the Petitioner, at the said meeting, Respondent No. 3, the Deputy Conservator of Forests, was directed to withdraw all forest offence cases initiated against persons and farmers on the basis of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, dated 05.02.1920. The Petitioner contends that Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 participated in the said meeting and that the direction to withdraw the cases was issued in their presence.

33.

The Petitioner states that, in view of the aforesaid proceedings, he was under the bona fide impression that the notices and proceedings initiated by the Forest Department on the basis of the notification dated 05.02.1920 had been withdrawn. He nevertheless alleges that the Forest Department continued to assert its claim over the property and proceeded against him notwithstanding the said proceedings and the documents relied upon by him.

34.

In these circumstances, contending that the action of the Forest Department is without lawful authority, that the notification relied upon by it had been withdrawn in 1924 and that his long-standing occupation and cultivation of the land have not been duly considered, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition.

FACTS IN WP NO.29656/2024

35.

The Petitioner claims to be a registered partnership firm engaged in the hospitality business. It is stated that the Petitioner’s predecessors in title, namely, Sri B.P. Yageshwar, Smt. M.B. Sarala, Sri A.Y. Nachiket and Sri A.Y. Poorvika, were the owners of lands bearing Sy. Nos. 102 and 198, measuring 5 acres and 38 guntas and 5 acres and 23 guntas, respectively, situated at Agani Grama, Kyamanahalli Mandal Panchayat, Hanubala Hobli, Sakleshpura Taluk, Hassan District.

36.

The Petitioner states that it purchased the aforesaid lands from the said owners under a registered sale deed dated 19.01.2011. Subsequently, the Petitioner obtained an order dated 13.06.2014 converting the lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use for commercial resort purposes. The Petitioner further states that its application for establishing a resort was approved by the Joint Director, Rural and Urban Development, Mysuru. It also obtained a No Objection Certificate from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and approval of the layout plan from the Panchayat Development Officer, Moorkangudda, Sakleshpura Taluk.

37.

The Petitioner further claims that the property was duly surveyed and an e-Khata was issued in its name. Pursuant to the aforesaid approvals, the Petitioner developed a resort on the property, which is stated to be fully operational and to employ approximately 30 persons.

38.

The grievance of the Petitioner arises from notices dated 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024 and 10.09.2024 issued by Respondent No. 13, the Forest Settlement Officer (FSO), under the provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. By the said notices, the Petitioner was informed that a preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920 had been issued in respect of the lands in question, proposing to constitute the area as forest land. Since the Petitioner’s lands were stated to fall within the boundaries of the Moorkangudda block, the Petitioner was called upon to appear before the Forest Settlement Officer and produce the relevant documents in support of its claims and objections.

39.

The Petitioner contends that, although a notification dated 05.02.1920 was issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and published in the Mysore Gazette on 12.02.1920, the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda block as a State Forest was subsequently dropped by the Government of the erstwhile State of Mysore, vide Government Order dated 11.01.1924. According to the Petitioner, by the said order, the proposal to constitute the area as a State Forest was abandoned and the Revenue Department was directed to withdraw the acquisition proceedings relating to the lands proposed to be included within the Moorkangudda State Forest.

40.

On the basis of the aforesaid Government Order, the Petitioner asserts that the notification dated 05.02.1920 ceased to have effect and cannot be relied upon by the Forest Department to assert jurisdiction over the lands in question. Consequently, the Petitioner contends that Respondent No. 13 had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices calling upon it to appear before the Forest Settlement Officer and establish its rights over the property.

41.

The Petitioner further states that, upon receipt of similar notices from the Forest Department, the owners of lands situated in the surrounding area submitted representations to the Revenue Department, alleging that the Forest Department was asserting claims over their lands in disregard of the existing revenue records. According to the Petitioner, the matter was thereafter considered at district-level coordination meetings convened under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division.

42.

The Petitioner contends that, upon consideration of the matter, the Regional Commissioner concluded that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, had been cancelled in the year 1924 itself. The Petitioner relies upon the said proceedings to contend that the Forest Department cannot continue to initiate proceedings against landowners on the basis of the notification dated 05.02.1920.

43.

Despite the aforesaid Government Order and the proceedings before the Regional Commissioner, Respondent No. 13 is stated to have persisted with the issuance of notices dated 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024 and 10.09.2024, calling upon the Petitioner to appear before the Forest Settlement Officer and produce documents in support of its claims and objections concerning the petition schedule property.

44.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the said notices, and contending that the same are without jurisdiction in view of the alleged withdrawal of the notification dated 05.02.1920, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition.

FACTS IN WP NO.33767/2025:

45.

The present writ petition has been filed by 87 Petitioners, who claim to have a common cause of action in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 29 claim to have acquired their respective portions of land under registered sale deeds, partition deeds, wills and other instruments of transfer or devolution of title.

46.

Petitioners Nos. 30 to 51 state that they were in unauthorised occupation of portions of the land and had submitted applications seeking regularisation of such occupation. According to them, their applications were allowed and their unauthorised occupation was accordingly regularised by the competent authority.

47.

Petitioners Nos. 52 to 87 claim to be the owners of their respective portions of land. The Petitioners have approached this Court jointly, asserting a common grievance in relation to the subject matter of the writ petition and seeking the reliefs prayed for therein.

48.

The claim of the Petitioners is tabulated hereunder for ease of reference:

PETITIONER NUMBERSURVEY NUMBEREXTENTLOCATION
1Sy.No.161/12 acres 11 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
2Sy.No.176/3 and Sy.No.176/622 guntas and 13 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
3Sy. No.763 guntas and 10 guntasNot explicitly mentioned
4Sy.No.89, 92/p and 1626 acres 14 guntas, 2 acres and 5 acres 22 guntas along with 18 guntas kharabAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
5Sy.No.88p, Sy.No.197 (old Sy.No.362)6 acres and 2 acres 7 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
6Sy.No.197/paiki10 acresNadahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
7Sy.No.1372 acres 22 guntas (including 15 guntas kharab)Achanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
8, 9Sy.No.216/p, 216/p and 1031 acre 23 guntas, 1 acre 23 guntas and 2 acres 14 guntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
10Sy.No.103Included with Petitioners 8 & 9Agani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
11Sy.No.1972 acres 5 guntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
12Sy.No.362, Sy.No.1978 acres 10 guntas (for Sy.No.197)Nadahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
13, 14, 15Sy.No.148 acres 13 guntasJambaradi village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
16Sy.No.1869 Acres 29 GuntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
17Sy.No.142 (300)7 acres 3 guntasKyamanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
18Sy.No.1538 acres 36 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
19Sy.No.157 /25 acres 36 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
20Sy.No. 1971 acre 26 guntasNadahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
21Sy.No.1542 acres 14 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
22Sy.No.197/p3 acresNadahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
23, 24Sy.No.782 acres 30 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
25Sy.No. 91/2 and 91/326 guntas and 38 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
26Sy.No.1044 acres 10 guntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
27Sy.No.1333 acres 4 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
28Sy.No.164 (Masjid)2 acresKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
29Sy.No.1836 acres 21 guntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
30Sy.No. 76Not Specified (House constructed)Kadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
31Sy.No. 88Not Specified (House constructed)Kadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
32Sy. No. 88 (old No.76)2 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
33, 34Sy.No.451.12 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
35Sy.No.9224 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
36, 37Sy.No.451.18 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
38Sy.No.921.18 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
39, 40Sy.No.921.18 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
41Sy No.923 acresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
42Survey No. 3902 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
43Sy.No.8802 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
44Sy. No. 1031.12 GuntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
45Sy. No. 88/14 acres and 18 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
46Sy.No.920.2 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
47Sy.No.1032 acres 9 guntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
48Sy.No.1972 acresNadahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
49Sy.No. 880.1 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
50Sy.No.124Not Specified (House constructed)Achanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
51Sy.No. 222 acres 5 guntasJambaradi village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
52, 53Sy.No.1824 acresAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
54Sy.No.161/24 acres 23 guntas and 13 guntas KharabAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
55Sy.No.1791 acre 34 guntas 6 guntas KharabAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
56Sy. No.921 acreAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
57Sy.No.932 AcresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
58, 59Sy. No.142 and Sy.No.1414 acres 22 guntas and 4 acres 20 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
60Sy.No.1032 AcresAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
61Sy.No.1666 AcresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
62Sy.No.932 AcresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
63Sy.No.931 acre 20 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
64Sy.No.1632 acres 20 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
65Sy.No.1632 acres 20 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
66Sy.No.984 AcresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
67, 68Sy.No.975 acresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
69Sy.No.1407 acres 26 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
70, 71, 72, 73, 74Sy.No.1342 Acres 10 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
75Sy.No.921 AcreAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
76Sy.No.1361 Acre 2 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
77Sy.No.3712 Acres 28 GuntasNadahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
78Sy.No.923 acresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
79Sy.No.1031.12 guntasAgani village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
80Sy.No.1743 acres 22 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
81, 82Sy.No.922 acresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
83Sy.No.410.2 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
84Sy.No.1781 acre 31 guntasAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
85Sy.No.17612 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
86Sy.No.762 guntasKadumane village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
87Sy.No.924 acresAchanahalli village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpur Taluk
49.

The Petitioners contend that, upon issuance of notices by the Forest Settlement Officer (FSO), they submitted representations to the Revenue Department, raising objections to the assertion of forest rights over the lands in question. They further state that the issues concerning their lands were considered at the district-level coordination meetings held on 10.06.2022 and 08.09.2022 under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division. According to the Petitioners, the directions issued by the Regional Commissioner in the said proceedings are equally applicable to their cases. On this basis, the Petitioners contend that the continued issuance of proclamation notices under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and the initiation or continuation of proceedings under Section 64A(1) of the said Act by the Forest Department are without jurisdiction and contrary to the directions issued by the Regional Commissioner. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioners have approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition.

FACTS IN WP NO.29690/2025:

50.

Petitioner No. 1 claims to be the absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of a coffee plantation measuring 14 acres and 20 guntas, comprised in Sy. Nos. 80, 177, 178, 179, 151/P and 133 (corresponding to old Sy. Nos. 88 and 88/P), situated at Kadumane Village, Hanubalu Hobli, Sakleshpura Taluk, Hassan District. Petitioner No. 1 states that the said lands were acquired under four registered sale deeds, three dated 30.08.2008 and the fourth dated 06.07.2017.

51.

Petitioner No. 2 claims to be the absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of 7 acres of land, inclusive of 10 guntas of kharab land, in Sy. No. 148 of the same village, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 22.11.2006.

52.

The Petitioners state that, pursuant to their respective purchases, the revenue records were mutated in their names, and their names were entered in the Record of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTC). Petitioner No. 2 further states that a house was constructed in the erstwhile Sy. No. 88/P, which subsequently came within the Gramathana limits.

53.

The Petitioners contend that, during the period between 1952 and 1961, the State Government granted different extents of land in Sy. Nos. 88 and 88/P of Kadumane Village to various persons who were in occupation of or cultivating the said lands, by issuing saguvali chits. According to the Petitioners, the lands forming part of their respective properties were originally granted to Sri Hasan Koya, from whom portions of the lands were purchased by them. The remaining portions were acquired from subsequent purchasers who had derived title from other original grantees.

54.

The Petitioners challenge the show-cause notices issued during the year 2022 under Section 64(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, alleging contravention of Sections 24(g), 24(gg), 24(h), 73(d) and 104 of the said Act, as well as Section 2(a) of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The notices allege that the Petitioners have encroached upon forest land situated in Sy. No. 76 of Kadumane Village.

55.

The Petitioners contend that the allegations are devoid of any factual or legal basis, having regard to their registered sale deeds, the revenue entries standing in their names and the historical grants evidenced by the saguvali chits.

56.

The Petitioners further state that, pursuant to the aforesaid proceedings, Respondent No. 5, the Forest Settlement Officer (FSO), issued a proclamation dated 19.07.2023 concerning the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda block as a Reserved Forest, relying upon the notification dated 05.02.1920.

57.

The Petitioners contend that the notification dated 05.02.1920, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, had been withdrawn in its entirety by a subsequent notification or Government Order dated 11.01.1924. On that basis, they assert that the earlier notification could not be relied upon to initiate or continue forest settlement proceedings in respect of the lands in question and that the Forest Settlement Officer could not proceed on the premise that the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda block as a Reserved Forest remained operative.

58.

In these circumstances, the Petitioners contend that the show-cause notices issued under Section 64(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and the proclamation dated 19.07.2023 issued by the Forest Settlement Officer are unsustainable in law. Accordingly, they have approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition.

FACTS IN WP NO.700/2026:

59.

The Petitioner claims to be the absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of coffee plantation lands measuring in all 52 acres and 5 guntas, comprised in Sy. Nos. 142, 66, 65, 64, 76 and 113 of Kadumane Village, Hanbal Hobli, Sakleshpura Taluk, Hassan District; Sy. Nos. 61, 63, 136 and 135 of Mulehadlu Kadumane Village, Hanbal Hobli, Sakleshpura Taluk, Hassan District; and Sy. Nos. 422 and 423 of Heggadde Village, Hanbal Hobli, Sakleshpura Taluk, Hassan District. The Petitioner states that the aforesaid lands were purchased under a registered sale deed dated 24.06.1988 in the name of a partnership firm styled “River View Estates”. The Petitioner further claims that its name has been entered in the Record of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTC) in respect of the said lands and that coffee and pepper are being cultivated thereon.

60.

The Petitioner states that a notice dated 30.06.2025 was issued to it under Section 7 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. According to the Petitioner, no other notice has been served upon it, nor have any proceedings been initiated against it under Section 64A(1) of the said Act.

61.

The Petitioner further contends that, although proclamation notices under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, have been issued in respect of lands belonging to other landowners and plantation owners in the vicinity, no such proclamation has been issued in respect of the lands claimed by the Petitioner, nor has any such proclamation been served upon it.

62.

The Petitioner states that, in view of the proceedings initiated by the Forest Department against other landowners and plantation owners in the surrounding area, it apprehends that similar proceedings may be initiated in respect of its lands. Aggrieved by the notice dated 30.06.2025 and apprehending further action by the Forest Department against the lands in its possession, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS:

63.

Sri.Manmohan P N, learned counsel for the Petitioner/s in WP No.16251/2023, WP No.29656/2024 and WP No.19980/2023 submits that:

63.1.

The lands in question do not belong to the Forest Department and continue to fall within the jurisdiction and administrative control of the Revenue Department. He submits that the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda block as a State Forest, pursuant to the notification dated 05.02.1920 issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, was dropped by the Government of Mysore vide Government Order dated 11.01.1924. Consequently, the notification ceased to have effect, and the Forest Department cannot claim jurisdiction over the Petitioners’ lands on the basis of the said notification.

63.2.

He further submits that the lands in question were granted by the Revenue Department to the predecessors-in-title of the Petitioners and that such grants must be given their full legal effect. In the absence of any challenge to the grants made by the competent Revenue authorities, the Forest Department cannot disregard the grants and the consequential revenue records and assert jurisdiction over the lands in question.

63.3.

Learned counsel reiterates that, the notification dated 05.02.1920 having been withdrawn in 1924, the initiation of proceedings by the Forest Settlement Officer (FSO) nearly a century later is wholly without jurisdiction. In the alternative, he submits that, even assuming that the notification continues to subsist, the initiation of proceedings after a lapse of approximately 100 years is beyond any reasonable period and is, therefore, unsustainable in law. According to him, the Forest Settlement Officer was required to initiate and conclude the statutory proceedings within a reasonable time, and a delay of such magnitude cannot be justified.

63.4.

He further contends that the Range Forest Officer (RFO) has acted beyond the authority conferred upon him and that the impugned actions are illegal and actuated by mala fides.

63.5.

Learned counsel submits that, even assuming that the notification dated 05.02.1920 continues to remain in force, the Forest Department could not have summarily evicted the Petitioners without completing the statutory procedure prescribed for constitution of a Reserved Forest under the applicable forest legislation. He contends that the mere existence of a notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, does not, by itself, authorise the Forest Department to dispossess the Petitioners from the lands in question.

63.6.

He further submits that, unless the statutory proceedings contemplated under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, had been completed and a final notification under Section 17 thereof had been issued, the Respondents could not invoke Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, to dispossess the Petitioners on the premise that the lands had acquired the status of forest land. He also contends that, upon repeal of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, by the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, any action by the Forest Department must be traceable to the powers conferred under the latter enactment and undertaken in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein.

63.7.

Learned counsel further submits that the concept of a deemed forest cannot be invoked as an independent legal basis to dispossess persons who are in settled possession of land. He contends that the Respondents cannot rely upon a purported deeming fiction, without establishing the legal status of the land and the applicability of the relevant statutory provisions, to justify the eviction of the Petitioners.

63.8.

With regard to the survey sketch relied upon by the RFO, learned counsel submits that no survey was conducted in the presence of the Petitioners or after affording them an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. He contends that the sketch relied upon by the Forest Department is based upon a unilateral survey conducted by its officials in 2019 and that the Petitioners were neither associated with the survey nor afforded an opportunity to raise objections regarding the identification and boundaries of the lands. On this basis, he disputes the evidentiary value of the survey sketch and contends that the Forest Department cannot assert its claim over the Petitioners’ lands solely on the strength of such a unilateral exercise.

63.9.

Learned counsel questions the competence of the authority who initiated the proceedings and passed the impugned orders. He submits that the orders in question were passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Forest Mobile Squad, Hassan, who, according to him, is not the authority competent to exercise the powers contemplated under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He therefore contends that the impugned proceedings are vitiated for want of jurisdiction and are liable to be set aside.

63.10.

Section 64A is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

64A. Penalty for unauthorisedly taking

possession of land constituted as reserved

forest, 2[district forest, village forest, protected

forest and any other land under the control of

the Forest Department .—(1) Any person unauthorisedly occupying any land in reserved forest, 2[district forest, village forest, protected forest and any other land under the control of the Forest Department may, without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him under any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, be summarily evicted, by a Forest Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests and any crop including trees raised in the land and any building or other construction erected thereon shall, if not removed by him within such time as the Forest Officer may fix, be liable to forfeiture:

Provided that before evicting a person under this sub-section he shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(2)

Any property forfeited under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of in such manner as the Forest Officer may direct and the cost of removal of any crop, building or other work and of all works necessary to restore the land to its original condition shall be recoverable from the person evicted in the manner provided in section 109.

(3)

Any person aggrieved by an order of the Forest Officer under sub-section (1) may, within such period and in such manner as may be prescribed, appeal against such order to the State Government or to such officer as may be authorised by the State Government in this behalf and the order of the Forest Officer shall, subject to the decision in such appeal, be final.

63.11.

By referring to Section 64A he submits that the exercise of power of summary eviction under the said provision is contingent upon the land in question falling within one of the categories specified therein, namely, reserved forest, district forest, village forest, protected forest or any other land under the control of the Forest Department. He contends that, in the present case, the lands in question neither constitute reserved forest nor have been established to be under the control of the Forest Department. On the contrary, according to him, the lands continue to fall within the jurisdiction and control of the Revenue Department. Consequently, the essential jurisdictional requirement for invoking Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, is not satisfied.

63.12.

Learned counsel further draws attention to the express stipulation in sub-section (1) of Section 64A that the power of summary eviction may be exercised only by a Forest Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests. He submits that the authority which initiated the impugned proceedings and passed the orders in question lacks the requisite statutory competence to exercise the said power. He therefore contends that the impugned proceedings are vitiated both for want of jurisdiction over the lands in question and for non-compliance with the statutory requirement concerning the rank and competence of the officer authorised to order eviction.

63.13.

Learned counsel submits that, although the Deputy Conservator of Forests is a rank higher than that of an Assistant Conservator of Forests, the Deputy Conservator of Forests who initiated the impugned action in the present case is attached to the Mobile Squad and is not the officer having territorial jurisdiction over the lands in question. He contends that the officer’s rank, by itself, does not establish his competence to initiate the proceedings in respect of the particular properties, and that the jurisdiction of the officer concerned must also be established.

63.14.

Learned counsel further submits that, in some cases, the lands were auctioned by the Revenue Department and purchased by private individuals, who subsequently obtained conversion of the lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, including for commercial resort purposes. According to him, the purchasers obtained the requisite licences and registrations from the concerned departments to carry on their businesses and invested substantial amounts in the construction and development of the resorts. He contends that the concerned authorities have failed to take into consideration the equities arising from these transactions, the permissions and licences granted, and the substantial investments made by the Petitioners before initiating the impugned proceedings.

63.15.

As regards the proclamation, he refers to Section 5 of the Act of 1963 which is reproduced hereunder for his reference:

5. Proclamation by Forest Settlement Officer.—

When a notification has been issued under section 4, the Forest Settlement Officer shall publish in Kannada and in any other regional language of the area, at the headquarters of each taluk in which any portion of the land comprised in such notification is situate and in every town and village in the neighbourhood of such land a proclamation,—

(a)

specifying, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of the proposed forest;

(b)

setting forth the substance of the provisions of section 6;

(c)

explaining the consequences which, as hereinafter provided, will ensue on such forest being constituted a reserved forest; and

(d)

fixing a period of not less than three months from the date of publishing such proclamation, and requiring every person claiming any right or making any claim referred to or mentioned in section 4, either to present to such officer within such period a written notice specifying or to appear before him within such period and state the nature of such right or claim (if any) and in either case to produce all documents in support thereof.

The Forest Settlement Officer shall also serve a notice to the same effect on every known or reputed owner or occupier of any land included in or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest or on his recognised agent or manager. Such notice may be sent by registered post to persons residing beyond the limits of the district in which such land is situate.

63.16.

By referring to Section 5, he submits that Section 5 prescribes the procedure to be followed upon issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the said Act. The provision requires publication of a proclamation in Kannada and any other regional language of the area, specifying the situation and limits of the proposed forest, setting forth the substance of Section 6, explaining the consequences of constitution of the forest as a reserved forest, and calling upon persons claiming any right or interest in the land to submit their claims within the prescribed period. Section 5 further requires the Forest Settlement Officer to serve a notice to the same effect on every known or reputed owner or occupier of land included in or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted as a reserved forest, or on such person’s recognised agent or manager.

63.17.

Placing reliance on Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, learned counsel submits that individual notice to every known or reputed owner or occupier of the land in question, or to such person’s recognised agent or manager, is a mandatory procedural requirement. He contends that, in the present case, no such notice was served on the Petitioners subsequent to the issuance of the notification under Section 4, much less was the procedure prescribed under Section 5 complied with. Accordingly, he submits that the proceedings are vitiated by non-compliance with the statutory requirements governing the settlement of rights in the proposed reserved forest.

63.18.

Learned counsel submits that several rights in favour of the Petitioners came to be created after 1920 and, more particularly, after the cancellation of the notification in 1924. In the circumstances, he contends that reliance on the notification issued in 1920 is misplaced. He further submits that, if the Respondents intend to constitute the lands in question as a reserved forest, they must recommence the proceedings de novo under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, by following the procedure prescribed therein from the inception.

63.19.

Learned counsel contends that, in the absence of such fresh proceedings, all actions taken pursuant to the notification of 1920, which has been cancelled in 1924, are non est in law and are not binding on the Petitioners. He further submits that, once the notification issued under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, ceased to be in force, a proclamation under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, could not have been issued without a valid notification under Section 4 of the said Act. Accordingly, he argues that the impugned actions of the Respondents are contrary to the applicable statutory provisions and are liable to be set aside.

63.20.

He refers to Section 4 of the Regulations of 1900 which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

Notification by Government

4.

Whenever it is proposed to constitute any land a State Forest, the Government shall publish a notification in the official Gazette-

(a)

specifying as nearly as possible the situation and limits of such land;

(b)

declaring that it is proposed to constitute such land a State Forest; and

(c)

appointing an officer (hereinafter called “the Forest Settlement Officer”) to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by, or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any land comprised within such limits, or to any forest produce of such land, and to deal with the same as provided in this chapter.

The officer appointed under clause (c) of this section shall ordinarily be a person other than a Forest Officer; but a Forest Officer may be appointed by the Government to assist the Forest Settlement Officer in the inquiry prescribed by this chapter.

63.21.

Learned counsel refers to Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which provides for the issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette whenever it is proposed to constitute any land as a State Forest. The provision requires the notification to specify, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of the land proposed to be constituted as a State Forest, declare such proposal, and appoint a Forest Settlement Officer to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of the rights claimed by, or alleged to exist in favour of, any person in or over the land or in respect of the forest produce thereof.

63.22.

Placing reliance on Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, learned counsel submits that the provision contemplates the publication of a proposal to constitute land as a State Forest and is not pari materia with Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. Drawing a comparison between the two provisions, he contends that, while Section 4 of the Regulation contemplates a proposal to constitute land as a State Forest, Section 4 of the Act of 1963 provides for the initiation of proceedings for constituting land as a reserved forest under the statutory framework of the said Act. He submits that, in the absence of proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Act of 1963, the Respondents could not have resorted to Section 5 thereof after the lapse of nearly a century by relying upon the cancelled notification issued in 1920.

63.23.

Learned counsel further contends that, even assuming that the proposal contained in the notification issued in 1920 continued to subsist, it remained only a proposal to constitute the land as a State Forest and could not, by itself, be treated as a decision to constitute the land as a reserved forest under the Act of 1963. According to him, the statutory scheme under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, differs from that under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and the two cannot be treated as interchangeable for the purpose of initiating or continuing proceedings for constitution of a reserved forest.

63.24.

Referring to the procedure contemplated under the Regulation, learned counsel submits that, upon publication of a notification under Section 4, the Forest Settlement Officer was required to publish a proclamation in the prescribed manner, specifying, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of the proposed forest, setting forth the substance of the relevant provisions concerning claims to rights, explaining the consequences of the proposed constitution of the land as a State Forest, and fixing a period of not less than three months for persons claiming rights or interests in the land to submit their claims or appear before the Forest Settlement Officer and produce supporting documents. He contends that the statutory process under the Regulation was distinct from that prescribed under the Act of 1963 and that the Respondents could not rely upon the former notification to dispense with the initiation and compliance of proceedings under the latter enactment.

63.25.

Learned counsel submits that the time limit prescribed under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, underscores the importance of adhering to the statutory timeline and completing the prescribed process within a reasonable period. Upon publication of the notification, the Forest Settlement Officer was required to issue a proclamation calling upon persons claiming rights or interests in the land to submit their claims or objections within the prescribed period of not less than three months from the date of publication of the proclamation.

63.26.

He contends that no such proclamation was issued by the Forest Settlement Officer under the relevant provisions of the Regulation following the notification issued in 1920. Consequently, even assuming that the notification of 1920 continued to remain in force, notwithstanding its cancellation in 1924, the Respondents could not seek to rely upon it after the lapse of nearly a century without having undertaken the consequential statutory proceedings within a reasonable period. According to learned counsel, the prolonged inaction and failure to follow the prescribed procedure have rendered the reliance placed on the notification untenable.

63.27.

Learned counsel further refers to Section 7 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

7. Enquiry by Forest Settlement Officer

The Forest Settlement Officer shall take down in writing all statements made under Section 5(d), and shall, at some convenient place, enquire into all claims duly preferred under that section, and into the existence and extent of any rights mentioned in Section 4(c) and not claimed under Section 5(d), so far as the same may be ascertainable from the records of Government and the evidence of any persons likely to be acquainted with the same.

The Forest Settlement Officer shall, at the same time, consider and record any allegation which the Forest Officer, if any, appointed to assist him may make to any such claim or any information which he may afford with regard to the existence and extent of any such right.

63.28.

By referring to Section 7 he submits that the Forest Settlement Officer was required to record in writing the statements made pursuant to the preceding provisions and conduct an inquiry into the claims received. He contends that no such inquiry was conducted and no steps were taken by the Forest Settlement Officer to complete the statutory process contemplated under the Regulation.

63.29.

Learned counsel further relies on Section 11 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

11. Order on claims to rights of way or pasture

or to forest produce or water. — In the case of a claim to rights of way or pasture or to forest produce or water, the Forest Settlement Officer shall pass an order specifying the particulars of such claim and admitting or rejecting the same in whole or in part.

63.30.

By referring to Section 11 he submits that the Forest Settlement Officer was required, in respect of every claim received, to pass an order specifying the particulars of the claim and admitting or rejecting it, either wholly or in part. He contends that no such orders were passed and that the claims of persons asserting rights over the lands were never adjudicated in accordance with the statutory procedure.

63.31.

On this basis, he submits that the proceedings initiated by reference to the notification of 1920 cannot be sustained in the absence of compliance with the mandatory steps prescribed under the Regulation.

63.32.

He relies on Section 12 of the Regulation of 1900, which reads as under:-

12. Record to be made where claim is admitted.

If the Forest Settlement Officer admits in whole or in part any claim under Section 11, he shall record the extent to which the claim is so admitted, specifying-

(a)

in the case of rights of way, by whom they may be enjoyed, the width of way, and whether for cart traffic or for men and cattle only, and the conditions, if any, attached to the right;

(b)

in the case of pasturage, the number and de-scription of cattle which the claimant is from time to time entitled to graze in the forest, the season during which such pasturage is permitted, and any conditions attached to the right;

(c)

in the case of forest produce, the quantity of timber or other forest produce which the claimant is entitled to take or receive, whether the benefit of such timber or other forest produce may be leased, sold or bartered, and such other particulars as may be necessary in order to define the nature, incidents and extent of the right; and

(d)

in the case of water, by whom and for what purposes the water may be utilized, and any conditions attached to its use.

63.33.

Learned counsel, placing reliance on Section 12 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, submits that the provision prescribes the particulars to be recorded by the Forest Settlement Officer upon admitting, either wholly or in part, a claim preferred under Section 11. The Forest Settlement Officer is required to specify the extent to which the claim is admitted and record the particulars relevant to the nature and incidents of the right recognised. These include, as applicable, the persons entitled to exercise a right of way, the width and nature of the way and the conditions attached thereto; the number and description of cattle permitted to be grazed, the relevant season and the conditions governing pasturage; the quantity of timber or other forest produce which the claimant is entitled to take or receive and the incidents of that right; and the persons entitled to utilise water, the purposes for which it may be used and the conditions governing such use.

63.34.

He further submits that the statutory requirement is not satisfied by a general or unspecified recognition of a claim. The extent of the admission and the particulars of the right recognised must be specifically recorded by the Forest Settlement Officer. According to learned counsel, no such determination was made and no record specifying the extent and particulars of any admitted claim was prepared. He therefore contends that the failure to comply with Section 12 constitutes a further instance of non-compliance with the procedure prescribed under the Regulation.

63.35.

He refers to Section 13 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

13. Exercise of admitted rights

Record to be made where claim is admitted.—If the Forest Settlement Officer admits in whole or in part any claim under section 12, he shall record the extent to which the claim is so admitted, specifying as far as may be practicable,—

(a)

the name, father’s name, residence, and occupation of the person claiming the right;

(b)

the designation, position and area of all fields or groups of fields (if any) and the designation and position of all buildings (if any) in respect of which the exercise of such rights is claimed;

(c)

in the case of rights of way, by whom they may be enjoyed, the width of the way, and whether for vehicular traffic or for men and cattle only, and the conditions, if any, attached to the right;

(d)

in the case of pasturage, the number and description of cattle which the claimant is from time to time entitled to graze in the forest, the season during which such pasturage is permitted, and any conditions attached to the rights;

(e)

in the case of forest produce, the quantity of timber or other forest produce which the claimant is entitled to take or receive, whether the benefit of such timber or other forest produce may be leased, sold or bartered and such other particulars as may be necessary in order to define the nature, incidents and extent of the right;

(f)

in the case of water, by whom and for what purposes the water may be utilised, and any condition attached to its use.

63.36.

By referring to Section 13, his submission is that the provision further requires the Forest Settlement Officer, upon admitting a claim, either wholly or in part, to record the extent of such admission and, as far as practicable, specify the particulars of the claimant, the fields or groups of fields and buildings in respect of which the rights are claimed, and the details necessary to identify and define the nature and extent of the rights admitted. These particulars include the persons entitled to exercise rights of way, the width and nature of the way and the conditions governing its use; the number and description of cattle permitted to graze, the relevant season and the conditions attached to pasturage; the quantity and nature of forest produce which may be taken or received and the incidents of that right; and the persons entitled to utilise water, the purposes for which it may be used and the conditions governing its use.

63.37.

Learned counsel further submits that Section 13 is intended to ensure that the rights admitted by the Forest Settlement Officer are specifically identified and recorded with sufficient particulars to facilitate their exercise in accordance with the terms of the settlement. He contends that, in the present case, no such record specifying the claimants, the lands or buildings concerned, or the nature and extent of the rights admitted was prepared. According to him, the absence of such particulars demonstrates that the claims were not adjudicated, and the exercise of any admitted rights was not provided for in the manner contemplated by the Regulation. He therefore submits that the failure to comply with Section 13 constitutes a further instance of non-compliance with the statutory procedure.

63.38.

He relies on Section 14, of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

14. Commutation of rights

In case the Forest Settlement Officer finds it impossible, having due regard to the maintenance of the proposed State Forest, to make such settlement under Section 13 as shall secure the continued exercise of the said rights to the admitted extent, he shall, subject to such rules as the Government may from time to time prescribe in this behalf, he may commute such rights, either by the payment of a sum of money in lieu thereof, or, with the consent of the claimant, by the grant of land, or in suh other manner as such officer thinks fit.

63.39.

By relying on Section 14, his submission is that Section 14 requires the Forest Settlement Officer, after recording the rights admitted, to pass appropriate orders to ensure their continued exercise, having due regard to the maintenance of the proposed reserved forest. For this purpose, the provision empowers the Forest Settlement Officer to provide an alternative and reasonably convenient right of way; set apart another forest tract of sufficient extent and in a reasonably convenient locality for the exercise of rights of pasturage or the collection of forest produce; alter the limits of the proposed reserved forest to exclude the relevant tract or demarcate an enclosure within which the rules governing reserved forests would not apply; or permit the continued exercise of the admitted rights, subject to prescribed conditions and restrictions designed to prevent their abuse.

63.40.

Referring to Section 14 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, learned counsel further submits that, where the Forest Settlement Officer is unable to make an order ensuring the continued exercise of the admitted rights, the Regulation provides for the commutation of such rights by payment of a sum of money in lieu thereof or, with the consent of the claimant, by the grant of land or through such other arrangement as may be permissible under the applicable provision. He contends that, consequently, if the rights of the Petitioners were admitted but could not be continued in their existing form, the Forest Settlement Officer was required to consider their commutation in accordance with law, including by monetary compensation or the grant of alternative land, as applicable. Learned counsel submits that no such determination or arrangement was made following the notification issued in 1920. He therefore contends that the failure to provide for the continued exercise of the admitted rights or to deal with their commutation in accordance with the statutory scheme constitutes a further ground for challenging the impugned proceedings.

63.41.

He relies on Section 15, of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

15. Appeal from order passed under Sections 10, 11, 12, 13 or 14.

Any person who has made a claim under this chapter or any Forest Officer or other person generally or specially empowered by the Government in this behalf, may, within three months from the date of the order passed on such claim by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 10, 11, 12, 13 or 14, prefer an appeal from such order to the officer of the Revenue Department, of rank not lower than that of a Deputy Commissioner, as the Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint by name, or as holding an office, to hear appeals from such ...

63.42.

Section 15 provides for payment of compensation where the Forest Settlement Officer, having due regard to the maintenance of the reserved forest, finds it impossible to make a settlement under Section 14 that would ensure the continued exercise of the admitted rights to the extent recognised. In such circumstances, the Forest Settlement Officer is required to direct the State Government to pay compensation, determined on the basis of the value of the rights as on the date of the notification issued under Section 4, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

63.43.

He relies on Section 16, of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

16. Appeal under Section 15

Every appeal under the last foregoing section shall be made by petition in writing, and may be delivered to the Forest Settlement Officer, who shall forward it without delay to the appellate authority.

Every such appeal shall be heard and determined in the manner prescribed for the time being for the disposal of appeals in matters relating to land revenue and the order passed on the appeal shall be final, subject only to revision by the Government.

63.44.

Learned counsel further submits that Section 16 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, provides for an appeal by a claimant aggrieved by an order passed under Sections 10 to 14 of the Regulation to an officer of the Revenue Department not below the rank of a Deputy Commissioner, as prescribed by the Government by notification. He contends that, in the present case, no orders were passed under Sections 10, 11, 12, 13 or 14 of the Regulation. Consequently, no occasion arose for the claimants or landowners to invoke the appellate remedy against any such order. According to learned counsel, the absence of orders determining the claims and rights in accordance with the statutory scheme further demonstrates that the proceedings contemplated under the Regulation were not completed.

63.45.

He relies on Section 17, of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

17. Notification declaring forest State forest.—(1)

When the following events have occurred, viz:—

(a)

the period fixed under Section 5 for preferring claims has elapsed, and all claims, (if any) made within such period have been disposed of by the Forest Settlement Officer; and

(b)

if such claims have been made, the period limited by section 15 for appealing from the orders passed on such claims has elapsed and all appeals (if any) presented within such period have been disposed of by the appellate authority; and

(c)

all proceedings prescribed by Sections 10 and 13 have been taken and all lands and buildings (if any) to be included in the proposed State Forest, which the Forest Settlement Officer has under section 10 elected to acquire under the Land Acquisition Regulation, 1894, have become vested in Government under section 16 of that Regulation,

(d)

the Government may publish a notification in the official Gazette specifying the limits of the forest which is intended to constitute a State Forest and declaring the same to be a State forest from a date fixed by such notification, subject to the exercise of rights (if any) specified at foot of the said notification.

(2)

From the date so fixed, such forest shall be deemed to be a “State Forest”.

63.46.

By relying on Section 17, he submits that it prescribes the conditions precedent for issuance of a final notification declaring a forest to be a reserved forest. The provision contemplates that the period prescribed for preferring claims under Section 5 must have expired and all claims made under that section or Section 9 must have been disposed of by the Forest Settlement Officer; the period prescribed for preferring appeals against orders passed on such claims must have expired and all appeals presented within that period must have been disposed of; and the proceedings contemplated under Sections 10 and 13 must have been completed, including the acquisition of any lands or buildings required to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

63.47.

Upon fulfilment of these conditions, the State Government is required to publish a notification specifying the limits of the forest and declaring it to be a reserved forest with effect from the date specified therein, subject to any rights expressly recognised in the notification. Under sub-section (2), the forest is deemed to be a reserved forest from the date so specified.

63.48.

Referring to Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, learned counsel submits that a final notification declaring the land to be a reserved forest could be issued only upon completion of the statutory proceedings contemplated under the Regulation, including the adjudication of claims by the Forest Settlement Officer and the disposal of any appeals arising therefrom. He contends that, in the present case, the proceedings contemplated under Sections 5 to 14 of the Regulation were not completed, no final notification under Section 17 was issued, and the lands have continued in the possession of the individual owners. Accordingly, he submits that the lands were never finally constituted as a reserved forest under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900.

63.49.

Learned counsel further places reliance on the report dated 11.10.2022 prepared by the Assistant Commissioner, Sakleshpur Sub-Division, Hassan District, and submits that the report also refers to the withdrawal of the notification issued in 1920. He contends that this material lends support to the Petitioners’ case that the notification relied upon by the Respondents had been withdrawn and that no subsequent proceedings culminating in a final notification under Section 17 were undertaken to constitute the lands as a reserved forest.

63.50.

He relies on the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s.Bharat Parikh and Co vs. The State of Karnataka and others [W.P. 22514/2018 dated 18.6.2019], more particularly paragraphs 5 to 7, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

5.

We have carefully considered the submissions. The impugned order/ communication proceeds on the assumption that the subject land has been declared as a reserved forest only because of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act. The only ground for invoking the said Act of 1980 is the issuance of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act.

6.

We have perused the provisions of Chapter II of the Karnataka Forest Act. For constituting any land as reserved forest, the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act is only a first step which is required to be taken before the State Government decides to constitute a land as a reserved forest. Thereafter, elaborate process will be followed as provided in various provisions of Chapter II and the land is declared as a reserved forest only after a notification under Section 17 of the Karnataka Forest Act is issued. Only on this narrow ground, the impugned communication will have to set aside.

7.

The issue whether subject land falls within the wider definition of ‘forest’ as held by the Apex Court and whether Section 2 of the said Act of 1980 is applicable are the issues which need not be gone into in this writ petition inasmuch as the impugned order proceeds only on one ground namely, the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act. The issue whether the subject land is a forest land within the meaning of said Act of 1980 is always open and we have made no adjudication on the said question. Hence, subject to what is observed above, a case is made out for quashing of impugned notice.

63.51.

By relying on M/s.Bharat Parikh and Co, he submits that the issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, is only the first step in the process of constituting land as a reserved forest and that the statutory procedure prescribed under Chapter II of the Act must thereafter be followed. The Court further observed that land can be declared a reserved forest only upon issuance of a notification under Section 17 of the Act. On that basis, the impugned communication in that case was set aside, while leaving open the question whether the land in question fell within the wider definition of ‘forest’ and whether the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, were applicable.

63.52.

Placing reliance on M/s.Bharat Parikh and Co, learned counsel submits that the issuance of a notification under Section 4, by itself, does not culminate in the constitution of land as a reserved forest. The statutory process prescribed under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, must be completed, culminating in the issuance of a final notification under Section 17. He contends that, in the present case, no such final notification has been issued and that the Respondents cannot treat the notification of 1920, issued under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, as sufficient, by itself, to establish that the lands in question were constituted as reserved forest. He therefore submits that, in the absence of a final notification and completion of the prescribed statutory process, the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside, in view of the principle laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench in M/s. Bharat Parikh and Co.

63.53.

He relies on the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Emerald Haven Estates Ltd., vs. State of Karnataka and others [WP No.41187/2016 dated 16.3.2017], more particularly Paras 7 to 13, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

7.

In order to appreciate the submission advanced by Mr.S.Vijayshankar, we need to consider certain provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act. Sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the said Act defines the expression “Forest Officer” as under:-

“Forest Officer means any person appointed by or under the orders of the State Government to be the Principal Chief Conservator, Additional Principal Chief Conservator, Chief Conservator, Additional Chief Conservator, Conservator, Deputy Conservator, Assistant Conservator, Forest Ranger, Forester, Forest Guard or Forest Watcher, or to discharge any function of Forest Officer under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder to be done by a Forest Officer.”

8.

Sub section (14) of Section 2 of the said Act, defines “Reserved Forest” as any land settled and notified as such in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the said Act.

9.

The clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act provides for appointment of Forest Settlement Officer to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any land comprised within such limits or in or over any forest produce, and to deal with the same as provided in the Chapter II of the said Act.

10.

He is a different person from a Forest Officer. It was expressly provided under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act that an officer appointed as Forest Settlement Officer shall be a person not holding any forest office except that of a Forest Settlement Officer. However, the State Government may appoint a Forest Officer to represent it in the inquiry under Chapter II by the Forest Settlement Officer.

11.

We find that Respondent No.2 is a Forest Officer within the meaning of sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the said Act and, therefore, is not competent to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of the right, title and interest claimed by the writ Petitioner, inasmuch as it may be determined by a Forest Settlement Officer appointed under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act.

12.

We find from the order dated October 21, 2016, that the proceeding was initiated for the purpose of ascertaining the rights of the writ Petitioner, proceeding on the assumption that the property has been a reserved forest. The initiation of the proceeding and the inquiry by the Respondent No.2, who has been a Forest Officer, is without jurisdiction. Thus, the entire initiative by the Respondent No.2 is void ab initio.

13.

We, thus, quash the notice at Annexure-B to the writ petition dated December 16, 2015 and all subsequent proceedings in pursuance thereof.

63.54.

By relying on Emerald Haven Estates Ltd, he submits that the Court considered the definitions of ‘Forest Officer’ and ‘reserved forest’ under Section 2 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and the statutory scheme under Section 4 governing the appointment and functions of the Forest Settlement Officer. The Court held that a Forest Settlement Officer is distinct from a Forest Officer and is entrusted with the statutory responsibility of inquiring into and determining the existence, nature and extent of rights claimed in respect of land proposed to be constituted as a reserved forest. It further held that a Forest Officer could not assume the jurisdiction of the Forest Settlement Officer to inquire into and determine the rights, title and interest claimed by the Petitioner therein, particularly where the proceedings proceeded on the assumption that the property was already a reserved forest. Accordingly, the Court held that the proceedings initiated by the Forest Officer were without jurisdiction and quashed the notice and all consequential proceedings.

63.55.

Learned counsel submits that the statutory functions of a Forest Settlement Officer cannot be exercised by a Forest Officer in the absence of the authority specifically conferred under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He contends that, in the present case, the Respondents have initiated proceedings concerning the Petitioners’ rights over the lands in question without establishing that the lands were duly constituted as a reserved forest in accordance with the statutory procedure. He further submits that the authorities cannot proceed on the assumption that the lands are reserved forest and, on that basis, undertake an inquiry into or determine the Petitioners’ rights without following the procedure prescribed under the Act and acting through the competent statutory authority. On this basis, he contends that the impugned proceedings are without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed in the light of the principle laid down in Emerald Haven Estates Ltd.

63.56.

He relies on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of V.Sampangi Ramaiah v. The Director/Commissioner, Department of Mines and Geology and others [2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8879], more particularly Paras 10 to 21, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

10.

The object of the Act is to consolidate the law relating to forest produce in the State of Karnataka. Sub-section (14) of Section 2 defines “Reserved Forest” to mean any land settled and notified as such, in accordance with the produce of Chapter II of the Act. Section 3 empowers the State Government to constitute any land which is the property of the Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights, as a reserved forest. For that purpose, a notification has to be issued under Section 4 of the Act declaring that it has been decided to constitute such land as a reserved forest specifying as nearly as possible, the situation and the limits of such land. An Officer called Forest Settlement Officer has to be appointed to enquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any land comprised within such limits or in or over any forest produce. Such an Officer shall not be a Forest Officer.

11.

The notification issued under Section 4 of the Act can be termed as a preliminary notification. The same has to be published by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 5 and also a copy of the notice has to be served on every known or owner or occupier of any land included in or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest or on his recognized agent or manager. On the issuance of a notification under Section 4, no right can be acquired in or over the land comprised in the notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government and between issuance of the preliminary notification and issuance of the Final Notification. Also no Civil Court can entertain any suit for the establishment of any right on any land included in the notification issued under Section 4.

12.

Under clause (d) of Section 5 of the Act, under which a proclamation is made by the Forest Settlement Officer a minimum period of three months from the date of publishing the proclamation is given to any person claiming, any right or making any claim referred to under Section 4 by producing all documents in support thereof. If such a claim is made, the Forest Settlement Officer shall enquire into the claim by looking into the records by the Government and the evidence of any person acquainted with the same and also hear the concerned Forest Officer as regards any objections under Section 7.

13.

Section 8 grants certain powers to the Forest Settlement Officer for the purpose of conducting the enquiry. If no claim is made within the period fixed under Section 5 before the Forest Officer, any rights in that regard shall be extinguished unless before the final notification under Section 17 is published, the person claiming them satisfies the Forest Settlement Officer that he had sufficient cause for not preferring such a claim within the period fixed under Section 5 in which case the Forest Settlement Officer would have to proceed to dispose of the claim.

14.

Section 10 deals with the manner in which claims relating to shifting cultivation would have to be dealt with. Section 11 enables the Forest Settlement Officer to acquire land over which a right is claimed in case such land is not excluded from the limits of the reserved forest or no agreement with the owner for the surrender of his rights is arrived at. In the event of an acquisition, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would apply and the Forest Settlement Officer would act as a Deputy Commissioner. With regard to the right of way to pasturage or other forest produce or water, the Forest Settlement Officer has to consider any such claims and pass an order under Section 12 read with Sections 13 and 14. If no settlement under Section 14 is arrived at, then compensation has to be determined on the basis of the value of the right claimed on the date of the preliminary notification in accordance with the provisions of the Act, insofar as such provisions are applicable under Section 15 of the Act.

15.

Section 16 provides for an appeal against an order passed under Sections 11. 12, 14 or 15. The statutory period for filing of an appeal is three months from the date of the order made by the Forest Settlement Officer. Section 17 states that when the period fixed under Section 5 for preferring a claim has lapsed and all claims have been disposed of under Section 9 and the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 16 has lapsed and appeals if any filed have been disposed of and all proceedings under Sections 11 and 14 have been taken, the State Government shall publish a final notification specifying clearly the boundary marks to constitute a reserved forest and declare the same to be a reserved forest from the date fixed by a notification subject to the exercise of rights if any specified in such a notification. From the date so fixed, such forest shall be deemed to be a reserved forest. Before the date fixed in the notification under Section 18. The same shall be published in the Official Gazette and at the Taluk Headquarters in which the forest is situated and in the neighbourhood as a proclamation is published under Section 5.

16.

Under Section 19, the State Government has the power to revise any arrangement made under Section 14 by modifying any order made under the said section and substitute the same by awarding compensation under Section 15. But the same has to be done within five years from the publication of any notification under Section 17.

17.

On a reading of the aforesaid provision, it becomes clear that though no specific date has been fixed for the issuance of a declaration under Section 17 of the Act, nevertheless, after the issuance of the preliminary notification, only a minimum period of three months is granted to every person to make a claim. Also, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would have to be read into Section 11 of the Act incase, a necessity to acquire the land arises.

18.

It is needless to observe that in many provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, specified time frames have been mandated from the declaration of the preliminary and final notification as well as for passing of an award. No doubt, an elaborate procedure has been contemplated between the issuance of a preliminary notification and the issuance of a final notification under the Act encompassing the making of claims with regard to the notified areas proposed to be declared to be reserved forest and also settlement of the said claims, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are also contemplated and orders passed under Sections 11, 12, 14 and 15 are also subject to appeal. However, we find that there is no specified period mentioned under the Act within which, the notification declaring the reserved forest has to be made once the preliminary notification has been issued.

19.

When specific period has been fixed, for making a claim and also by filing an appeal by any persons, a corresponding time frame for the adjudication of the claims and for issuance of a declaration ought to have been made. The absence of any specific time frame for the issuance of a declaration under Section 17 would imply that such a declaration must be made within a reasonable time. What is the reasonable time in the absence of any specific time frame mentioned in a statutory provision would vary from Act to Act and depending upon the object and scope of the Act. In the instant case, having regard to the object and scope of the Act in question, we are of the view that a period of three years would be the reasonable period within which, a declaration under Section 17 of the Act ought to be made, excluding the period when steps are taken under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as well as appellate proceedings, if any. This period obviously would exclude any stay orders granted by any Court of Law. But in the instant case, the State is unable to point out any steps initiated after the order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer, excluding 366.63 acres, which according to the Petitioner also includes the area of the subject quarry. This aspect is communicated to the Petitioner in the year 2007, whereas in 2004 itself the quarry lease was granted to the Petitioner.

20.

In this context, reliance could be placed on the fact that originally in the matter of issuance of preliminary notification and a declaration under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, there was no time limit fixed for making an award. Subsequently, in the year 1984, an amendment was brought in the form of insertion to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44, which is a decision on a dispute arising prior to the insertion of Section 4 to the Land Acquisition Act, the Supreme Court has held that compensation has to be paid within a reasonable time, even in the absence of any time limit prescribed under the Act and the reasonable time was stated to be about two years in the said case.

21.

In the instant case, though the preliminary notification is issued on 3-6-1991, the final notification is yet to be issued. In fact, several adjournments were given in the matter so as to enable the Respondent-Authorities to take a decision with regard to issuance of a declaration under Section 17 of the Act, even then, no steps have been taken to issue such a declaration. Therefore, we find that the State Government has by not taking steps for over two decades after the issuance of the preliminary notification, abandoned its intention to notify Sy. No. 601/A1 as a Reserved Forest. This becomes all the more clear by the fact that subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification in the year 1991 and quarrying lease has also been granted to the Petitioner and possibly to the other similarly placed persons in the year 2004. Therefore, the impugned order at Annexure-A is without authority of law.

63.57.

By relying on V. Sampangi Ramaiah, he submits that the Division Bench of this Court examined the statutory scheme under Chapter II of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and observed that a notification under Section 4 is only a preliminary notification initiating the process of constituting land as a reserved forest. The Court noted that the statutory scheme contemplates an elaborate procedure involving publication of a proclamation, submission and adjudication of claims by the Forest Settlement Officer, consideration of the rights claimed, and disposal of appeals, wherever preferred, before a final notification can be issued under Section 17 of the Act.

63.58.

Learned counsel submits that, although the Act does not prescribe an express time limit for issuance of the final notification under Section 17, such notification must be issued within a reasonable period. He draws particular attention to the observation of the Co-ordinate Bench in paragraph 19 that, having regard to the object and scheme of the Act, a period of three years would constitute a reasonable period for issuance of the final notification, excluding the time taken in acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, appellate proceedings and any period covered by an order of stay granted by a competent court.

63.59.

Learned counsel further submits that, in V. Sampangi Ramaiah, the Division Bench of this Court held that the State’s failure to take steps towards issuance of a final notification for over two decades, coupled with the subsequent grant of a quarrying lease, indicated that the State had abandoned its intention to constitute the land in question as a reserved forest. The impugned order was accordingly held to be without authority of law.

63.60.

Applying the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision to the facts of the present case, learned counsel contends that the notification relied upon by the Respondents dates back to 1920 and that no final notification under Section 17 has been issued even after the lapse of nearly a century. He submits that the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the statutory proceedings were completed or that any legally sustainable steps were taken within a reasonable period to constitute the lands in question as a reserved forest. He further contends that the prolonged inaction of the authorities, together with the subsequent dealings with the lands and the rights asserted by the Petitioners, supports their case that the intention to constitute the lands as a reserved forest was not pursued to completion. Accordingly, he submits that the impugned proceedings, founded on the preliminary notification of 1920 in the absence of a final notification, are unsustainable in law.

63.61.

He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and another vs. D. Narsing Rao and others [(2015) 3 SCC 695], more particularly Paras 25 to 31, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

25.

The legal position is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only to bring home the point that the absence of a stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference insofar as the exercise of the power is concerned which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period.

26.

In one of the earlier decisions of this Court in S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India, this Court held that exercise of suo motu power of revision must also be within a reasonable time and that any unreasonable delay in the exercise may affect the validity. But what would constitute reasonable time would depend upon the facts of each case.

27.

To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy wherein this Court held that even in cases of fraud the revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable period and that several factors need to be kept in mind while deciding whether relief should be denied only on the ground of delay. The Court said : (SCC p. 677, para 9)

“9.

… In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act).”

28.

To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport wherein this Court reiterated the legal position and held that the power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrarily and interminably. This Court observed : (SCC p. 476, para 28)

“28.

The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time-limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words ‘at any time’ in Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute.”

29.

In State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh [(2004) 10 SCC 585] this Court held that in the absence of any special circumstances a delay of 15 years in suo motu exercise of revisional power was impermissible as the delay was unduly long and unexplained. This Court observed : (SCC pp. 588-89, para 6)

“6.

We are now left with the second question which was raised by the Respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector. It is true that sub-section (3) provides that such a power may be exercised at any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time-limit or it is in infinity. All that is meant is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also withdrawn sometime in March 1976. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of the Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable. But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 20.”

30.

We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur wherein the Court explained the legal position as under : (SCC pp. 602-03, para 13)

“13.

The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the Petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case [Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110] relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed.”

31.

To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.

63.62.

By relying on Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District, he submits that even where the statute does not prescribe a specific period of limitation for the exercise of a statutory power, such power must nevertheless be exercised within a reasonable period. He contends that the absence of an express limitation period does not confer an indefinite or perpetual authority to initiate proceedings, particularly where the passage of time has resulted in the creation of third-party rights, changes in the nature and use of the property, or the attainment of finality by transactions and orders. He further submits that the determination of what constitutes a reasonable period must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the power exercised, the extent of the delay, the explanation for such delay and the consequences of disturbing rights that have accrued in the intervening period.

63.63.

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, learned counsel contends that the Respondents cannot rely upon the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920 to initiate proceedings after the lapse of several decades, without demonstrating that the statutory process for constitution of the lands as a reserved forest was completed or that the prolonged inaction is legally justified. He submits that the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, coupled with the subsequent dealings with the lands and the rights claimed by the Petitioners, renders the belated action of the Respondents unsustainable. Accordingly, he contends that the impugned proceedings are vitiated by unreasonable delay and are contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District.

63.64.

He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another vs. Citi Bank [(2022) 19 SCC 188], more particularly Para 19, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

19.

It is a settled proposition of law that when the proceedings are required to be initiated within a particular period provided under the statute, the same are required to be initiated within the said period. However, where no such period has been provided in the statute, the authorities are required to initiate the said proceeding within a reasonable period. No doubt that what would be a reasonable period would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

63.65.

By relying on Citi Bank, he submits that where the statute does not prescribe a specific period for initiating or completing proceedings, the authorities are nevertheless required to act within a reasonable period, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. He contends that the absence of an express statutory time limit cannot be construed as conferring an unfettered power upon the authorities to initiate proceedings at any point of time, irrespective of the length of the delay and its consequences. Applying this principle to the present case, learned counsel submits that the Respondents’ reliance on the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920, in the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, even after the lapse of several decades, warrants scrutiny on the touchstone of reasonableness. He further submits that the prolonged inaction of the authorities, considered alongside the subsequent dealings with the lands and the rights asserted by the Petitioners, renders the belated proceedings unsustainable in law.

63.66.

He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.Karunanidhi vs. Union of India and another [(1979) 3 SCC 431], more particularly Para 35, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

35.

On a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge:

1.

That in order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.

2.

That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.

3.

That where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.

4.

That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field.

63.67.

By relying on M.Karunanidhi, he submits that in determining whether two statutory enactments can operate in the same field, the test is whether their provisions are inconsistent and irreconcilable, such that both cannot operate simultaneously. He contends that the mere fact that two enactments deal with the same subject matter does not, by itself, give rise to repugnancy or result in the implied repeal of one enactment by the other. Applying these principles to the present case, learned counsel submits that the statutory framework governing the lands in question must be examined to determine whether the relevant provisions of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, can operate consistently, or whether any actual inconsistency exists between them. He further contends that the Respondents cannot rely merely on the existence of the later enactment to overcome the legal consequences arising from the failure to complete the proceedings contemplated under the earlier Regulation, particularly in the absence of a final notification under Section 17 thereof.

63.68.

He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Rajeev Bansal (and other appeals) [2024 SCC Online SC 2693], more particularly Paras 42 and 43, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

42.

Another principle of interpretation is that when two laws are inconsistent or repugnant, the later legislation is interpreted as having impliedly repealed the earlier legislation. The principle underlying implied repeal is that there is no need for the later enactment to state in express words that the earlier enactment has been repealed if the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is manifested through the provisions of the later enactment. (State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker, this court culled out the following principles applicable to the implied repeal of legislation:

(a)

A subsequent legislation may not be too readily presumed to effectuate a repeal of existing statutory laws in the absence of express or at least unambiguous indication to that effect;

(b)

Courts must lean against implying a repeal unless the two provisions are so plainly repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together and it is not possible on any reasonable hypothesis to give effect to both at the same time;

(c)

It is necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect of both the earlier and the later statute; and

(d)

If the objects of the two statutory provisions are different and the language of each statute is restricted to its objects or subject, then they are generally intended to rule in parallel lines without meeting and there would be no real conflict.

43.

The principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests is that if the subject-matter of a later legislation is identical to that of an earlier legislation so that they both cannot stand together, then the earlier legislation is impliedly repealed by the later legislation. (Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay) The courts have to determine whether the Legislature intended the two sets of provisions to be applied simultaneously. (Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India) The presumption against implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature knows the existing laws and does not intend to create any confusion by retaining two conflicting provisions or statutes. (Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka) The test to be applied for the construction of implied repeal is whether the new or subsequent law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law. The inconsistency or repugnancy should clearly and manifestly reveal an intention to repeal the existing laws. (Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph) The inconsistency or repugnancy must be such that the two statutes cannot be reconciled on reasonable construction or hypothesis. To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication of an earlier statute, it is necessary to examine the scope and object of the two enactments by comparison of their provisions. (State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd. ) Implied repeal should be avoided, if possible, where both the statutes can stand together. (Harshad S. Mehta v. State of Maharashtra )

63.69.

By relying on Rajeev Bansal, he submits that a subsequent enactment cannot be presumed to have impliedly repealed an earlier enactment merely because both deal with the same subject matter. Such repeal can be inferred only where the provisions of the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot be reconciled or given effect to simultaneously, and the legislative intention to supersede the earlier law is clearly manifested. He contends that, in determining whether an implied repeal has occurred, the scope, object and effect of both enactments must be examined, and where they can reasonably operate alongside each other, the presumption must be against implied repeal.

63.70.

Applying these principles to the present case, learned counsel submits that the provisions of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, must be examined to ascertain whether the later enactment expressly or by necessary implication displaced the earlier statutory framework and what consequences follow in respect of proceedings initiated under the earlier Regulation. He contends that the Respondents cannot merely rely upon the subsequent enactment to disregard the statutory procedure contemplated under the earlier Regulation, particularly the requirement of a final notification under Section 17, without establishing the legal basis on which the lands in question are claimed to have acquired the status of reserved forest. Accordingly, he submits that the impugned proceedings must be tested against the applicable statutory provisions and the principles governing implied repeal laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

63.71.

He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.Godrej Sara Lee Ltd., vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors., [(2025) 11 SCC 808] more particularly paragraphs 4 and 6, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

27.

Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the High Courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the Petitioner before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the Petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the Petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

……..

6.

At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under:

(i)

where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;

(ii)

where there is violation of principles of natural justice;

(iii)

where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or

(iv)

where the vires of an Act is challenged.

63.72.

By relying on M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd, he submits that the availability of an alternative statutory remedy does not constitute an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He submits that the rule requiring a party to ordinarily avail itself of an alternative remedy is a rule of judicial policy, convenience and discretion, and not an inflexible rule of law. He further submits that the maintainability of a writ petition must be distinguished from its entertainability, as a writ petition that is maintainable may nevertheless not be entertained in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court

63.73.

The learned counsel further submits that, as recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the High Court may exercise its writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy in exceptional circumstances, including where the impugned proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the principles of natural justice have been violated. In the present case, he contends that the Petitioners have raised substantial questions concerning the jurisdiction of the authorities to initiate the impugned proceedings and the legality of the action taken against their respective properties. Accordingly, he submits that the Petitioners’ challenge ought not to be rejected merely on the ground that an alternative statutory remedy is available, without examining the nature of the jurisdictional objections raised and whether the circumstances warrant the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

63.74.

He relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and other [(2021) 6 SCC 771], more particularly Para 27, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

27.

The principles of law which emerge are that:

27.1.

The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.

27.2.

The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person.

27.3.

Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.

27.4.

An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.

27.5.

When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion.

27.6.

In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.

63.75.

By relying on Radha Krishan Industries, he submits that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not, by itself, bar the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He contends that the rule requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of discretion and not an absolute prohibition against entertaining a writ petition. He further submits that the recognised exceptions to this rule include cases involving violation of the principles of natural justice and proceedings initiated wholly without jurisdiction.

63.76.

Applying these principles to the present case, learned counsel contends that the impugned proceedings are amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, as the Petitioners challenge the jurisdiction of the authorities to initiate proceedings in respect of the lands in question and allege non-compliance with the mandatory statutory procedure. He submits that, in the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and having regard to the alleged failure to follow the prescribed procedure under the applicable forest law, the Petitioners’ challenge falls within the recognised exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. Accordingly, he submits that the writ petitions are maintainable and may be entertained notwithstanding the availability of any alternative statutory remedy.

63.77.

By relying on all the above, his submission is that the writ petition is required to be allowed.

64.

Sri. A.M. Vijay, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner in W.P. No. 29690/2025, adopts the submissions made by Sri. Manmohan P.N., learned counsel appearing for the other Petitioners. He makes the following additional submissions:

64.1.

The resort in question was developed by the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023. He submits that the Respondent authorities entered the Petitioner’s property and forcibly evicted the Petitioners, an action which, according to him, cannot be countenanced either in law or on facts. He contends that such action violates the Petitioners’ constitutional right to property guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

64.2.

Learned counsel submits that a notification which has been withdrawn or has otherwise ceased to operate cannot be revived in the absence of statutory authority. Neither the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, nor the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, contemplates the revival of such a notification, particularly after the lapse of nearly a century. He submits that the entire area is now inhabited and developed, with several landowners having established resorts and undertaken other developmental and agricultural activities. When the State Government had chosen not to proceed with the notification in 1924, at a time when the population in the area was comparatively smaller, the question of reviving the notification after such a prolonged period, in the changed circumstances, does not arise.

64.3.

He further submits that, even assuming that such revival is legally permissible, it would cause serious prejudice to the landowners, who have invested substantial amounts in constructing houses, developing resorts, establishing amenities and undertaking agricultural activities. In view of the significant changes that have occurred in the intervening period, learned counsel contends that the Forest Department was required to undertake a thorough assessment of the likely impact of the proposed action on the local population before proceeding to issue a proclamation under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963.

64.4.

In this regard, learned counsel draws a distinction between Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He submits that, while the former contemplated the existence of a proposal to constitute land as a State Forest, the latter requires the State Government to take a decision in that regard. According to him, the use of the expression “decide” in Section 4 of the 1963 Act necessitates a proper decision-making process, involving consideration of all relevant aspects, including the nature of the land, the rights and interests of the existing owners and occupants, and the adverse consequences that the proposed action may have on the local population. He contends that the issuance of a proclamation under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, without a proper decision having been taken under Section 4, demonstrates non-application of mind, is indicative of mala fides and violates the principles of natural justice.

64.5.

Learned counsel further submits that the State Government itself had granted lands in Kadumane Village to various occupants from the year 1952 onwards, some by way of grants without payment of consideration and others at an upset price. He contends that these grants constitute subsequent governmental conduct consistent with the withdrawal of the notification in 1924. The Respondents, therefore, ought to have considered the grants and the rights flowing therefrom before mechanically issuing the proclamation under Section 5 of the 1963 Act.

64.6.

He refers to Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1963, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

133. Presumption regarding entries in the

records.—An entry in the Record of Rights and a certified entry in the Register of Mutations [or in the patta book] shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefore.

64.7.

By relying on Section 133 learned counsel submits that the entries in the revenue records carry a statutory presumption as to their genuineness and correctness. He points out that the revenue records relating to the lands in question have, in many cases for several decades, stood in the names of the respective landowners and not in the name of the State Government or the Forest Department. He further submits that the relevant revenue records do not contain entries indicating any right of the Government over the lands in question. The lands have also been assessed to land revenue and other applicable taxes, which have been paid by the respective owners. These circumstances, according to learned counsel, support the Petitioners’ claim to the lands and ought to have been considered by the Respondents before initiating the impugned proceedings.

64.8.

Learned counsel additionally submits that, following the grants and subsequent transactions, several phodi and durasthi proceedings have been undertaken in respect of the lands, resulting in changes to the survey numbers and the subdivision of the original extents. He contends that the proclamation issued by the FSO is unsustainable because it refers to survey numbers that no longer correspond to the existing survey particulars of the lands in question.

64.9.

He further submits that the Respondents’ allegation that the Petitioners are encroachers is itself disputed, as the Petitioners assert independent rights over their respective properties on the basis of documentary evidence, including grant certificates, registered sale deeds, partition deeds and other title documents. According to learned counsel, the notices issued by the FSO under Section 5 of the 1963 Act are incapable of eliciting an effective response because the descriptions therein do not correspond to the existing survey particulars and boundaries of the lands. He submits that multiple rights have accrued in respect of the lands over the intervening decades and that, before issuing notices, the FSO was required to ascertain the identity and extent of each parcel, its boundaries, the persons claiming ownership or occupation, and the nature of their respective rights, even assuming that the notification of 1920 continued to subsist.

64.10.

Learned counsel contends that, in the absence of clear particulars identifying the lands claimed by the Respondents, including their extent and boundaries, the landowners and occupants are unable to ascertain the precise subject matter of the proceedings or submit effective objections and claims. He submits that the Petitioners have not been served with notices containing sufficient particulars to enable them to respond meaningfully. On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the impugned proceedings are unsustainable and that the writ petition is liable to be allowed by granting the reliefs sought therein.

65.

Sri. Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the Respondents, opposes the writ petitions and submits that:

65.1.

The lands claimed by the Petitioners form part of the Moorkangudda Block, which was notified for constitution as a State Forest under Notification No. R.8806-FT.43-15-6 dated 05.02.1920, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900.

65.2.

He submits that the notification covered a total extent of 7,938 acres and 38 guntas, equivalent to approximately 12.4 square miles, situated in Manjerabad Taluk and comprising lands in Achanahalli, Agini, Kyamanahalli, Nadahalli and Kadumane villages, as well as Jambardi, Manjanahalli Estate and Kadumane Estate.

65.3.

According to him, the notification relating to the said extent continues to form the basis of the Forest Department’s claim over the lands in question and was not cancelled by the subsequent notification dated 11.01.1924, as alleged by the Petitioners.

W.P. NO. 16251/2023

65.4.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the lands claimed by the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 form part of an extent of 36 acres and 22 guntas in Sy. No. 92 of Achanahalli Village, which was auctioned by the Revenue Department notwithstanding the earlier notification dated 05.02.1920. He submits that an extent of 536 acres 22 guntas in Achanahalli Village was subsequently mutated in the name of the Forest Department on 05.08.2013, vide M.R. No. H3/13-14. According to him, the absence of corresponding revenue entries in the name of the Forest Department in respect of the remaining extent does not extinguish or otherwise affect the legal consequences flowing from the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1900 Regulation.

65.5.

He further submits that the auction of land in Sy. No. 92 of Achanahalli Village was conducted by the Revenue Department through the Amildar in favour of Byregowda at a public auction held by the jurisdictional Tahsildar on 20.09.1924. The said auction, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, took place despite the prior notification dated 05.02.1920, solely because the necessary revenue entries had not been carried out in the name of the Forest Department following publication of the notification in the Official Gazette. He contends that an omission to make corresponding entries in the revenue records cannot, by itself, nullify the notification or confer upon the Revenue Department the authority to deal with the notified lands in a manner inconsistent with their alleged forest status.

65.6.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that, if the lands had already been brought within the ambit of the forest notification, the Revenue Department could not have treated them as ordinary revenue lands and proceeded to auction them without first ascertaining their legal status. He contends that the legality of the auction must be examined in the context of the subsisting notification and the statutory restrictions governing the use and disposal of forest land. In this regard, he relies upon Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Conservation Act’), which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

2. Restriction on the dereservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purpose.—

(1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing—

(i)

that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression “reserved forest” in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;

(ii)

that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.

[(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any private person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other organization 2 [subject to such terms and conditions, as the Central government may, by order specify];

(iv)

that any forest land or any portion thereof may be cleared of trees which have grown naturally in that land or portion, for the purpose of using it for reafforestation.] [Explanation.— For the purposes of this section “non-forest purpose” means the breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for—

(a)

the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices, rubber, palms, oil-bearing plants, horticultural crops or medicinal plants;

(b)

4 [but does not include any work relating to or ancillary to conservation, development and management of forest and wildlife, such as-

(i)

silvicultural operations including regeneration operations;

(ii)

establishment of check-posts and infrastructure for the front line forest staff;

(iii)

establishment and maintenance of fire lines;

(iv)

wireless communication;

(v)

construction of fencing, boundary marks or pillars, bridges and culverts, check dams, waterholes, trenches and pipelines;

(vi)

establishment of zoo and safaris referred to in the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, owned by the Government or any authority, in forest areas other than protected areas;

(vii)

eco-tourism facilities included in the Forest Working Plan or Wildlife Management Plan or Tiger Conservation Plan or Working Schedme of that area; and

(viii)

any other like purposes, which the Central Government may, by order, specify.”;]

[(2) The Central Government may, by order, specify the terms and conditions subject to which any survey, such as, reconnaissance, prospecting, investigation or exploration including seismic survey, shall not be treated as non-forest purpose.]

65.7.

By referring to Section 2, he submits that, once land is legally recognised as forest land within the meaning of the applicable law, its diversion for a non-forest purpose requires prior approval of the Central Government, wherever the provision applies. According to him, no such approval was obtained before the auction of the extent of 36 acres and 22 guntas and, consequently, the auction could not have lawfully been conducted on the assumption that the land was available for disposal by the Revenue Department.

65.8.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the subsequent mutation of 500 acres in favour of the Forest Department does not mean that only the said extent was covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920. He contends that the notification and the extent of land covered thereby must be construed with reference to the notification itself and the relevant survey particulars, rather than merely on the basis of the entries subsequently made in the revenue records.

65.9.

He submits that, although the final notification relied upon by the Respondents pertains to an extent of 500 acres, the remaining extent of 36 acres and 22 guntas forms part of Sy. No. 92 of Achanahalli Village and is claimed by the Forest Department as part of the lands notified in 1920. According to him, the absence of a mutation entry in respect of the latter extent cannot, by itself, be treated as proof that the land was excluded from the forest notification or that the Petitioners acquired an indefeasible right over it through the auction conducted by the Revenue Department.

65.10.

He further submits that revenue entries are maintained primarily for fiscal and administrative purposes and that the existence or absence of a particular mutation entry cannot, without examining the underlying notification, title documents and relevant survey records, conclusively determine the legal status of the land. On that basis, he contends that the Petitioners cannot rely solely upon the absence of entries in the name of the Forest Department to defeat the Respondents’ claim. He submits that the material question is whether the subject lands fall within the area covered by the notification and the subsequent statutory proceedings, and that the Petitioners’ claims must be examined in that context.

65.11.

Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned Additional Advocate General advances an alternative contention with regard to the extent of land claimed by the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023. He submits that, even assuming that the auction conducted by the Revenue Department was valid and that the Petitioners derived a lawful right thereunder, such right could extend only to 5 acres and could not be enlarged to cover the entire extent of 14 acres and 36 guntas over which the resort has been developed.

65.12.

He contends that the Petitioners, under the guise of asserting ownership over 5 acres, have extended their possession and construction activities to an additional extent of 9 acres and 36 guntas belonging to the Forest Department. According to him, the Petitioners cannot claim any right over the additional extent merely because the resort has been developed as a single establishment across the entire property. He submits that the extent of any legally acquired right must be determined by reference to the relevant grant, auction records, title documents and survey particulars, and that the Petitioners cannot use the development undertaken over the larger area to enlarge the extent of land lawfully acquired by them.

65.13.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that proceedings were initiated under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, before the Deputy Conservator of Forests, on the basis of a complaint received from the Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpura. He states that, pursuant to the said proceedings, an order dated 26.07.2022 was passed directing the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Sakleshpura, to evict the Petitioners from the portion alleged to have been encroached upon, measuring 14 acres and 36 guntas.

65.14.

He further submits that, even if the extent of 5 acres claimed by the Petitioners were excluded from the area alleged to have been encroached upon, the remaining extent of 9 acres and 36 guntas would continue to be in unauthorised occupation. According to him, the Petitioners would have no legal basis to retain possession of that portion, much less to maintain the structures and commercial activities established thereon. He accordingly contends that, at the minimum, the structures standing on the extent of 9 acres and 36 guntas are liable to be removed, subject to the applicable statutory procedure and the determination of the rights asserted by the Petitioners.

65.15.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Respondents have been unable to proceed with the proposed action on account of the interim orders passed by this Court. He contends that the dispute regarding the extent of the Petitioners’ alleged entitlement must be kept distinct from the question whether the remaining extent is under unauthorised occupation, and that the Petitioners cannot claim protection over the entire property merely by asserting a limited right over 5 acres.

65.16.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the interim protection initially granted by this Court was confined to an extent of 5 acres. Subsequently, the Petitioners approached this Court seeking stay of the proceedings initiated under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and an order granting such relief came to be passed on 10.08.2023. He contends that the subsequent order has prevented the Respondents from proceeding with the statutory action initiated against the Petitioners in respect of the alleged encroachment.

65.17.

He further alleges that, notwithstanding their alleged unauthorised occupation of forest land, the Petitioners have threatened the Forest Department officials with various legal proceedings, including contempt proceedings. According to him, the resort had earlier been seized by the authorities; however, the Respondents were subsequently compelled to unseize the entire resort and restore it to the Petitioners, with the result that the Petitioners have continued to remain in possession and to carry on activities over the land claimed by the Forest Department.

65.18.

Learned Additional Advocate General contends that the Petitioners have not fairly disclosed the distinction between the extent of 5 acres claimed by them and the additional extent of 9 acres and 36 guntas alleged to be under encroachment. He submits that, by relying upon the interim orders passed in the writ proceedings, the Petitioners have continued in possession, occupation and enjoyment of the entire extent of 14 acres and 36 guntas, although, even according to their alternative claim, their entitlement could extend only to 5 acres.

65.19.

He reiterates that this submission is without prejudice to the Respondents’ primary contention that the entire extent, including the 5 acres claimed by the Petitioners, forms part of the forest land. He therefore submits that the interim orders ought not to be construed as conferring any substantive right upon the Petitioners over the disputed property or as preventing the Respondents from asserting their rights in accordance with law. According to him, the Petitioners’ claim to interim protection must be considered in the light of the extent of land actually covered by their title documents and the nature of the proceedings initiated by the Forest Department.

65.20.

With regard to the Government Order or notification dated 11.01.1924, learned Additional Advocate General specifically denies the Petitioners’ contention that the notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8806-FT.43-15-6, was cancelled or withdrawn. He submits that the notification dated 11.01.1924 related to a separate notification issued on 05.02.1920 under No. R.8808-FT.43-15-7, concerning other lands proposed to be constituted as part of the Moorkangudda State Forest. According to him, it was the latter notification that was dropped by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924, and not the notification bearing No. R.8806-FT.43-15-6, which is relied upon by the Respondents in the present proceedings.

65.21.

He contends that the Petitioners have proceeded on an erroneous assumption that, because both notifications were issued on 05.02.1920 and related to the Moorkangudda area, the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 must necessarily have cancelled the notification concerning the subject lands. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the notification numbers are distinct and that the legal effect of the Government Order must be determined by examining the particular notification to which it refers, and the extent of land covered thereby. He argues that the similarity in the date and general description of the lands cannot justify treating the two notifications as one and the same instrument.

65.22.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the notification dated 11.01.1924 dropped only an extent of 68 acres and 33 guntas and did not withdraw the entire proposal concerning the Moorkangudda Block, which comprises 7,938.38 acres, equivalent to approximately 12.4 square miles. He contends that the Petitioners’ assertion that the constitution of the entire Moorkangudda Forest was abandoned is therefore contrary to the terms and scope of the Government Order relied upon by them.

65.23.

He submits that the notification dated 05.02.1920 bearing No. R.8806-FT.43-15-6 continued to remain operative and that the subsequent proceedings must be examined on that basis. According to him, the Petitioners cannot derive a right to treat the entire area as having been released from the proposed forest merely by relying upon an order which, according to the Respondents, relates to a different notification and a limited extent of land.

65.24.

Learned Additional Advocate General further alleges that the Petitioners have sought to utilise the alleged withdrawal of the notification to justify private development over lands claimed by the Forest Department, notwithstanding the statutory restrictions governing such lands. He submits that the development of the resort and other activities undertaken by the Petitioners cannot, by themselves, establish that the lands were lawfully released from the forest notification or that the Respondents have lost the right to proceed in accordance with the applicable law.

65.25.

With regard to the alleged decision or direction said to have been issued at a meeting of the District-Level Committee chaired by the Regional Commissioner, learned Additional Advocate General denies that any direction was issued to drop the proceedings initiated against the Petitioners. He submits that Annexure-L produced by the Petitioners consists of representations made by villagers requesting that the cases registered or proceedings initiated against them be dropped. According to him, the mere submission or consideration of such representations does not establish that the competent Government authority has taken a decision accepting the request.

65.26.

He further submits that no order has been passed by the State Government directing the dropping of the proceedings against the Petitioners. He contends that, where the law requires a decision by the competent authority, the same must be evidenced by an appropriate order issued in accordance with law and cannot be inferred merely from an oral statement or an alleged understanding said to have emerged during a committee meeting. He also specifically denies that the Regional Commissioner issued any direction to drop the proceedings and submits that the Petitioners have not established the existence of any such direction.

65.27.

Learned Additional Advocate General accordingly contends that Annexure-L does not support the Petitioners’ assertion that the proceedings against them had been ordered to be dropped. He submits that, in the absence of an authenticated decision by the competent authority, the Respondents were entitled to continue the proceedings in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, subject to the orders passed by this Court.

65.28.

He further submits that the Petitioners’ application seeking amendment of the writ petition to challenge the notification dated 05.02.1920 is a circumstance that, according to the Respondents, supports their contention that the notification had not been cancelled by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. He argues that the Petitioners’ decision to specifically challenge the original notification indicates that they themselves recognise the need to question its continuing legal effect, rather than merely rely upon the alleged withdrawal in 1924.

65.29.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the notification dated 05.02.1920 bearing No. R.8806-FT.43-15-6 continued to remain in force and that, in furtherance of the statutory process, the Forest Settlement Officer issued a proclamation dated 09.11.2023 under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He points out that the said proclamation has also been challenged by the Petitioners in the present proceedings. According to him, the challenge to the proclamation cannot be sustained merely on the basis of the Petitioners’ interpretation of the Government Order dated 11.01.1924, particularly when, according to the Respondents, that order related to a different notification and a limited extent of land.

65.30.

On these grounds, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the notification dated 05.02.1920 was not cancelled in respect of the lands in question, that the Petitioners have failed to establish a lawful right over the entire extent occupied by them, and that the Respondents were justified in initiating proceedings to protect the lands claimed by the Forest Department. He accordingly seeks dismissal of the writ petitions.

65.31.

He relies on Section 4 of the Mysuru Forest Act, 1900, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

4. Notification by Government

Whenever it is proposed to constitute any land a State Forest, the Government shall publish a notification in the Official Gazette—

(a)

specifying as nearly as possible the situation and limits of such land;

(b)

declaring that it is proposed to constitute such land a State Forest; and

(c)

appointing an officer (hereinafter called “the Forest Settlement Officer”) to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by, or alleged to exist in favour of, any person in or over any land comprised within such limits, or to any forest produce of such land, and to deal with the same as provided in this chapter.

The officer appointed under clause (c) of this section shall ordinarily be a person other than a Forest Officer; but a Forest Officer may be appointed by the Government to assist the Forest Settlement Officer in the enquiry prescribed by this chapter.

65.32.

His submission is that the publication of a notification under Section 4 is the initial step in the statutory process of constituting land as a State Forest and is intended to be followed by further proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900. He contends that, upon publication of such notification, the Forest Settlement Officer is required to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of the rights claimed by, or alleged to exist in favour of, persons in or over the notified lands or in respect of forest produce thereof. He submits that the statutory scheme contemplates the identification and adjudication of such rights, together with the consequential steps prescribed under the Regulation, before the process of constituting the land as a State Forest can be completed. Accordingly, he contends that the legal effect of the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the subsequent proceedings must be examined with reference to the statutory scheme as a whole and not merely on the basis of the absence of mutation entries in the revenue records.

65.33.

Learned Additional Advocate General reiterates that the Petitioners have taken inconsistent stands. On the one hand, they contend that the notification dated 05.02.1920 was cancelled or withdrawn; on the other, they challenge the very same notification. He submits that the auction conducted by the Revenue Department admittedly took place subsequent to the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900. According to him, the inconsistency in the Petitioners’ submissions is evident from their initial contention that their predecessor acquired the property through the auction after the alleged cancellation or withdrawal of the notification dated 05.02.1920.

65.34.

It was only when it was pointed out that the notification had neither been cancelled nor withdrawn that the Petitioners proceeded to challenge the notification itself. He therefore contends that their earlier plea, that the purchase was made after the cancellation or withdrawal of the notification, is unsustainable. He further submits that the notification dated 05.02.1920 continued to remain in force as on 20.09.1924 and that Section 6 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, expressly precludes the acquisition of rights over land notified under Section 4.

65.35.

He relies upon Section 6 of the Mysuru Forest Act, 1900 is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

6. Bar of accrual of forest rights

(1)

During the interval between the publication of such proclamation and the date fixed by the notification declaring the forest to be a State Forest as hereinafter provided, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession, or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by, or on behalf of, the Government or some person in whom such right, or power to create such right, was vested when the proclamation was published; and, on such land, no new house shall be built or plantation formed, no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made, and no trees shall be cut for the purpose of trade or manufacture except as hereinafter provided. No right of occupancy shall, without the previous sanction of the Government, be granted in respect of such land, and every right of occupancy granted without such sanction shall be null and void.

(2)

Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit any act done under the written permission of the Forest Settlement Officer.

(3)

No Civil Court shall, between the dates of publication of the notification under section 4 and of the final notification to be issued under section 17, entertain any suit to establish any right in or over any land or to the forest produce of any land included in the notification under section 4.

65.36.

Relying on Section 6 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, learned Additional Advocate General submits that, during the period between the publication of the proclamation and the issuance of the final notification declaring the land to be a State Forest, the acquisition of rights over the notified land is barred, except in the circumstances expressly provided under the provision. He contends that the statutory restriction assumes significance in examining the Petitioners’ claim that rights over the subject land were subsequently acquired through grants, transfers or other transactions. He further relies on Section 6(3), which bars civil courts from entertaining suits for the establishment of rights over the notified land or its forest produce during the period specified therein.

65.37.

Learned Additional Advocate General accordingly submits that the claims of the Petitioners must be examined in the light of the statutory restrictions imposed by Section 6, including the exceptions expressly recognised therein, and the legal effect of the notification dated 05.02.1920, which, according to him, continued to remain in force.

65.38.

His submission is that the entire prayer which has been sought for after the amendment is contradictory and diametrically opposite to the prayers which had been sought for when the writ petition was filed originally. His contention is that both these prayers actually cancel each other out.

65.39.

He submits that now that it has been established that the cancellation or withdrawal was regards another notification though dated 05.02.1920, the notification in respect of Moorkangudda State Forest dated 05.02.1920 subject matter of the writ petition continues to be in operation. He invokes the doctrine of public trust and submits that the State Authorities are custodians of forest land. There is a deemed trust which has been created requiring the State to protect the interest not only of the present generation but also of the future generation thereby making it a custodian of intra-generational equity and it is discharge of this obligation that the Government including the Forest Department is discharging.

65.40.

He relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, [(1997) 1 SCC 388], which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

"Public Trust Doctrine was founded on the ideas that certain common properties such as rivers, sea-shore, forests and the air were held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. These natural resources have a great importance to the people as a whole that it would wholly unjustified to make them subject to private ownership. These resources being a gift of nature, should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes.”

65.41.

By relying on M.C Mehta, he submits that the State, as a trustee of natural resources, bears a public duty to protect and preserve forests and other ecologically significant resources for the benefit of the public, including future generations. He contends that this duty requires the State authorities to prevent the unauthorised appropriation, degradation or exploitation of forest lands and to ensure that natural resources are not dealt with solely in furtherance of private or commercial interests at the expense of the public good. He submits that the action taken by the State to protect the subject land must be considered in the light of this obligation. According to him, the doctrine of public trust reinforces the State’s responsibility to preserve the land and its ecological value.

65.42.

He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Narinder Singh and Ors. v. Divesh Bhutani [2022 SCC OnLine SC 899], more particularly Para 41 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

41.

If a land is shown as a forest in government records, it will be governed by Section 2. A government record is a record maintained by its various departments. A government record is always made after following a certain process. Only the entries made after following due process can be a part of any government record. Government records will include land or revenue records, being statutory documents. For the same reason, it will also include the record of the Forest Department. After all, the Forest Department is the custodian of forests. It is this department of the State which is under an obligation to protect the forests for upholding the constitutional mandate. Further, it is this department which identifies the forest lands and maintains a record. Therefore, the record maintained by the Forest Department of forest lands after duly identifying the forest lands will necessarily be a government record.

65.43.

By relying on Narinder Singh, his submission is that the Forest Department, being the custodian of forests, is under a constitutional obligation to protect forest lands. He contends that the Forest Department is entrusted with the identification of forest lands and the maintenance of records pertaining thereto. Accordingly, records maintained by the Forest Department following due identification of forest lands constitute Government records and, in his submission, are entitled to due evidentiary consideration, including presumptive value, while determining the nature and status of the subject land.

65.44.

He relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. I.S.Nirvane Gowda & ors., [(2007) 15 SCC 744], more particularly Para 4 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

4.

The trial court as well as the first appellate court, based on the evidence, recorded findings that the lands in question were the part of reserved forest. We do not find any good ground or a valid reason for rejection of Ext. D-1 by the High Court. When the lands were included in reserve forest, the entries in the revenue records were of no consequence and further, mere saguvali chits did not confer any title on the suit lands. This apart, the Revenue Authorities were not competent to deal with the property which was the part of the reserved forest. The first appellate court was right in affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. We find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment and decree as far as these Respondents — I.S. Nirwane Gowda and B. Govindaraj in these two appeals are concerned. In this view these appeals are entitled to succeed. Accordingly, they are allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court, so far as these Respondents, namely, I.S. Nirwane Gowda and B. Govindaraj are concerned, are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suits are restored. No costs.

65.45.

By relying on I.S.Nirvane Gowda he submits that once land has been duly constituted as reserved forest, entries in the revenue records do not, by themselves, confer title or override its status as reserved forest. He further contends that the mere issuance of saguvali chits does not confer title to land forming part of a reserved forest and that the Revenue Authorities lack competence to deal with such land. On this basis, he submits that the revenue entries and grants relied upon by the Petitioners cannot be considered in isolation, but must be examined in the context of the legal status of the subject land and the statutory framework governing reserved forests.

W.P. NO. 19980/2023

65.46.

Insofar as W.P. No. 19980/2023 is concerned, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the contentions advanced on behalf of the Respondents in W.P. No. 16251/2023 would, to a substantial extent, apply equally to the present writ petition. He further points out that the Petitioner in W.P. No. 19980/2023 is the husband of the first Petitioner and the father of the other Petitioner in W.P. No. 16251/2023 and submits that the issues arising in the two petitions are, therefore, closely interconnected. He reiterates that the Petitioner has advanced an incorrect claim regarding the alleged withdrawal or cancellation of the notification dated 05.02.1920 relating to the Moorkangudda State Forest.

65.47.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the notification dated 11.01.1924, upon which reliance is placed in support of the alleged withdrawal or cancellation, was issued under sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, 1894, in relation to the proposed acquisition of certain lands by the Government. According to him, the said notification concerned the withdrawal of acquisition proceedings in respect of 68 acres and 33 guntas of land and had no bearing on the notification dated 05.02.1920 issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, in respect of the Moorkangudda State Forest, comprising an extent of 7,938 acres and 38 guntas. He contends that the two notifications relate to distinct statutory proceedings and that the withdrawal of the proposed acquisition of a specified extent of land under the land acquisition legislation cannot be construed as having the effect of withdrawing or cancelling the notification issued in relation to the constitution of the State Forest.

65.48.

He therefore submits that the Petitioner's reliance on the notification dated 11.01.1924 to contend that the notification dated 05.02.1920 ceased to operate is misconceived. According to him, unless the notification relating to the Moorkangudda State Forest was itself withdrawn or otherwise rendered inoperative in accordance with law, the notification issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, would continue to have the legal effect attributable to it under the applicable statutory provisions. He accordingly maintains that the Petitioner's claim must be examined on the basis of the distinction between the proceedings under the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, 1894, and those initiated under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900.

65.49.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Petitioner has himself asserted that he is in unauthorised occupation of the land situated in Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village. He contends that this assertion assumes significance in determining the nature of the Petitioner's claim over the subject land. According to him, the Petitioner's own case is not founded on an established title or a recognised right of occupation, but on an occupation which he subsequently sought to have regularised by approaching the Revenue Authorities. He submits that, in the absence of an independently established legal right over the subject land, the Petitioner cannot rely merely on his continued occupation thereof to resist the action initiated by the Forest Department.

65.50.

He further contends that the Petitioner's assertion of unauthorised occupation, when considered alongside his subsequent applications seeking regularisation, undermines his claim that he possesses an existing and enforceable right over the subject land. On this basis, he submits that the Petitioner cannot claim a right against the Forest Department merely by reason of his occupation, particularly when the land is claimed by the State to form part of the Moorkangudda State Forest. He maintains that the legal status of the land and the Petitioner's entitlement, if any, to occupy it must be determined with reference to the applicable statutory provisions and the relevant records.

65.51.

In this context, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the proceedings initiated against the Petitioner under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, are proper and justified. He contends that the Petitioner, having failed to establish a lawful entitlement to occupy the subject land, cannot resist proceedings for removal of unauthorised occupation merely on the basis of his possession or the pendency of his earlier requests for regularisation. According to him, the action taken by the Forest Department is intended to protect the land claimed to be under its control and to prevent continued occupation without lawful authority.

65.52.

He accordingly submits that the proceedings under Section 64A must be considered in the light of the Petitioner's asserted unauthorised occupation, the alleged forest status of the subject land and the statutory powers conferred on the competent Forest Officer. He maintains that the initiation of such proceedings cannot be faulted merely because the Petitioner has been in occupation of the land for a considerable period, particularly when no order regularising such occupation has been passed in his favour.

65.53.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Petitioner approached the Revenue Authorities only after several decades of occupation, seeking regularisation of the structures and cultivation on the subject land. He refers to the application dated 02.09.2021, stated to have been filed under Section 94C of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, seeking regularisation of a house measuring approximately 2,400 square feet constructed on the subject land. He submits that the said application was rejected by the Tahsildar, Sakleshpur, by order dated 01.07.2024. He contends that the rejection of the application demonstrates that the Petitioner has not obtained regularisation of the house through the statutory process invoked by him and cannot, on that basis, assert a right to continue in occupation.

65.54.

He also refers to the application dated 15.09.2022, filed under Section 94A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, seeking regularisation of unauthorised cultivation over an extent of four acres in Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the said application was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner, Hassan, by order dated 07.08.2024. He contends that the Petitioner has, therefore, failed to secure regularisation either of the house constructed on the land or of the cultivation carried on therein. According to him, the Petitioner cannot rely upon the mere filing of applications for regularisation as conferring any right or legitimate expectation of continued occupation, particularly when the competent Revenue Authorities have rejected the applications.

65.55.

Learned Additional Advocate General accordingly submits that the Petitioner's claim to continue in occupation is not supported by any order granting regularisation under Sections 94A or 94C of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. He contends that the Petitioner's own case, as reflected in the applications submitted to the Revenue Authorities, is that he sought regularisation of an existing unauthorised occupation, and that such requests have been rejected. In these circumstances, he submits that the Petitioner cannot claim to have acquired a lawful right to occupy the subject land merely by reason of the passage of time or the construction of a house and cultivation thereon.

65.56.

He therefore contends that the Petitioner has not established a legally enforceable right which would entitle him to the reliefs sought in the writ petition. He submits that the rejection of the regularisation applications, read with the Petitioner's assertion of unauthorised occupation and the State's claim that the land forms part of the Moorkangudda State Forest, supports the action initiated by the Forest Department under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. On these grounds, he seeks dismissal of the writ petition.

65.57.

He relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of B.R.Ganapathi Singh vs. State of Karnataka [2020 SCC Online Kar 3074], more particularly Para 64 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

64.

Having regard to the definition of forest enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it must be held that all statutorily recognized forest, whether designated as reserved forest, protected or otherwise, must be held to come within the scope of the expression “Forest”. In the instant case, the land in question was decided to be constituted as reserved forest under S. 4 of the Act. Merely because a final declaration under S. 17 of the Act has not been issued in the instant case, it cannot be held that subject land is not forest land. As already noted, when once the land is decided to be constituted as reserved forest under S. 4 of the Act, it continues to be forest land until the procedure contemplated for exclusion of any portion of the said land from being declared as reserved forest is completed by adjudication of the claims. If no claim is made in respect of the land constituted as reserved forest under S. 4 of the Act, it fructifies as reserved forest. The object of issuance of Notification under S. 17 of the Act is to restate the boundaries of the reserved forest after excluding the lands constituted as reserved forest on adjudication of the claims under the Act. Thus, if there are no claims which are adjudicated, then the land intended to be constituted as reserved forest is declared as reserved forest.

65.58.

By relying on B.R.Ganapathi Singh, he submits that the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, does not, by itself, necessarily establish that land covered by a notification under Section 4 is not forest land. He contends that, once the statutory process for constituting land as reserved forest has been initiated under Section 4, the land continues to retain its character as forest land unless and until the claims and objections are dealt with in accordance with the applicable statutory procedure and the land is excluded, where warranted, from the proposed reserved forest. He further submits that, where no claims are made or where the statutory process does not result in the exclusion of any portion of the notified land, the absence of a final notification cannot, in itself, be treated as determinative of the land’s status. On this basis, he contends that the legal effect of the notification dated 05.02.1920 relating to the Moorkangudda State Forest must be considered in the light of the principles enunciated in B.R. Ganapathi Singh, together with the relevant statutory provisions and the subsequent proceedings concerning the subject land.

W.P. NO. 29656/2024

65.59.

Insofar as W.P. No. 29656/2024 is concerned, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the proceedings relating to the constitution of the Moorkangudda State Forest have progressed in accordance with the statutory scheme contemplated under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He submits that the Government, by Government Order No. FEE 258AASE 2022, Bengaluru, dated 19.12.2022, appointed a Forest Settlement Officer to conclude the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The officer so appointed is arrayed as Respondent No. 13 in the present writ petition. Pursuant to the said appointment, Respondent No. 13 issued a proclamation under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, on 19.07.2023, calling upon persons claiming any right or interest in or over the lands comprised within the notified limits to submit their respective claims in accordance with law.

65.60.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that, pursuant to the proclamation issued under Section 5 of the Act, several persons came forward and submitted their claims before Respondent No. 13. The Forest Settlement Officer thereafter undertook an inquiry under Section 7 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and proceeded to consider the claims in accordance with the statutory procedure. Upon consideration of the claims and the material placed before him, Respondent No. 13 passed orders under Section 14 of the Act. According to learned Additional Advocate General, the proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer were thus not merely at an interlocutory stage but had culminated in an order determining the claims put forward by the persons concerned in relation to the notified lands.

65.61.

On the basis of the aforesaid statutory proceedings, learned Additional Advocate General raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition. He submits that, once the Forest Settlement Officer has considered the claims and passed an order under Section 14 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, the aggrieved claimant is required to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal provided under Section 16 of the Act. He contends that the appellate remedy is specifically intended to enable a person aggrieved by the determination of the Forest Settlement Officer to question the decision before the competent appellate forum, namely, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. According to him, the Petitioner cannot disregard the remedy expressly provided by the legislature and directly invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the determination made by the Forest Settlement Officer.

65.62.

He further submits that the statutory appellate forum is competent to examine the legality and correctness of the order passed by Respondent No. 13, including the determination of the claims and the treatment of the documentary material relied upon by the Petitioner. Therefore, according to learned Additional Advocate General, the Petitioner ought to have availed himself of the remedy under Section 16 of the Act, rather than seeking adjudication of the disputed claims in the present writ proceedings. He accordingly contends that the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground that an efficacious alternative statutory remedy is available to the Petitioner.

65.63.

Learned Additional Advocate General draws attention to the order dated 24.10.2025 passed by Respondent No. 13 and submits that the Petitioner’s claim was considered by the Forest Settlement Officer and was neither wholly accepted nor wholly rejected. He points out that Respondent No. 13 recognised the Petitioner’s rights in respect of an extent of 5 acres and 38 guntas in old Survey No. 167, corresponding to new Survey No. 102 of Agni Village, while rejecting the claim in respect of a further extent of 11 acres and 18 guntas in Agni Village. He submits that the order thus reflects an adjudication of the Petitioner’s claim to the extent considered by the Forest Settlement Officer and distinguishes between the extent in respect of which rights were recognised and the extent in respect of which the claim was not accepted.

65.64.

According to learned Additional Advocate General, if the Petitioner is aggrieved by the rejection of his claim to the extent of 11 acres and 18 guntas, the appropriate course is to challenge that part of the order by filing an appeal under Section 16 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. He submits that the Petitioner cannot seek to have the disputed claim reconsidered in writ proceedings without first pursuing the statutory remedy available against the order of the Forest Settlement Officer. He accordingly reiterates that the objection concerning the availability of an alternative remedy applies with particular force to the challenge against the rejection of the Petitioner’s claim.

65.65.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Petitioner did not place before Respondent No. 13 documentary material sufficient to establish his ownership over the lands claimed by him. He identifies the properties in question as an extent of 5 acres and 38 guntas in Survey No. 102 and an extent of 5 acres and 23 guntas in Survey No. 198 of Agni Village, within Kamanahalli Mandala Panchayat, Sakleshpur Taluk, Hassan District. According to him, a person asserting a right or interest in land included within the notified limits is required to substantiate the claim by producing the relevant title documents and other supporting material before the Forest Settlement Officer. He contends that the Petitioner failed to establish a clear and legally sustainable basis for the title claimed over the disputed extents.

65.66.

He further submits that the Petitioner’s claim to ownership must be examined not merely on the basis of possession or isolated revenue entries, but with reference to the documents evidencing the origin and devolution of title. According to him, the Petitioner did not establish the source from which his alleged predecessor derived title, the nature of the right held by such predecessor, or the manner in which the right was transferred to the Petitioner. He therefore contends that, in the absence of a satisfactorily established chain of title, the Petitioner cannot claim that the order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer is liable to be interfered with in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

65.67.

Learned Additional Advocate General also emphasises that the Petitioner claims to have purchased the subject properties on 19.01.2011, nearly nine decades after the notification dated 05.02.1920 was issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900. He submits that the purchase relied upon by the Petitioner is subsequent to the issuance of the notification and that the Petitioner cannot disregard the legal consequences, if any, flowing from that notification merely because the purchase was effected at a later point of time. According to him, the date of purchase is a material circumstance in examining the Petitioner’s claim, particularly in view of the State’s contention that the lands in question fall within the boundaries of the area notified for constitution as the Moorkangudda State Forest.

65.68.

He further submits that the Petitioner acquired the property long after the issuance of the notification and must, therefore, establish that the person from whom he purchased the land possessed a transferable right capable of being conveyed to him. Learned Additional Advocate General contends that a subsequent conveyance cannot, by itself, establish a better title in the purchaser than that possessed by the transferor. He accordingly submits that the Petitioner was required to demonstrate not only the execution of the purchase transaction dated 19.01.2011, but also the subsisting title of the transferor and the legal entitlement to convey the land, having regard to the prior forest notification and the statutory proceedings undertaken thereafter.

65.69.

Learned Additional Advocate General specifically submits that, out of the lands claimed by the Petitioner, an extent of 5 acres and 23 guntas in Survey No. 198 of Agni Village falls within the boundaries covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920. He contends that the location of the said extent within the notified boundary is a material circumstance that cannot be overlooked while examining the Petitioner’s claim of ownership. According to him, the Petitioner’s purchase in 2011 does not, without further proof, establish that the land was available for valid transfer or that the transferor possessed a right capable of being conveyed, particularly if the land was subject to a subsisting statutory forest notification.

65.70.

He further submits that the Petitioner has not produced a satisfactory account of the title history of the property tracing the rights from the original holder through the successive transfers, if any, up to the purchase relied upon by him. In his submission, the absence of a clear chain of title assumes particular significance where the State asserts that the land falls within an area notified for constitution as a State Forest. He therefore contends that the Petitioner cannot establish an enforceable right merely by relying upon the purchase transaction without first demonstrating the title of the transferor and the legal status of the land at the time of the transfer.

65.71.

Learned Additional Advocate General accordingly submits that the Petitioner’s challenge to the order dated 24.10.2025 is liable to be considered in the light of the statutory proceedings conducted by Respondent No. 13, the determination made under Section 14 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and the appellate remedy available under Section 16 of the Act. He reiterates that the Petitioner has failed to establish a clear chain of title to the disputed lands and that a substantial portion of the property claimed by him, namely, 5 acres and 23 guntas in Survey No. 198 of Agni Village, is stated to fall within the boundaries covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920. He submits that the subsequent purchase dated 19.01.2011 cannot, in itself, displace the legal consequences of the earlier notification, if it remained operative and applicable to the land in question.

65.72.

On these grounds, learned Additional Advocate General contends that the Petitioner has not made out a case for interference in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court and that the Petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy available under Section 16 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, in respect of the order passed by Respondent No. 13.

65.73.

He further relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj, [(2021) 18 SCC 104], more particularly paragraphs 24 and 28, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

24.

Mr. Khan further raised an argument that the final notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act has not been published. A reading of Section 20 of the Forest Act does not show that for a reserved forest, there is a requirement of publication of notification but no time limit is prescribed for publication of such notification under Section 20. Therefore, even if notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act has not been issued, by virtue of Section 5 of the Forest Act, there is a prohibition against acquisition of any right over the land comprised in such notification except by way of a contract executed in writing by or on behalf of the Government. Since no such written contract was executed by or on behalf of the State or on behalf of the person in whom such right was vested, therefore, the Gaon Sabha was not competent to grant lease in favour of the appellant.

xxx

28.

The High Court had referred to the objections filed by the lessees under the Consolidation Act and also objections by the Forest Department. It was held by the High Court that since no objections were filed by the Forest Department earlier, therefore, the objections would be barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. We find that such finding recorded by the High Court is clearly erroneous. The land vests in the Forest Department by virtue of notification published under a statute. It was the lessee who had to assert the title on the forest land by virtue of an agreement in writing by a competent authority but no such agreement in writing has been produced. Therefore, the lessee would not be entitled to any right only on the basis of an entry in the revenue record.

65.74.

By relying on Arun Kumar Bhardwaj, Learned Additional Advocate General submits that in paragraph 24, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, notwithstanding the absence of a final notification under Section 20 of the applicable Forest Act, the prohibition under Section 5 against acquisition of rights over land comprised in the preliminary notification continued to operate, except where such rights were acquired under a written contract executed by or on behalf of the Government or a person competent to create such rights. The Court consequently held that the Gaon Sabha was not competent to grant the lease in question in the absence of such a written contract.

65.75.

In paragraph 28, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the lessee could not claim rights over the forest land merely on the basis of an entry in the revenue records, particularly when no written agreement executed by a competent authority had been produced to establish the claimed title.

65.76.

Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the absence of a final notification under the applicable forest legislation does not, by itself, render every subsequent grant or transaction concerning land covered by a preliminary forest notification legally valid. He contends that the legal effect of any grant, lease or other transaction relied upon by the Petitioners must be examined with reference to the applicable statutory restrictions and the competence of the authority purporting to create the right. He further submits that revenue entries, by themselves, cannot confer title where the claimed right is not supported by a legally valid grant or other instrument recognised by law.

65.77.

Accordingly, he contends that the Petitioners cannot rely solely upon revenue entries or subsequent transactions to establish an enforceable right over the lands in question without demonstrating that the rights asserted by them were lawfully created and are consistent with the applicable forest legislation.

65.78.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Petitioners have failed to explain the source of title of their respective predecessors-in-interest or to establish how the latter acquired rights over the subject lands. He further submits that the Petitioners appeared before the Forest Settlement Officer and produced documents in support of their respective claims, thereby participating in and submitting to the statutory proceedings before the said authority. According to him, it is only after the Forest Settlement Officer passed orders adverse to their interests that the Petitioners approached this Court by filing the present writ petitions. He also contends that the Petitioners have suppressed the material fact of their participation in the proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer and have, therefore, not placed the complete factual background before this Court.

65.79.

Learned Additional Advocate General reiterates that, upon issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, the land comprised within the notified limits is intended to be constituted as a State Forest and must be dealt with in accordance with the statutory scheme governing such constitution. He submits that the subsequent proceedings, including the inquiry into the claims and rights asserted by interested persons, are steps contemplated by the Regulation, culminating in the issuance of the final notification under Section 17.

65.80.

Relying on Section 6 of the Regulation, he contends that, during the prescribed period, no new rights may be acquired over the notified land except in the circumstances expressly recognised by the provision. On this basis, he submits that the Petitioners cannot claim rights over the subject lands merely by relying upon subsequent transactions or entries in the revenue records, without establishing that such rights were lawfully acquired and are recognised under the applicable statutory framework.

65.81.

He accordingly submits that the proceedings initiated under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, are in accordance with law. According to him, the Petitioners are required to participate in those proceedings, produce all relevant documents in support of their claims and permit the competent authority to consider the material and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. He contends that the Petitioners cannot circumvent the statutory process by approaching this Court prematurely, particularly when the relevant questions concerning their claims and the status of the land are required to be examined by the competent authorities under the applicable legislation.

W.P. No. 33767/2025

65.82.

Insofar as W.P. No. 33767/2025 is concerned, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the writ petition has been filed by 87 Petitioners, of whom 86 appeared before the Forest Settlement Officer and submitted their objections and claims in respect of the lands asserted by them. He submits that, pursuant to their participation, the Forest Settlement Officer conducted the inquiry and prepared a report, which was forwarded to the concerned authorities for further action in accordance with law.

65.83.

He further submits that the claims of certain Petitioners have been admitted, either wholly or in part, in the course of the proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer. In particular, the claims of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14 and 15 in respect of lands in Survey No. 14 of Jambaradi Village, Petitioner No. 25 in respect of Survey No. 91/3 of Achanahalli Village, and Petitioner No. 26 in respect of Survey No. 104 of Agni Village have been admitted to the extent of an aggregate area of 14.07 acres, which, according to him, falls within the extent of 68 acres and 33 guntas proposed to be acquired by the State Government. He also refers to the claim of Petitioner No. 50 in respect of 0.10 acres in Survey No. 124 of Achanahalli Village, which, according to him, falls outside the boundary covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920.

65.84.

Learned Additional Advocate General makes a specific submission that the State will not proceed against the lands to the extent of the claims admitted by the Forest Settlement Officer in respect of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50. He submits that, to the extent their claims have been recognised, those Petitioners need not apprehend further proceedings by the State in respect of the admitted extents. However, insofar as the claims of the Petitioners have been rejected or have not been accepted in their entirety, he contends that the appropriate remedy is to challenge the adverse determination in an appeal under Section 16 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. He submits that the Petitioners, having participated in the proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer, cannot bypass the statutory appellate mechanism and seek a reconsideration of the disputed claims directly in these writ proceedings.

65.85.

Learned Additional Advocate General further refers to Notification No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, in respect of the Moorkangudda Block, comprising an extent of 7,938 acres and 38 guntas. He submits that, as on the date of issuance of the said notification, all the lands comprised within the notified extent, except 68 acres and 33 guntas, were already at the disposal of the State Government. According to him, it was only the remaining extent of 68 acres and 33 guntas that was required to be acquired by the State Government. He contends that the distinction between the total extent covered by the forest notification and the smaller extent proposed to be acquired is material to understanding the effect of the subsequent Government order dated 11.01.1924.

65.86.

In this regard, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Petitioners are seeking to create confusion by relying upon the withdrawal made in 1924 without distinguishing between the relevant notifications. He contends that the Government order dated 11.01.1924 related to Notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7 and not to Notification No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, which pertains to the Moorkangudda Block and is the subject matter of the present controversy. According to him, Notification No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6 has never been withdrawn or cancelled and continues to remain in force. He therefore submits that the Petitioners cannot rely upon the withdrawal of a different notification to contend that the notification dated 05.02.1920 concerning the Moorkangudda Block has ceased to operate.

65.87.

Learned Additional Advocate General also disputes the Petitioners’ contention that the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, and the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, are distinct enactments having separate legal identities relevant to the present controversy. He submits that the Petitioners are attempting to introduce an untenable distinction between the two descriptions of the legislation. According to him, whether referred to as the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, or the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, the statutory scheme relied upon by the State is the same and provides that, following the issuance of a preliminary notification under Section 4, claims and rights over the notified land are to be dealt with in accordance with the prescribed procedure, subject to the restrictions contained in Section 6. He contends that the Petitioners cannot avoid the legal consequences of the notification by relying upon the nomenclature of the enactment under which it was issued, his further submission is that the nomenclature has been used interchangeably, both of them are one and the same is his submission.

65.88.

He further submits that the restriction under Section 6 operates during the period contemplated by the provision, pending completion of the statutory process culminating in the final notification under Section 17. According to him, the Petitioners’ contention that rights could freely accrue over the notified lands during the intervening period is contrary to the statutory scheme. He therefore submits that any claim founded on subsequent grants, transfers or other transactions must be examined in the light of Section 6, including the exceptions expressly provided therein, and cannot be accepted merely because the transaction is reflected in revenue records.

65.89.

With regard to the repeal of the Mysore Forest legislation of 1900, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, repealed the earlier enactment but preserved the legal effect of actions validly taken thereunder. He contends that the repeal did not, by itself, extinguish the notification dated 05.02.1920, which had been issued under the earlier legislation. According to him, the notification and the proceedings validly undertaken pursuant thereto continue to have legal effect, subject to the applicable repeal-and-savings provisions and any subsequent lawful action affecting them. On this basis, he submits that the notification relating to the Moorkangudda Block cannot be treated as having lapsed merely because the earlier forest legislation was repealed.

65.90.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Petitioners have not placed on record any material demonstrating that the State Government had granted the subject lands to them or to their respective predecessors-in-interest. He contends that the Petitioners have failed to establish the source of their alleged title and have not produced documents tracing the origin and devolution of title through the successive holders of the properties. According to him, the mere assertion of ownership, possession or reliance upon revenue entries is insufficient to establish a lawful entitlement to the lands, particularly where the State disputes the Petitioners’ claims and asserts that the lands fall within the area covered by the forest notification.

65.91.

He draws attention to the Record of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTCs) and submits that, in respect of more than 6,400 acres of land, the name of the Forest Department is recorded in Column Nos. 9 or 11. According to him, these entries are material evidence of the association of the lands with the Forest Department and support the State’s contention that the lands were not at the disposal of the Revenue Department for grant or disposal as ordinary revenue lands. He submits that the relevant revenue records must be considered along with the forest notification, the records maintained by the Forest Department and the statutory proceedings undertaken in respect of the notified area.

65.92.

Learned Additional Advocate General further contends that the Revenue Department did not have administrative control over the lands which were under the control of the Forest Department and, consequently, could not validly grant or dispose of such lands without the requisite authority under law. He submits that, even if any grant, auction or other transaction is shown to have been effected by the Revenue Department, the validity and legal effect of such transaction must be examined with reference to the status of the land at the relevant time and the authority of the department purporting to deal with it. According to him, a transaction effected by an authority lacking the requisite competence cannot, merely by reason of its entry in the revenue records or the subsequent possession of the grantee or purchaser, establish an indefeasible right against the State.

65.93.

He further submits that, in several instances, the Revenue Department has granted, auctioned or otherwise dealt with lands claimed by the Forest Department without obtaining the latter’s concurrence and in disregard of the statutory restrictions applicable to forest lands. According to him, such transactions cannot be treated as conclusive proof of title merely because they were undertaken by a Government department. He contends that the respective powers and responsibilities of the Revenue and Forest Departments must be determined with reference to the governing statutes and the legal status of the lands concerned, rather than solely by reference to the fact that a grant or auction was conducted by the Revenue Department.

65.94.

Learned Additional Advocate General also refers to the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, which came into force on 25.10.1980, and submits that even after its commencement, forest lands continued in certain instances to be granted or diverted by the Revenue Department without obtaining the prior approval of the Central Government contemplated under Section 2 of the said Act. He contends that such action, where it involved the diversion of forest land for a non-forest purpose and attracted Section 2, could not lawfully be undertaken without compliance with the statutory requirement. He therefore submits that transactions involving the grant, assignment or diversion of land claimed to be forest land must be scrutinised in the light of the applicable forest legislation and cannot be presumed valid merely because they were effected through the Revenue Department.

65.95.

Finally, learned Additional Advocate General reiterates that the Forest Settlement Officer has completed the inquiry and submitted a report in which the claims of certain Petitioners have been admitted, either wholly or in part. He submits that the Petitioners participated in the statutory proceedings, produced documents and had an opportunity to substantiate their claims before the competent authority. According to him, they cannot now disregard the outcome of those proceedings and seek to challenge the process itself before this Court merely because the determination is adverse to their interests. He maintains that the Petitioners whose claims have been rejected or only partially admitted must pursue the statutory appellate remedy under Section 16 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. On these grounds, he seeks rejection of the Petitioners’ challenge to the proceedings and reiterates that the State is entitled to take such further action as is permissible under the applicable law.

65.96.

He refers to the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 more particularly Section 2 thereof, he submits that forest land cannot be diverted for a non-forest purpose, assigned by way of lease or otherwise, or dereserved without the prior approval of the Central Government, wherever such approval is statutorily required. He contends that the lands in question have consistently been treated as forest land and that, in the absence of material establishing otherwise, the contrary contention cannot be accepted.

65.97.

As regards the ecological significance of the subject lands, learned counsel submits that Moorkangudda forms part of the Western Ghats, a region of exceptional ecological importance, characterised by rich biodiversity, high levels of endemism and a variety of sensitive forest and grassland ecosystems. He relies upon the recognition of the Western Ghats as one of the world’s eight biodiversity hotspots and submits that the region contains some of the finest examples of non-equatorial tropical evergreen forests and is home to a substantial number of globally threatened species of flora and fauna. In this regard, he refers to the identification of at least 325 globally threatened species in the Western Ghats, including plants, mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish. He further submits that the ecological importance of the region is not confined to its biodiversity but extends to the regulation of the monsoon, the maintenance of catchment areas and the sustenance of water systems upon which a large population depends.

65.98.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the presence of wildlife in the Western Ghats, including tigers, elephants, leopards, gaurs and sloth bears, as well as other species such as the leopard cat, mouse deer, Indian porcupine, barking deer, peacock and jungle fowl, underscores the need to preserve the ecological integrity of the region. He also refers to species such as the Nilgiri marten, brown palm civet, Indian brown mongoose and lion-tailed macaque, which are associated with the biodiversity of the Western Ghats. Relying upon camera-trap exercises and other observations said to have been undertaken in the area, he submits that the Moorkangudda landscape provides habitat for wildlife and that its protection is necessary to preserve the ecological balance of the region. He contends that the species-specific claims, including the presence of particular species in Moorkangudda and their respective statutory classifications.

65.99.

Learned Additional Advocate General places particular emphasis on the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda. He submits that these ecosystems perform an important hydrological function by intercepting and absorbing rainfall, facilitating infiltration and releasing water gradually into streams and rivers. According to him, the grasslands function as natural catchment areas and help regulate runoff and sustain stream flows beyond the monsoon season. He contends that their ecological value cannot be assessed merely by reference to their outward appearance, since an area that appears to be open grassland may nevertheless perform an indispensable function within a forest and catchment ecosystem. He therefore submits that the protection of Moorkangudda must take account of the interdependence of its shola forests, grasslands, soil, water resources and wildlife.

65.100.

He further submits that the ecological consequences of degradation would not be confined to the immediate locality. According to him, encroachment, unauthorised occupation, construction and commercial activities, including the operation of resorts, could alter the natural characteristics of the area, impair its water-retention capacity and adversely affect the streams originating therein. He contends that the Forest Department is consequently required to act proactively to prevent unauthorised occupation and protect the area from activities that may compromise its ecological integrity. Learned counsel submits that the protection of the subject lands must be considered in the context of the larger environmental interests involved and not merely as a dispute concerning the competing claims of individual occupants and the State.

65.101.

In support of the hydrological significance of the area, learned counsel refers to streams said to originate in the Moorkangudda forest, including Bennehalla and Chettinahalla, which, according to him, join the Yagachi River and thereafter the Hemavathi River, ultimately forming part of the east-flowing Cauvery river system, which drains into the Bay of Bengal. He also refers to the Yettinahole stream, which he submits originates in the Western Ghats and forms part of the west-flowing river system that ultimately drains into the Arabian Sea. On this basis, he contends that the forest and grassland ecosystems of Moorkangudda are connected with the broader hydrological systems of the region and that their degradation may have consequences extending beyond the immediate area.

65.102.

Learned Additional Advocate General further refers to the Yettinahole Integrated Drinking Water Project, undertaken by the Government of Karnataka to address drinking-water requirements in drought-prone parts of the State by diverting water from west-flowing streams originating in the Western Ghats. He submits that the project involves a substantial public investment and is intended to benefit several districts, towns and villages by providing drinking water and facilitating the filling of irrigation tanks for groundwater recharge. He refers to the project’s proposed coverage of 6,657 villages and 38 towns, the intended filling of 527 tanks, and the estimated population of approximately 75 lakh beneficiaries. He also refers to the revised project cost of approximately ₹23,000 crore. These particulars are relied upon to demonstrate the public importance of protecting the source catchments and associated ecosystems.

65.103.

Learned Additional Advocate General contends that, if the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda are degraded, the consequences may extend to the availability and regulation of water in the region and may prejudice the drinking-water interests of the population intended to be served by the project. He submits that the protection of these lands is therefore not merely a matter of conserving flora and fauna, but also concerns the preservation of ecological services, catchment functions and water security for southern Karnataka. He accordingly urges that the potential environmental consequences of encroachment and unauthorised commercial activity must be considered while examining the legality of the proceedings initiated by the Forest Department.

65.104.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda constitute a distinct and ecologically sensitive ecosystem forming part of the Western Ghats. He submits that the ecological significance of the area cannot be assessed merely by examining whether the land is covered by dense tree growth or whether it outwardly resembles a conventional forest. The shola forests and the adjoining grasslands function as an integrated ecological unit, each performing a complementary role in the conservation of biodiversity, the regulation of water flows and the maintenance of the regional environment. He contends that the grasslands are not wastelands or ecologically insignificant open areas, but form an integral part of the natural landscape and contribute substantially to its ecological stability.

65.105.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the shola forests and grasslands perform an important hydrological function by intercepting rainfall, facilitating the infiltration of water into the soil and regulating the release of water into streams and rivers. The grasslands, in particular, are said to function as natural catchment areas by absorbing and retaining rainfall and moderating surface runoff. According to him, these characteristics enable the ecosystem to sustain stream flows beyond the monsoon season and contribute to the replenishment of water resources. He therefore submits that the ecological value of Moorkangudda extends beyond the immediate forest area and encompasses the maintenance of the catchments and water systems associated with the Western Ghats.

65.106.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda must be viewed as an interconnected ecological system, the degradation of which could have consequences extending well beyond the immediate area. He contends that encroachment, unauthorised occupation, construction and commercial activities, including the establishment and operation of resorts, may disturb the natural vegetation, alter soil characteristics, impair water infiltration and affect the ecological functions of the catchment. Such activities, according to him, may consequently affect the habitat of wildlife and the capacity of the landscape to regulate water flows. He submits that the protection of the area is therefore necessary not only for the conservation of flora and fauna but also for safeguarding the ecological services upon which surrounding communities depend.

65.107.

In this regard, learned Additional Advocate General refers to the streams originating in and around the Western Ghats, including those said to form part of the Yagachi–Hemavathi–Cauvery river system and the west-flowing river system associated with the Netravati. He further refers to the Yettinahole drinking-water project, which is intended to address the water requirements of drought-prone districts of Karnataka. He submits that the ecological integrity of the source catchments is material to the long-term sustainability of water resources and that damage to the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda may adversely affect the hydrological functions of the region. He accordingly contends that the potential consequences of degradation must be considered in the context of the larger public interest in the conservation of water resources and the protection of the environment.

65.108.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the ecological importance of shola forests and grasslands also warrants a precautionary approach to activities that may cause irreversible environmental damage. He contends that the absence of dense tree cover in a particular portion of the landscape cannot, by itself, be treated as proof that the land is ecologically insignificant or incapable of forming part of a forest ecosystem. According to him, the character and function of the land must be assessed having regard to its vegetation, ecological associations, catchment functions and relationship with the surrounding forest landscape. He therefore submits that any proposal to permit construction, commercial exploitation or other activities in the subject area must be examined with due regard to the potential impact on the shola ecosystem and the public interest in its preservation.

65.109.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the State, as custodian of natural resources held for the benefit of the public, is under an obligation to protect ecologically sensitive areas from degradation and unauthorised exploitation. He relies upon the public trust doctrine and the principles governing environmental protection to contend that natural ecosystems cannot be permitted to deteriorate merely because portions of the land have been occupied, developed or used for commercial purposes. He submits that the Forest Department’s efforts to protect Moorkangudda must therefore be considered in the light of the ecological functions performed by the shola forests and grasslands and the wider public interest in conserving the natural environment.

65.110.

Learned Additional Advocate General finally submits that the ecological significance of Moorkangudda reinforces the need to preserve the area and to prevent further degradation pending determination of the competing claims. He contends that the protection of the shola forests and grasslands is a matter of long-term environmental security and that the consequences of irreversible ecological damage may extend to biodiversity, catchment stability and the availability of water resources. He accordingly urges that the claims of individual occupants and the legality of the activities undertaken in the subject lands be examined in a manner that gives due consideration to the ecological sensitivity of the area and the State’s obligation to protect the environment.

65.111.

Turning to the statutory framework, learned counsel submits that the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920 was issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, declaring the Government’s proposal to constitute the notified area as a State Forest and initiating the statutory process for the ascertainment and settlement of rights claimed in respect of the area. He contends that the Regulation does not prescribe an express outer time limit within which the final notification under Section 17 must be published. On that basis, he argues that the absence of a final notification, merely because a considerable period has elapsed since the preliminary notification, should not automatically result in the extinguishment of the State’s authority to protect the notified lands.

65.112.

He further submits that the preliminary notification was not a mere declaration of an intention without legal consequences. According to him, the notification attracted the statutory restrictions applicable to the notified area, including restrictions upon the acquisition of rights after its publication, subject to the exceptions recognised by law. He therefore contends that the legal effect of the notification must be examined in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and cannot be determined solely by reference to the subsequent entries made in revenue records, grants or other dealings with the land. He submits that the absence of a final notification under Section 17 does not, by itself, answer every question concerning the subsistence of the preliminary notification or the consequences flowing from it.

65.113.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that neither the Petitioners nor their predecessors challenged the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920 for several decades and that the present challenge has been raised only after the Forest Settlement Officer was appointed and proceedings were initiated in respect of the subject lands. He contends that the prolonged failure to question the notification, coupled with the subsequent challenge at the stage of the statutory settlement proceedings, attracts the principles of delay, laches and acquiescence. According to him, the Petitioners cannot permit the statutory process to remain unchallenged for decades and then seek to defeat the proceedings merely by questioning the preliminary notification at a belated stage.

65.114.

He therefore submits that the challenge to the notification and the consequential proceedings is liable to be rejected on the grounds of delay, laches and acquiescence. He further contends that, having regard to the ecological significance of the area and the public interest in preserving its forest and catchment functions, the passage of time should not, in itself, be treated as sufficient to defeat the State’s lawful efforts to protect the subject lands. He accordingly urges that the Petitioners’ objections be examined in the light of the statutory scheme, the legal effect of the notification dated 05.02.1920, the nature of the rights claimed by the Petitioners and the public interest in the preservation of the area.

65.115.

He also relies upon the judgment of this Court in Girish H.E. v. State of Karnataka, [2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10537], more particularly paragraphs 8, 10-17, and 19 to thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

8.

Any action taken by the authorities prior to the issuance of the impugned notification is irrelevant for the purpose of the case. The notification dated 22-6-1991 states that an extent of 422.32 hectares in Uchangi Durga Village, Davangere District, is notified as reserved forest. The said notification has appointed the Range Forest Officer as the Forest Settlement Officer. Once any land is notified to constitute as a reserved forest, various steps are contemplated under the Act before a declaration can be issued under Section 17 of the Act declaring that the land is reserved forest. The relevant provisions of the Act in this regard are extracted below for felicity of reference:

“2.

Definitions. —In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.—

(14)

“Reserved Forest” means any land settled and notified as such in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of this Act;

3.

Powers to constitute reserved forests.— The State Government may constitute any land which is the property of the Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or to the whole, or any part of the forest produce of which the Government is entitled, a reserved forest in the manner hereinafter provided.

4.

Notification by Government.—(1) Whenever it has been decided to constitute any land a reserved forest the State Government shall issue a notification.—

(a)

declaring that it has been decided to constitute such land a reserved forest;

(b)

specifying, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such land; and

(c)

appointing an officer (hereinafter called the “Forest Settlement Officer”) to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any land comprised within such limits or in or over any forest produce, and to deal with the same as provided in this Chapter.

Explanation. —For the purpose of clause (b) it shall be sufficient to describe the limits of the forest-by roads, rivers, bridges, or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries.

(2)

The officer appointed under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall, be a person not holding any forest office except that of Forest Settlement Officer; but a Forest Officer may be appointed by the State Government to represent it in the inquiry under this Chapter by the Forest Settlement Officer.

5. Proclamation by Forest Settlement Officer.

—When a notification has been issued under Section 4, the Forest Settlement Officer shall publish in Kannada and in any other regional language of the area, at the Headquarters of” each taluk in which any portion of the land comprised in such notification is situate and in every town and village in the neighbourhood of such land a proclamation.—

(a)

specifying, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of the proposed forest;

(b)

setting forth the substance of the provisions of Section 6;

(c)

explaining the consequences which, as hereinafter provided, will ensue on such forest being constituted a reserved forest; and

(d)

fixing a period of not less than three months from the date of publishing such proclamation, and requiring every person claiming any right or making any claim referred to or mentioned in Section 4, either to present to such officer within such period a written notice specifying or to appear before him within such period and state the nature of such right or claim (if any) and in either case to produce all documents in support thereof.

The Forest Settlement Officer shall also serve a notice to the same effect on every known or reputed owner or occupier of any land included in or adjoining the land proposed” to be constituted a reserved forest or on his recognised agent or manager. Such notice may be sent by registered post to persons residing beyond the limits of the district in which such land is situate.

6.

Bar of accrual of forest rights.—(1) After the issue of a notification under Section 4, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government or some person in whom such right, or power to create such right, was vested when the notification was issued; and on such land no new house shall be built or plantation formed, no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made and no trees shall be cut for the purpose of trade or manufacture except as hereinafter provided. No patta or right of occupancy shall without the previous sanction of the State Government be granted, in respect of such land, and every patta or right of occupancy granted without such sanction shall be null and void.

(2)

Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit any act done under the written permission of the Forest Settlement Officer.

(3)

No Civil Court shall, between the dates of publication of the notification under Section 4 and of the final notification to be issued under Section 17 entertain any suit to establish any right in or over any land or to the forest produce of any land included in the notification under Section 4.

7.

Inquiry by Forest Settlement Officer.— The Forest Settlement Officer shall take down in writing all statements made under clause (d) of Section 5 and shall, at some convenient place, inquire into all claims duly preferred under that section and into the existence and extent of any rights mentioned in Section 4 and not claimed under Section 5 so far as the same may be ascertainable from the records of the Government and the evidence of any person likely to be acquainted with the same.

The Forest Settlement Officer shall at the same time, consider and record any objection which the Forest Officer, if any, appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 4 may make to any such claim or any information which he may afford with regard to the existence and extent of any such right.

8.

Powers of Forest Settlement Officer.— For the purpose of such inquiry, the Forest Settlement Officer may exercise the following powers, that is to say.—

(i)

power to enter, by himself or any officer authorised by him for the purpose, upon any land, and to survey, demarcate and make a map of the same; and

(ii)

the powers of a Civil Court in the trial of suits.

9.

Extinction of rights— Rights in respect of which no claim has been preferred under Section 5, and of the existence of which no knowledge has been acquired by inquiry under Section 7, shall be extinguished unless, before the final notification under Section 17 is published, the person claiming them satisfies the Forest Settlement Officer that he had sufficient cause for not preferring such claim within the period fixed under Section 5 in which case the Forest Settlement Officer shall proceed to dispose of the claim as hereinafter provided.

xxx

17. Notification declaring forest a reserved forest.—

(1)

When the following events have occurred, namely.—

(a)

the period fixed under Section 5 for preferring claims has elapsed, and all claims, if any, made under that section or Section 9 have been disposed of by the Forest Settlement Officer;

(b)

if any such claims have been made, the period limited by Section 16 for appealing from the orders passed on such claims has elapsed and all appeals (if any) presented within such period have been disposed of; and

(c)

all proceedings prescribed by Sections 11 and 14 have been taken and all lands and buildings (if any) to be included in the proposed reserved forest, which the Forest Settlement Officer has under Section 11 elected to acquire under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, have become vested in the Government under Section 16 of that Act, the State Government shall publish a notification specifying clearly according to the boundary marks erected or otherwise, the limits of the forest which is intended to constitute a reserved forest and declaring the same to be a reserved forest from the date fixed by such notification, subject to the exercise of rights (if any) specified in such notification.

(2)

From the date so fixed, such forest shall be deemed to be a reserved forest”.

10.

The notification issued under Section 4 of the Act may be termed as a Preliminary Notification. The same has to be published by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 5 as a proclamation and also a copy of the notice has to be served on every known owner or occupier of any land included in or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest or on his recognized agent or manager. On the issuance of a notification under Section 4, no right can be acquired in or over the land comprised in the notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government. Also no Civil Court can entertain any suit for the establishment of any right on any land included in the notification issued under Section 4.

11.

Under clause (d) of Section 5 of the Act, under which a proclamation is made by the Forest Settlement Officer a period of three months from the date of publishing the proclamation is given to any person claiming any right or making any claim referred to under Section 4 by producing all documents in support thereof. If such a claim is made, the Forest Settlement Officer has to enquire into the claim by looking into the records of the Government and the evidence of any person acquainted with the same and also hear the concerned Forest Officer as regards any objections under Section 7.

12.

Section 8 grants certain powers to the Forest Settlement Officer for the purpose of conducting an enquiry. If no claim is made within the period fixed under Section 5 before the Forest Officer, any rights in that regard shall be extinguished unless before the final notification under Section 17 is published, the person claiming them satisfies the Forest Settlement Officer that he had sufficient cause for not preferring such a claim within the period fixed under Section 5 in which case the Forest Settlement Officer would have to proceed to dispose of the claim.

13.

Section 10 deals with the manner in which claims relating to shifting cultivation would have to be dealt with. Section 11 enables the Forest Settlement Officer to acquire land over which a right is claimed in case such land is not excluded from the limits of the reserved forest or no agreement with the owner for the surrender of his rights is arrived at. In the event of an acquisition, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would apply and the Forest Settlement Officer would act as a Deputy Commissioner. With regard to the right of way to pasturage or other forest produce or water, the Forest Settlement Officer has to consider any such claims and pass an order under Section 12 read with Sections 13 and 14. If no settlement under Section 14 is arrived at, then compensation has to be determined on the basis of the value of the right claimed on the date of the preliminary notification in accordance with the provisions of the Act, insofar as such provisions are applicable under Section 15 of the Act.

14.

Section 16 provides for an appeal against an order passed under Section 11, 12, 14 or 15. The statutory period for filing of an appeal is three months from the date of the order made by the Forest Settlement Officer. Section 17 states that when the period fixed under Section 5 for preferring a claim has lapsed and all claims have been disposed of under Section 9 and the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 16 has lapsed and appeals if any filed have been disposed of and all proceedings under Sections 11 and 14 have been taken, the State Government shall publish a final notification specifying clearly the boundary marks of the reserved forest and declare the same to be a reserved forest from the date fixed by a notification subject to the exercise of rights if any specified in such a notification. From the date so fixed, such forest shall be deemed to be a reserved forest. Before the date fixed in the notification under Section 18, the same shall be published in the Official Gazette and at the Taluk Headquarters in which the forest is situated and in the neighbourhood as a proclamation is published under Section 5.

15.

On a reading of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that though no specific date has been fixed for the issuance of a declaration under Section 17 of the Act, nevertheless, after the issuance of the preliminary notification, a period of three months is granted to every person to make a claim. Also, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would have to be read into Section 11 of the Act in case, a necessity to acquire the land arises.

16.

It is observed that in many provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, specified time-frames have been mandated-from the date of publication of the preliminary and final notification as well as for passing of an award. No doubt, an elaborate procedure has been contemplated between the issuance of a preliminary notification and the issuance of a declaration or final notification under the Act under consideration encompassing the making of claims with regard to the notified areas proposed to be declared to be reserved forest and also settlement of the said claims, but the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are also contemplated and orders passed under Sections 11, 12, 14 and 15 are also subject to appeal. However, there is no specified period mentioned under the Act within which, the notification declaring the reserved forest has to be issued under Section 17 of the Act, once the preliminary notification has been issued.

17.

Before answering the contention raised by the Petitioners that in the absence of any declaration under Section 17 of the Act, the lands notified under Section 4 of the Act cannot become forest lands and therefore, FC clearance is not required, it would be necessary to first set at rest, the rival contentions raised on the basis of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in V. Sampangi Ramaiah's case to which one of us (Mrs. B.V. Nagarathna, J.) was a member. Briefly stated, the facts of that case were that the Petitioner therein was granted quarrying lease in respect of 12.30 acres of land in Sy. No. 601/A1 in Kollegal Taluk. Notice dated 8-7-2005 was issued to the Petitioner therein calling upon him to stop all quarrying operations. The same was assailed in W.P. No. 17941 of 2005, which was allowed by this Court by order dated 16-8-2007 and the impugned notice was quashed. As preliminary notification dated 3-6-1991 had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, and the Assistant Commissioner of Kollegal Station was appointed as Forest Settlement Officer by the State Government to enquire into the existence of any rights or claims of persons under the Act pursuant to Section 4 notification, a communication dated 18-1-2007 was issued to the Petitioner therein. In the meeting held on 20-1-2007 under the Chairmanship of the Forest Settlement Officer-cum-Assistant Commissioner, it was decided to exclude 366.63 acres of land and the balance 617.71 acres was to be constituted as reserved forest out of a total extent of 984.34 acres in Sy. No. 601/A1. When the matter stood thus, another notice dated 17-10-2008 was issued to the Petitioner therein asking him to stop all quarrying operations and not to transport the quarried material till further orders. That notice was assailed in W.P. No. 13708 of 2008 and by order dated 25-6-2009, the writ petition was allowed and the notice was quashed reserving liberty to the Joint Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Mysore Zone to hold a detailed enquiry with regard to the nature of the land and to pass orders in accordance with law. During the pendency of that writ petition, the lease period had come to an end and an application for renewal had been filed by the Petitioner therein seeking renewal of 10 acres of land out of 12.30 acres of land granted originally. By an endorsement dated 8-1-2010, the Petitioner therein was informed by an endorsement that the land sought by him for renewal of the lease was notified as a reserved forest. Assailing that endorsement a revision petition was filed, which was dismissed and thereafter, the writ petition was filed. In the order passed in the writ petition, paragraphs 19 to 23 are extracted for immediate reference:

“19.

When specific period has been fixed, for making a claim and also by filing an appeal by any persons, a corresponding time-frame for the adjudication of the claims and for issuance of a declaration ought to have been made. The absence of any specific time frame for the issuance of a declaration under Section 17 would imply that such a declaration must be made within a reasonable time. What is the reasonable time in the absence of any specific time frame mentioned in a statutory provision would vary from Act to Act and depending upon the object and scope of the Act. In the instant case, having regard to the object and scope of the Act in question, we are of the view that a period of three years would be the reasonable period within which, a declaration under Section 17 of the Act ought to be made, excluding the period when steps are taken under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as well as appellate proceedings, if any. This period obviously would exclude any stay orders granted by any Court of Law. But in the instant case, the State is unable to point out any steps initiated after the order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer, excluding 366.63 acres, which according to the Petitioner also includes the area of the subject quarry. This aspect is communicated to the Petitioner in the year 2007, whereas in 2004 itself the quarry lease was granted to the Petitioners.

20.

In this context, reliance could be placed on the fact that originally in the matter of issuance of preliminary notification and a declaration under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, there was no time limit fixed for making an award. Subsequently, in the year 1984, an amendment was brought in the form of insertion to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44, which is a decision on a dispute arising prior to the insertion of Section 4 to the Land Acquisition Act, the Supreme Court has held that compensation has to be paid within a reasonable time, even in the absence of any time limit prescribed under the Act and the reasonable time was stated to be about two years in the said case.

21.

In the instant case, though the preliminary notification is issued on 3-6-1991, the final notification is yet to be issued. In fact, several adjournments were given in the matter so as to enable the Respondent-authorities to take a decision with regard to issuance of a declaration under Section 17 of the Act, even then, no steps have been taken to issue such a declaration. Therefore, we find that the State Government has by not taking steps for over two decades after the issuance of the preliminary notification, abandoned its intention to notify Sy. No. 601/A1 as a Reserved Forest. This becomes all the more clear by the fact that subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary notification in the year 1991 and quarrying lease has also been granted to the Petitioner and possibly to the other similarly placed persons in the year 2004. Therefore, the impugned order at Annexure-A is without authority of law.

22.

The preliminary notification dated 3-6-1991 is also quashed insofar as Sy. No. 601/A1 is concerned, though in our view, the entire preliminary notification is inchoate. Annexures-A and B are also quashed. The Respondent-Authorities are directed to consider the Petitioner's application for renewal of the quarrying lease for a further period of ten years, excluding the period of lease when the Petitioner was prevented from carrying on the quarrying activities during the subsistence of the Quarrying Deed No. 105 since the year 2004.

23.

The writ petition is accordingly, allowed. The renewal of the lease to be effected within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Parties to bear their respective costs”.

19.

Having considered the implication of the decision in V. Sampangi Ramaiah's case, this case would have to be decided on its facts. If the provisions of the Act are applied to the facts of the case, what emerges is that when a notification is issued under Section 4 declaring the decision to constitute any land as Reserved Forest, by virtue of Section 6 of the Act, no contract can be entered into in respect of that land on behalf of the Government with any person except with the previous sanction of the State Government and no right can be acquired in or around or over the land comprised in the notification except by succession or under the grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government or some person in whom such right or power to create such right, was vested when the notification was issued. No doubt, under Section 6, the State can enter into a contract with any person in respect of the lands notified under Section 4 provided the provisions of that section are fully complied with. Therefore, in that sense the Petitioners may be partly right in contending that despite issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act State had the power to grant the mining leases in favour of the Petitioners. But the matter does not rest here.

65.116.

By relying on Girish H.E., the Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the issuance of a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, initiates the statutory process for constitution of a reserved forest, which requires further proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act, culminating in a final notification under Section 17. He relies on the observations in paragraphs 8 and 10 to 17 of the said judgment, which explain the statutory procedure governing the notification, publication of proclamation, submission and inquiry into claims, settlement of rights and issuance of the final notification.

65.117.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that, upon issuance of a notification under Section 4, the consequences prescribed under Section 6 of the Act ensue, including restrictions on the acquisition of rights over the notified land, subject to the exceptions provided therein. He contends that the legal effect of subsequent grants, contracts or other purported creation of rights must, therefore, be examined in the light of Section 6 and the circumstances in which such rights are claimed to have arisen.

65.118.

He also relies on the discussion in Girish H.E. concerning the decision in V. Sampangi Ramaiah, particularly the principle that, although the Act does not prescribe a specific period for issuance of the final notification under Section 17, the statutory process must be completed within a reasonable time. He submits, however, that the question of reasonable time and the legal consequences of delay must be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, including the steps taken by the authorities, the nature of the land and the rights claimed by the Petitioners.

65.119.

Relying further on paragraph 19 of Girish H.E., the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the effect of a preliminary notification under Section 4, and the validity of any subsequent grant or contract relating to the notified land, must be assessed by applying the relevant provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. He contends that the Petitioners cannot rely merely on the existence of subsequent grants or other transactions to defeat the statutory consequences of the notification, without establishing that the rights asserted by them were lawfully created and are legally enforceable.

65.120.

He relies on B.R. Ganapathi Singh v. State of Karnataka [2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3074] more particularly Paras 46 and 64 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

46.

Further, in the aforesaid context, we do not think that there can be any distinction with regard to a piece of land which has been decided to be constituted as reserved forest under S. 4(1) of the Act and land being deemed to be reserved forest under S. 17 of the Act which is like a final notification. The reason being, once the land is constituted as reserved forest under S. 4(1) of the Act, it is by issuance of a Notification then the claims would have to be made and it is only on the consideration of the claims that an application for exclusion of the land constituted as reserved forest under S. 4(1) of the Act could be ordered. Merely because the procedure contemplated under the Act subsequent to the issuance of a Notification under S. 4 of the Act is not yet completed or no Notification has been issued under S. 17(1) of the Act, in our view, would not make any difference, as the object and purpose of reserving any land is to treat the said land as being constituted a reserved forest. If such a land or any portion thereof is excluded on adjudication of claims, it would not find a place in Notification issued under S. 17 of the Act. In such a case, it would no longer be constituted as reserved forest. But, till that procedure is not completed by the Forest Settlement Officer, it remains to be constituted as reserved forest.

64.

Having regard to the definition of forest enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it must be held that all statutorily recognized forest, whether designated as reserved forest, protected or otherwise, must be held to come within the scope of the expression “Forest”. In the instant case, the land in question was decided to be constituted as reserved forest under S. 4 of the Act. Merely because a final declaration under S. 17 of the Act has not been issued in the instant case, it cannot be held that subject land is not forest land. As already noted, when once the land is decided to be constituted as reserved forest under S. 4 of the Act, it continues to be forest land until the procedure contemplated for exclusion of any portion of the said land from being declared as reserved forest is completed by adjudication of the claims. If no claim is made in respect of the land constituted as reserved forest under S. 4 of the Act, it fructifies as reserved forest. The object of issuance of Notification under S. 17 of the Act is to restate the boundaries of the reserved forest after excluding the lands constituted as reserved forest on adjudication of the claims under the Act. Thus, if there are no claims which are adjudicated, then the land intended to be constituted as reserved forest is declared as reserved forest.

65.121.

By relying on B. R. Ganapathi, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, declaring the intention to constitute an area as a reserved forest, has legal consequences even before the issuance of the final notification under Section 17. He contends that the mere absence of a final notification does not, by itself, establish that the notified land has ceased to be forest land, as the statutory process initiated by the preliminary notification remains to be completed through the ascertainment and adjudication of claims by the Forest Settlement Officer. He submits that, until the statutory process is completed and any exclusion is effected in accordance with law, the absence of a final notification cannot be relied upon, by itself, to defeat the State’s claim to protect the notified area.

65.122.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that, as explained in B.R. Ganapathi Singh, the final notification under Section 17 serves to declare the boundaries of the reserved forest after taking into consideration the claims adjudicated during the settlement proceedings. He contends that, where no claims are made or where the adjudication of claims does not result in the exclusion of any portion of the notified area, the absence of a final notification cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the land is not forest land. On this basis, he opposes the Petitioners’ contention that the non-issuance of a final notification under Section 17 necessarily deprives the State of the authority to protect the subject lands.

65.123.

Applying the aforesaid reasoning to the facts of the present case, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, must be considered in the light of its terms and legal effect. He contends that the absence of a final notification should not, by itself, be treated as extinguishing the legal consequences of the preliminary notification or as conferring an unrestricted right upon private parties to occupy, develop or commercially exploit the notified lands. He accordingly submits that the Petitioners’ claims must be examined with reference to the notification history, the statutory process for settlement of rights and the applicable provisions governing the protection of forest lands.

65.124.

The learned Additional Advocate General further relies upon paragraph 64 of B.R. Ganapathi Singh to submit that statutorily recognised forests fall within the expression “forest”, irrespective of whether they are classified as reserved forests, protected forests or otherwise. He contends that the character of the subject lands cannot be determined merely by reference to the presence or absence of dense tree cover or to subsequent descriptions in revenue records. According to him, the absence of a final notification under Section 17 cannot, in itself, conclusively establish that the subject lands fall outside the scope of forest protection.

65.125.

He therefore submits that the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920, the subsequent proceedings, the claims made before the Forest Settlement Officer and the effect of the applicable repealing and saving provisions must be considered together. On these grounds, he opposes the writ petitions and seeks rejection of the Petitioners’ contention that the subject lands are not forest lands merely because a final notification under Section 17 was not issued.

65.126.

The learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State and opposing the writ petitions, relies upon the Circular dated 20.08.2004 issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, referring to the order dated 13.11.2000 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India v. Union of India [2000 SCC OnLine SC 119]. He submits that the said order emphasises that no dereservation of forests, sanctuaries or national parks shall be undertaken without following the prescribed procedure.

65.127.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Ministry of Environment and Forests has clarified that a proposal for deletion of an area covered by a notification under Section 4 of the applicable forest legislation can be processed by the Central Government only after the concerned State Government or Union Territory administration obtains the requisite permission of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He contends that, in view of the aforesaid directions and the procedure followed pursuant thereto, several States and Union Territories have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in relation to proposals for deletion of such areas, which have been referred for consideration by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC). He submits that the procedure prescribed for seeking such deletion must be followed in the present case as well, and that the Petitioners cannot circumvent the prescribed process by seeking to occupy or assert rights over the subject lands without establishing their entitlement in accordance with law.

65.128.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the revenue records relating to the subject lands disclose their forest character and that such entries put the Petitioners on notice of the Forest Department’s claim. He contends that the Petitioners, having purchased the lands despite the entries in the revenue records and the subsisting claim of the Forest Department, cannot claim equities merely on the basis of such purchases or the investments made thereafter. He accordingly submits that the Petitioners cannot seek protection of their alleged rights on equitable considerations while disregarding the statutory framework and the procedure applicable to the deletion or dereservation of forest land.

65.129.

He relies on Narinder Singh v. Divesh Bhutani [2022 SCC OnLine SC 899], more particularly para 49 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

49.

Most of the well-known dictionaries are more or less consistent when it comes to the meaning of the word “forest”. The erstwhile Nagpur High Court in Laxman Ichharam v. Divl. Forest Officer made an attempt to define “forests” by referring to dictionary meaning of the word “forest” in the Oxford English Dictionary. Para 13 of the said decision reads thus : (SCC OnLine MP)

“13.

The term “forest” has not been defined anywhere in the Forest Act. In the absence of such a definition the word “forest” must be taken in its ordinary dictionary sense. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I, gives the following meaning to it:

‘1. An extensive tract of land covered with trees and undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture….

2.

Law. A woodland district, usually belonging to the king, set apart for hunting wild beasts and game, etc.….

3.

A wild uncultivated waste.’ ”

65.130.

By relying on Narinder Singh, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that, in the absence of an exhaustive statutory definition of the expression “forest”, the expression must be understood in its ordinary dictionary sense, having regard to the context in which it is used. He relies upon the meaning of the expression referred to in Narinder Singh, which includes an extensive tract of land covered with trees and undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture, a woodland district, and a wild, uncultivated tract of land. He contends that the character of a forest cannot be determined solely by examining whether the land is densely covered with trees, as the expression is capable of encompassing land comprising both tree-covered areas and interspersed pasture or grassland.

65.131.

Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda must be considered as part of the larger ecological landscape and that the presence of open grasslands or the absence of dense tree cover in certain portions does not, by itself, exclude such lands from being treated as forest. He further contends that the nature and character of the subject lands must be assessed in the light of the relevant forest records, the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the ecological characteristics of the area, rather than merely by reference to the present physical appearance of individual parcels.

65.132.

The learned Additional Advocate General accordingly submits that the Petitioners cannot contend that the subject lands fall outside the scope of forest protection merely because some portions comprise grasslands or are not covered by dense tree growth. He urges that the expression “forest” be construed in its proper statutory and factual context and that the Petitioners’ challenge be rejected insofar as it rests solely upon the absence of dense tree cover.

65.133.

He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of UOI v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd., [(1996) 4 SCC 453], particularly paragraph 10, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

10.

According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein. Mr Hidayatullah submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 27 does not apply either to a suit filed by the importer or to a writ petition filed by him and that in such cases the period of limitation would be three years. The learned counsel refers to certain decisions of this Court to that effect. We shall assume for the purposes of this appeal that it is so, notwithstanding the fact that the said question is now pending before a larger Constitution Bench of nine Judges along with the issue relating to unjust enrichment. Yet the question is whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs authorities, who are the creatures of the Customs Act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27, whether before or after amendment. Maybe the High Court or a civil court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Article 226 or the power of a civil court. No such delegation or conferment can ever be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law. When we expressed this view during the hearing Mr Hidayatullah requested that in such a case the matter be remitted to the High Court and the High Court be left free to dispose of the writ petition according to law.

65.134.

By relying on Kirloskar Pneumatic, the Learned Additional Advocate General submits that Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is intended to effectuate the law, enforce the rule of law and ensure that State authorities act in accordance with law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that such jurisdiction cannot be invoked to direct statutory authorities to act contrary to the provisions of the governing enactment.

65.135.

The learned Additional Advocate General submits that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to compel statutory authorities to act contrary to the applicable law or to disregard the statutory restrictions governing their powers. He contends that, where the Forest Department authorities are acting in discharge of their statutory duties under the applicable forest legislation, this Court ought not to issue directions that would require them to act in derogation of the governing statutory provisions. He further submits that the Petitioners cannot seek relief that would have the effect of restraining the competent authorities from enforcing the law, merely by relying upon revenue entries, grants or other transactions, without establishing that the rights asserted by them are legally sustainable under the applicable law.

65.136.

He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana [(1981) 1 SCC 11] [Paragraph 51], which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

51.

On a consideration of the decisions of this Court it is clear that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power of the State. So also, the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the Government must be held to have notice of the limitations of his authority. the Court can enforce compliance by a public authority of the obligation laid on him if he arbitrarily or on his mere whim ignores the promises made by him on behalf of the Government. It would be open to the authority to plead and prove that there were special considerations which necessitated his not being able to comply with his obligations in public interest.

65.137.

By relying on Jit Ram Shiv Kumar, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent the State from exercising its legislative powers or discharging its statutory duties. He contends that the State cannot be bound by acts or assurances given by its officers or agents beyond the scope of their authority and that persons dealing with such officers are required to take note of the limitations on their authority. He further submits that an obligation allegedly arising from a representation made on behalf of the Government cannot be enforced where doing so would prevent the competent authority from acting in accordance with law.

65.138.

Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the learned Additional Advocate General contends that any grants, permissions, revenue entries or other acts of the Revenue Department relied upon by the Petitioners cannot, by themselves, preclude the Forest Department or the State from discharging its statutory obligations to protect forest lands, if such acts were contrary to the applicable law or were undertaken by authorities lacking the requisite competence. He submits that the Petitioners cannot claim an enforceable equitable right merely on the basis of acts or representations of public authorities, without establishing that those authorities were legally competent to grant the rights asserted.

65.139.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be employed to compel the State to perpetuate an illegality or to refrain from taking action required by law in the public interest. He therefore contends that the Petitioners cannot resist the proceedings initiated by the Forest Department solely on the ground that they or their predecessors acquired the lands, obtained revenue entries or made investments in reliance upon acts of the Government, particularly if the underlying transactions are shown to be inconsistent with the governing forest legislation. On this basis, he seeks rejection of the Petitioners’ claims founded upon promissory estoppel or equitable considerations.

65.140.

He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel [(2010) 4 SCC 393], Paragraph 14, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

14.

Generally, no court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has been injected by law. (Vide State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla, State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra , Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd., University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra and Karnataka SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan)

65.141.

By relying on Manish Goel, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that a Court cannot issue directions contrary to law or compel a statutory authority to act in contravention of the governing statutory provisions. He contends that the jurisdiction of a constitutional Court must be exercised to uphold the rule of law and cannot be invoked to secure an outcome that is impermissible under the applicable legislation.

65.142.

Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Petitioners cannot seek directions from this Court that would prevent the competent authorities from discharging their statutory obligations under the applicable forest laws. He contends that, if the subject lands are governed by the relevant forest legislation and the proceedings initiated by the Forest Department are otherwise in accordance with law, the Petitioners cannot obtain relief that would effectively require the authorities to disregard the statutory framework or permit acts prohibited thereunder.

65.143.

He further submits that any grants, permissions, revenue entries or other dealings relied upon by the Petitioners cannot, merely by their existence, entitle them to relief contrary to the governing law. According to him, the legality and effect of such instruments must be determined in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, and the Court cannot direct the State or its authorities to recognise or perpetuate rights that are legally unsustainable. On this basis, the learned Additional Advocate General opposes the reliefs sought in the writ petitions and submits that the petitions cannot be allowed to the extent that the reliefs claimed would require the authorities to act contrary to law.

65.144.

He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the case of CIT v. Punalur Paper Mills, [(1988) 170 ITR 37], Paragraphs 5 and 6 which are reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

5.

We see no force in this plea. The Board of Revenue is competent to issue circulars under section 119 of the Income-tax Act. The circulars so issued have got the force of law. All officers of the Department are bound by the said circulars. The benevolent circulars issued by the Board are in the nature of administrative relief. They really “supplant” the law. The circular can afford administrative relief even beyond the relevant terms of the statute. It can deviate from the provisions of the Act. The courts have held that such circulars are binding on the officers of the Department. It is not open to the Department to contend, even in cases where the circular goes beyond the terms of the section, that the circular has no legal effect or should not be given effect to. The circulars would go to the assistance of the assessees. It is settled law that the circulars cannot impose any burden on the taxpayer. But, by the issue of a circular, the rigour of the law can be relaxed by giving administrative relief. Apart from the fact that such circulars are binding on the officers of the Department, even if the circulars are relied on for the first time in the High Court during the course of hearing, the assessee will be entitled to the benefit afforded by the circular. The court is bound to take note of the circular. These propositions are well settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of High Courts (Vide Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, AAC [1965] 56 ITR 198 at p. 203 (SC), Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 913 (SC), Tala Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. N.C. Upadhyaya [1974] 96 ITR 1 (Bom), F.C. Agarwal v. CIT [1976] 102 ITR 408 (Gauhati), Navnitlal Ambalal v. CIT [1976] 105 ITR 735 (Bom), CWT v. Gammon India P. Ltd. [1981] 130 ITR 471 (Bom) and Addl. CIT v. Mrs. Avtar Mohan Singh [1982] 136 ITR 645 (Delhi)). This court has also taken the same view in a series of decisions. They are: Rajarajeswari Weaving Mills v. ITO [1978] 113 ITR 405, CIT v. B. Al. Edward, India Sea Foods [1979] 119 ITR 334 [FB] and CIT v. T.S. Venkiteswaran [1979] 120 ITR 675. It is too late in the day for the Revenue to contend that the circular issued by the Board of Revenue is only an administrative direction or that it will not bind the Department or that it shall not be given effect to, since it goes beyond or deviates from the terms of the statute. As stated, the circular “supplants “ the law and not “ supplements “ the law.

6.

In the light of the above position in law, we are satisfied that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in giving effect to the Circular dated

65.145.

By relying on Punalur Paper Mills the Learned Additional Advocate General submits that administrative circulars issued by a competent statutory authority, within the scope of its powers, have binding effect upon the officers of the concerned Department. He further contends that, in the present case, the relevant circulars and administrative instructions relied upon by the State must be considered in the context of their legal authority and applicability to the forest lands in question.

65.146.

He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of RBI v. Peerless [(1987) 1 SCC 424], Paragraph 33, which is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

33.

Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasonsfor it that the Court construed the expression “Prize Chit” in Srinivasa [(1980) 4 SCC 507 : (1981) 1 SCR 801 : 51 Com Cas 464] and we find no reason to depart from the Court’s construction.

65.147.

By relying on Peerless, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the provisions of the applicable forest legislation must be interpreted having regard to the text, context, object and scheme of the enactment as a whole. He contends that the relevant provisions cannot be read in isolation or construed solely on the basis of the meaning attributed to an individual expression, without considering their relationship with the other provisions and the legislative purpose. Accordingly, the legal effect of the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the subsequent Government Order dated 11.01.1924 must, according to him, be determined by examining the relevant instruments in their proper statutory and historical context and in the light of the scheme of the applicable forest legislation.

65.148.

On the basis of all the above arguments and contentions, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the petition is required to be dismissed.

66.

Heard Sri.Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioner/s in WP No.16251/2023, WP No.29656/2024, WP No.33767/2025 in WP No.700/2026 and WP No.19980/2023, Sri.A.M.Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioner/s in WP No.29690/2025, and Sri.Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General for the Respondents and perused papers.

67.

The points that would arise for consideration are as under:

(i)

Whether the notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, continues to remain operative, and whether the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 had the effect of withdrawing or cancelling the said notification or related to a distinct notification and a limited extent of land?

(ii)

What is the legal effect of the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and whether the absence of such notification precludes the State from asserting the forest status of the notified lands or taking action under the applicable forest legislation?

(iii)

Whether the repeal of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, by the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, affects the validity or continued operation of the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, having regard to the applicable repeal-and-savings provisions?

(iv)

Whether the prolonged lapse of time between the preliminary notification and the subsequent proceedings renders the proceedings legally unsustainable on the grounds of unreasonable delay, abandonment of the proposal to constitute the lands as reserved forest, or creation of third-party rights in the intervening period?

(v)

Whether the grants, saguvali chits, registered instruments, revenue entries, conversion orders, licences and other permissions relied upon by the Petitioners confer legally enforceable rights over the lands in question, having regard to the applicable forest legislation and the competence of the authorities who issued them?

(vi)

Whether the Petitioners have established that their respective properties fall within the boundaries of the land covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920, having regard to the survey particulars, extent, boundaries and other relevant records?

(vii)

Whether the Petitioners are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the availability of alternative statutory remedies, having regard to the nature of the impugned action and the grounds urged in the respective writ petitions?

(viii)

Proceedings under Section 64A: In the writ petitions challenging proceedings under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, whether the provision was legally applicable to the respective petition schedule properties; whether the proceedings were initiated by competent authorities; and whether the prescribed procedure, including the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of hearing, was complied with?

(ix)

Proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer: In the writ petitions challenging proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer, whether the appointment of the Officer, publication of the proclamation, service of notices, inquiry into claims and objections, and determination of rights were in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions?

(x)

Orders under Section 14 and remedy under Section 16: In the writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 14 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, whether the Petitioners have an effective statutory appeal under Section 16 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and, if so, whether the circumstances of the respective cases nevertheless warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

(xi)

Proceedings of the Regional Commissioner: In the writ petitions relying upon the proceedings dated 08.09.2022 of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division, whether those proceedings possess any binding legal effect upon the State Government or the Forest Department and whether they affect the validity or continuation of the forest proceedings?

(xii)

Individual rights and relief: Whether, in the facts and circumstances of each writ petition, the Petitioners have established a legally enforceable right warranting the relief sought, including any challenge to eviction, sealing of premises, seizure of articles or other consequential action?

(xiii)

What order?

68.

This court answers the above points as follows:

69.

Answer to Point No. (i): Whether the notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, continues to remain operative, and whether the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 had the effect of withdrawing or cancelling the said notification or related to a distinct notification and a limited extent of land?

69.1.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest, notified on 05.02.1920, was dropped by the Government of Mysore by its order dated 11.01.1924. The notification, therefore, ceased to operate from that date, and the Forest Department cannot claim jurisdiction over the Petitioners’ lands on its basis. He further submits that rights in favour of the Petitioners were created after the 1920 notification and after the Government’s decision in 1924; that proceedings founded on the 1920 notification are non est in law; and that, if the State intends to constitute the lands a reserved forest, it must initiate fresh proceedings under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He also relies on the report dated 11.10.2022 of the Assistant Commissioner, Sakleshpur Sub-Division, and the proceedings of the coordination meetings held under the Regional Commissioner.

69.2.

Sri A.M. Vijay submits that a notification once withdrawn or rendered inoperative cannot be revived in the absence of statutory authority. Neither the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, nor the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, provides for such revival, particularly after nearly a century during which the area has become inhabited and developed. He also relies on the grant of lands by the State in Kadumane Village from 1952 onwards as conduct consistent with the Government’s decision of 1924.

69.3.

On this basis, the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 16251/2023, 19980/2023 and 33767/2025 seek a declaration that the 1920 notification has lapsed or been abandoned. The Petitioner in W.P. No. 29690/2025 seeks, pursuant to the amendment allowed on 24.11.2025, a declaration that the notification is not binding on its land.

69.4.

The learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Petitioners’ lands fall within the Moorkangudda Block, stated to comprise 7,938 acres 38 guntas, and that the notification dated 05.02.1920 continues to form the basis of the Forest Department’s claim. He denies that the notification was cancelled or withdrawn. According to him, the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 concerned a separate notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7, issued under the Land Acquisition Regulation, 1894. It withdrew acquisition only in respect of 68 acres 33 guntas and did not affect the notification issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900. He submits that, when the 1920 notification was issued, all lands within the notified extent, except 68 acres 33 guntas, were already at the disposal of the State Government, and only that extent required acquisition. Unless the Section 4 notification was itself withdrawn or rendered inoperative in accordance with law, he submits, it continues to have effect.

69.5.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Petitioners have taken inconsistent positions. According to him, they initially pleaded that the notification had been cancelled and sought to challenge it only after that assertion was disputed; the prayers subsequently introduced by amendment are, therefore, inconsistent with the original prayers. He submits that the Revenue Department auctioned land in Achanahalli Village on 20.09.1924 only because the revenue records had not been updated to reflect the Forest Department’s claim, and that such omission does not invalidate the notification. He relies on RBI v. Peerless [(1987) 1 SCC 424], paragraph 33, to contend that the 1920 notification and the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 must be construed in their statutory and historical context.

69.6.

The issue turns on the Government records and the legal effect of the orders recorded therein. Both sides accept that the notification dated 05.02.1920 was published, that the Government passed an order on 11.01.1924, and that a notification of that date was published in the Gazette. The dispute concerns the decision taken by the Government in 1924. That question must be answered from the contemporaneous documents relied upon by the parties.

69.7.

The relevant provisions of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, are Sections 4 and 17. Section 4 provides:

4.

Whenever it is proposed to constitute any land a State Forest, the Government shall publish a notification in the official Gazette— (a) specifying as nearly as possible the situation and limits of such land; (b) declaring that it is proposed to constitute such land a State Forest; and (c) appointing an officer (hereinafter called ‘the Forest Settlement Officer’) to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights claimed by, or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any land comprised within such limits, or to any forest produce of such land, and to deal with the same as provided in this chapter.

69.8.

Section 4 provides for publication of a proposal to constitute land a State Forest and for inquiry into the rights claimed in respect of that land. The notification issued under that provision does not, by itself, constitute the land a State Forest. That status is conferred by the notification contemplated under Section 17. After the claims and appeals have been disposed of, the proceedings required by the Regulation have been completed and the lands to be acquired have vested in the Government, Section 17 provides for publication of a notification specifying the limits of the forest and declaring it to be a State Forest from a date fixed therein. Under Section 17(2), the forest is deemed to be a State Forest from that date.

69.9.

The Government is not bound to complete the process merely because it has issued a notification under Section 4. It may decide not to proceed with the proposal. The notification under Section 4 initiates the statutory process; it does not compel the Government to carry that process to its conclusion.

69.10.

The notification No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, dated 05.02.1920, published on 12.02.1920, declares that it is proposed to constitute the lands described in its Schedule as a State Forest. The Schedule identifies the Moorkangudda Block in Manjarabad Taluk, comprising Achanahalli, Agini, Kyamanahalli, Nadahalli, Kadumane, Jambardi, Manjanahalli Estate and Kadumane Estate, with an extent of about 7,938 acres 38 guntas. It also appoints the Forest Settlement Officer and the appellate authority.

69.11.

The separate notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7, was issued under Section 6 of the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, VII of 1894, in respect of private holdings aggregating 68 acres and 33 guntas, required for the reservation of the Moorkangudda Forest Block. It was published in the Mysore Gazette dated 12.02.1920. It was distinct from the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, XI of 1900. The former initiated acquisition of the specified private holdings; it did not itself propose to constitute the entire Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest.

69.12.

The file of the General and Revenue Secretariat, File No. 296 of 1922, certified copies of which are on record, discloses the subsequent course of events. By letter No. 712, received on 29.04.1923, the Conservator of Forests wrote:

“Adverting to G.O. No.R.8803-5/Ft.43-15-5 dated the 5th February 1920, sanctioning the reservation of the Moorkangudda Forest Block in the Manjerabad Taluk and the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Forest Regulation, I have the honour to state that during my recent tour in the Hassan District, I had an occasion to inspect the area in compliance with the protest petitions received by me. The area proposed for reservation comprises of treeless, grassy plains, without any vegetation whatever. As it is not worth while conserving the block to the detriment of the villagers concerned, I am of opinion that further proceedings in the matter may be dropped and the notification issued under Section 4 of the Forest Regulation treated as cancelled.”

69.13.

The Secretariat thereafter sought information as to whether any land had been acquired and compensation paid, whether the area had been demarcated, and whether the Forest Settlement Officer had taken any action. The District Forest Officer, Hassan, reported that twelve miles of preliminary demarcation line had been cut and that “no compensation was paid as no lands were acquired”. The Secretariat then recorded that “the reservation should be cancelled”.

69.14.

By a further letter No.595 dated 17.12.1923, the Conservator forwarded the settlement records and reiterated that the area comprised treeless grassy plains and that the proposal could be dropped.

69.15.

The Government took its decision on 11.01.1924. The cover sheet of the Secretariat file bears the subject “Cancelling the reservation of the Murkangudda State Forest in the Hassan District”. The direction was addressed to the Conservator of Forests, the Revenue Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Hassan, and stated that “the proposal to constitute the area into a State Forest may be dropped”.

69.16.

The Proceedings in File No. 296-22 (Serial No. 6) list two matters. The first is:

“Govt. Notfn. No. R8806-Ft.43-15-6 dt. 05.02.1920 declaring the proposal to constitute certain lands in the Manjarabad Taluk into a State Forest under the name the Moorkangudda Block”.

69.17.

The second, Notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7 dated 05.02.1920, issued under the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation in respect of private lands required for the constitution of the Block, is the order authorising acquisition of lands for that purpose. After setting out the Conservator’s letters, the Proceedings record the following order:

“Order — IC 4236.8. Govt. agree with the Conservator and direct that the proposal to constitute the area into a State Forest be dropped. 2. A notification will be published in the gazette withdrawing from the acquisition of the properties referred to above.”

69.18.

The digest of Government orders for the second week of January 1924 records the decision as item 271, I.C. 4236.8-Ft.296-22-6, dated 11.01.1924 under the heading “Moorkangudda Forest Block”:

“Directs that the proposal to constitute certain lands in the Manjarabad Taluk into a State Forest under the name of — be dropped”.

69.19.

Item 272 records the consequential order withdrawing, under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Regulation, the properties declared for acquisition under Notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7. That order was published in the Mysore Gazette dated 17.01.1924 as Notification No. I.C. 4239-Ft.296-22-7 dated 11.01.1924. It reads:

“Under Section 48 (1) of the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, VII of 1894, the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore are pleased to withdraw from the acquisition of the properties declared for acquisition in their Notification No. R. 8808— Ft. 43-15-7, dated 5th February 1920, as required for the constitution of the Moorkangudda State Forest in the Hassan District.”

69.20.

The typed copy of the Government proceedings recording Entry 272 refers to the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, VII of 1891. However, the separate acquisition notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7 dated 05.02.1920 identifies the applicable Regulation as VII of 1894. The Gazette notification dated 11.01.1924, published on 17.01.1924 to withdraw that acquisition, also refers to the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, VII of 1894. The discrepancy in the reference to the Regulation in the typed copy of Entry 272 is noted. The statutory references in the two Gazette notifications are reproduced as they appear in those documents.

69.21.

For clarity, the records disclose two distinct notifications dated 05.02.1920 and two separate Government actions dated 11.01.1924. Notification No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6 was the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, XI of 1900, proposing to constitute the Moorkangudda Block, measuring approximately 7,938 acres and 38 guntas, as a State Forest. Notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7 was a separate notification issued under Section 6 of the Mysore Land Acquisition Regulation, VII of 1894, for acquisition of 68 acres and 33 guntas of private lands required for that purpose. On 11.01.1924, Entry 271, bearing No. I.C. 4236.8-Ft.296-22-6, recorded the Government's decision to drop the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest. Entry 272, bearing No. I.C. 4239-Ft.296-22-7, recorded the consequential withdrawal, under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Regulation of the acquisition of the 68 acres and 33 guntas. The latter notification was published in the Mysore Gazette dated 17.01.1924. Thus, Entry 271 concerns the Section 4 proposal for the entire Moorkangudda Block, whereas Entry 272 concerns only the separate acquisition proceedings relating to 68 acres and 33 guntas.

69.22.

These documents resolve the first part of the dispute. On 11.01.1924, the Government made two distinct decisions, recorded separately as IC 4236.8 and IC 4239. By the first, it dropped the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda Block a State Forest. By the second, it withdrew the acquisition of the 68 acres 33 guntas required for that purpose.

69.23.

The withdrawal of acquisition was consequential upon the decision to abandon the proposal to constitute the forest. The acquisition notification itself states that the properties were required for the constitution of the Moorkangudda State Forest. Once the Government decided not to constitute the forest, the acquisition for that purpose was no longer required. Paragraph 2 of the order expressly provides that a notification withdrawing the acquisition “will be published”. It follows the decision recorded in paragraph 1; it does not replace or limit that decision.

69.24.

The learned Additional Advocate General submits that the Government Order concerned only the separate acquisition notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7 and the limited extent of 68 acres 33 guntas. That submission reads the consequential withdrawal of acquisition in isolation and fails to account for the principal decision recorded as item 271 (IC 4236.8). It cannot be accepted for the following reasons.

69.24.1.

The order expressly directs that “the proposal to constitute the area into a State Forest be dropped”. Section 4 of the Regulation provides for publication of precisely such a proposal. The only notification proposing to constitute the Moorkangudda Block a State Forest was the notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6. A notification under the Land Acquisition Regulation declares that land is required for a public purpose; it does not propose to constitute a forest. No other instrument answers the description used in the Government order.

69.24.2.

The Government’s own record confirms this distinction. The Proceedings list the 1920 notification under the Forest Regulation as the first matter and the acquisition notification as the second. The order then deals with “the proposal to constitute the area” in paragraph 1 and “the properties referred to above” in paragraph 2. The two paragraphs correspond to the two matters listed in the Proceedings.

69.24.3.

The Government accepted the Conservator’s recommendation that the area comprised treeless grassy plains and that conserving the Block would be to the detriment of the villagers. That reason concerned the Block as a whole, not merely the 68 acres 33 guntas of private holdings. The Conservator had recommended that further proceedings be dropped and that the Section 4 notification be “treated as cancelled”. The Secretariat recorded that “the reservation should be cancelled”, and the file itself was titled “Cancelling the reservation”. The decision cannot reasonably be read as applying only to the limited extent proposed for acquisition.

69.24.4.

The learned Additional Advocate General’s own submission supports this conclusion. He states that, when the 1920 notification was issued, all lands within the Block, except 68 acres 33 guntas, were already at the disposal of the State Government, and that only the latter extent required acquisition. Thus, 68 acres 33 guntas was the extent sought to be acquired, not the extent covered by the proposal to constitute a State Forest. The proposal covered the entire Block. When the Government dropped “the proposal”, it dropped the proposal for the entire Block. The limited extent relied upon by the Respondents pertains to the consequential withdrawal of acquisition, not to the principal decision.

69.24.5.

If the Government had intended to deal only with acquisition, there would have been no reason to direct that the proposal to constitute the area a State Forest be dropped, to communicate that decision to the Conservator of Forests, the Revenue Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, or to record it in the digest under the heading “Moorkangudda Forest Block”.

69.25.

The learned Additional Advocate General also relies on RBI v. Peerless [(1987) 1 SCC 424], paragraph 33, to submit that the 1920 notification and the 1924 order must be read in their statutory and historical context. The principle that text must be read in context, and that no part of a statute or word may be construed in isolation, is sound. The same discipline applies when construing a Government order. Here, the text, context and purpose of the order establish that the proposal to constitute the entire Block a State Forest was dropped.

69.26.

The next question is whether the Government’s decision was effective in the absence of a separate notification under the Regulation withdrawing the Section 4 notification. It was.

69.27.

The Regulation prescribes no particular form for the Government to abandon a proposal notified under Section 4. Nor has any party identified a provision requiring a further notification for that purpose. Section 17 confers a power on the Government to issue a final notification; it does not compel the Government to complete the process once a proposal has been notified. A decision not to proceed with the proposal, therefore, did not require a notification in the form prescribed for constituting a State Forest.

69.28.

The Government recorded its decision in the Secretariat file and communicated it to the officers responsible for carrying the process forward. It also published the notification required to withdraw the acquisition. The order was a decision of the Government, made and recorded in the manner reflected in its official proceedings. The absence of a separate notification withdrawing the Section 4 notification does not nullify that decision.

69.29.

The Government’s subsequent conduct is consistent with the decision of 1924. The Respondents have produced no proclamation, inquiry or final notification concerning the Block after January 1924 before 2022.

69.30.

The Revenue Department auctioned land in Achanahalli Village on 20.09.1924, eight months after the Government’s decision. The Petitioners state that the Government granted lands in Kadumane Village from 1952 onwards, and that assertion has not been controverted.

69.31.

No notification concerning the Block under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, which came into force on 01.06.1969, has been shown. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, a Forest Settlement Officer was appointed by Government Order dated 19.12.2022, nearly ninety-nine years after the order of 11.01.1924.

69.32.

The suggestion that the auction in 1924 was held only because the revenue records had not been updated to reflect the Forest Department’s claim is unsupported by any document before this Court. It also fails to explain why the Government had itself directed, eight months earlier, that the proposal to constitute the Block a State Forest be dropped.

69.33.

Some petitions describe the cancellation of the Section 4 proposal as having been made by "Government Order No. I.C. 4239-Ft.296-22-7". That description conflates the two entries. The decision to drop the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest is recorded in Entry 271, bearing No. I.C. 4236.8-Ft.296-22-6, dated 11.01.1924. Entry 272, bearing No. I.C. 4239-Ft.296-22-7, dated 11.01.1924, concerns the consequential withdrawal under Section 48(1) of the acquisition initiated by Notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7. The withdrawal was published in the Mysore Gazette dated 17.01.1924.

69.34.

The 1920 notification remains part of the historical record. What ceased to exist was the proposal under that notification as a live proposal to constitute the Block a State Forest.

69.35.

The contention that the Petitioners have taken inconsistent positions is without merit. Their case is that the notification ceased to operate in 1924. A prayer seeking a declaration that the notification has lapsed or been abandoned is consistent with that case. It seeks a declaration of the legal position asserted by the Petitioners and does not contradict the prayer for quashing the impugned proceedings. The Respondents have not demonstrated any prejudice arising from the amendment.

69.36.

This Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that the notification dated 05.02.1920, bearing No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, does not remain operative as a proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda Block a State Forest. By the Government decision recorded in Entry 271, bearing No. I.C. 4236.8-Ft.296-22-6, dated 11.01.1924, the Government dropped the proposal for the entire Block. The decision was not confined to the 68 acres and 33 guntas covered by the separate acquisition notification. Entry 272, bearing No. I.C. 4239-Ft.296-22-7, dated 11.01.1924, and published in the Mysore Gazette dated 17.01.1924, records the consequential withdrawal of acquisition under Notification No. R.8808-Ft.43-15-7. The Respondents' contrary contention is rejected.

70.

Answer to Point No. (ii): What is the legal effect of the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and whether the absence of such notification precludes the State from asserting the forest status of the notified lands or taking action under the applicable forest legislation?

70.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that, even assuming that the notification dated 05.02.1920 had remained in force, it could not, by itself, authorise the Forest Department to dispossess the Petitioners. Unless the proceedings under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900 were completed and a final notification under Section 17 was issued, the Respondents could not treat the lands as a reserved forest or invoke Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 on that basis. He submits that the expression “deemed forest” cannot furnish an independent ground for dispossession and that the Respondents must first establish the legal status of the lands.

70.2.

Sri Manmohan P.N. further submits that Section 17 of the Regulation prescribes the stages which must be completed before a final notification can be issued. The period for preferring claims must have expired and the claims must have been disposed of; the period for preferring appeals must have expired and all appeals must have been decided; and the proceedings prescribed by the Regulation, including the acquisition of lands and buildings selected for that purpose, must have been completed. None of these stages was completed in respect of Moorkangudda Block. No final notification under Section 17 was issued. The lands were therefore never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation. He also relies on the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 11.10.2022 in support of the Petitioners’ case.

70.3.

Sri Manmohan P.N. relies on M/s. Bharat Parikh & Co. v. State of Karnataka [W.P. No. 22514/2018], decided on 18.06.2019, particularly paragraphs 5 to 7. A Coordinate Bench held that a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act is only the first step in the process of constituting a reserved forest and that the land acquires that status only upon publication of a notification under Section 17. The Bench expressly left open the question whether the land constituted forest in the wider sense under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

70.4.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, adopts the submissions of Sri Manmohan P.N. on this point.

70.5.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, does not contend that a final notification under Section 17 of the Regulation was issued in respect of Moorkangudda Block. His submission is that the notification dated 05.02.1920 was not a mere expression of intention. It attracted statutory restrictions on the acquisition of rights in the notified area, and its legal effect must be examined under the Regulation rather than determined solely by reference to subsequent revenue entries, grants and transactions. He submits that the Regulation prescribes no outer time limit for publication of the final notification and that the absence of such notification does not, by itself, determine the legal consequences of the preliminary notification.

70.6.

Sri Kiran Ron relies on B.R. Ganapathi Singh v. State of Karnataka [2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3074], particularly paragraphs 46 and 64. He submits that land covered by a subsisting notification under Section 4 continues to be subject to the statutory process until the claims are adjudicated and the land, where appropriate, is excluded from the proposed forest. He further relies on Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj [(2021) 18 SCC 104], particularly paragraphs 24 and 28, and Girish H.E. v. State of Karnataka [2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10537], particularly paragraphs 8, 10 to 17 and 19. According to him, these decisions establish that the absence of a final notification does not, by itself, extinguish the statutory restrictions attached to a preliminary notification.

70.7.

Sri Kiran Ron also relies on Narinder Singh v. Divesh Bhutani [2022 SCC OnLine SC 899], particularly paragraphs 41 and 49. He submits that, in the absence of a statutory definition, the expression “forest” bears its ordinary dictionary meaning and that land recorded as forest in Government records attracts Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. On that basis, he contends that the shola forests and grasslands of Moorkangudda constitute forest notwithstanding the absence of dense tree cover in some parts. He also relies on Section 2 of the 1980 Act, the circular issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests dated 20.08.2004, and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 13.11.2000 in Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India v. Union of India [2000 SCC OnLine SC 119], to submit that an area covered by a notification under Section 4 cannot be deleted without the permission of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He further relies on State of Karnataka v. I.S. Nirvane Gowda [(2007) 15 SCC 744], particularly paragraph 4, to contend that revenue entries and saguvali chits confer no title over land forming part of a reserved forest.

70.8.

This point raises two distinct questions. The first is whether the absence of a final notification under Section 17 prevented Moorkangudda Block from acquiring the status of a State Forest or reserved forest. The second is whether, notwithstanding the absence of such notification, the State can rely on the preliminary notification dated 05.02.1920 to assert forest status or initiate proceedings against the Petitioners.

70.9.

Section 17 of the Regulation prescribes the stages which must precede publication of the final notification. The period fixed under Section 5 for preferring claims must have expired and the claims must have been disposed of by the Forest Settlement Officer. Where claims have been made, the period for preferring appeals under Section 15 must have expired and the appeals must have been disposed of. The proceedings prescribed by Sections 10 and 13 must also have been completed, including the vesting in the Government of lands and buildings which the Forest Settlement Officer elected to acquire under the Land Acquisition Regulation, 1894.

70.10.

Upon completion of those stages, Section 17(1)(d) provides that the Government may publish a notification specifying the limits of the forest and declaring it to be a State Forest from the date fixed in that notification. Section 17(2) provides that, from that date, the forest shall be deemed to be a State Forest. The final notification is thus the statutory instrument by which the proposed forest acquires the status of a State Forest under the Regulation.

70.11.

No notification under Section 17 has been identified or produced in respect of Moorkangudda Block. The Respondents do not dispute its absence. The lands were therefore never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation.

70.12.

The same conclusion follows under the 1963 Act. Section 2(14) defines a “Reserved Forest” as land settled and notified as such in accordance with Chapter II of that Act. Section 23(1) recognises as reserved forests under the 1963 Act forests which had already been notified as State Forests under the Mysore Forest Regulations, 1900, before the 1963 Act came into force. It does not confer the status of a reserved forest on land which was merely the subject of a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Regulation and was never declared a State Forest under Section 17. Since Moorkangudda Block was never constituted a State Forest, Section 23 does not apply to it. Section 23 is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

23. Reserved forests constituted previous to

passing of this Act.— (1) Any forest which has been notified as a State Forest under the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, or as a reserved forest under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, the Madras Forest Act, 1882, or the Hyderabad Forest Act, 1355F, prior to the date on which this Act comes into force, shall be a reserved forest under this Act:

Provided that if the rights of private persons to or over any land or forest produce in such forest shall not have been inquired into, settled and recorded in a manner which the State Government deems sufficient, the same shall be inquired into, settled and recorded in the manner provided by this Act; and until such inquiry, settlement and record have been completed, the operation of this section shall not abridge, or affect such rights.

(2)

All questions decided, orders issued and records prepared in connection with the constitution of such forest as a State Forest or reserved forest shall be deemed to have been decided, issued and prepared under this Act, and the provisions of this Act relating to reserved forests shall apply to forests to which the provisions of sub-section (1) are applicable.

70.13.

The decision in M/s. Bharat Parikh & Co. supports this distinction. The Coordinate Bench held that a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act is “only a first step which is required to be taken before the State Government decides to constitute a land as a reserved forest” and that the land is declared a reserved forest only after publication of a notification under Section 17. Though that decision concerned the 1963 Act, the distinction between the preliminary notification and the final declaration applies equally to the scheme of the Regulation. Section 4 initiates the process; Section 17 completes it and confers the status of a State Forest. The Coordinate Bench also expressly left open the question whether the land constituted forest land within the meaning of the 1980 Act. This Court adopts the same distinction.

70.14.

The absence of a final notification, however, does not by itself answer the second question. A preliminary notification may attract statutory consequences before the land acquires the final status of a State Forest or reserved forest. The nature, commencement and duration of those consequences must be determined from the applicable statutory provisions. They cannot be equated with the legal status conferred by a final notification under Section 17.

70.15.

Section 6 of the Regulation is material. Section 6(1) prohibits the acquisition of rights in or over the notified land, subject to the exceptions specified in that provision. It also restricts the construction of new houses, formation of plantations, fresh clearings and cutting of trees for trade or manufacture. It further prohibits the grant of a right of occupancy without the previous sanction of the Government. The prohibition under Section 6(1), however, operates during the interval between publication of the proclamation contemplated by Section 5 and the date fixed by the notification declaring the forest to be a State Forest. It does not commence merely upon publication of the notification under Section 4. Section 6(2) preserves acts done with the written permission of the Forest Settlement Officer.

70.16.

It follows that the prohibition under Section 6(1) cannot be applied to every transaction entered into after the notification dated 05.02.1920 merely on the basis of that notification. The statutory trigger prescribed by Section 6(1) must first be established.

70.17.

Section 6(3) deals with a different matter. It bars a Civil Court, during the period between publication of the notification under Section 4 and the final notification under Section 17, from entertaining a suit to establish a right in or over the notified land or its forest produce. It does not prohibit the acquisition of rights in the same terms as Section 6(1), nor does it confer on the Forest Department a power of eviction. It is a procedural bar ancillary to the statutory process for constituting a State Forest. Once the Government formally dropped that proposal, the provision could not continue to operate as though the process remained pending. It cannot be used to preserve indefinitely the consequences of a proposal which the Government itself had abandoned.

70.18.

In Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, even in the absence of a final notification, a statutory bar on the acquisition of rights could continue to operate after publication of a preliminary notification. The decision must be read in the context of the statutory provision considered by the Supreme Court. It concerned Section 5 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as substituted by the Uttar Pradesh Act 23 of 1965. That substituted provision expressly prohibited the acquisition of rights in land after publication of a notification under Section 4, subject to the exceptions specified in it.

70.19.

The decision establishes that a preliminary notification may attract an express statutory bar on the acquisition of rights. It does not permit the Court to disregard the wording of the corresponding provision in the Regulation. Section 6(1) of the Regulation ties the prohibition on the acquisition of rights to publication of the proclamation under Section 5. The statutory trigger under the Regulation is therefore different from the one considered in Arun Kumar Bhardwaj. The decision cannot be applied without regard to that distinction. Further, the statutory restrictions recognised in that decision presuppose a subsisting notification. It does not hold that those restrictions continue after the Government has withdrawn the proposal on which they depend.

70.20.

In B.R. Ganapathi Singh, a co-ordinate bench of this Court considered a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The co-ordinate bench held that, notwithstanding the absence of a final notification under Section 17, land covered by a subsisting Section 4(1) notification continued to be forest land for the purposes of the 1980 Act until the claims were adjudicated and the boundaries of the proposed forest were settled. The decision recognises that the absence of a final notification does not, by itself, remove the consequences of a preliminary notification which remains in force.

70.21.

That proposition does not assist the Respondents in the present case. The decision concerned a subsisting notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. This Court has already held under point (i) that the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 (IC 4236.8) dropped the proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920 for the entire Moorkangudda Block. Notification IC 4239 was the consequential withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings relating to 68 acres 33 guntas. The notification of 1920 did not remain in force as a live proposal after 11.01.1924. B.R. Ganapathi Singh does not hold that the consequences of a preliminary notification survive the Government’s withdrawal of the proposal itself.

70.22.

Girish H.E. also concerns the statutory process under the 1963 Act. The observations in paragraph 19 recognise the restrictions which follow a notification under Section 4 of that Act, including the restrictions under Section 6. Those observations apply where the notification under Section 4 remains in force. They do not concern a proposal under the Regulation which the Government subsequently withdrew. The decision therefore does not establish that the restrictions under the 1963 Act can be founded on a notification which had ceased to operate before the 1963 Act came into force.

70.23.

These decisions lay down principles which operate in their respective statutory settings. M/s. Bharat Parikh & Co. explains that a preliminary notification does not, by itself, confer the final status of a reserved forest. B.R. Ganapathi Singh recognises that a subsisting notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act may have consequences under the 1980 Act even before publication of the final notification. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj applies an express statutory bar contained in the Uttar Pradesh amendment to the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Girish H.E. concerns the restrictions under the 1963 Act. None of these decisions holds that statutory restrictions continue after the Government has withdrawn the proposal on which they rest. There is no conflict between these authorities.

70.24.

The Petitioners’ submission concerning “deemed forest” requires a further distinction. Section 17(2) of the Regulation deems land to be a State Forest from the date fixed in the final notification. That provision was never attracted in respect of Moorkangudda Block. The lands were therefore never deemed to be a State Forest under the Regulation.

70.25.

That conclusion does not determine whether any parcel is forest land under the 1980 Act or under another applicable provision of law. The expression “forest land” under the 1980 Act is not confined to land formally declared a reserved forest. The question whether any parcel falls within that wider meaning must be examined independently.

70.26.

In Narinder Singh v. Divesh Bhutani, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the meaning of “forest” for the purposes of Section 2 of the 1980 Act. It held that, in the absence of a statutory definition, the word “forest” bears its ordinary dictionary meaning. It also recognised that land shown as forest in Government records attracts Section 2 of the 1980 Act, provided the relevant entries were made after due process. This Court applies those principles.

70.27.

Those principles do not, however, create a power of summary eviction under Section 64A of the 1963 Act or confer jurisdiction on a Forest Settlement Officer under Section 5 and the succeeding provisions of that Act. The exercise of those powers must satisfy the conditions prescribed by the 1963 Act. The existence of forest land under the 1980 Act and the availability of a particular statutory power under the 1963 Act are separate questions.

70.28.

Whether a particular parcel is forest in the ordinary dictionary sense or is recorded as forest in a Government record prepared after due process, is a question of fact. It requires examination of the nature of the parcel, the relevant records, the manner in which those records came into existence, and the identity and boundaries of the land. Sri Kiran Ron submits that the character of the area must be assessed with reference to the forest records, the notification and its ecological features, rather than solely by reference to the present physical appearance of individual parcels.

70.29.

The general reference to forest entries in Government records does not establish that each Petitioner's property is forest land. The relevant records must be identified, their provenance and legal basis examined, and the entries matched to the particular parcels claimed by the Petitioners. The present record does not permit a parcel-wise finding on whether any land in Moorkangudda Block is forest in the ordinary dictionary sense. Nor does the description of the area in the 1924 documents as treeless grassy plains conclude that question. The ordinary meaning of forest may include extensive tracts in which pasture and woodland occur together. The character of each parcel must therefore be determined on the relevant evidence and under the applicable law.

70.30.

I.S. Nirvane Gowda concerned land which had been included in a reserved forest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that revenue entries were of no consequence in relation to such land and that the Revenue Authorities could not deal with it. The decision applies where the legal status of the land as a reserved forest has first been established. It does not establish that land which was never constituted a reserved forest under the applicable statute must be treated as one.

70.31.

Sri Kiran Ron also relies on the circular dated 20.08.2004 and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 13.11.2000 in Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India v. Union of India. He submits that an area covered by a notification under Section 4 cannot be deleted without the permission of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

70.32.

That procedure has no application to the finding under point (i). The Government Order dated 11.01.1924 dropped the proposal to constitute the entire Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest. Recognising the effect of that order is not an act of deletion or dereservation of an area from a subsisting forest notification. This judgment does not direct the deletion of any area from a notification which remains in force, nor does it authorise non-forest use of land which is otherwise established to be forest land. If any parcel in Moorkangudda Block is forest land within the meaning of the 1980 Act, the restrictions imposed by that Act continue to apply.

70.33.

Sri Kiran Ron also relies on CIT v. Punalur Paper Mills [(1988) 170 ITR 37], particularly paragraphs 5 and 6, for the proposition that circulars issued by a competent authority within its statutory powers bind the officers of the department. The Hon’ble Kerala High Court recognised the binding effect of circulars issued by the competent authority under the Income-tax Act. The principle is accepted. It does not advance the Respondents’ case. A departmental circular may regulate the manner in which officers exercise an existing power. It cannot create a statutory notification, revive a proposal already withdrawn, or confer jurisdiction which the statute does not provide. The circular dated 20.08.2004 cannot, therefore, revive the proposal withdrawn in 1924.

70.34.

The legal position follows from the statutory scheme and the finding under point (i). The absence of a final notification under Section 17 means that Moorkangudda Block was never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation. It did not acquire the status of a reserved forest under Section 2(14) of the 1963 Act, nor does it fall within Section 23 of that Act as a forest previously notified as a State Forest.

70.35.

A preliminary notification may attract statutory restrictions before the final notification is issued. The restrictions under Section 6 of the Regulation, however, operate in accordance with the conditions and time periods specified in that provision. They cannot be detached from the statutory process and continued after the Government has withdrawn the proposal. The Government Order dated 11.01.1924 (IC 4236.8) dropped the proposal to constitute the entire Block as a State Forest. Notification IC 4239 was consequential and withdrew the acquisition proceedings relating to 68 acres 33 guntas. The Respondents cannot rely on the 1920 notification as a continuing source of restrictions or as the basis for proceedings against the Petitioners.

70.36.

The repeal-and-savings provision in Section 117 of the 1963 Act cannot revive a notification or proposal which the Government had withdrawn before the 1963 Act came into force. The finding under point (i), that the proposal had been dropped in 1924, governs that consideration.

70.37.

These findings do not determine whether any particular parcel is forest land under the 1980 Act or falls within another category recognised by the 1963 Act. The State may establish such status on an independent legal and factual basis and take action authorised by the applicable law. The existence of forest land under the 1980 Act does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction to invoke Section 64A or to conduct proceedings before a Forest Settlement Officer. Each statutory power must be exercised only after establishing the conditions which confer it. Since the proposal under the 1920 notification was withdrawn, the State cannot use that notification as a substitute for a fresh decision under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act if it seeks to constitute the lands as a reserved forest.

70.38.

This Court therefore answers Point No. (ii) by holding that no final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, was issued in respect of Moorkangudda Block. The lands were never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation and did not acquire the status of a reserved forest under Section 2(14) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, or under Section 23 of that Act.

70.39.

The absence of a final notification does not, by itself, extinguish statutory restrictions attached to a subsisting preliminary notification. In the present case, however, the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 (IC 4236.8) dropped the proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920 for the entire Moorkangudda Block. Notification IC 4239 was consequential and related to the withdrawal of acquisition proceedings for 68 acres 33 guntas. The Respondents cannot rely on the withdrawn proposal as a continuing basis to assert that the lands constitute a State Forest or reserved forest, or to initiate proceedings against the Petitioners.

71.

Answer to Point No. (iii): Whether the repeal of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, by the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, affects the validity or continued operation of the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, having regard to the applicable repeal-and-savings provisions?

71.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that, after the repeal of the Regulation by the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, every action of the Forest Department must derive its authority from the 1963 Act and comply with the procedure prescribed therein. He submits that a notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900 is fundamentally different from a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The former announces a proposal to constitute land as a State Forest, whereas the latter declares that the State Government has decided to constitute land as a reserved forest. The subsequent proceedings, including the appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer, publication of the proclamation and inquiry into claims, must therefore satisfy the requirements of the 1963 Act. Even if the notification dated 05.02.1920 had survived, it remained a proposal under the Regulation and could not, by itself, be treated as a decision under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. A proclamation under Section 5 of the 1963 Act could not be issued without a notification satisfying Section 4(1).

71.2.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, advances the same distinction between a proposal under the Regulation and a decision under the 1963 Act. He submits that the issue of a proclamation without a proper decision under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act demonstrates non-application of mind.

71.3.

Sri Manmohan P.N. relies on M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India [(1979) 3 SCC 431], particularly paragraph 35, and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693], particularly paragraphs 42 and 43. He submits that repeal by implication is not readily inferred. It arises only where the provisions of the two enactments are so inconsistent that they cannot operate together. The scope, object and scheme of both enactments must be examined before such a conclusion is reached. On that basis, he contends that the Respondents cannot rely on the 1963 Act to dispense with the statutory process under the Regulation or avoid the requirement of a final notification under Section 17. They must establish the legal basis on which the lands acquired the status of a reserved forest.

71.4.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that Section 117 of the 1963 Act expressly repealed the earlier forest enactment but preserved the legal effect of actions validly taken under it. According to him, the repeal did not extinguish the notification dated 05.02.1920 or the proceedings validly undertaken pursuant to it. Those actions continued to have effect under the savings provision until superseded by action taken under the 1963 Act. The notification cannot be treated as having lapsed merely because the earlier enactment was repealed.

71.5.

Sri Kiran Ron further submits that the description of the old enactment as the Mysore Forest Act, 1900 or the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900 makes no difference to the present controversy. The statutory scheme contemplated a preliminary notification under Section 4, followed by adjudication of claims and determination of rights, subject to the restrictions under Section 6. He submits that the repeal-and-savings provision must be read together with the preliminary notification and the proceedings undertaken pursuant to it.

71.6.

The question is whether the repeal of the Regulation by the 1963 Act affected the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the proceedings initiated under it. The question must be answered in light of the finding under point (i) that the Government dropped the proposal to constitute Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest by its order dated 11.01.1924. Point (ii) has further held that the lands were never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation and that the Respondents cannot rely on the withdrawn notification as a continuing basis for proceedings against the Petitioners.

71.7.

The Respondents nevertheless rely on Section 117 of the 1963 Act to contend that the notification and the proceedings pursuant to it were preserved. The effect of that provision must therefore be examined. Section 117 is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

117.

Repeal and savings.—The Indian Forest Act, 1927 (Central Act XVI of 1927), as in force in the 1 [Belgaum Area]1 , the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (Central Act XVI of 1927), as in force in the Coorg District, the Hyderabad Forest Act, 1355 Fasli (Hyderabad Act II of 1355 Fasli), as in force in the 1 [Gulbarga Area]1 , the Madras Forest Act, 1882 (Madras Act V of 1882), as in force in the 1 [Mangalore and Kollegal Area]1 , the Mysore Forest Act, 1900 (Mysore Act X of 1900), as in force in the Mysore Area, and the 1 [Karnataka]1 Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1962 (1 [Karnataka]1 Act No. 19 of 1962), are hereby repealed:

Provided that the repeal shall not affect,—

(a)

the previous operation of any law so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or

(b)

any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed, or

(c)

any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any law so repealed, or

(d)

any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy, may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed:

Provided further that, subject to the preceding proviso, anything done or any action taken (including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order, instruction or direction issued, rule, regulation, form, or scheme framed, certificate obtained, permit or licence granted or registration effected) under any such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act.

71.8.

Section 117 of the 1963 Act is the repeal-and-savings provision. It expressly repeals, among other enactments, the Mysore Forest Regulations, 1900, as in force in the Mysore Area. The first proviso preserves the previous operation of the repealed law, anything duly done or suffered under it, rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under it, and investigations, legal proceedings and remedies relating to those matters. It further provides that such investigations, proceedings and remedies may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the 1963 Act had not been passed.

71.9.

The second proviso reads:

“Provided further that, subject to the preceding proviso, anything done or any action taken (including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order, instruction or direction issued, rule, regulation, form, or scheme framed, certificate obtained, permit or licence granted or registration effected) under any such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act.”

71.10.

The two provisos serve distinct purposes. The first preserves the past operation of the repealed law and the rights, obligations, liabilities and proceedings which accrued under it. The second gives continuity under the corresponding provisions of the new Act to actions and instruments taken or issued under the repealed law. Neither proviso can be read in isolation from the other or beyond the terms used by the Legislature.

71.11.

Section 117 does not extinguish what was validly done under the repealed enactment. It preserves the legal consequences which had accrued under that enactment. It also continues actions and instruments which remained in force when the 1963 Act came into operation, by treating them as actions taken under the corresponding provisions of the new Act. The words “shall continue to be in force accordingly” are decisive. They preserve continuity; they do not revive an action which had already ceased to operate before the new Act commenced.

71.12.

The notification dated 05.02.1920 must be examined on that basis. The 1963 Act came into force on 01.06.1969. The proposal contained in the 1920 notification had been dropped by the Government order dated 11.01.1924. The notification was therefore not a subsisting proposal when Section 117 came into operation. The second proviso cannot revive it. This conclusion follows from the text of Section 117 and the finding already reached under point (i). The position may be stated as under:

71.12.1.

The repeal was express. Section 117 specifically names the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, as in force in the Mysore Area, among the enactments repealed by the 1963 Act. The principles governing implied repeal, on which the Petitioners rely, do not determine the present issue. In M. Karunanidhi, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that repeal by implication cannot be inferred unless the inconsistency between the enactments is apparent and irreconcilable. In Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that a later enactment is not readily presumed to repeal an earlier law in the absence of an express or unambiguous intention and that implied repeal must be avoided where both enactments can operate together. Those principles are well settled. They have no application to the question whether the Legislature expressly repealed the earlier forest law. Section 117 answers that question in clear terms. The issue here is the extent of the savings made by that section.

71.12.2.

The difference in nomenclature between the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900 and the Mysore Forest Act, 1900 does not, by itself, decide the issue. The notification dated 05.02.1920 is described as having been issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900. Section 117 refers to the Mysore Forest Act, 1900, as in force in the Mysore Area. The parties have proceeded on the basis that the provision in Section 117 relates to the earlier Mysore forest law governing the notification in question. For the purpose of deciding the present point, the Court proceeds on that common position. The second proviso to Section 117 does not revive the notification dated 05.02.1920. The notification was duly published under the old law. Its past operation is therefore not erased by repeal. But the Government subsequently dropped the proposal to constitute Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest by its order dated 11.01.1924. As held under point (i), that order brought the proposal to an end. The notification was not in force on 01.06.1969, when the 1963 Act commenced.

71.12.3.

The expression “shall continue to be in force accordingly” in the second proviso presupposes that the action or instrument was still in force when the new Act came into operation. It does not authorise the revival of an action which had ceased to operate under the repealed law. To hold otherwise would convert a provision for continuity into a power of revival. Section 117 contains no such power. The general submission of Sri Kiran Ron that actions validly taken under the repealed enactment are preserved is correct. It does not assist the Respondents because the proposal had already been withdrawn in 1924.

71.12.4.

The first proviso must be considered separately. It preserves the previous operation of the repealed law, anything duly done or suffered under it, rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities which accrued under it, and investigations, proceedings and remedies relating to them. It is therefore not correct to say that the first proviso has no application merely because the notification was withdrawn before the 1963 Act commenced. Any right or liability validly accrued under the Regulation during its operation remains governed by the first proviso, subject to proof of its existence and legal character.

71.13.

That saving, however, does not establish that a proceeding under the Regulation remained pending on 01.06.1969. The steps taken between 1920 and 1923, preceded the Government’s decision to drop the proposal. No subsequent proceeding under the Regulation has been identified. Nor have the Respondents identified any investigation or legal proceeding pending on 01.06.1969 which was later continued under the first proviso. The proceedings commenced in 2022 and thereafter were initiated under the 1963 Act, including proceedings under Section 5 and the succeeding provisions of Chapter II and action under Section 64A. They were not a continuation of any pending proceeding under the Regulation. Their validity must therefore rest on a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act or on a notification lawfully saved and deemed to have been issued under the corresponding provision by the second proviso to Section 117. The withdrawn notification of 1920 provides neither.

71.14.

The Petitioners also contend that a notification under Section 4 of the Regulation, which merely announced a proposal to constitute land as a State Forest, cannot be treated as a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act, which requires a decision to constitute land as a reserved forest. The distinction is apparent from the language of the two provisions. Section 4 of the Regulation applies when it is proposed to constitute land as a State Forest and requires the notification to declare that proposal. Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act applies when the State Government has decided to constitute land as a reserved forest and requires the notification to declare that decision. Section 4(2) of the 1963 Act further requires the Forest Settlement Officer to be a person who does not hold any forest office other than that of Forest Settlement Officer. The Regulation, by contrast, states that the officer shall ordinarily be a person other than a Forest Officer.

71.15.

The second proviso to Section 117 refers to a “corresponding provision”, not an identical provision. Whether a notification announcing a proposal under the Regulation could, in a case where it remained in force on the commencement of the 1963 Act, be treated as a notification under the corresponding provision of that Act is a question which does not arise for decision here. The notification dated 05.02.1920 had already ceased to operate in 1924.

71.16.

It is sufficient to hold that Section 5 of the 1963 Act permits the Forest Settlement Officer to publish a proclamation only when a notification has been issued under Section 4 of that Act. The Respondents have not established that a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act was issued in respect of Moorkangudda Block before the proceedings commenced in 2022. Nor can the withdrawn notification of 1920 be treated as a notification continuing under Section 117.

71.17.

Sri Manmohan P.N.’s submission that the repeal did not dispense with the need to complete the statutory process is correct to the extent that the State could not treat a preliminary proposal as a final declaration of a State Forest or reserved forest. The repeal itself did not invalidate the notification dated 05.02.1920 or erase its past operation. The proposal ceased to operate because the Government dropped it by its order dated 11.01.1924. The legal consequence follows from that order, not from the subsequent repeal of the Regulation.

71.18.

The Respondents’ reliance on the savings provision and the Petitioners’ reliance on the distinction between the two enactments must therefore be considered in light of the same conclusion. Section 117 preserves the past operation of the repealed law and any rights, obligations, liabilities and proceedings which accrued under it. Its second proviso continues actions and instruments which remained in force when the 1963 Act commenced. It does not revive the notification dated 05.02.1920, which the Government had withdrawn in 1924. Nor does it authorise the commencement of fresh proceedings under the 1963 Act on the strength of that withdrawn notification.

71.19.

The State remains entitled to exercise the powers conferred by Sections 3 and 4(1) of the 1963 Act if it seeks to constitute land as a reserved forest. It must do so by taking a decision under Section 4(1), issuing the prescribed notification and following the procedure in Chapter II. This finding does not preclude the State from establishing that any identified parcel constitutes forest land under the 1980 Act or under another applicable provision of law. That issue remains governed by point (ii).

71.20.

This Court answers Point No. (iii) by holding that Section 117 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, expressly repealed the earlier Mysore forest law. The repeal did not, by itself, extinguish the notification dated 05.02.1920 or erase its past operation. The first proviso to Section 117 preserves the previous operation of the repealed law and any rights, obligations, liabilities, investigations, proceedings and remedies validly accrued under it. The second proviso continues actions and instruments which remained in force when the 1963 Act commenced, by deeming them to have been taken under the corresponding provisions of that Act.

71.21.

The proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920 had, however, been dropped by the Government order dated 11.01.1924. It was not in force on 01.06.1969, when the 1963 Act came into operation. Section 117 neither saves it as a continuing notification nor deems it to have been issued under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The proceedings commenced under the 1963 Act on the strength of the withdrawn notification are not supported by the savings provision.

72.

Answer to Point No. (iv): Whether the prolonged lapse of time between the preliminary notification and the subsequent proceedings renders the proceedings legally unsustainable on the grounds of unreasonable delay, abandonment of the proposal to constitute the lands as reserved forest, or creation of third-party rights in the intervening period?

72.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits in the alternative that, even if the notification dated 05.02.1920 had remained in force, the State was required to initiate and complete the statutory proceedings within a reasonable time. A delay of nearly a century, without any satisfactory explanation, is unreasonable and cannot sustain proceedings commenced in 2022. The Regulation prescribes a minimum period of three months for persons to submit their claims after publication of the proclamation under Section 5. Yet, no proclamation or subsequent proceedings under the Regulation followed the notification of 1920. The prolonged inaction and failure to follow the statutory procedure render the Respondents’ present reliance on the notification untenable.

72.2.

Sri Manmohan P.N. relies on V. Sampangi Ramaiah v. Director/Commissioner, Department of Mines and Geology [2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8879], particularly paragraphs 10 to 21. He submits that, although the 1963 Act prescribes no period for publication of the final notification under Section 17, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time. In paragraph 19, the Hon’ble Division bench of this Court held that three years was a reasonable period on the facts of that case, excluding the time taken in acquisition proceedings, appeals and court-ordered stays. In paragraph 21, the Court held that the State had abandoned its intention to constitute the land as a reserved forest after taking no steps for over two decades, particularly when a quarrying lease had been granted in the meantime.

72.3.

Sri Manmohan P.N. also relies on Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing Rao [(2015) 3 SCC 695], particularly paragraphs 25 to 31, for the principle that a statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable period even where the statute prescribes no limitation. The length of the delay, the explanation for it, the creation of third-party rights, changes in the nature and use of the property, and the need for finality in transactions are relevant considerations. He further relies on Union of India v. Citi Bank [(2022) 19 SCC 188], particularly paragraph 19, for the proposition that, where the statute prescribes no period, the authority must initiate proceedings within a reasonable time having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

72.4.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, submits that when the Government decided not to proceed with the proposal in 1924, the area was sparsely populated. It is now inhabited and developed, with agricultural activity, residential structures and resorts. The owners have made substantial investments in the lands. Acting upon the notification after nearly a century would cause grave prejudice to them. He further submits that, before issuing a proclamation under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, the Forest Department ought to have assessed the effect of the proposed action on the local population. He also relies on the grants made by the State in Kadumane Village between 1952 and 1961 as conduct consistent with the Government having abandoned the proposal in 1924.

72.5.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the Regulation prescribes no outer time limit for publication of the final notification under Section 17. The passage of time cannot, by itself, extinguish the State’s authority to protect lands covered by a forest notification. He accepts that the statutory process must be pursued within a reasonable time but submits that what constitutes a reasonable period depends on the circumstances of each case, including the steps taken by the authorities, the nature of the land and the rights asserted by the Petitioners. He further submits that the Respondents were unable to proceed because of interim orders passed by this Court.

72.6.

Sri Kiran Ron further submits that the Petitioners and their predecessors did not question the notification for several decades and approached this Court only after the Forest Settlement Officer was appointed and proceedings commenced. Their challenge is therefore barred by delay, laches and acquiescence. He submits that the ecological importance of the area and its role in maintaining forest and catchment functions are matters of public interest which must be considered while assessing the State’s action. The passage of time should not defeat the State’s lawful duty to protect the lands. He also relies on the revenue records to contend that the forest character of the lands was reflected in Government records and that the Petitioners acquired their properties with notice of those entries and of the Forest Department’s claim. According to him, the Petitioners cannot rely on their purchases or subsequent investments to claim equities against the State.

72.7.

Sri Kiran Ron relies on M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath [(1997) 1 SCC 388], in support of the public trust doctrine. The principle, as explained in the judgment, is that forests and other natural resources are held by the Government in trust for the public and that the doctrine “enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes”. He submits that the State, as trustee, must prevent unauthorised appropriation, degradation and exploitation of forest land. He accepts that this obligation must be discharged within the applicable statutory framework.

72.8.

In support of the ecological importance of Moorkangudda, Sri Kiran Ron refers to its location in the Western Ghats, its biodiversity, shola forests and grasslands, the streams originating in the area, their connection with the Cauvery and west-flowing river systems, and the Yettinahole Integrated Drinking Water Project. He also refers to the risk of ecological damage from unauthorised occupation, construction and commercial activity. He accepts that claims concerning particular species, and the course and hydrological connectivity of the streams, must be established through wildlife records and scientific and hydrological material.

72.9.

This point concerns three matters: unreasonable delay, abandonment of the proposal, and the creation of third-party rights in the intervening period.

72.10.

The finding under point (i) is that the Government dropped the proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920 by its order dated 11.01.1924. Points (ii) and (iii) hold that the lands were never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation and that the withdrawn notification was not saved or revived by Section 117 of the 1963 Act. The Respondents therefore cannot rely on the 1920 notification as a continuing source of authority.

72.11.

The question of delay and abandonment must nevertheless be examined independently. In the alternative, even if the notification had survived the Government order of 11.01.1924, the State could not leave the statutory process unattended for nearly a century and then act on the preliminary notification as though the proceedings had remained pending throughout. The effect of third-party rights is considered separately.

72.12.

The governing principle is settled. The absence of a prescribed period of limitation does not confer an unlimited power to act at any time. In Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “such power must be exercised within a reasonable period”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also warned against “endless uncertainty in human affairs” and held that third-party rights created during a prolonged and unexplained delay cannot be defeated by a belated exercise of statutory power. The reasonableness of the period depends on the nature of the power, the circumstances in which it is exercised and the consequences of disturbing rights and transactions which have attained finality.

72.13.

In Union of India v. Citi Bank, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated in paragraph 19 that, “where no such period has been provided in the Statute, the authorities are required to initiate the said proceeding within a reasonable period”. What constitutes a reasonable period depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.

72.14.

This Hon’ble Division bench of this Court applied the same principle to proceedings for constitution of a reserved forest in V. Sampangi Ramaiah. In paragraph 19, the Hon’ble Division bench of this Court held that the absence of a specific time limit for publication of the notification under Section 17 of the 1963 Act required the final notification to be issued within a reasonable time. Having regard to the statutory scheme and the circumstances of that case, the Hon’ble Division bench considered three years to be a reasonable period, excluding the time taken in acquisition proceedings, appeals and court-ordered stays. In paragraph 21, it held that the State had abandoned its intention to constitute the land as a reserved forest after taking no steps for over two decades, particularly when a quarrying lease had been granted in the meantime.

72.15.

The three-year period fixed in Sampangi Ramaiah is not a statutory period of limitation applicable to every forest notification. It was the reasonable period determined on the facts of that case. The controlling principle is that statutory proceedings must be pursued within a reasonable time. That principle applies to the present controversy as well. The Regulation prescribes no outer time limit for completion of the process under Section 17. That omission does not authorise the State to leave a proposal pending indefinitely.

72.16.

The chronology is decisive. The notification dated 05.02.1920 was published in the Mysore Gazette on 12.02.1920. The Settlement Officer submitted a report on 25.09.1922. The Conservator of Forests reported against constitution of the proposed forest in April 1923. The Government thereafter passed its order dated 11.01.1924, the effect of which has been determined under point (i).

72.17.

Even on the Respondents’ case that the notification dated 05.02.1920 remained in force, the record discloses no further statutory settlement proceedings for nearly a century. No proclamation under Section 5 of the Regulation, service of notices on the affected owners or occupiers, completed inquiry into claims, adjudication of rights, final demarcation or notification under Section 17 has been established for the period after the initial steps in 1920 to 1923. The next material step was the Government Order No. FW258AASC 2022 dated 19.12.2022 appointing the Forest Settlement Officer to proceed with the matter. The proclamation under Section 5 of the 1963 Act followed on 19.07.2023.

72.18.

Thus, the State took no demonstrated step to carry the statutory settlement process to completion for nearly a century. The Respondents have furnished no satisfactory explanation for that prolonged inaction. The interim orders passed by this Court do not explain the delay. The order dated 10.08.2023, on which the learned Additional Advocate General relies, stayed proceedings under Section 64A in W.P. No. 16251/2023. It was passed after the appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer in December 2022 and after the proclamation of July 2023. It cannot explain or justify the absence of proceedings between 1924 and 2022.

72.19.

Sri Kiran Ron submits that the reasonableness of the period must be assessed by considering the steps taken by the authorities, the nature of the lands and the rights claimed by the Petitioners. Those considerations have been examined. The steps taken between 1920 and 1923 did not lead to completion of the statutory process. No subsequent settlement proceedings have been shown until the appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer in December 2022. The State cannot explain a delay of nearly a century by referring to steps taken at the commencement of the process and then relying on interim orders passed only in 2023.

72.20.

The learned Additional Advocate General also relies on the public interest in protecting the area. The ecological and public interest considerations are relevant to the State’s decision to protect forests and other natural resources. They do not displace the requirement that statutory powers be exercised within a reasonable time and in accordance with law. Public interest cannot convert an abandoned proposal into a perpetual source of authority. The decision in Sampangi Ramaiah itself concerned the proposed constitution of a reserved forest. Despite the public interest in forest protection, the Division Bench of this Court held that the State’s prolonged inaction, considered with the subsequent grant of a quarrying lease, established abandonment.

72.21.

The question of abandonment must be considered in light of the State’s conduct. The primary finding under point (i) is that the Government expressly dropped the proposal on 11.01.1924. This is not a case in which abandonment is inferred solely from the passage of time. The Government’s own order brought the proposal to an end.

72.22.

Even if that finding is set aside and the Respondents’ interpretation of the 1924 order is accepted, the subsequent conduct of the Government remains relevant. The Revenue Department auctioned land in Sy. No. 92 of Achanahalli Village in September 1924. The Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025 rely on grants made by the State in Kadumane Village between 1952 and 1961. The Respondents themselves acknowledge that the Revenue Department granted, auctioned or otherwise dealt with lands in the area. These transactions do not, by themselves, establish title or determine whether the Revenue Department was competent to deal with the lands.

72.23.

Sri Kiran Ron submits that the Revenue Department had no administrative control over lands under the Forest Department and that the auction and grants cannot bind the Forest Department. He also points to the absence of entries in the revenue records showing the Forest Department’s name. These submissions concern the authority of the Revenue Department and the legal effect of its transactions. They do not explain why the statutory process under the Regulation was not pursued for nearly a century.

72.24.

The Respondents also rely on the mutation of 500 acres in Achanahalli Village in favour of the Forest Department on 05.08.2013 and on revenue records which, according to them, show the Forest Department’s name in respect of more than 6,400 acres. Those entries evidence a later assertion of the Forest Department’s claim over the lands covered by the entries. They do not establish that the statutory settlement process under the Regulation was continued or completed. A mutation or an entry in the Record of Rights is not a substitute for the proclamation, inquiry, adjudication and final notification prescribed by the forest legislation. The Government Order appointing the Forest Settlement Officer in 2022 is likewise a later step; it does not retrospectively cure the prolonged failure to pursue the statutory process within a reasonable time.

72.25.

The conclusion is therefore twofold. First, as held under point (i), the Government expressly dropped the proposal to constitute Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest on 11.01.1924. Secondly, even if the notification dated 05.02.1920 had survived that order, the State’s failure to pursue the statutory process for nearly a century, without any satisfactory explanation, renders its belated reliance on the notification legally unsustainable. The inaction, viewed with the subsequent dealings with the lands by Government authorities, establishes abandonment of the proposal. A preliminary notification cannot be kept in abeyance for an indefinite period and acted upon after nearly a century as though the statutory process had remained alive. If the State now seeks to constitute any land as a reserved forest, it must proceed under the 1963 Act on the basis of a fresh decision and the procedure prescribed therein.

72.26.

The objection that the Petitioners are themselves guilty of delay, laches and acquiescence is not sustainable. The Petitioners do not challenge the validity of the notification as it stood when issued in 1920. Their case is that the Government withdrew the proposal in 1924 and that the Respondents cannot act upon it after the lapse of nearly a century. The immediate cause of action arose when the Respondents began relying on the notification to initiate proceedings, issue notices and take coercive action between 2022 and 2025. The petitions were filed in response to those steps.

72.27.

The principle discussed in paragraph 30 of Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, with reference to Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, requires the Court to consider whether the Petitioner approached the Court before a parallel right was created and whether the delay is attributable to the Petitioner’s own negligence or inaction. The Petitioners approached this Court after the Respondents began acting upon the 1920 notification. The long period during which the State itself took no statutory step cannot be attributed to the Petitioners. Their challenge to the present reliance on the notification is not barred by laches.

72.28.

The effect of the Petitioners’ participation in proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer, and whether any individual Petitioner is precluded from raising a particular objection by reason of such participation, is considered under point (vii).

72.29.

The third aspect concerns third-party rights. The Petitioners rely on grants, sale deeds, revenue entries, houses, agricultural activity, resorts, licences and substantial investments made over the years. Sri Kiran Ron disputes the equities claimed by the Petitioners and submits that they acquired their properties with notice of the Forest Department’s claim and the relevant revenue entries.

72.30.

The creation of third-party rights and changes in the nature and use of property are relevant to the application of the rule of reasonable time. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District recognises that transactions which have attained finality and rights created in favour of third parties cannot be unsettled by an unexplained and belated exercise of statutory power. Those considerations assume significance in the present case.

72.31.

This Court does not, under this point, adjudicate the title or the enforceability of the rights claimed by any individual Petitioner or purchaser. Whether a particular grant, auction, sale deed, revenue entry or other instrument confers a legally enforceable right must be determined on its own terms and under the applicable law. The question whether a purchaser acquired property with notice of the Forest Department’s claim is also a matter to be examined on the relevant evidence. Those questions are considered under point (v). The existence and extent of individual properties within the notified boundaries are considered under point (vi).

72.32.

The finding on delay and abandonment does not rest on the equities of any individual purchaser. The State’s own order of 1924 and its prolonged failure to pursue the statutory process provide the basis for the conclusion. The intervening transactions, changes in land use and investments reinforce the prejudice that would result from permitting the State to act upon the proposal after such an extraordinary lapse of time.

72.33.

The public trust doctrine is an established principle of law. In M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised that the Government holds forests, rivers and other natural resources in trust for the public and must protect them for public enjoyment. The doctrine imposes a duty on the State; it does not confer a statutory power which the Legislature has withheld or permit the State to act without authority of law.

72.34.

Article 300A of the Constitution of India provides:

“No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”

72.35.

The public trust doctrine and Article 300A must operate together. The State must protect natural resources, but it must do so by exercising powers conferred by law and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The duty to protect forests cannot justify proceedings founded on a notification which had been withdrawn or on a statutory proposal left unattended for nearly a century. Equally, this judgment does not release any land which is otherwise established to be forest land from the protection of the applicable law. The State remains under a duty to protect such land through lawful measures.

72.36.

This Court has considered the ecological submissions advanced by Sri Kiran Ron. The location of Moorkangudda in the Western Ghats, the presence of shola forests and grasslands, the biodiversity of the area and the role of its streams and catchments are matters of public importance. The learned Additional Advocate General has himself accepted that species-specific claims and the hydrological connections of the streams must be assessed on wildlife records and scientific material.

72.37.

This Court makes no finding on the ecological character of any particular parcel or on the asserted hydrological connection with the Yettinahole Integrated Drinking Water Project.

72.38.

The ecological importance of the area does not alter the legal conclusion on delay. It requires the State to act promptly and lawfully to protect any land established to be forest land. It does not authorise the State to proceed on a withdrawn or abandoned proposal.

72.39.

The State remains free to take action under the applicable forest legislation, including by initiating proceedings under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act where the statutory conditions are satisfied. Nothing in this judgment protects any construction, clearing, felling or commercial activity which is otherwise unlawful.

72.40.

This Court answers Point No. (iv) by holding that the Government dropped the proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920 to constitute Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest by its order dated 11.01.1924. This is the primary ground on which the Respondents cannot rely upon that notification as a continuing basis for proceedings against the Petitioners.

72.41.

In the alternative, even if the notification had survived the Government order, the State’s failure to pursue the statutory process for nearly a century, without any satisfactory explanation, constitutes unreasonable delay and establishes abandonment of the proposal. The subsequent appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer and commencement of proceedings in 2022 and 2023 do not cure that delay. The State cannot act upon the 1920 notification after leaving the statutory process unattended for such an extraordinary period.

72.42.

The objections of delay, laches and acquiescence raised against the Petitioners are rejected. The State remains at liberty to take fresh action in accordance with the 1963 Act and other applicable law, upon satisfying the statutory requirements.

73.

Answer to Point No. (v): Whether the grants, saguvali chits, registered instruments, revenue entries, conversion orders, licences and other permissions relied upon by the Petitioners confer legally enforceable rights over the lands in question, having regard to the applicable forest legislation and the competence of the authorities who issued them?

73.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that the lands were granted by the Revenue Department to the Petitioners’ predecessors-in-title. Those grants have not been set aside by the competent authorities, and the Forest Department cannot disregard them or the revenue records maintained on their basis. In some cases, the lands were auctioned by the Revenue Department and purchased by private individuals. The purchasers thereafter obtained conversion of the lands for non-agricultural purposes, including the establishment of resorts, secured the necessary licences and registrations, and made substantial investments. Learned counsel submits that the authorities failed to consider these transactions, the rights arising from them and the consequences of disturbing long-standing possession before initiating the impugned proceedings. He further submits that several rights in favour of the Petitioners arose after the notification of 1920 and, in particular, after the Government withdrew the proposal in 1924.

73.2.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, submits that the State itself granted lands in Kadumane Village between 1952 and 1961, some free of cost and others at an upset price. The Respondents ought to have considered those grants and the rights flowing from them before issuing the proclamation.

73.3.

Sri A.M. Vijay relies on Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter, “the KLR Act”), which provides:

“133. Presumption regarding entries in the

records.— An entry in the Record of Rights and a certified entry in the Register of Mutations [or in the patta book] shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor.”

73.4.

He submits that this presumption applies to the entries which have stood in the Petitioners’ names for several decades, in which no right of the Government or the Forest Department is recorded. The lands have also been assessed to land revenue and taxes have been paid by the Petitioners and their predecessors. He further submits that phodi and durasthi proceedings resulted in changes to the survey numbers and that the Petitioners rely on grant certificates, registered sale deeds and partition deeds as the source of their respective rights.

73.5.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that, in W.P. No. 16251/2023, the Petitioners claim land forming part of an extent auctioned by the Revenue Department notwithstanding the notification dated 05.02.1920. He points out that 536 acres 22 guntas in Achanahalli Village were subsequently mutated in favour of the Forest Department on 05.08.2013. The absence of corresponding entries in respect of the remaining extent, he submits, does not extinguish the legal consequences of the forest notification.

73.6.

Sri Kiran Ron contends that the Revenue Department could not treat land covered by the forest notification as ordinary revenue land without first ascertaining its legal status. He relies on Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, which restricts the use of forest land for non-forest purposes and its assignment to private persons without the prior approval of the Central Government. He further submits that revenue entries are maintained primarily for fiscal and administrative purposes and cannot conclusively determine the legal status of land.

73.7.

In the alternative, and without prejudice to these submissions, Sri Kiran Ron submits that, even if the auction is held to be valid, the right derived from it extends to five acres only and not to the entire extent of 14 acres 36 guntas over which the resort has been developed.

73.8.

For all the petitions, Sri Kiran Ron relies on Section 6 of the Regulation and Section 6 of the 1963 Act. He submits that, after publication of the notification under Section 4, rights cannot be acquired in the notified lands except in the manner permitted by the applicable provision. Claims based on subsequent grants and transfers must therefore be examined in the light of those restrictions and cannot be accepted merely because they are reflected in revenue records.

73.9.

He further contends that the Revenue Department had no administrative control over lands under the control of the Forest Department and was not competent to grant or otherwise dispose of them. A transaction by an authority lacking competence does not create an indefeasible right against the State merely because it is followed by possession or reflected in revenue records. In several instances, according to him, the Revenue Department dealt with lands claimed by the Forest Department without obtaining its concurrence.

73.10.

Sri Kiran Ron also relies on the entries showing the Forest Department’s name in Columns 9 or 11 of the Records of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTCs) relating to more than 6,400 acres. He submits that the Petitioners have not established the source of their title or traced the chain of devolution through successive holders. A purchaser cannot acquire a better title than that held by the transferor. The State, he submits, is not bound by grants, permissions or revenue entries which are contrary to law or made by authorities lacking competence. The Petitioners cannot claim an enforceable right or equity merely from acts of public authorities which were beyond their powers.

73.11.

Sri Kiran Ron relies on State of Karnataka v. I.S. Nirvane Gowda [(2007) 15 SCC 744], particularly paragraph 4, to submit that, once land is included in a reserved forest, revenue entries are of no consequence, saguvali chits do not confer title, and the Revenue Authorities are not competent to deal with such land.

73.12.

He also relies on Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj [(2021) 18 SCC 104], particularly paragraphs 24 and 28, to submit that, while a preliminary notification remains in force, rights cannot be acquired except through a written contract made by or on behalf of the Government, and a lessee cannot claim rights merely on the basis of a revenue entry without a written agreement executed by a competent authority.

73.13.

Sri Kiran Ron further relies on Girish H.E. v. State of Karnataka [2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10537], particularly paragraph 19, concerning the effect of Section 6 of the 1963 Act on grants made after publication of a notification under Section 4. He also relies on Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana [(1981) 1 SCC 11], particularly paragraph 51, for the proposition that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power or against the Government discharging its statutory duties. The Government, he submits, is not bound by acts of officers who acted beyond the scope of their authority.

73.14.

Lastly, he relies on Section 2 of the 1980 Act and contends that certain diversions and grants made after its commencement were effected without the prior approval of the Central Government.

73.15.

This point does not require the Court to declare the title of any Petitioner. The title to each property depends on the documents relied upon, the authority of the person who made the original grant, the extent of the land granted and the subsequent chain of transactions. Those matters cannot be finally determined in these writ petitions on the basis of affidavits, particularly when the documents and the rights of persons who are not parties may also be involved.

73.16.

The question for determination is whether the forest legislation or any want of competence established on the present record renders the documents relied upon by the Petitioners legally ineffective. The answer requires examination of the statutory restrictions, the decisions relied upon by the Respondents, and the legal effect of each category of document.

73.17.

The Respondents rely on Section 6(1) of the Regulation to contend that no rights could be acquired in the notified area after publication of the notification under Section 4. The relevant portion of Section 6(1), reads:

“(1)

During the interval between the publication of such proclamation and the date fixed by the notification declaring the forest to be a State Forest as hereinafter provided, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession, or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by, or on behalf of, the Government or some person in whom such right, or power to create such right, was vested when the proclamation was published; … No right of occupancy shall, without the previous sanction of the Government, be granted in respect of such land, and every right of occupancy granted without such sanction shall be null and void.”

73.18.

The language of Section 6(1) is clear. The prohibition on the acquisition of rights does not commence merely upon publication of the notification under Section 4. It operates during the interval between publication of the proclamation under Section 5 and the date fixed by the final notification declaring the forest to be a State Forest. The provision also recognises exceptions for acquisition of rights by succession and under a written grant or contract made by or on behalf of the Government, or by a person vested with the power to create such rights when the proclamation was published. A right of occupancy, however, cannot be granted without the previous sanction of the Government.

73.19.

The Respondents have not produced a proclamation under Section 5 of the Regulation in respect of Moorkangudda Block. The burden of establishing the statutory bar rests on the Respondents, who rely upon it to defeat the rights claimed by the Petitioners. In the absence of proof of the event which attracts Section 6(1), that provision cannot be invoked to invalidate the grants and transactions relied upon by the Petitioners.

73.20.

There is a further and decisive consideration. The Government withdrew the proposal to constitute Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest by its order dated 11.01.1924. As held under point (i), the proposal did not remain alive thereafter. The statutory process initiated by the proposal thus came to an end. The restrictions attached to that process cannot be treated as continuing indefinitely after the Government itself had abandoned it. The auction in Achanahalli Village took place in September 1924, after the Government order of 11.01.1924. The grants relied upon in Kadumane Village were made between 1952 and 1961. Neither category of transaction is rendered invalid by Section 6(1) of the Regulation on the basis of the withdrawn proposal.

73.21.

Section 6(1) of the 1963 Act provides that, after publication of a notification under Section 4, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made by or on behalf of the Government or a person vested with the power to create such right. The provision also requires the previous sanction of the State Government for the grant of a right of occupancy.

73.22.

The restriction under the 1963 Act therefore depends upon the issue of a notification under Section 4 of that Act. No such notification has been issued in respect of Moorkangudda Block. Nor was the notification dated 05.02.1920 carried into the 1963 Act by Section 117, as held under point (iii). Section 6 of the 1963 Act is consequently not attracted to the Petitioners’ lands on the basis of the 1920 notification.

73.23.

The decision in Girish H.E., particularly paragraph 19, concerns rights in land covered by a notification under Section 4 of the 1963 Act. It recognises the restrictions imposed by Section 6 and also the exceptions which that provision permits. It does not support the application of Section 6 to lands which are not covered by a subsisting notification under that Act.

73.24.

The Respondents’ reliance on I.S. Nirvane Gowda must be considered in its factual and legal context. In that case, the trial court and the first appellate court had, on the evidence, found that the lands formed part of a reserved forest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held:

“When the lands were included in reserve forest, the entries in the revenue records were of no consequence and further, mere saguvali chits did not confer any title on the suit lands. This apart, the Revenue Authorities were not competent to deal with the property which was the part of the reserved forest.”

73.25.

The principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that once land is duly established to form part of a reserved forest, revenue entries and saguvali chits cannot override that status, and the Revenue Authorities cannot deal with the land contrary to the forest legislation.

73.26.

The decision does not apply to the present case in the manner suggested by the Respondents. Under point (ii), this Court has held that Moorkangudda Block was never constituted a State Forest under the Regulation and did not acquire the status of a reserved forest under the 1963 Act. The Respondents cannot therefore invoke I.S. Nirvane Gowda on the assumption that the Petitioners’ lands form part of a reserved forest. Whether any parcel is forest land on an independent basis, including under the 1980 Act, remains open.

73.27.

The Respondents’ further submission that the Revenue Department lacked competence to deal with the lands presupposes that the relevant lands were under the control of the Forest Department or had otherwise been placed beyond the authority of the Revenue Department under a subsisting statutory provision. The withdrawn notification of 1920 does not establish that proposition. The Forest Department’s revenue entries must be examined on their own evidentiary basis, as considered below. The competence of the authority which issued any particular grant must also be assessed with reference to the relevant grant, the extent and identity of the land, and the law in force on the date of the grant.

73.28.

In Prabhagiya Van Adhikari Awadh Van Prabhag v. Arun Kumar Bhardwaj, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraph 24 that, even in the absence of a final notification, “by virtue of Section 5 of the Forest Act, there is a prohibition against acquisition of any right over the land comprised in such notification except by way of a contract executed in writing by or on behalf of the Government”. In paragraph 28, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the claimant had to establish the right through “an agreement in writing by a competent authority” and could not claim a right merely on the basis of an entry in the revenue records.

73.29.

The principle that a person claiming a right under a statutory forest notification must establish the written grant or agreement required by the applicable law is sound. The statutory provision considered in Arun Kumar Bhardwaj, however, was Section 5 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as amended in Uttar Pradesh. As already explained under point (ii), that provision is not identical to Section 6(1) of the Regulation. The decision also proceeded on the basis of a subsisting preliminary notification and an express statutory bar on the acquisition of rights.

73.30.

Neither premise is established here. The proposal contained in the 1920 notification was withdrawn on 11.01.1924, and the Respondents have not established publication of the proclamation required to attract Section 6(1) of the Regulation. The auction in Achanahalli Village took place after the proposal had been withdrawn. The decision in Arun Kumar Bhardwaj therefore does not render that auction or the subsequent grants invalid merely because they relate to lands once covered by the 1920 proposal.

73.31.

The documents relating to the auction in favour of Sri Byregowda include the auction advertisement dated 30.08.1924, the auction proceedings, the bid amount, the payment made into the Government treasury and the supplemental khetwar recording a grant of five acres in original Survey No. 95, subsequently re-surveyed as Survey No. 92. The Petitioners rely on these documents to establish the source of their claim.

73.32.

Sri Kiran Ron, in the alternative, submits that the right derived from the auction extends to five acres only and not to the entire extent of 14 acres 36 guntas. That submission is consistent with the extent of five acres recorded in the supplemental khetwar. The Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 also claim the property as measuring five acres.

73.33.

The auction proceedings produced by the Petitioners record the date of auction as 20.09.1924. The reference to 29.09.1924 is not borne out by the auction record placed before this Court. To the extent that the learned Additional Advocate General has referred to the latter date, the same is not supported by the documentary record produced in relation to the auction. In any event, the auction is subsequent to the Government decision dated 11.01.1924. The legal effect, genuineness and precise extent of the grant, and the title derived by subsequent transferees, remain matters to be established on the documents in the appropriate proceedings.

73.34.

In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraph 51:

“There can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power of the State.”

73.35.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the doctrine cannot be invoked “for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law” and that “the Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority”.

73.36.

The Petitioners’ case, however, does not rest on promissory estoppel. They rely on Government grants, auction documents and other instruments as sources of claimed rights. They also rely on the Government’s order dated 11.01.1924 as the basis for contending that the proposal to constitute the Block as a State Forest had been withdrawn. The legal effect of those documents must be determined under the applicable statutory provisions and cannot be rejected merely by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

73.37.

Whether a particular Revenue Officer acted beyond the authority conferred by law is a matter to be determined with reference to the particular grant and the law in force when it was made. The Respondents have not identified, in respect of each grant relied upon, the specific statutory prohibition or want of authority which rendered it invalid. Their general submission that the Revenue Department lacked competence cannot, by itself, invalidate every grant or transaction in the area. Nothing in this judgment prevents the State from establishing, in the appropriate proceedings, that a particular grant was made by an authority lacking competence or in breach of a statutory prohibition.

73.38.

The legal effect of the different categories of documents relied upon by the Petitioners must now be considered separately.

GRANTS BY THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE 1924 AUCTION AND THE SAGUVALI CHITS ISSUED

BETWEEN 1952 AND 1961:

73.39.

The 1924 auction took place after the Government had withdrawn the proposal to constitute Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest. The saguvali chits relied upon by the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025 were issued between 1952 and 1961, long after the withdrawal. The objection that these grants were invalid merely because the lands had been covered by the 1920 notification is therefore rejected.

73.40.

This does not amount to a declaration that every such grant is valid. The claimant must establish the genuineness of the grant, the authority of the officer who issued it, the conditions attached to it, the extent granted and the identity of the land. The legal effect of each grant must be determined on its own terms and under the law applicable on the date of its issue.

73.41.

The Respondents submit that the Petitioner in W.P. No. 29656/2024 has not produced sufficient material to establish a grant by the State in favour of the Petitioner or its predecessors. The burden of establishing the source of title rests on that Petitioner. This Court makes no finding that the Petitioner has established a Government grant or a complete chain of title.

REVENUE ENTRIES AND MUTATIONS:

73.42.

Revenue entries are evidence of the matters recorded in them; they are not, by themselves, instruments of title. Section 133 of the KLR Act provides a rebuttable presumption in favour of an entry in the Record of Rights and a certified entry in the Register of Mutations or patta book. The presumption continues until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted.

73.43.

The presumption applies to qualifying entries relied upon by the Petitioners. It also applies to qualifying entries in favour of the Forest Department. The Respondents rely on the mutation made on 05.08.2013 in respect of land in Achanahalli Village and on RTC entries showing the Forest Department’s name in Columns 9 or 11 in respect of more than 6,400 acres.

73.44.

The presumption under Section 133 is not conclusive and cannot determine the competing claims merely by the existence of entries on either side. The source, date, certification, legal basis and extent of each entry must be examined. An entry in favour of the Forest Department does not, without more, establish that the land was duly constituted a reserved forest or that the Department acquired control over it under a statutory provision. Equally, an entry in the Petitioners’ names does not, by itself, establish that the State granted the land or that the person whose name appears in the record had title capable of transfer.

73.45.

The Respondents are correct that revenue entries cannot, by themselves, determine the legal status of land. The same principle applies to the entries on which they rely. This Court makes no finding on the correctness of the competing entries or on the extent of land covered by them. Those matters must be determined with reference to the original records and the identity of the respective parcels.

REGISTERED SALE DEEDS, PARTITION DEEDS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF TRANSFER:

73.46.

A registered sale deed or partition deed transfers only the interest which the transferor lawfully possesses. A purchaser cannot acquire a better title than that of the transferor. The Respondents are correct in relying on this principle.

73.47.

The Petitioners must therefore establish the original source of title and trace the devolution of the claimed rights through the successive holders. The production of a sale deed or partition deed, without proof of the transferor’s title, does not establish ownership against the State. The sufficiency of the chain of title must be examined separately for each Petitioner and each parcel. This Court does not decide that issue in these proceedings.

73.48.

In W.P. No. 16251/2023, the Petitioners rely on the 1924 auction in favour of Sri Byregowda and subsequent instruments of transfer, including the registered sale deed and partition deed. The Respondents’ alternative submission is that the original auction covered five acres only. The documents relied upon also refer to a grant of five acres. The claim cannot, therefore, be enlarged beyond the extent supported by the original grant merely on the basis of subsequent transactions or revenue entries. Whether the subsequent transfers validly conveyed the interest originally granted remains to be established in the appropriate proceedings.

CONVERSION ORDERS, LICENCES, REGISTRATIONS AND OTHER PERMISSIONS:

73.49.

A conversion order permitting non-agricultural use, a licence to establish or operate a resort, registration with a statutory authority, a No Objection Certificate, a Panchayat approval or a tax entry is issued for the limited purpose governed by the relevant statute. Such an order or permission does not, by itself, confer ownership or establish the title of the person in whose favour it is issued.

73.50.

The Petitioners rely, among other documents, on the conversion order dated 12.06.2019 in W.P. No. 16251/2023, the conversion order dated 13.06.2014 in W.P. No. 29656/2024, and approvals or permissions issued by the Zilla Panchayat, the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and the Panchayat Development Officer. These documents may establish that the concerned authorities permitted particular activities or uses of the land. They do not establish the underlying title or cure a defect in the title of the applicant.

73.51.

The Respondents have not identified a specific statutory defect in each of these permissions or established that the authority which issued any particular permission lacked competence. Their validity must be examined with reference to the relevant statute, the status of the land and the authority of the issuing officer. This Court does not declare any of these permissions valid or invalid. Nor do they confer a right to continue any activity which is prohibited by the applicable forest or environmental legislation.

THE FOREST (CONSERVATION) ACT, 1980:

73.52.

The Respondents rely on Section 2 of the 1980 Act. The relevant provision, as extracted above, restricts the State Government or any other authority from making, without the prior approval of the Central Government, an order directing:

“(i)

that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;

(ii)

that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.”

73.53.

The provision also regulates the assignment of forest land by way of lease or otherwise to private persons or other entities, subject to the statutory requirements.

73.54.

The 1980 Act came into force on 25.10.1980. The auction of 1924 and the saguvali chits issued between 1952 and 1961 predate its commencement. Section 2 of the 1980 Act cannot retrospectively invalidate those grants merely because they relate to land which the State now claims to be forest land.

73.55.

The position is different in respect of orders made after the commencement of the 1980 Act. If any parcel is established to be forest land within the meaning of that Act, the use of that land for a non-forest purpose or its assignment by the State or other authority must comply with Section 2 and obtain the prior approval of the Central Government where the provision so requires. A conversion order or other permission issued by a State authority cannot override that statutory requirement.

73.56.

The question whether any particular parcel constitutes forest land within the meaning of the 1980 Act has been left open under point (ii). The Respondents must establish that status with reference to the relevant records and the nature of the land. The mere fact that the land was once included in the proposal under the 1920 notification does not establish that status, since the proposal was withdrawn in 1924. Equally, the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Regulation does not, by itself, exclude land from the wider meaning of forest under the 1980 Act.

73.57.

This Court therefore makes no finding on whether any post-25.10.1980 conversion order, grant, assignment or other permission concerning a particular parcel contravened Section 2 of the 1980 Act. The State is at liberty to examine any such transaction and take action authorised by that Act, provided it first establishes that the land falls within its scope and complies with the statutory procedure.

73.58.

The grants, saguvali chits and other instruments relied upon by the Petitioners are not rendered invalid merely because the lands were once covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920. That proposal was withdrawn by the Government order dated 11.01.1924. The notification was not saved or revived by Section 117 of the 1963 Act. The Respondents have also not established publication of a proclamation under Section 5 of the Regulation so as to attract the prohibition under Section 6(1). Section 6 of the 1963 Act is not attracted because no notification under Section 4 of that Act, or notification deemed to have been issued under it, is in force in respect of the Block.

73.59.

This conclusion does not validate every grant, sale deed, revenue entry, conversion order or permission relied upon by the Petitioners. Each document must be proved and its legal effect determined with reference to its source, the authority of the person who issued or executed it, the extent of land covered and the applicable law. Revenue entries are rebuttable evidence and do not create title. A conveyance transfers only the interest held by the transferor. Conversion orders and licences do not confer ownership.

73.60.

The restrictions under Section 2 of the 1980 Act continue to apply to any parcel established to be forest land within the meaning of that Act. The validity of post-25.10.1980 diversions, assignments and permissions must be tested against that provision. This Court does not declare title in favour of any Petitioner or determine the forest character of any individual parcel under the 1980 Act.

73.61.

In W.P. No. 16251/2023, the Respondents themselves submit in the alternative that the right arising from the auction extends to five acres only. The auction records and supplemental khetwar relied upon by the Petitioners also refer to five acres. The claim under the auction cannot extend beyond that extent on the basis of the documents presently identified. This observation does not amount to a declaration of title in favour of the Petitioners.

73.62.

This Court answers Point No. (v) by holding that the grants, saguvali chits, registered instruments, revenue entries, conversion orders, licences and permissions relied upon by the Petitioners are not rendered ineffective merely by the notification dated 05.02.1920, by Section 6 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, or by Section 6 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. The proposal contained in the 1920 notification was withdrawn by the Government order dated 11.01.1924 and was not saved or revived under Section 117 of the 1963 Act. The Respondents have not established publication of a proclamation under Section 5 of the Regulation so as to attract the restriction under Section 6(1). No notification under Section 4 of the 1963 Act is in force in respect of the Block.

73.63.

The documents relied upon by the Petitioners are not, however, conclusive proof of title. Their genuineness, extent, the competence of the issuing authority and the chain of devolution must be established in respect of each property. Revenue entries, whether in the Petitioners’ names or in the name of the Forest Department, are rebuttable evidence and do not, by themselves, create or extinguish title. A sale deed or partition deed transfers only the interest lawfully held by the transferor. Conversion orders, licences and permissions do not confer ownership.

73.64.

Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, continues to apply to any parcel established to be forest land within the meaning of that Act. The validity of any post-25.10.1980 diversion, assignment or permission must be examined in accordance with that provision. No title is declared in favour of any Petitioner, and no finding is recorded on whether any particular parcel is forest land under the 1980 Act.

73.65.

In W.P. No. 16251/2023, the right claimed through the 1924 auction is confined to the five acres reflected in the auction records and supplemental khetwar. This observation records the extent supported by the documents and the Respondents’ alternative submission; it is not a declaration of title.

74.

Answer to Point No. (vi): Whether the Petitioners have established that their respective properties fall within the boundaries of the land covered by the notification dated 05.02.1920, having regard to the survey particulars, extent, boundaries and other relevant records?

74.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 16251/2023, 29656/2024 and 19980/2023, submits that the lands in question do not belong to the Forest Department and continue to remain under the administrative control of the Revenue Department. He disputes the evidentiary value of the survey sketch relied upon by the Range Forest Officer, contending that it was prepared by Forest Department officials in 2019 without notice to, or participation by, the Petitioners. They were not afforded an opportunity to verify the identification of their lands or object to the boundaries shown in the sketch. He submits that the Forest Department cannot assert a claim over their lands solely on the basis of such a unilateral survey. He does not, however, contend that any particular property lies outside the limits described in the notification dated 05.02.1920.

74.2.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, submits that the grants and subsequent transactions were followed by phodi and durasthi proceedings, which altered the survey numbers and subdivided the original extents. The survey particulars in the proclamation, therefore, do not correspond with the present survey numbers of the properties. He further submits that the Petitioners rely upon grant certificates, registered sale deeds, partition deeds and other documents, whereas the notices issued under Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, do not identify their properties with sufficient particulars to enable them to submit an effective response. Even assuming that the notification dated 05.02.1920 continued to subsist, the Forest Settlement Officer was required to ascertain the identity, extent and boundaries of each parcel, the persons claiming rights therein and the nature of those rights. In the absence of such particulars, the Petitioners could not effectively respond to the proceedings.

74.3.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the lands claimed by the Petitioners form part of the Moorkangudda Block notified on 05.02.1920. The notification covered an extent of 7,938.38 acres, approximately 12.4 square miles, in Manjerabad Taluk, comprising lands in Achanahalli, Agini, Kyamanahalli, Nadahalli and Kadumane villages, besides Jambardi, Manjanahalli Estate and Kadumane Estate. He submits that the extent and boundaries of the Block must be determined with reference to the notification and the contemporaneous survey particulars, and not merely on the basis of subsequent revenue entries.

74.4.

In W.P. No. 16251/2023, he contends that the Petitioners' lands form part of an extent of 36 acres and 22 guntas in Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village. Though the Petitioners occupy 14 acres and 36 guntas, their claim, at its highest, extends only to 5 acres.

74.5.

In W.P. No. 29656/2024, he submits that an extent of 5 acres and 23 guntas in Survey No. 198 of Agini Village falls within the notified boundaries. He further contends that the nature and location of the lands must be assessed with reference to the forest records, the notification and the ecological features of the area, and not merely by examining the present physical appearance of individual parcels.

74.6.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, Sri Kiran Ron submits that, of the 87 Petitioners, 86 appeared before the Forest Settlement Officer. The claims of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14 and 15 in Survey No. 14 of Jambaradi Village, Petitioner No. 25 in Survey No. 91/3 of Achanahalli Village and Petitioner No. 26 in Survey No. 104 of Agini Village have been admitted to an aggregate extent of 14.07 acres, which, according to him, forms part of the 68 acres and 33 guntas proposed to be acquired by the State Government. He further submits that the claim of Petitioner No. 50 to an extent of 0.10 acre in Survey No. 124 of Achanahalli Village falls outside the notified boundary. He makes a specific statement that the State will not proceed against the lands to the extent of the claims admitted in respect of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50.

74.7.

The question must be considered in the light of the findings on Points (i) to (iv). This Court has held that the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 dropped the proposal to constitute the entire Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest. The notification dated 05.02.1920, therefore, cannot now be relied upon as an operative basis for asserting forest jurisdiction over the lands in question. Whether a particular parcel fell within the geographical limits described in that notification does not alter the legal effect of its withdrawal. The Petitioners are consequently not required to establish, for the purpose of these writ petitions, that their properties fall inside or outside those limits. The State must, however, establish the factual and legal basis for any action taken under an independent statutory provision. The geographical limits of the withdrawn notification cannot, by themselves, establish that a particular parcel is forest land under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, or under any other applicable law.

74.8.

In any event, the material on record does not permit this Court to determine the location of each property in relation to the limits described in the notification of 1920. The survey particulars then in use have since undergone changes through re-survey, phodi and durasthi proceedings. The present survey numbers cannot be correlated with the earlier numbers merely by reference to the descriptions in the pleadings or the Forest Department's sketch.

74.9.

In W.P. No. 16251/2023, the Petitioners describe their property as originally bearing Survey No. 95, subsequently re-surveyed as Survey No. 92, assigned new Survey No. 148 and later subdivided into Survey Nos. 148/1 and 148/2.

74.10.

In W.P. No. 19980/2023, the Petitioner claims land in Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village.

74.11.

In W.P. No. 29690/2025, Petitioner No. 1 describes the lands as Survey Nos. 80, 177, 178, 179, 151/P and 133, corresponding to old Survey Nos. 88 and 88/P of Kadumane Village. Petitioner No. 2 claims land in Survey No. 148 of the same village. The notices, however, refer to Survey No. 76. The available material does not establish whether that reference denotes the same land, a corresponding old or new survey number, an overlap or an error.

74.12.

In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the extent of 5 acres and 38 guntas recognised by the Forest Settlement Officer is in old Survey No. 167, now Survey No. 102 of Agini Village. The separate claim concerning 5 acres and 23 guntas relates to Survey No. 198 of that village. In W.P. No. 700/2026, the Petitioner claims lands in Kadumane, Mulehadlu Kadumane and Heggadde villages.

74.13.

Although the State's summary refers to Kadumane Village, it does not include Mulehadlu Kadumane or Heggadde. That omission from the summary does not, by itself, establish the location of the lands in relation to the limits described in the notification. The claims in W.P. No. 33767/2025 also concern several parcels in different survey numbers and villages.

74.14.

A determination of the location of these properties would require the contemporaneous survey records, the present village and survey maps, the records of re-survey, phodi and durasthi, and a parcel-wise correlation of the old and present survey numbers. It would also require measurement and demarcation on the ground. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken on the basis of the material presently placed before this Court, especially in writ jurisdiction, when such facts are disputed.

74.15.

The principal material relied upon by the Respondents for identifying the lands is the survey sketch prepared by the Forest Department in 2019. Sri Manmohan P.N. disputes that sketch on the ground that the Petitioners were neither notified of the survey nor associated with it. The Respondents have not explained the manner in which the survey was conducted, the records on which it was based or the method by which the present survey numbers were correlated with those referred to in the notification of 1920. This Court does not hold that the sketch is factually incorrect. It cannot, however, be relied upon in these proceedings as sufficient material to establish that any particular Petitioner's property falls within the limits described in the notification. The identification of land for the purpose of any fresh proceeding must rest on a proper survey and an opportunity to the persons affected to participate in it.

74.16.

Sri A.M. Vijay's objection that the proclamation and notices do not contain particulars sufficient to identify the properties and enable the Petitioners to submit effective claims concerns the fairness and legality of the statutory proceedings.

74.17.

The specific statements made by Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, are required to be recorded.

74.18.

First, the State has stated that it will not proceed against the lands to the extent of the claims admitted in respect of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50 in W.P. No. 33767/2025. The admitted claims of the first five Petitioners aggregate to 14.07 acres, and the claim of Petitioner No. 50 relates to 0.10 acre. The Respondents are bound by this statement.

74.19.

Secondly, the learned Additional Advocate General has specifically stated that the extent of 0.10 acre in Survey No. 124 of Achanahalli Village, claimed by Petitioner No. 50, lies outside the boundary described in the notification dated 05.02.1920. That statement is also binding on the Respondents.

74.20.

Thirdly, the submission that 5 acres and 23 guntas in Survey No. 198 of Agini Village fall within the notified limits is the Respondents' contention and not an admitted fact. No finding can be recorded on that assertion in the absence of a proper survey. The Respondents' alternative submission that the claim derived from the 1924 auction in W.P. No. 16251/2023 extends, at the highest, to 5 acres concerns the extent of the asserted right and does not establish the location of the property within the historical limits.

74.21.

This Court accordingly makes no general finding that any Petitioner's property lies within or outside the geographical limits described in the notification dated 05.02.1920. The only specific statement concerning location, apart from the undertaking not to proceed against the admitted claims, is the Respondents' concession that the extent of 0.10 acre in Survey No. 124 of Achanahalli Village claimed by Petitioner No. 50 lies outside those limits. That concession is recorded and binds the Respondents. This Court also makes no finding under this Point on whether any individual parcel is forest land under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, or under any other independent legal basis.

74.22.

Since the proposal initiated in 1920 was withdrawn in 1924, no survey is required in these writ proceedings for the purpose of giving effect to that proposal. If the State initiates any fresh proceeding under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, it must do so on a valid statutory foundation and identify the lands to which that proceeding relates. The requirements of Section 4(1)(b), Section 5 and Section 8(i) amongst others of the 1963 Act must be followed, as applicable. The identification must be supported by a proper survey, correlation of the old and present survey particulars, demarcation of the affected parcels and notice to the persons concerned. Nothing in this judgment authorises continuation of proceedings on the basis of the proposal withdrawn in 1924.

74.23.

This Court answers Point No. (vi) by holding that the Petitioners are not required to establish that their properties fall within the geographical limits described in the notification dated 05.02.1920, since the proposal to constitute the Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. This Court makes no parcel-wise finding as to whether any property lies inside or outside those historical limits, except to record the Respondents' concession that the extent of 0.10 acre in Survey No. 124 of Achanahalli Village claimed by Petitioner No. 50 in W.P. No. 33767/2025 lies outside them. The Respondents are bound by that concession and by their undertaking not to proceed against the lands to the extent of the claims admitted in respect of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50. The 2019 survey sketch is insufficient to establish the location of any other Petitioner's property. Any fresh proceeding founded on an independent and valid statutory basis must identify the affected lands through a proper survey, with notice to the persons concerned.

75.

Answer to Point No. (vii): Whether the Petitioners are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the availability of alternative statutory remedies, having regard to the nature of the impugned action and the grounds urged in the respective writ petitions?

75.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, relies on M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. The Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and Others [(2025) 11 SCC 808], particularly paragraphs 4 and 6, and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2021) 6 SCC 771], particularly paragraph 27. He submits that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary and that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not render a writ petition unmaintainable. The rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative remedy is one of policy, convenience and discretion. The concepts of maintainability and entertainability are distinct. A writ petition may be maintainable, yet the Court may decline to entertain it in the exercise of its discretion. The recognised exceptions include cases in which the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the principles of natural justice have been violated.

75.2.

Sri Manmohan P.N. submits that the Petitioners raise fundamental questions concerning the authority of the Respondents to initiate and continue the impugned proceedings. The absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, the withdrawal of the proposal by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924, and the absence of a subsisting statutory foundation for the proceedings raise questions of jurisdiction which cannot be avoided by directing the Petitioners to pursue alternative remedies. He accordingly submits that the writ petitions fall within the recognised exceptions and deserve consideration under Article 226. He also relies on Emerald Haven Estates Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Others [W.P. No. 41187/2016, decided on 16.03.2017, paragraphs 7 to 13], in which a Coordinate Bench examined proceedings founded on the assumption that the land in question had the status of reserved forest and held the impugned action to be without jurisdiction on the facts of that case.

75.3.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, adopts the submissions of Sri Manmohan P.N. on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. He further submits that the Petitioners have been subjected to action without lawful authority, affecting their right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution. He contends that the proclamations and notices were issued without a proper decision and without affording the affected persons an adequate opportunity of being heard. He submits that these grounds warrant examination by this Court notwithstanding the availability of statutory remedies.

75.4.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, raises a preliminary objection in W.P. No. 29656/2024. He submits that once the Forest Settlement Officer has considered a claim and passed an order under Section 14 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, an aggrieved claimant must avail the appeal provided under Section 16 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The appellate forum is competent to examine the legality and correctness of the order, including the manner in which the documentary evidence has been considered. He relies on the order dated 24.10.2025 passed by the Forest Settlement Officer, by which the Petitioner's rights were recognised over 5 acres and 38 guntas in old Survey No. 167, corresponding to new Survey No. 102 of Agni Village, while the claim to a further extent of 11 acres and 18 guntas was rejected. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the Petitioner must challenge the rejected portion of the claim before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and cannot seek its reconsideration in a writ petition.

75.5.

Sri Kiran Ron further submits that several Petitioners appeared before the Forest Settlement Officer, participated in the inquiry and produced documents in support of their claims. Having participated in the proceedings, they cannot bypass the statutory process merely because the outcome is adverse. He also alleges that the Petitioners suppressed their participation before approaching this, Court. In respect of the proceedings under Section 64A of the Act, he submits that the Petitioners must participate, produce their documents and permit the competent authority to decide their claims in accordance with law.

75.6.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, he states that 86 of the 87 Petitioners appeared before the Forest Settlement Officer, who conducted an inquiry and prepared a report for further action. He contends that those whose claims have been rejected or not accepted in full must pursue the remedy under Section 16 and cannot seek a fresh adjudication of the same claims in these writ proceedings.

75.7.

The objection raised by the Respondents is described as one of maintainability. The distinction between maintainability and entertainability is material. The availability of an alternative remedy does not take away the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled rule of judicial restraint that the Court will ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition when an effective and efficacious statutory remedy is available. That rule, however, is one of discretion and not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.

75.8.

In M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (paragraph 4), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the rule requiring a party to pursue an alternative remedy is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. The Court also emphasised that maintainability and entertainability are distinct concepts. In paragraph 6, it reiterated the recognised exceptions to the rule, including cases in which the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. In Radha Krishan Industries (paragraph 27), the Hon’ble Supreme Court restated the governing principles. Paragraph 27.3 identifies the recognised exceptions, including violation of natural justice and proceedings wholly without jurisdiction. Paragraph 27.4 clarifies that the existence of an alternative remedy does not divest the High Court of its jurisdiction. Paragraph 27.5, however, emphasises that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for enforcing it, the party must ordinarily pursue that remedy. Paragraph 27.6 recognises that disputed questions of fact may also justify a refusal to entertain a writ petition.

75.9.

These principles govern the present cases. The existence of an alternative remedy must be examined with reference to the nature of the particular action challenged, the relief sought and the grounds raised. The objection cannot be decided uniformly without distinguishing between challenges to the foundational notification, statutory proclamations and notices, proceedings under Section 64A, and orders determining individual claims.

75.10.

The principal jurisdictional challenge in these petitions concerns the legal foundation on which the Respondents initiated the proceedings. The Petitioners rely on the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. The Respondents contend that the notification of 1920 continued to remain in force notwithstanding the Government Order. The legal effect of these instruments, the absence of a final notification under Section 17 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, and the consequences of repeal under Section 117 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, have been considered and decided under Points (i) to (iv).

75.11.

This Court has held that the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 dropped the proposal to constitute the entire Moorkangudda Block as a State Forest. It has also held that the withdrawn proposal cannot be revived through the repeal-and-savings provision in Section 117 of the 1963 Act. The absence of a final notification under Section 17 and the absence of any subsisting action saved by Section 117 have also been considered. The Respondents cannot, therefore, rely on the withdrawn proposal of 1920, by itself, as a subsisting statutory foundation for the impugned action.

75.12.

The challenge to the legal effect of these instruments is not a dispute requiring the adjudication of title or the resolution of contested evidence. It turns on the interpretation of the statutory provisions and the legal effect of documents whose existence and contents are not in dispute. The Forest Settlement Officer cannot conclusively determine the legal effect of the Government Order or the continued existence of the very notification from which his authority is claimed to derive. The challenge therefore raises a question going to the root of the authority to initiate proceedings on the basis of the 1920 proposal. It falls within the recognised jurisdictional exception. This finding does not, by itself, determine whether any independent action may be taken under another applicable provision of law.

75.13.

The statutory remedies must also be examined according to their scope. Section 16(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, provides an appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by a person who has made a claim under Chapter II, or by an authorised Forest Officer or other person, against an order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer on that claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. The appeal must be filed within three months from the date of the order. Section 16(2) provides a separate appeal to the District Court against an order under Section 15.

75.14.

The remedy under Section 16 is thus directed against an order determining a claim under the specified provisions. It does not provide an appeal against the notification, the appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer, a proclamation under Section 5 or a notice calling upon a person to appear and produce documents. The statutory appeal cannot, therefore, be treated as a remedy against every action taken during the course of the forest-settlement proceedings.

75.15.

The principal challenges in these writ petitions include the proclamations dated 19.07.2023 and 09.11.2023; the notices issued by the Forest Settlement Officer, including those dated 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024, 10.09.2024, 13.02.2025, 26.06.2025, 30.06.2025 and 07.07.2025; the notices issued by the Assistant Conservator of Forests and the Deputy Conservator of Forests; and the notices issued in the A.Mo. series. These actions are not orders deciding claims under Sections 11, 12 or 14. Section 16 does not provide an appeal against them. The Respondents have not identified any other provision under which an appeal against the proclamations or the notices themselves could be pursued.

75.16.

The Respondents also rely on orders passed by the Forest Settlement Officer on individual claims. The order dated 24.10.2025 in W.P. No. 29656/2024 recognised the Petitioner's claim to 5 acres and 38 guntas and rejected the claim to a further extent of 11 acres and 18 guntas. That order was passed after the writ petition had been instituted. The prayers in W.P. No. 29656/2024 do not seek to quash or review that order. The Petitioner has not amended the prayers to bring that order under challenge. Nor does the Petitioner seek, in these proceedings, a reappraisal of the documents or a determination of the claims accepted or rejected by the Forest Settlement Officer. The correctness of that order is, therefore, not in issue in this writ petition and must be pursued in accordance with Section 16.

75.17.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, the prayers challenge the proclamations and notices and seek consequential relief. They do not specifically seek to quash an order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. The learned Additional Advocate General refers to the claims admitted or rejected in the course of the proceedings. The existence, date and service of any appealable order on each such claim must, however, be distinguished from the report stated to have been prepared and forwarded to other authorities. A report by itself is not an order determining a claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. Where an appealable order has in fact been passed, the remedy against its merits lies under Section 16.

75.18.

The availability of that remedy does not prevent this Court from examining the legality of the proclamations and notices which are the subject of the prayers.

75.19.

The Respondents' contention that the Petitioners seek adjudication of disputed claims in these writ petitions cannot be accepted as a ground for declining to examine the jurisdictional issues. This Court is not called upon under this Point to determine the title of any Petitioner, the extent of land lawfully held by any Petitioner, the validity of individual grants or transactions, or the evidentiary value of the documents relied upon by the parties. Those matters remain open for consideration before the competent statutory authority and, where an appeal lies, before the appellate forum. The issues addressed here concern the legal authority to initiate the impugned proceedings and the availability and scope of the statutory remedies. They are questions which this Court is competent to examine under Article 226.

75.20.

The submission that the Petitioners, by appearing before the Forest Settlement Officer, submitted to his jurisdiction is also without merit. A person who receives a proclamation under Section 5 is called upon to present his claim within the prescribed period. Section 9 attaches consequences to the failure to make a claim within that period, subject to the statutory provision enabling a person to establish sufficient cause before the final notification under Section 17. A person who appears and places his documents before the Forest Settlement Officer does so to protect the rights asserted by him and to avoid the consequences of failing to make a claim. Such participation cannot, by itself, amount to acceptance of the authority under which the proceedings have been initiated.

75.21.

More importantly, a defect going to the jurisdiction of a statutory authority cannot be cured by consent or acquiescence. If the statutory foundation for an action is absent, participation by an affected person cannot supply it. The Petitioners' challenge to the legal effect of the notification dated 05.02.1920 and the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 is evident from the pleadings. The Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 16251/2023 and 19980/2023 have challenged the proclamation dated 09.11.2023, and the record in W.P. No. 16251/2023 also shows that the Petitioner placed documents before the Forest Settlement Officer in response to the notice. Their participation does not extinguish their right to question the legal foundation of the proceedings.

75.22.

The allegation of suppression is not established. The learned Additional Advocate General relies on the participation of some Petitioners before the Forest Settlement Officer. He has not identified any specific document or material fact deliberately withheld by a Petitioner which, if disclosed, would have affected the consideration of the jurisdictional challenge. The fact that a Petitioner participated in the statutory inquiry does not, by itself, establish suppression. The legal consequence of participation, where an order determining a claim has been passed, is a separate matter governed by Section 16.

75.23.

The order dated 24.10.2025 in W.P. No. 29656/2024 was passed after the writ petition had been filed. Its non-disclosure at the time of institution of the petition cannot be treated as suppression. In any event, the order is not under challenge in the prayers, and its merits are not examined here. No Petitioner is denied relief on the ground of suppression.

75.24.

The learned Additional Advocate General also submits that the Petitioners should participate in the proceedings under Section 64A and allow the competent authority to decide their claims. Section 64A(3) provides an appeal to the State Government or to an officer authorised by it against an order passed by a Forest Officer under Section 64A(1), within such period and in such manner as may be prescribed. The statutory appeal is against an order under Section 64A(1), not a mere notice proposing action.

75.25.

The Respondents have not pressed the existence of the appeal under Section 64A(3) as a bar to the writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 16251/2023 and 19980/2023. Their submission is that the Petitioners should participate in the proceedings and place their documents before the competent authority. The Petitioners, on the other hand, question the authority to take action under Section 64A, the statutory conditions governing its exercise and the competence of the officers who initiated the proceedings. These are jurisdictional issues. The existence of an appeal under Section 64A(3) does not, in the circumstances of these cases, require this Court to decline examination of those issues.

75.26.

This Court has also considered whether the petitions should nevertheless be declined in the exercise of its discretion. The common jurisdictional issue concerns the legal effect of a notification issued in 1920 and the subsequent Government Order dated 11.01.1924. The proceedings have affected, or are asserted to affect, a large number of landowners. The same foundational question would otherwise arise repeatedly before different authorities and forums in individual proceedings. Its determination by this Court avoids fragmented consideration of a common question of law and serves the interests of justice and orderly administration.

75.27.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (paragraph 4) has recognised that, even where a sound legal point is raised, the Court may decline relief if its grant would not further public interest. That principle does not justify refusal to examine the present jurisdictional challenge. The question is common to the connected petitions and concerns the legal authority on which the State has acted. The Respondents themselves contend that the notification of 1920 and the Government Order of 11.01.1924 must be construed in their proper statutory and historical context. That question has accordingly been examined under the earlier Points.

75.28.

The principle laid down in Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. [(1996) 4 SCC 453, paragraph 10] and Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel [(2010) 4 SCC 393, paragraph 14], that a writ court cannot direct a statutory authority to act contrary to law, is not in dispute. Entertaining the present petitions does not require the Court to issue any such direction. The Court examines the legal foundation of the impugned action and leaves the authorities free to exercise powers available to them under an independent and applicable statutory provision, subject to compliance with the law.

75.29.

The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is confined to the legal and jurisdictional questions raised. It does not extend to deciding disputed questions concerning title, the extent or boundaries of individual parcels, the character of the land on the ground, the validity and effect of individual grants or transactions, or the claim concerning movable articles allegedly taken from the premises in W.P. No. 16251/2023. Those matters are left open for determination before the competent authority or the appropriate statutory forum, as the case may be. The availability of those remedies does not prevent this Court from examining the common jurisdictional challenge or the legality of the impugned action.

75.30.

This Court answers Point No. (vii) by holding that the Petitioners are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The availability of an alternative statutory remedy does not render the writ petitions unmaintainable. The Court entertains the challenges to the legal foundation of the impugned proceedings and to the jurisdiction of the authorities to initiate or continue them, as those challenges raise questions of law falling within the recognised exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedies. Section 16 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, provides an appeal against orders determining claims under Sections 11, 12 and 14, and Section 16(2) provides an appeal against an order under Section 15. It does not provide an appeal against a notification, proclamation or notice. The correctness of any order determining an individual claim is not examined in these writ petitions and remains subject to the remedy under Section 16. The availability of an appeal under Section 64A(3) does not, in the circumstances of these cases, bar examination of the jurisdictional challenge to the proceedings under that provision. Participation before the Forest Settlement Officer does not amount to a waiver of the right to question the statutory foundation of the proceedings, and the allegation of suppression is not established. The disputed questions of fact and the merits of individual claims are left open for determination in accordance with law.

76.

Answer to Point No. (viii): Proceedings under Section 64A: In the writ petitions challenging proceedings under Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, whether the provision was legally applicable to the respective petition schedule properties; whether the proceedings were initiated by competent authorities; and whether the prescribed procedure, including the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of hearing, was complied with?

76.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that, even assuming that the notification dated 05.02.1920 continued to subsist, the Forest Department could not summarily evict the Petitioners without completing the statutory process prescribed for constituting a reserved forest. A notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, is only the commencement of that process and does not, by itself, authorise dispossession. Until the statutory proceedings are completed and a final notification under Section 17 is issued, the lands cannot be treated as reserved forest for the purpose of invoking Section 64A of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. He further submits that the expression “deemed forest” cannot be used as an independent source of authority to dispossess persons in settled possession.

76.2.

Sri Manmohan P.N. relies on Section 64A and submits that the power of summary eviction under sub-section (1) is available only in respect of land falling within one of the categories specified therein, namely, reserved forest, district forest, village forest, protected forest or other land under the control of the Forest Department. He contends that the petition schedule properties have not been shown to fall within any of those categories. They have not been constituted as reserved forest and are not shown to be under the control of the Forest Department. According to him, they continue to remain under the administrative control of the Revenue Department.

76.3.

On the competence of the officers, learned counsel submits that the order dated 26.07.2022 was passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests attached to the Forest Mobile Squad, Hassan, and that the Range Forest Officer acted beyond his authority. He accepts that a Deputy Conservator of Forests is of a rank higher than that of an Assistant Conservator of Forests. His objection, however, is that the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Forest Mobile Squad, had no territorial jurisdiction over the properties in question. He submits that the rank of an officer, by itself, does not establish his authority to exercise the power in respect of properties falling outside his jurisdiction.

76.4.

Sri Manmohan P.N. further disputes the survey sketch relied upon by the Range Forest Officer on the ground that it was prepared through a unilateral survey conducted in 2019, without associating the Petitioners. That objection is considered under Point (vi). He also submits that the authorities failed to consider the circumstances arising from the Government auctions, grants, conversions, licences and investments made in the properties, including the development of resorts. He alleges mala fides against the Range Forest Officer.

76.5.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, additionally submits that the eviction of the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 was without authority of law and infringed their right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution. The pleadings in W.P. No. 16251/2023 also state that, on 18.07.2023, approximately 45 officials entered the resort premises and the dwelling house without prior notice and seized articles.

76.6.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the proceedings under Section 64A were initiated before the Deputy Conservator of Forests on a complaint made by the Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpur. By order dated 26.07.2022, the Deputy Conservator of Forests directed the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Sakleshpur, to evict the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 from an extent of 14 acres and 36 guntas alleged to be under unauthorised occupation. He contends that, even if the claim of the Petitioners to 5 acres is excluded, the remaining 9 acres and 36 guntas continue to be under unauthorised occupation and the structures on that extent are liable to removal, subject to the statutory procedure and determination of the rights asserted by the Petitioners.

76.7.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the Respondents could not proceed with the eviction because of the interim orders passed by this Court. He states that the resort was seized and was subsequently unsealed and restored pursuant to the orders of this Court. He contends that the interim orders do not confer any substantive right upon the Petitioners or establish their title to the properties.

76.8.

In W.P. No. 19980/2023, Sri Kiran Ron submits that the Petitioner has himself described his occupation of land in Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village as unauthorised. He refers to the applications made by the Petitioner for regularisation under Sections 94C and 94A of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, and submits that those applications were rejected. According to him, the Petitioner cannot resist action under Section 64A merely on the basis of possession or applications for regularisation which have not been allowed but have been rejected. He accordingly maintains that the proceedings under Section 64A are lawful.

76.9.

In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the proceedings under Section 64A are in accordance with law and that the Petitioner must participate in them, produce the documents relied upon and permit the competent authority to decide the matter.

76.10.

On the status of the lands, he relies upon the mutation said to have been effected in favour of the Forest Department on 05.08.2013 in respect of 536 acres and 22 guntas in Achanahalli Village. He also refers to the Records of Rights in which the Forest Department's name is stated to appear in Column Nos. 9 or 11 in respect of more than 6,400 acres. He submits that the absence of a mutation entry in the Forest Department's name for the remaining extent of Survey No. 92 does not establish that such land was excluded from the notification.

76.11.

Section 64A(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, provides:

“Any person unauthorisedly occupying any land in reserved forest, district forest, village forest, protected forest and any other land under the control of the Forest Department may, without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him under any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, be summarily evicted, by a Forest Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests and any crop including trees raised in the land and any building or other construction erected thereon shall, if not removed by him within such time as the Forest Officer may fix, be liable to forfeiture: Provided that before evicting a person under this sub-section he shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

76.12.

Section 64A confers a power of summary eviction without requiring the Forest Department to institute a civil suit. The power is, however, confined to the categories of land expressly specified in the provision. It is not a general power to evict any person from land which the Forest Department describes as forest land. Its exercise is subject to distinct statutory requirements.

76.12.1.

First, the land must fall within one of the categories specified in Section 64A(1).

76.12.2.

Secondly, the person proceeded against must be in unauthorised occupation of that land.

76.12.3.

Thirdly, the power must be exercised by a Forest Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests.

76.12.4.

Fourthly, the occupant must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before eviction.

76.13.

These are conditions governing the exercise of the power. The requirement of a reasonable opportunity of hearing is expressly made mandatory by the proviso to sub-section (1). Section 64A(3) further provides an appellate remedy to a person aggrieved by an order passed under sub-section (1).

76.14.

The first requirement is central to the present controversy. Unless the land is shown to fall within one of the specified categories, the question whether the person occupying it is unauthorised does not arise for determination under Section 64A.

76.15.

Applicability to the petition schedule properties. Sri Manmohan P.N. is right in contending that the classification of the land within one of the categories specified in Section 64A(1) is a jurisdictional requirement. The Respondents' principal case is that the petition schedule properties form part of the Moorkangudda Block, which was notified on 05.02.1920 under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900. Their claim is thus founded on the notification and the proposal to constitute the Block as a State Forest.

76.16.

The Respondents do not assert that the petition schedule properties were separately constituted as district forest, village forest or protected forest. They rely principally on the 1920 notification and, in the alternative, on the expression “any other land under the control of the Forest Department”. The applicability of Section 64A must therefore be examined with reference to those two grounds.

76.17.

The first ground does not satisfy the statutory requirement. This Court has held under Points (i) to (iv) that the proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920 was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924; that the statutory process under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, was not completed by a final notification under Section 17; and that no subsisting notification under Section 4(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, or saved equivalent has been established in respect of the Block.

76.18.

Section 2(14) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, defines “reserved forest” as land settled and notified as such in accordance with Chapter II of that Act. The Moorkangudda Block was not constituted as a State Forest under the earlier Regulation and did not acquire the status of a reserved forest under the 1963 Act. The notification of 05.02.1920, therefore, cannot establish that the petition schedule properties fall within the category of reserved forest for the purpose of Section 64A(1).

76.19.

The effect of Section 117 of the 1963 Act has already been considered under Point (iii). That provision does not revive the proposal withdrawn in 1924. Nor can the Respondents rely upon the proposition that land covered by a preliminary notification necessarily retains the status of forest land until the claims are decided. That argument presupposes a subsisting notification and has been dealt with under Points (ii) and (iii). The 1920 notification, by itself, does not bring the petition schedule properties within any of the categories specified in Section 64A(1).

76.20.

The Respondents' alternative case is that the lands constitute “any other land under the control of the Forest Department”. This category is distinct from reserved forest, district forest, village forest and protected forest. It may operate independently of a final notification under Section 17. The absence of a notification constituting reserved forest does not, by itself, exclude the application of Section 64A to land which is otherwise established to be under the control of the Forest Department. The Respondents must, however, establish that the particular land against which action is proposed falls within that category.

76.21.

The material relied upon by the Respondents does not establish that requirement in respect of the petition schedule properties. The mutation dated 05.08.2013 is stated to relate to 536 acres and 22 guntas in Achanahalli Village. The Respondents also acknowledge the absence of a corresponding entry for the remaining extent of Survey No. 92. The statement that the Forest Department's name appears in the Records of Rights in respect of more than 6,400 acres is an aggregate assertion. It is not accompanied by a parcel-wise correlation establishing that the properties against which the impugned proceedings were initiated form part of that extent.

76.22.

The presumption under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, applies to qualifying entries in the Record of Rights and certified revenue records, subject to rebuttal in accordance with law. It operates in favour of entries in the names of the Petitioners as well as entries in the name of the Forest Department. Such entries are relevant evidence, but they do not, by themselves, conclusively determine title or establish that a particular parcel falls within a statutory category under Section 64A. The legal effect of the competing revenue records has been considered under Point (v). The present question requires the Respondents to establish the statutory basis for invoking the power of summary eviction against each property.

76.23.

The impugned order dated 26.07.2022 is not shown to have proceeded on a parcel-wise determination that the lands were under the control of the Forest Department. The material relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General in these proceedings does not cure that deficiency. It is not enough to refer generally to Forest Department entries over a large extent without establishing their application to the particular properties against which action was taken. This Court, therefore, does not hold that no land in the Moorkangudda area can be under the control of the Forest Department. It holds only that the Respondents have not established that the petition schedule properties fall within that category on the basis on which the impugned proceedings were initiated.

76.24.

In W.P. No. 19980/2023, the Respondents rely upon the Petitioner's description of his occupation of Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village as unauthorised and upon the rejection of his applications for regularisation under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. The fact that the Petitioner sought regularisation of his occupation does not establish that the land is reserved forest, district forest, village forest, protected forest or other land under the control of the Forest Department. The requirement concerning the character and control of the land under Section 64A(1) is independent of the question whether the Petitioner's occupation is authorised.

76.25.

The record refers to the rejection of the Petitioner's applications under Sections 94A and 94C of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. The Petitioner, on the other hand, states that an order rejecting his application was passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 05.06.2025 and that his appeal is pending before the Deputy Commissioner. Those proceedings are not before this Court. No finding is made on their validity, effect or present status. The Petitioner does not acquire any right to remain in occupation merely because the proceedings under Section 64A cannot be sustained on the basis advanced by the Respondents. The finding is confined to the failure to establish the jurisdictional condition under Section 64A(1).

76.26.

The Petitioners' submission that Section 64A can never be invoked until a final notification under Section 17 is issued cannot be accepted in that broad form. The provision is not confined to reserved forests. It expressly includes district forests, village forests, protected forests and other land under the control of the Forest Department. These categories do not, in every case, depend upon the issuance of a final notification under Section 17. The absence of such a notification is therefore not, by itself, an answer to every possible exercise of power under Section 64A.

76.27.

The Petitioners succeed on the narrower and decisive ground that the Respondents have not established that their schedule properties fall within any of the statutory categories. The Respondents' reliance on Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and their submission that the 1924 auction and subsequent grants required the approval prescribed by that provision concern the legal effect of the grants and transactions. Those issues have been considered under Point (v). The possible application of the 1980 Act does not, without more, establish that the land is under the control of the Forest Department for the purpose of Section 64A(1). This Court makes no finding under this Point on whether any individual parcel is forest land within the meaning of the 1980 Act.

76.28.

Competence of the officers. Section 64A(1) requires the power of summary eviction to be exercised by a Forest Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests. Section 2(6) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, includes a Deputy Conservator of Forests and an Assistant Conservator of Forests within the definition of “Forest Officer”. Section 2(3) identifies the Deputy Conservator of Forests as the Chief Forest Officer of a Forest Division. The statutory rank of a Deputy Conservator of Forests is higher than that of an Assistant Conservator of Forests. Sri Manmohan P.N. also accepts that position.

76.29.

The order dated 26.07.2022 was passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Forest Mobile Squad, Hassan. The order directed the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Sakleshpur, to carry out the eviction. Both officers satisfy the minimum rank prescribed by Section 64A(1). The rank requirement, therefore, does not invalidate the order or the direction to the Assistant Conservator of Forests.

76.30.

The Petitioners' objection that the Deputy Conservator of Forests lacked territorial jurisdiction is not supported by any statutory provision, rule or order placed before this Court. Section 64A(1) prescribes the minimum rank of the officer who may exercise the power. No provision has been shown which excludes a Deputy Conservator of Forests attached to the Forest Mobile Squad from exercising that power or imposes the territorial restriction asserted by the Petitioners. In the absence of the relevant statutory or administrative instrument, the objection to territorial competence cannot be accepted.

76.31.

The position of the Range Forest Officer is different. An officer below the rank of Assistant Conservator of Forests cannot independently exercise the power of summary eviction under Section 64A(1). The notice dated 18.07.2023 was issued by the Range Forest Officer in furtherance of the order dated 26.07.2022. It cannot confer upon the Range Forest Officer a power which the statute does not vest in him. The notice also cannot survive independently of the order pursuant to which it was issued.

76.32.

There is a further material circumstance. The order dated 26.07.2022 was passed before the Government Order dated 19.12.2022 appointing the Forest Settlement Officer and before any inquiry into the claims of the affected persons had commenced under Chapter II of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. The Deputy Conservator of Forests treated the properties as forest land on the basis of the notification dated 05.02.1920 and directed eviction on that footing. The order did not establish that the properties fell within any other category specified in Section 64A(1), particularly land under the control of the Forest Department. In the absence of that jurisdictional foundation, the order cannot be sustained. The subsequent appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer and the initiation of proceedings cannot retrospectively validate the order.

76.33.

Accordingly, in W.P. Nos. 16251/2023 and 19980/2023, the order dated 26.07.2022 and the consequential notice dated 18.07.2023 cannot be sustained. This conclusion does not prevent the State from taking action under Section 64A or any other applicable provision if the statutory conditions are independently established and the prescribed procedure is followed.

76.34.

In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the Assistant Conservator of Forests issued notices dated 20.09.2024 and 18.10.2024. Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, treats these as proceedings under Section 64A. The officer who issued them satisfies the rank requirement under that provision. The challenge, however, concerns the legal basis for invoking the power against the Petitioner's property. The Respondents have not established that the property falls within any of the categories specified in Section 64A(1). The notice cannot derive that authority from the notification dated 05.02.1920, which was withdrawn in 1924. Nor has the Respondents' alternative assertion that the property is under the control of the Forest Department been established by parcel-specific material. The jurisdictional objection to proceedings founded on Section 64A is therefore made out.

76.35.

Reasonable opportunity of being heard. The proviso to Section 64A(1) is mandatory. It requires that a person be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before he is evicted under that provision. The requirement is not satisfied merely by issuing a notice after the decision to evict has already been taken. The affected person must have a meaningful opportunity to place his objections and supporting material before the competent officer, and those objections must be considered before an order of eviction is made.

76.36.

The Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 have pleaded that, on 18.07.2023, officials entered the resort and dwelling house without prior notice and seized articles found therein. The Respondents state that the resort was seized and subsequently unsealed and restored.

76.37.

The Respondents have not placed any material before the Court to establish that notice was issued to the Petitioners, or that they were afforded an opportunity of being heard, before the said action was taken. The material on record, therefore, does not establish compliance with the requirement of prior notice.

76.38.

Any fresh action under Section 64A must strictly comply with the proviso to sub-section (1). The person sought to be evicted must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard before eviction. This is a mandatory statutory safeguard and cannot be dispensed with.

76.39.

The remaining submissions require no separate determination under this Point. The allegation of mala fides against the Range Forest Officer is not examined, since the impugned action cannot be sustained on the jurisdictional ground already discussed and the present record does not require a finding on the officer's state of mind. The contention based on Article 300A of the Constitution is considered under Point (xii). The equities arising from grants, long possession, conversions, licences and investment are considered under Points (v) and (xii). The objection to the survey sketch is dealt with under Point (vi). The effect of the interim orders, including the submission that they confer no substantive right, is addressed in the operative part of the judgment.

76.40.

A separate issue arises in W.P. No. 29690/2025. The Petitioners describe the show-cause notices issued in 2022 as notices under Section 64(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. They state that the notices alleged contravention of Sections 24(g), 24(gg), 24(h), 73(d) and 104 of that Act, as well as Section 2(a) of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, on the allegation that the Petitioners had encroached upon forest land in Survey No. 76 of Kadumane Village.

76.41.

Section 64 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 was omitted by Act 1 of 1981 with effect from 23.02.1981. Section 64 and Section 64A are distinct provisions. The omission of Section 64 does not, by itself, determine whether an authority could have acted under another provision of the Act, including Section 64A, if the conditions of that provision were satisfied.

76.42.

The prayers in W.P. No. 29690/2025 challenge the proclamations dated 19.07.2023, the notices dated 11.08.2025 and 26.08.2025, and the inquiry notice dated 30.06.2025. They also seek to restrain the Respondents from proceeding against the Petitioners' lands on the basis of the notification dated 05.02.1920. The Respondents have not identified, in answer to this challenge, an independent statutory basis for treating the Petitioners' lands as land under the control of the Forest Department. The withdrawn notification cannot, by itself, establish the applicability of Section 64A. These notices are, however, show-cause or inquiry notices; they do not themselves constitute orders of eviction.

76.43.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, the Petitioners challenge notices in the A.Mo. series. To the extent that the notices seek to proceed against the Petitioners or their lands solely on the basis of the notification dated 05.02.1920, that notification cannot sustain the action. Any fresh action must satisfy the requirements of the provision under which it is taken, including the requirements of authority and hearing.

76.44.

This court answers Point No. (viii) by holding that Section 64A(1) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, applies to a person in unauthorised occupation of land falling within one of the categories specified in that provision: reserved forest, district forest, village forest, protected forest or other land under the control of the Forest Department. The provision is not confined to land notified as reserved forest under Section 17. The absence of a final notification under Section 17 does not, by itself, exclude the application of Section 64A to land independently established to fall within another statutory category. However, the Respondents have not established that the petition schedule properties fall within any of those categories. The notification dated 05.02.1920, withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924, cannot by itself establish reserved forest status or that the properties are under the control of the Forest Department. The general revenue-record material relied upon by the Respondents does not establish that the particular properties against which action was initiated fall within the latter category.

76.45.

The Deputy Conservator of Forests who passed the order dated 26.07.2022 and the Assistant Conservator of Forests to whom execution was entrusted satisfy the rank requirement under Section 64A(1). The objection to the Deputy Conservator of Forests' territorial jurisdiction is rejected. A Range Forest Officer, being below the prescribed rank, cannot independently exercise the power of summary eviction under that provision. The order dated 26.07.2022, having been passed on the basis of the withdrawn notification and without establishing that the properties fell within a category specified in Section 64A(1), cannot be sustained. The consequential notice dated 18.07.2023 issued by the Range Forest Officer cannot survive independently of that order.

76.46.

The jurisdictional objection to the proceedings under Section 64A in W.P. No. 29656/2024 is also made out on the material placed before this Court. The notices in W.P. No. 29690/2025 and the A.Mo. series notices in W.P. No. 33767/2025 cannot be supported, to the extent they rely solely on the notification dated 05.02.1920. No proceeding under Section 64A is shown to have been initiated against the Petitioner in W.P. No. 700/2026.

76.47.

The proviso to Section 64A(1) is mandatory and must be complied with before any fresh eviction is undertaken under that provision. The findings under this Point do not declare any Petitioner's title or confer a right to remain in occupation. They leave the State at liberty to exercise any power available under an independent and applicable statutory provision, subject to proof of the statutory conditions and compliance with the procedure prescribed by law.

77.

Answer to Point No. (ix): Proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer: In the writ petitions challenging proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer, whether the appointment of the Officer, publication of the proclamation, service of notices, inquiry into claims and objections, and determination of rights were in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions?

77.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, relies on Section 5 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and submits that the Forest Settlement Officer is required to serve individual notices on every known or reputed owner or occupier of land situated within or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest, or on such person's recognised agent or manager. He contends that no such notice was served on the Petitioners pursuant to a notification under Section 4 of the 1963 Act. According to him, the proceedings are consequently vitiated. He further submits that, once the proposal contained in the 1920 notification had been withdrawn, no proclamation could lawfully be issued under Section 5 of the 1963 Act on the strength of that notification. Any action founded on the withdrawn proposal is without jurisdiction. If the State proposes to constitute the Block, or any part of it, as a reserved forest, it must commence proceedings afresh in accordance with the 1963 Act.

77.2.

Sri Manmohan P.N. further submits that the statutory steps contemplated by Sections 5, 7 and 11 to 16 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, were not completed after the 1920 notification. No proclamation, inquiry, determination of claims, record of admitted rights, commutation or appellate proceedings have been shown. The process contemplated by the Regulation before issuance of a final notification under Section 17 was, therefore, not completed. He relies on M/s. Bharat Parikh & Co. v. State of Karnataka [W.P. No. 22514/2018, decided on 18.06.2019], particularly paragraphs 6 and 7, for the proposition that a notification under Section 4(1) is only the first step and that land acquires the status of a reserved forest only upon issuance of a notification under Section 17. He also relies on Emerald Haven Estates Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 41187/2016, decided on 16.03.2017, particularly paragraphs 10 to 12, to contend that a Forest Settlement Officer is distinct from a Forest Officer; a Forest Officer cannot conduct the inquiry into and determination of rights entrusted to the Forest Settlement Officer; and proceedings conducted by a Forest Officer on the assumption that the land is reserved forest are without jurisdiction. He also refers to the Assistant Commissioner’s report dated 11.10.2022 in support of his submission that the 1920 notification had been withdrawn.

77.3.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, submits that the Forest Department ought to have assessed the likely impact of the proposed constitution of the forest on the local population before issuing a proclamation under Section 5. He contends that the expression “decided” in Section 4 of the 1963 Act requires a proper decision-making process. In the absence of such a decision, the proclamation reflects non-application of mind and, according to him, indicates mala fides and a breach of natural justice. He further submits that the proclamations refer to survey numbers which no longer exist and that the notices do not contain adequate particulars of the lands, their boundaries or the claims required to be answered. The affected persons are consequently unable to identify the lands concerned and effectively present their claims.

77.4.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the State Government, by Government Order No. FEE 258 AASE 2022 dated 19.12.2022, appointed the Forest Settlement Officer, arrayed as Respondent No. 13 in W.P. No. 29656/2024, to conclude the proceedings under the 1963 Act. The Forest Settlement Officer thereafter issued a proclamation under Section 5 on 19.07.2023. Several persons submitted claims, the Officer conducted an inquiry under Section 7 and orders were thereafter passed under Section 14.

77.5.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, 86 of the 87 Petitioners appeared before the Officer, an inquiry was conducted and a report was prepared. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, some claims were admitted either wholly or in part. In W.P. No. 16251/2023, he also refers to the proclamation dated 09.11.2023 and submits that its validity cannot be defeated merely by the Petitioners’ interpretation of the Government Order dated 11.01.1924.

77.6.

On the statutory scheme, Sri Kiran Ron submits that, after a notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, claims and rights are dealt with in accordance with the prescribed procedure, subject to the statutory restrictions, and the process culminates in a final notification under Section 17.

77.7.

The challenge under this point concerns the appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer, publication of the proclamation, service of notices, inquiry into claims and objections, and determination of rights. These are stages of the process prescribed under Chapter II of the 1963 Act. The first question is whether that process could lawfully have been initiated in the absence of the statutory foundation required by the Act. The compliance of the individual steps must be considered in that context.

77.8.

Statutory foundation for proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer. Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act provides that, whenever the State Government has decided to constitute any land a reserved forest, it shall issue a notification declaring that decision, specifying the situation and limits of the proposed forest and, under clause (c), appointing an officer, to be known as the Forest Settlement Officer, to inquire into and determine the existence, nature and extent of the rights claimed in the land. Section 5 begins with the words, “When a notification has been issued under section 4”, and requires the Forest Settlement Officer to publish a proclamation. Section 7, in turn, requires the Officer to inquire into claims duly preferred under Section 5.

77.9.

The scheme is clear. The notification under Section 4(1) is the statutory foundation for the proceedings under Chapter II. The appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer, publication of the proclamation, receipt and inquiry into claims, and determination of rights must follow that notification. In its absence, the Officer cannot invoke the powers conferred by those provisions in relation to the land concerned.

77.10.

It has already been held under Points (i) to (iii) that the proposal contained in the 1920 notification was dropped by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924; that Section 117 of the 1963 Act did not revive or continue that withdrawn proposal; and that no notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act has been issued in respect of the Block. The Respondents do not contend that such a notification was issued. Their case is that the Forest Settlement Officer was appointed by the Government Order dated 19.12.2022 and that the subsequent proceedings were taken on the basis of the 1920 notification.

77.11.

The Government Order dated 19.12.2022, cannot be treated as a substitute for the notification expressly required by Section 4(1). A separate order appointing an officer, even if otherwise valid, does not declare the decision to constitute the land a reserved forest, identify the land in the manner required by the statute or set in motion the process contemplated by Chapter II. The appointment made by that Government Order cannot, therefore, confer upon the Officer jurisdiction to undertake proceedings under Sections 5 and 7 in the absence of the foundational notification under Section 4(1). This conclusion does not amount to a finding on the validity of the Government Order for any other purpose. It is confined to its inability to replace the statutory notification required by Section 4(1).

77.12.

Appointment and qualification of the Forest Settlement Officer. Section 4(2) of the 1963 Act prescribes the qualification and status of the officer appointed as Forest Settlement Officer. The distinction between a Forest Settlement Officer and a Forest Officer is material. In Emerald Haven Estates Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, paragraphs 10 to 12, this Court recognised that the inquiry into and determination of rights under Chapter II are entrusted to the Forest Settlement Officer. A Forest Officer may represent the State in that inquiry, but cannot assume the jurisdiction vested in the Forest Settlement Officer. Proceedings conducted by a Forest Officer in place of the duly appointed Forest Settlement Officer are without jurisdiction.

77.13.

In W.P. No. 700/2026, the notice dated 30.06.2025, described by the Petitioner as a notice under Section 7, is attributed to the Deputy Conservator of Forests. The record does not establish whether the notice was issued by that officer in his capacity as a Forest Officer or whether he acted as the Forest Settlement Officer. No finding on that factual question is necessary. If the notice was issued by a Forest Officer acting in that capacity, the principle stated in Emerald Haven Estates Ltd., particularly paragraphs 11 and 12, would apply. If it was issued by the Forest Settlement Officer, the absence of a notification under Section 4(1) would deprive the proceedings of their statutory foundation. The notice cannot be sustained in either event, for want of the notification required by Section 4(1).

77.14.

Proclamation under Section 5. A proclamation under Section 5 can be issued only after a notification under Section 4(1). The proclamations challenged in these petitions were issued on the basis of the 1920 notification. As already held, the proposal contained in that notification was withdrawn in 1924 and did not continue under the 1963 Act. There was, therefore, no subsisting notification under Section 4(1) on which the proclamations could lawfully be founded.

77.15.

Sri A.M. Vijay’s submission that the Forest Department was required to assess the likely impact of the proposed constitution of the forest on the local population before issuing the proclamation is not accepted as an independent statutory requirement. Neither Section 4 nor Section 5 of the 1963 Act expressly mandates a prior assessment of that nature. No other statutory provision or judicial authority imposing such a requirement has been brought to the notice of this Court.

77.16.

The Act, however, provides for the protection and adjudication of the rights of affected persons through the claims contemplated by Section 5, the inquiry under Section 7, the exclusion of land in the circumstances specified in Section 11(2)(i), and the right of appeal under Section 16. The absence of a prior impact assessment, by itself, does not establish a violation of the Act.

77.17.

The further contention that the proclamations were issued without a decision under Section 4(1) is accepted to the extent that the Respondents have not established that any such decision was taken in accordance with that provision. The absence of the required notification is independently sufficient to invalidate the proceedings. It is unnecessary, therefore, to record findings on the allegations of mala fides or breach of natural justice founded on the same omission.

77.18.

Service of notices. Section 5 requires the Forest Settlement Officer, in addition to publishing the proclamation, to serve a notice to the same effect on every known or reputed owner or occupier of any land included in, or adjoining, the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest. This requirement is distinct from publication of the proclamation. The statutory obligation is to ensure that the persons identified by the provision are individually notified in the prescribed manner.

77.19.

The Petitioners’ general assertion that no notice was served requires consideration against the pleadings in the individual petitions. In W.P. No. 16251/2023, the Petitioner states that he was called upon by a proclamation notice to appear on 04.12.2023 and that he produced his documents. In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the Petitioner challenges notices calling upon it to appear and produce documents. These pleadings establish that the Petitioners had received or become aware of communications requiring their appearance. They do not, by themselves, establish that individual notices were served on them in the manner required by Section 5.

77.20.

As regards the 87 Petitioners in W.P. No. 33767/2025 and the other Petitioners, the record does not contain sufficient material to determine, in each case, whether the statutory requirement of individual service was complied with. The Respondents have also not addressed that question by placing the relevant service records before the Court. No general finding on actual service in each petition can, therefore, be recorded. In view of the absence of a notification under Section 4(1), the proclamations and the proceedings founded on them cannot be sustained, irrespective of whether any individual Petitioner received a notice.

77.21.

Description and identification of the lands. Section 4(1)(b) and Section 5(a) require the situation and limits of the proposed forest to be specified as nearly as possible. The Explanation to Section 4(1) permits the limits to be described by reference to roads, rivers, bridges or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries. The statutory standard is one of practical identification. The description must enable affected persons to understand whether their lands are included in the proposed forest and to present their claims accordingly.

77.22.

Sri A.M. Vijay submits that the survey numbers mentioned in the proclamations and notices have undergone changes through phodi, durasthi and re-survey operations, making it difficult for the affected persons to identify the lands concerned. The changes in survey numbers have also been considered under Point (vi). This Court, therefore, does not record a finding on the adequacy of the description contained in any particular proclamation or notice.

77.23.

The issue nevertheless has direct relevance to any fresh proceedings. A notification and proclamation issued hereafter must describe the proposed forest by reference to boundaries and particulars that can be correlated with the present survey records. Before calling upon any owner or occupier to prefer a claim, the Forest Settlement Officer must be satisfied that the land identified in the notice corresponds to the relevant parcel in the current survey records.

77.24.

Inquiry into claims and determination of rights. The Respondents submit that the Forest Settlement Officer conducted inquiries and passed orders under the 1963 Act. They also state that claims were admitted wholly or in part in certain cases. An inquiry under Section 7 and orders under Sections 11 to 14 are subsequent stages of the process established by Chapter II. Their authority depends upon the existence of a valid notification under Section 4(1). Since no such notification was issued in respect of the Block, the inquiry and orders purportedly made in exercise of those provisions lack the required statutory foundation and cannot be sustained against the Petitioners who challenge the proceedings.

77.25.

It is unnecessary to examine whether any particular claim was rightly admitted or rejected, whether the evidence placed before the Officer established title or any other right, or whether the lands were correctly identified. Those are matters which would arise for consideration only in proceedings lawfully instituted under the Act. The admissions made by the State in respect of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50 in W.P. No. 33767/2025 have already been recorded under Point (vi). Those admissions are unaffected by the present conclusion.

77.26.

The Petitioners’ submissions concerning the stages prescribed by the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, do not require a separate determination under this point. Those submissions bear on whether the Block was ever constituted a State Forest under the Regulation and whether the process contemplated by that enactment culminated in a notification under Section 17. Those questions have been considered under Point (ii). The proceedings initiated in 2023 and thereafter were purportedly taken under the 1963 Act and must be tested against the requirements of that enactment. It is unnecessary to determine under this point whether a proclamation was published after the 1920 notification.

77.27.

The conclusions recorded in this point do not prevent the State from taking lawful steps to protect the area or from initiating proceedings to constitute any part of the Block as a reserved forest. If the State decides to do so, it must act in accordance with Sections 3 and 4(1) of the 1963 Act. That course requires a fresh decision under the Act, a notification identifying the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest and appointing a qualified Forest Settlement Officer, followed by compliance with the remaining provisions of Chapter II. The State is at liberty to place relevant ecological and other material before the competent authority for consideration in that process. No opinion is expressed on the merits or sufficiency of such material.

77.28.

This Court answers Point No. (ix) by holding that the proceedings before the Forest Settlement Officer are not in accordance with the 1963 Act. A notification under Section 4(1) is the statutory foundation for the proceedings under Chapter II. No such notification was issued in respect of the Block. The Government Order dated 19.12.2022 appointing the Forest Settlement Officer cannot substitute for that notification. Consequently, the proclamations issued under Section 5, the notices calling upon the Petitioners to appear and prefer claims, and the inquiries and orders founded on those proceedings cannot be sustained.

77.29.

The notice dated 30.06.2025 in W.P. No. 700/2026 is also liable to be quashed for want of the notification under Section 4(1). Any fresh proceeding to constitute land as a reserved forest must commence in accordance with Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the 1963 Act and must comply with the other applicable provisions of Chapter II.

78.

Answer to Point No. (x): Orders under Section 14 and remedy under Section 16: In the writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 14 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, whether the Petitioners have an effective statutory appeal under Section 16 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and, if so, whether the circumstances of the respective cases nevertheless warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

78.1.

The submissions of Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, on the objection based on an alternative statutory remedy have been considered under Point (vii) and need not be repeated. In substance, he submits that the existence of an appeal does not bar the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; the rule requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies is one of discretion and not an inflexible rule of law. He contends that the recognised exceptions apply because the Petitioners challenge the jurisdiction of the authorities to initiate proceedings on the basis of the 1920 notification. He relies on M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority [(2025) 11 SCC 808], paragraphs 4 and 6, and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [(2021) 6 SCC 771], paragraph 27. As regards the remedy under the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, he submits that no orders were passed under Sections 10 to 14 of that Regulation and, therefore, no occasion arose for any claimant to invoke the appellate remedy provided therein.

78.2.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that, in W.P. No. 29656/2024, the Forest Settlement Officer passed an order dated 24.10.2025 under Section 14 of the 1963 Act, recognising the Petitioner’s rights over 5 acres 38 guntas in old Survey No. 167, corresponding to new Survey No. 102, of Agni Village, while rejecting the claim in respect of a further extent of 11 acres 18 guntas. He submits that the Petitioner has an appeal under Section 16 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal against the rejection of the claim. The Tribunal is competent to examine the legality and correctness of the order, including the treatment of the documents produced by the claimant. According to him, the Petitioner cannot seek reconsideration of the disputed claim in a writ petition without first availing of that statutory remedy.

78.3.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, Sri Kiran Ron submits that 86 of the 87 Petitioners appeared before the Forest Settlement Officer and that an inquiry was conducted. A report was prepared, and the claims of some Petitioners were admitted wholly or in part. He submits that those whose claims were rejected or admitted only to a limited extent must pursue the remedy of appeal under Section 16 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Having participated in the proceedings, they cannot bypass that remedy and seek adjudication of their claims in writ proceedings.

78.4.

Section 16(1) of the 1963 Act provides:

“Any person who has made a claim under this Chapter or any Forest Officer or other person generally or specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may, within three months from the date of the order passed on such claim by the Forest Settlement Officer under section 11, section 12, or section 14, appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and the decision of the said Tribunal on such appeal shall be final.”

78.5.

Under Section 16(1), a person who has made a claim under Chapter II, a Forest Officer, or any other person empowered by the State Government may appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal within three months from the date of an order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer on a claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. The decision of the Tribunal on such appeal is final.

78.6.

Section 11 deals with claims to rights in or over land. Section 12 deals with claims relating to rights of way, pasture, forest produce and water. Section 14 deals with the exercise of rights admitted by the Forest Settlement Officer. The Respondents describe the order dated 24.10.2025 in W.P. No. 29656/2024 as one passed under Section 14.

78.7.

It is unnecessary, for the present purpose, to determine whether the claim concerning rights in land ought to have been dealt with under Section 11 rather than Section 14. Section 16(1) expressly provides an appeal against an order under any of those three provisions.

78.8.

Accordingly, a person aggrieved by an order of the Forest Settlement Officer on a claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14 has a statutory right of appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal within the period prescribed by Section 16(1). This remedy is confined to orders of the nature specified in that provision. It does not provide an appeal against the initial proclamation under Section 5, the appointment of the Forest Settlement Officer or a notice merely calling upon a person to prefer a claim.

78.9.

The remedy under Section 16(1) is effective for challenging the merits of an order passed on a claim. A claimant whose claim has been rejected, or whose claim has been admitted only to a lesser extent than claimed, may seek appellate examination of the material relating to the existence and extent of the asserted rights, including the evidence concerning title and possession. These are primarily matters of fact. The High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, does not ordinarily undertake the role of an appellate forum for reappraising such evidence.

78.10.

In M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd., paragraph 4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that a High Court should “normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available”. In Radha Krishan Industries, paragraph 27.5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, where a statute creates a right and prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing that right or liability, the statutory remedy must ordinarily be pursued. Paragraph 27.6 also recognises that the existence of disputed questions of fact may be a ground for declining to exercise writ jurisdiction.

78.11.

The learned Additional Advocate General is, therefore, correct to the extent that a claimant who seeks reconsideration of the extent of the rights recognised by the Forest Settlement Officer, or challenges the rejection of a claim on its merits, must ordinarily pursue the appeal provided under Section 16(1). This Court does not undertake any such reappraisal in these petitions.

78.12.

The further question is whether the circumstances of these cases nevertheless warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The answer depends on the nature of the challenge and the relief actually sought in each petition.

78.13.

None of the six petitions seeks a direct adjudication by this Court on the merits of an individual order passed on a claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. The principal challenge is to the jurisdictional foundation of the proceedings themselves, namely, the authority to initiate proceedings under Chapter II of the 1963 Act on the basis of the 1920 notification, despite the withdrawal of the proposal in 1924 and the absence of a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The distinction between a challenge to the jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings and a challenge to the merits of an individual claim is material.

78.14.

The order dated 24.10.2025 in W.P. No. 29656/2024 was passed after the writ petition had been instituted. No amendment was made to the petition to challenge that order. In W.P. No. 33767/2025, the relief sought includes a prayer to quash the proclamations and notices and, consequently, all further proceedings taken pursuant to them. The effect of that prayer requires separate consideration.

78.15.

In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the order dated 24.10.2025 is not directly under challenge. This Court neither sets aside that order nor examines the correctness of the decision recognising 5 acres 38 guntas and rejecting the claim to the further extent of 11 acres 18 guntas. It would be inappropriate to grant relief against an order that the Petitioner has not specifically challenged and whose merits have not been placed before this Court for adjudication.

78.16.

The Petitioner’s remedies against that order, including the remedy under Section 16(1), remain governed by law. Any question concerning limitation or the availability of a particular remedy must be determined by the competent forum. At the same time, the order dated 24.10.2025 cannot, by itself, validate the proceedings initiated without the notification required by Section 4(1). Nor can the State rely upon that order, or the proceedings of which it forms part, to disturb the Petitioner’s possession otherwise than in accordance with law. This protection is within the scope of the relief sought in the petition and shall be reflected in the operative part.

78.17.

The position in W.P. No. 33767/2025 is different. Prayer (i) seeks to quash the proclamations and notices and, consequently, “all further proceedings pursuant thereto”. The inquiry conducted by the Forest Settlement Officer, the report prepared in those proceedings and the orders, if any, passed on the claims of the Petitioners are subsequent steps arising from the impugned proclamations and notices. They are founded on the same proceedings whose statutory basis has been challenged.

78.18.

The jurisdictional defect identified in this judgment is anterior to the consideration of individual claims. No notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act was issued in respect of the Block. The proclamations and the subsequent proceedings under Chapter II were, therefore, initiated without the statutory foundation required by the Act. The orders, if any, passed upon the claims in those proceedings cannot be severed from that defect and sustained as independent determinations under Chapter II.

78.19.

Section 16(1) provides an appeal against an order passed on a claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. It does not provide a direct appeal against the proclamation under Section 5, which is the foundational step challenged in these petitions. The issue decided by this Court is not whether the Forest Settlement Officer correctly assessed the evidence or properly determined the extent of any individual claim. It is whether the proceedings in which those determinations were made had the statutory foundation required by Section 4(1). That common jurisdictional issue has been decided in these writ petitions.

78.20.

In these circumstances, the inquiry, report and orders passed on the claims of the Petitioners in W.P. No. 33767/2025 are liable to be set aside as consequential relief within the scope of prayer (i), insofar as they concern the Petitioners and their respective lands. This conclusion does not involve an adjudication of the merits of any claim or a determination of title, extent or possession.

78.21.

Setting aside the consequential proceedings in W.P. No. 33767/2025 does not take away any benefit arising from the State’s specific statement that it will not proceed against the lands to the extent of the admitted claims of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50. That statement, already recorded under Point (vi), binds the Respondents and shall be reflected in the operative part.

78.22.

The setting aside of the proceedings leaves the Petitioners in the position they occupied before those proceedings commenced. It does not confer or declare title in their favour. If the State initiates any fresh proceedings under the applicable law, the Petitioners may present their claims in those proceedings, and the State may contest them in accordance with law. Any order made on such claims will carry the statutory remedies available under the 1963 Act.

78.23.

The submission that participation in the proceedings precludes the Petitioners from challenging their jurisdictional foundation has already been considered under Point (vii). Participation in proceedings does not, by itself, cure the absence of statutory jurisdiction or take a case outside the recognised exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies. The principles stated in M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd., paragraph 6, and Radha Krishan Industries, paragraph 27.3, apply for the reasons recorded under that point.

78.24.

The Court is not directing the Petitioners to pursue appeals against orders which are being set aside as consequential steps in proceedings initiated without the statutory foundation required by Section 4(1). At the same time, no Petitioner is deprived of the right to pursue the statutory remedy against an order on the merits of a claim made in any fresh proceeding lawfully initiated under the 1963 Act. Such a remedy, where available, will be governed by Section 16.

78.25.

This Court answers Point No. (x) by holding that an appeal lies under Section 16(1) of the 1963 Act to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, within three months, against an order of the Forest Settlement Officer passed on a claim under Section 11, Section 12 or Section 14. It is an effective statutory remedy for challenging the merits of such an order, including the determination of the existence and extent of the rights claimed.

78.26.

The writ petitions do not seek direct adjudication of the merits of individual claim orders. The challenge is to the jurisdictional foundation of the proceedings under Chapter II, namely, the absence of a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The Petitioners are, therefore, not relegated to the remedy under Section 16 in respect of that challenge.

78.27.

In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the order dated 24.10.2025 is not set aside, and the Petitioner’s remedies against it remain governed by law. The State shall not rely upon that order to disturb the Petitioner’s possession except in accordance with law. In W.P. No. 33767/2025, the inquiry, report and orders, if any, passed on the Petitioners’ claims in the proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned proclamations and notices are set aside as consequential relief, insofar as they concern the Petitioners and their respective lands. No finding is recorded on the merits of any individual claim.

79.

Answer to Point No. (xi): Proceedings of the Regional Commissioner: In the writ petitions relying upon the proceedings dated 08.09.2022 of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division, whether those proceedings possess any binding legal effect upon the State Government or the Forest Department and whether they affect the validity or continuation of the forest proceedings?

79.1.

The Petitioners rely on the proceedings of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division, dated 08.09.2022. According to them, landowners in the area had submitted representations to the Revenue Department, following which two coordination meetings were held at Sakleshpur under the chairmanship of the Regional Commissioner, with the participation of officials of the Forest and Revenue Departments of Hassan District. They contend that the meetings recognised that the Government of Mysore had withdrawn the proposal initiated by the notification of 1920 in 1924.

79.2.

The Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 describe the proceedings dated 08.09.2022 as an order by which the cases initiated on the basis of the withdrawn notification stood abated and the notices were required to be withdrawn. The Petitioner in W.P. No. 19980/2023 further asserts that, at the meeting held on 08.09.2022, the Deputy Conservator of Forests was directed to withdraw all forest offence cases initiated on the basis of the 1920 notification, in the presence of Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. The Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 29656/2024 and 33767/2025 also rely on the proceedings as recording the conclusion that the notification had been withdrawn in 1924 and that the Forest Department could not continue proceedings on its basis.

79.3.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, also relies on the Assistant Commissioner’s report dated 11.10.2022 in support of the contention that the 1920 notification had been withdrawn.

79.4.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, disputes that any direction was issued at the meeting of the District-Level Committee chaired by the Regional Commissioner to drop the proceedings against the Petitioners. He submits that Annexure-L consists of representations made by villagers seeking the dropping of cases against them. The consideration of such representations does not establish that the competent authority had taken a decision to terminate the proceedings.

79.5.

He further submits that the State Government has not issued any order directing that the proceedings be dropped. A decision required to be taken by a competent authority must be evidenced by an order made in accordance with law. It cannot be inferred merely from an oral statement or an understanding said to have emerged at a committee meeting. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the Regional Commissioner did not issue any such direction. Annexure-L, therefore, does not confer any legal right on the Petitioners, and, in the absence of an authenticated decision of the competent authority, the Respondents were entitled to continue the proceedings.

79.6.

The Petitioners have placed before this Court the minutes of the coordination meeting of Revenue and Forest Department officials, chaired by the Regional Commissioner, Mysore Division, on 10.06.2022 at the office of the Assistant Commissioner, Sakleshpur, concerning the Moorkangudda issue.

79.7.

The minutes record that directions were issued to the Deputy Conservator of Forests (Territorial) and the Range Forest Officer to stop prosecution cases against members of the public and farmers in the area. They also record that:

“[C]lear directions were issued by the Regional Commissioner, Mysore Division to wait for the directions from the Government of Karnataka on the issue of Moorkangudda section 4 notification”.

79.8.

The minutes further state that the Tahsildar and the Assistant Commissioner were directed to search for old grant documents and submit a report to the Government.

79.9.

The minutes of the meeting held on 08.09.2022. It states that information concerning the cancellation of the Moorkangudda Forest Block, which the minutes place in the year 1923, was furnished to the Deputy Conservator of Forests (Territorial), the Assistant Conservator of Forests and the Range Forest Officer. It further records that documents said to establish the cancellation, including Gazette publications and a certified copy of the original file obtained from the Department of Archives, were handed over to the Forest Department.

79.10.

The minutes then state:

“[D]irections have been issued to the Deputy Conservator of Forest (Territorial), Hassan District, Assistant Conservator of Forest, Sakleshpur and Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpur to withdraw all the forest offence cases filed against the people and farmers on the basis of section 4 of Moorkangudda block within 15 days”.

79.11.

The proceedings do not bind the State Government. The notification of 1920 was issued by the Government, and the proposal contained in it was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. The legal effect of that order has been determined under Point (i) on the basis of the original Government records. The proceedings of the Regional Commissioner cannot alter that determination or operate as a decision of the State Government to withdraw, revive or otherwise modify the legal position.

79.12.

No statutory provision or Government order has been brought to the notice of this Court conferring on the Regional Commissioner the authority to cancel, declare cancelled or revive a notification issued by the Government under the forest law. The minutes of the meeting dated 10.06.2022 themselves record that the Regional Commissioner directed the officers to await the Government’s decision on the issue. The record does not disclose any subsequent Government order pursuant to those minutes. The learned Additional Advocate General is, therefore, correct in submitting that the proceedings cannot be treated as a decision of the State Government.

79.13.

The proceedings also do not establish a legally binding direction capable of invalidating the statutory proceedings initiated by the Forest Department or of creating an enforceable right in favour of the Petitioners against that Department. The statement in the minutes dated 08.09.2022 that directions had been issued to withdraw forest offence cases is not supported by a separate authenticated order of the Regional Commissioner. More importantly, the Petitioners have not identified any statutory provision or rule under which such a direction would operate to terminate proceedings initiated under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, or render them invalid.

79.14.

The 1963 Act confers the relevant statutory powers on the authorities specified in its provisions. The validity of the exercise of those powers must be tested against the Act and the applicable law. It cannot be determined merely by reference to an administrative communication recorded in the minutes of a coordination meeting.

79.15.

Whether the officers concerned were required, as a matter of internal departmental discipline or administrative hierarchy, to act upon any direction issued at the meeting is not necessary for deciding these writ petitions. No finding is recorded on that question.

79.16.

The proceedings of the Regional Commissioner do not determine the validity or continuation of the forest proceedings. Those questions fall to be decided on the basis of the applicable statutory provisions and the original Government records. As held under Points (i) to (iv), the proposal contained in the 1920 notification was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924; that proposal was not revived by Section 117 of the 1963 Act; and the State cannot sustain the impugned proceedings on the strength of the withdrawn proposal. The proceedings challenged in these petitions fail for the reasons recorded under those points and not because of any direction attributed to the Regional Commissioner.

79.17.

The learned Additional Advocate General is correct in submitting that the meetings, in the absence of an authenticated decision of the competent authority, did not by themselves require the Respondents to treat the proceedings as terminated. That conclusion, however, does not validate the proceedings on their merits or provide an independent statutory foundation for their continuation. Their validity must stand or fall on the applicable law, as determined in the preceding points.

79.18.

This Court has examined the original archival records in determining the legal effect of the 1920 notification and the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. The minutes of the meetings refer to the original file and Gazette publications said to have been obtained from the Department of Archives. They describe the cancellation as having taken place in 1923, whereas the Government order in the archival record is dated 11.01.1924.

79.19.

The reference in the minutes to the year 1923 and the legal opinion recorded therein do not determine the date or legal effect of the Government action. Similarly, the Assistant Commissioner’s report dated 11.10.2022 expresses an opinion on the effect of the historical documents. Such an opinion, whether made by an officer of the Revenue Department or otherwise, cannot substitute for an examination of the Government records and the applicable law. The conclusion under Point (i) rests on the original archival documents and the legal effect of the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. Neither the minutes of the Regional Commissioner nor the Assistant Commissioner’s report is the basis of that finding.

79.20.

The allegation in W.P. No. 19980/2023 that Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were present when the direction was issued is not disputed. Their alleged presence, however, does not cure the absence of an authenticated order or confer on the proceedings the legal effect claimed by the Petitioners.

79.21.

The Petitioners’ challenge to the forest proceedings does not depend on the legal effect of the Regional Commissioner’s proceedings. The conclusions under Points (i) to (iv) rest on the Government Order dated 11.01.1924, the statutory scheme and the absence of a lawful basis for continuing the proceedings on the withdrawn proposal. The Petitioners obtain the relief flowing from those findings. The proceedings of the Regional Commissioner may have been an administrative effort to address a dispute affecting landowners and residents in the area. They do not, on the material produced, constitute a source of enforceable legal rights in favour of the Petitioners or a ground for invalidating the forest proceedings.

79.22.

This Court answers Point No. (xi) by holding that the proceedings of the Regional Commissioner, Mysuru Division, dated 10.06.2022 and 08.09.2022, do not have binding legal effect on the State Government or the Forest Department so as to terminate or invalidate the proceedings under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. They do not alter the legal effect of the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 or the conclusions recorded under Points (i) to (iv). The Assistant Commissioner’s report dated 11.10.2022 and the legal opinion recorded in the minutes are opinions on the effect of the historical documents. This Court rests no finding on those opinions. The validity of the impugned forest proceedings is determined by the original Government records and the applicable statutory provisions.

80.

Answer to Point No. (xii): Individual rights and relief: Whether, in the facts and circumstances of each writ petition, the Petitioners have established a legally enforceable right warranting the relief sought, including any challenge to eviction, sealing of premises, seizure of articles or other consequential action?

80.1.

Sri Manmohan P.N., learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that the lands in question were granted or auctioned by the Revenue Department to the Petitioners or their predecessors-in-title. According to him, such grants and auctions must be given effect unless set aside in accordance with law. The Forest Department cannot disregard the grants and the revenue records and assert jurisdiction over the lands on the basis of the 1920 notification.

80.2.

He further submits that purchasers of lands sold by auction subsequently obtained orders of conversion for non-agricultural use, including for establishing resorts, secured the licences and registrations required for their businesses and invested substantial sums. The authorities failed to consider these circumstances before taking action against them. He also contends that persons in settled possession cannot be dispossessed merely on the assertion that the lands are deemed forest land.

80.3.

Sri A.M. Vijay, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 29690/2025, submits that the eviction of the Petitioners in W.P. No. 16251/2023 violates Article 300A of the Constitution. He relies on the grants made by the State in Kadumane Village from 1952 onwards as conduct consistent with the withdrawal of the 1920 notification. He also relies on the revenue records, which, according to him, have stood in the names of the owners for several decades without any entry showing the Government or the Forest Department as the owner. He submits that the entries carry the presumption contemplated by Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, and that the owners have regularly paid land revenue and taxes. He further contends that revival of the notification after nearly a century would cause serious prejudice to persons who have invested in houses, resorts and plantations.

80.4.

Sri Kiran Ron, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the Petitioners have not established any legally enforceable right over the lands. They have not produced the source of their predecessors’ title or established a complete chain of title. In W.P. No. 29656/2024, the purchase was made on 19.01.2011, nearly nine decades after the 1920 notification. A purchaser cannot acquire a better title than that held by the transferor.

80.5.

In W.P. No. 16251/2023, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that, even assuming that the auction of 1924 conferred a valid right, that right extended only to 5 acres. The Petitioners are alleged to have extended their occupation and construction to a further extent of 9 acres 36 guntas.

80.6.

In W.P. No. 19980/2023, the Petitioner has himself described his occupation as unauthorised in his applications for regularisation, which have been rejected.

80.7.

In W.P. No. 33767/2025, the learned Additional Advocate General relies on the claims admitted by the Forest Settlement Officer, the State’s statement that it will not proceed against the admitted extents of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50, and his submission that the remaining Petitioners must pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

80.8.

The learned Additional Advocate General further submits that revenue entries do not confer title where the underlying right has not been validly created. The Revenue Department could not grant land under the control of the Forest Department. Grants or assignments made after the commencement of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, must also satisfy Section 2 of that Act. He contends that there can be no promissory estoppel against the performance of statutory duties.

80.9.

He relies on Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 453, paragraph 10, and Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, (2010) 4 SCC 393, paragraph 14, to submit that this Court cannot direct public authorities to act contrary to law. According to him, the Petitioners cannot obtain an order restraining the authorities from enforcing the forest laws merely on the basis of revenue entries, grants or other transactions.

80.10.

This point requires the Court to determine the nature of the rights established by the Petitioners and the relief that follows in each case. It is necessary to distinguish between the right to challenge State action taken without lawful authority and the right, if any, to the land itself.

80.11.

A Petitioner need not establish title to obtain relief against State action founded on a notification that has no legal force. Equally, the absence of a lawful basis for the particular action challenged does not establish the Petitioner’s title or confer a right to retain land irrespective of the applicable law. The validity and extent of the grants, auctions, transfers, conversions and other transactions, as well as the precise extent and character of each Petitioner’s interest, are matters of evidence. They are not decided in these proceedings. This is consistent with the findings under Points (v) and (vi).

80.12.

The Petitioners have established a legally enforceable right not to have their possession or asserted interests disturbed by executive action founded solely on the 1920 notification. The proposal contained in that notification was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. It was not revived by Section 117 of the 1963 Act, and no notification under Section 4(1) of that Act has been issued in respect of the Block.

80.13.

Article 300A of the Constitution provides:

“No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”

80.14.

The protection under Article 300A requires the State to deprive a person of property only under the authority of valid law and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by that law. Insofar as a Petitioner establishes a proprietary interest, the State cannot deprive that person of the property by relying on a proposal that was withdrawn and has not been replaced by a valid statutory notification.

80.15.

A person in occupation who has not established title cannot, merely by reason of possession, claim ownership or an indefeasible right to remain on the land. But the State must still act under an applicable legal provision and follow the procedure prescribed by it. The present judgment does not confer title, regularise any unauthorised occupation or protect any person against lawful eviction. It protects the Petitioners against coercive action founded on the withdrawn 1920 proposal and against deprivation otherwise than in accordance with law. That is the enforceable right which warrants the relief considered below.

80.16.

The submissions of the Respondents based on Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. and Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel are accepted as statements of law. In paragraph 10 of Kirloskar Pneumatic, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 is:

“designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law” and:

“cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law”.

80.17.

In paragraph 14 of Manish Goel, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

“no court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions”.

80.18.

These principles do not preclude the relief granted in the present cases. This Court does not direct the Forest Department to recognise any grant, regularise any occupation, permit any activity prohibited by law or refrain from enforcing the forest laws. The direction is confined to preventing action on the basis of a notification whose proposal was withdrawn, and which has no continuing legal force. The State remains at liberty to take action under any independently applicable statutory provision, provided that its requirements are established and the prescribed procedure is followed. Such relief gives effect to the law; it does not restrain its lawful enforcement.

80.19.

The principle in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana [(1981) 1 SCC 11], paragraph 51, that promissory estoppel cannot operate against the exercise of legislative power or the discharge of statutory duties, is also accepted, as considered under Point (v). The relief granted here does not rest on promissory estoppel or on any assurance given by a State officer. It rests on the absence of a lawful foundation for the particular action challenged.

80.20.

The grants, auctions, conversions, licences, registrations and investments relied upon by the Petitioners do not form the basis for granting relief in these proceedings. Their validity and legal effect are not decided. The Respondents’ contentions that the Revenue Department lacked competence to make certain grants, and that grants or diversions made after 25.10.1980 must satisfy Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, are likewise not decided, for the reasons recorded under Point (v).

80.21.

The equities arising from the Petitioners’ investments and the ecological concerns relied upon by the State may be placed before the competent authority in any fresh proceedings lawfully initiated under the applicable law. Neither those equities nor the ecological value of the area can dispense with the statutory requirements governing the exercise of State power.

80.22.

Individual petitions and relief. The relief in each petition must be considered in the light of its pleadings, the action challenged and the findings recorded under the preceding points. No relief granted below shall be understood as a declaration of title or as a determination of the location of any parcel in relation to the boundaries referred to in the 1920 notification.

W.P. NO. 29656/2024.

80.23.

The Petitioner is a firm which purchased Survey No. 102, measuring 5 acres 38 guntas, and Survey No. 198, measuring 5 acres 23 guntas, in Agni Village, on 19.01.2011. It obtained an order of conversion dated 13.06.2014 for establishing a resort and is operating the resort on the property.

80.24.

The Respondents dispute the Petitioner’s chain of title and contend that the extent measuring 5 acres 23 guntas in Survey No. 198 lies within the boundary claimed under the 1920 notification. No finding is recorded on the Petitioner’s title or on the location of either parcel.

80.25.

The notices issued by the Forest Settlement Officer on 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024 and 10.09.2024 are founded on the proceedings under Chapter II of the 1963 Act, which lack the notification required by Section 4(1). They cannot be sustained. The notices issued by the Assistant Conservator of Forests on 20.09.2024 and 18.10.2024 are also unsustainable for the reasons recorded under Point (viii). The Respondents have not established that the Petitioner’s schedule properties fall within any of the categories specified in Section 64A(1), including the category of other land under the control of the Forest Department. The notices dated 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024, 10.09.2024, 20.09.2024 and 18.10.2024 are accordingly quashed.

80.26.

The Respondents shall not disturb the Petitioner’s possession on the strength of the 1920 notification or the proceedings quashed by this judgment. This direction does not prevent action under an independently applicable provision of law, provided its requirements are established and the prescribed procedure is followed. The order dated 24.10.2025 is dealt with separately under Point (x) and is not set aside in this petition.

W.P. NO. 16251/2023.

80.27.

The Petitioners claim rights over 5 acres of land originally bearing Survey No. 95, subsequently re-surveyed as Survey No. 92 and now numbered as Survey Nos. 148/1 and 148/2. Their claim is founded on the auction dated 20.09.1924, a sale deed dated 28.01.2016, a partition deed dated 02.06.2017, mutation entries and an order of conversion dated 12.06.2019. They operate a resort known as Stone Valley Nature Resorts and reside on the property.

80.28.

The Respondents contend that, even if the auction conferred a valid right, it extended only to 5 acres, whereas the Petitioners occupy 14 acres 36 guntas. According to the Respondents, the additional extent of 9 acres 36 guntas is unauthorisedly occupied. The Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the resort and dwelling house stand in Survey No. 148/1, which is shown in the conversion order as measuring 3 acres 4 guntas.

80.29.

The auction relied upon by the Petitioners took place in September 1924, after the Government had withdrawn the proposal by its order dated 11.01.1924. The 1920 notification cannot, therefore, be used to invalidate that auction. This, however, does not amount to a finding that the auction or the subsequent transactions confer title to the entire extent claimed. The Respondents’ objection as to the extent of the Petitioners’ rights remains open.

80.30.

The order dated 26.07.2022 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests and the notice dated 18.07.2023 issued by the Range Forest Officer are unsustainable for the reasons recorded under Points (i) to (iv) and (viii). They are quashed. The order covered an extent of 14 acres 36 guntas. Its invalidity does not depend on whether the Petitioners establish a right beyond the 5 acres claimed under the auction.

80.31.

The Petitioners seek restoration of, and protection against further disturbance to, their possession of the resort, the dwelling house and their belongings. The Respondents state that the resort was seized and subsequently unsealed and restored. The Petitioners do not dispute the restoration. No further direction for restoration of the resort is, therefore, necessary.

80.32.

The Respondents shall not disturb the Petitioners’ possession of the land described in the petition schedule, or of the resort and dwelling house to the extent that they stand on that land, in pursuance of the 1920 notification, the order dated 26.07.2022 or the notice dated 18.07.2023. Any action affecting their possession must be taken only under an independently applicable provision of law and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by it.

80.33.

Whether the resort and dwelling house stand entirely within the 5 acres claimed by the Petitioners or extend beyond that extent is a disputed question of fact. This Court makes no finding on it. Nothing in this judgment recognises a right in the Petitioners over the additional extent of 9 acres 36 guntas alleged by the Respondents to be unauthorisedly occupied. The State remains at liberty to take such action as is authorised by law, after identifying the land concerned and complying with the requirements of the applicable provision, including the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of hearing wherever prescribed.

80.34.

The Petitioners further allege that, on 18.07.2023, officials entered the resort and dwelling house and removed articles, including gold and silver articles, without preparing a mahazar. The Respondents have stated that the resort was seized and subsequently unsealed and restored. This does not specifically answer the allegation concerning the removal of the articles or the preparation of a mahazar.

80.35.

The precise articles removed, the circumstances in which they were taken and whether any particular article remains in the custody of the Respondents are disputed questions of fact. This Court does not record a finding on the Petitioners’ allegation that articles were removed and not returned. However, any article taken and retained by the Respondents in the course of action founded on the order dated 26.07.2022 or the notice dated 18.07.2023 cannot continue to be retained on the basis of those proceedings after they are set aside. The Respondents shall return any such article remaining in their custody to the person entitled to receive it, against a proper acknowledgment. The Petitioners’ claim concerning articles alleged to have been removed but not returned, or otherwise not found in the Respondents’ custody, is left open to be pursued in accordance with law.

80.36.

W.P. No. 19980/2023. The Petitioner states that he occupies approximately 4 acres in Survey No. 92 of Achanahalli Village, on which he has constructed a house measuring approximately 2,400 square feet. He has sought regularisation of his occupation. In his applications for regularisation, he has described his occupation as unauthorised. The Respondents rely on those statements and on the rejection of his applications under the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964.

80.37.

The Petitioner has not established a right to remain in occupation of the land, and no such right is declared. Nevertheless, the absence of such a declaration does not validate action taken against him on the basis of the withdrawn 1920 proposal. His prayers to quash the order dated 26.07.2022, the notice dated 18.07.2023 and the proclamation dated 09.11.2023, and for a declaration concerning the withdrawal and abandonment of the 1920 proposal, are granted to the extent warranted by the findings under Points (i) to (iv), (viii) and (ix).

80.38.

The petition contains no prayer for restoration of possession or for a mandamus protecting the Petitioner’s continued occupation. No such relief is granted. The proceedings relating to his applications for regularisation before the Revenue authorities are not under challenge and are not affected by this judgment. The State remains at liberty to take action against the Petitioner under an independently applicable provision of law, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by it.

80.39.

W.P. No. 29690/2025. The Petitioners claim to own or hold a coffee plantation measuring 14 acres 20 guntas in Kadumane Village under registered sale deeds executed in 2008 and 2017, and a further extent of 7 acres in Survey No. 148 under a sale deed dated 22.11.2006.

80.40.

The proclamation dated 19.07.2023, insofar as it concerns the Petitioners’ lands, is unsustainable for want of a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. It is accordingly quashed to that extent.

80.41.

The Petitioners also challenge the notices dated 11.08.2025 and 26.08.2025 and the inquiry notice dated 30.06.2025. The mere reference to Section 64, which had been omitted, does not by itself establish that the notices are invalid if an independent statutory power is otherwise available. Nor does the present record permit a finding on any alleged violation of Sections 24, 73 or 104 of the 1963 Act, or on any separate forest offence proceeding.

80.42.

The Respondents shall not proceed against the Petitioners’ lands or take penal action against them on the sole basis of the withdrawn 1920 notification. This direction does not prevent the Respondents from pursuing proceedings under an independently applicable statutory provision, if its requirements are satisfied and the Petitioners are afforded the procedural safeguards prescribed by law. No finding is made on the Petitioners’ title or on the location of their lands in relation to the boundaries referred to in the 1920 notification.

W.P. NO. 33767/2025.

80.43.

The 87 Petitioners fall into three broad groups. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 29 claim through sale deeds, partition deeds, wills and other instruments. Petitioners Nos. 30 to 51 claim that their unauthorised occupation was subsequently regularised and Petitioners No. 52–87 claiming ownership.

80.44.

The proclamations and notices challenged under prayer (i), and the inquiry, report and orders, if any, made in the proceedings initiated pursuant to them, are set aside for the reasons recorded under Points (ix) and (x), insofar as they concern the Petitioners and their respective lands. The relief is consequential to the absence of the notification required by Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. No finding is made on the merits of the individual claims or on the Petitioners’ title.

80.45.

The A.Mo. series notices challenged under prayer (ii) require separate treatment. They cannot be sustained to the extent that they seek to proceed solely on the basis of the withdrawn 1920 notification. This judgment does not, however, invalidate any proceeding that may be founded on an independent statutory power, the applicability of which has not been examined in these petitions. Any such proceeding must satisfy the requirements of the law under which it is initiated.

80.46.

The statement of the learned Additional Advocate General that the State will not proceed against the lands to the extent of the admitted claims of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50 is recorded. That statement binds the Respondents and shall be reflected in the operative part.

80.47.

The declaration sought under prayer (iii) is granted to the extent that the proposal contained in the 1920 notification was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 and cannot be relied upon as a subsisting notification. The further relief seeking deletion of the Forest Department’s name from the revenue records relating to the Petitioners’ properties is refused.

80.48.

Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, attaches a rebuttable presumption of truth to entries in the Record of Rights and certified entries. Such entries do not, by themselves, confer title. Their evidentiary effect is also not confined to the Petitioners’ case; the presumption must be considered in relation to the relevant entries and the material relied upon to rebut it.

80.49.

The Petitioners have not identified each entry sought to be deleted or established the basis on which it was made. The Respondents rely on an entry dated 05.08.2013 concerning 536 acres 22 guntas in Achanahalli Village and on entries in Column Nos. 9 or 11 of the revenue records relating to more than 6,400 acres. This Court cannot assume that every such entry was made solely on the basis of the 1920 notification. Nor can the Court direct wholesale deletion without examining the individual entries and the records on which they rest.

80.50.

The Petitioners are at liberty to approach the competent Revenue authorities under the applicable land revenue law for correction of any particular entry. They may rely on the findings in this judgment concerning the effect of the Government Order dated 11.01.1924. The competent authority shall consider such an application in accordance with law.

W.P. NO. 700/2026.

80.51.

The Petitioner states that it purchased 52 acres 5 guntas of coffee plantation under a sale deed dated 24.06.1988 in the name of a partnership firm. It challenges the notice dated 30.06.2025, described as one issued under Section 7, and apprehends further action. The record indicates that no proclamation has been issued or served on the Petitioner, and the Respondents do not dispute that position.

80.52.

The notice dated 30.06.2025 is quashed for want of the notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The Respondents shall not initiate or continue action against the Petitioner on the basis of the withdrawn 1920 notification. This does not prevent action under an independently applicable statutory provision, provided its requirements are established and the prescribed procedure is followed. No finding is made on the Petitioner’s title or on the location of the lands in relation to the boundaries referred to in the 1920 notification.

80.53.

The relief granted in these petitions does not prevent the State from taking lawful steps to protect the area. If the State decides to constitute any part of the Block as a reserved forest, it may do so by following Sections 3 and 4 of the 1963 Act and the procedure prescribed in Chapter II. It must take a fresh decision, issue the notification required by Section 4(1), identify the land proposed to be constituted a reserved forest and appoint a qualified Forest Settlement Officer. The claims and rights of affected persons must thereafter be dealt with in accordance with the Act.

80.54.

The State may also take action against unauthorised occupation under Section 64A or any other applicable provision, provided that the land falls within the category to which that provision applies, the statutory conditions for its exercise are established and the competent authority follows the prescribed procedure. In particular, any action under Section 64A must satisfy the requirements concerning the nature of the land, unauthorised occupation, the rank of the Forest Officer exercising the power and the reasonable opportunity of hearing required by the proviso to Section 64A(1).

80.55.

The ecological importance of the area may be placed before the competent authority and considered in any fresh proceeding. It does not dispense with the statutory requirements. The Petitioners, for their part, may establish such rights as they claim in the forum and proceedings provided by law. The State is entitled to contest those claims. This Court expresses no opinion on the merits of any such claim.

80.56.

This court answers Point No. (xii) by holding that the Petitioners have established a legally enforceable right not to be subjected to coercive action, eviction or dispossession on the strength of the 1920 notification, the proposal contained in which was withdrawn by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 and which was not revived or replaced by a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act. The relief warranted in each petition is confined to the impugned action founded on that withdrawn proposal and is specified above.

80.57.

No Petitioner has established, and this Court does not determine, title to or the precise extent of any land, the validity of any grant, auction, transfer, conversion or licence, or the location of any parcel in relation to the boundaries referred to in the 1920 notification. The claim in W.P. No. 33767/2025 for deletion of the Forest Department’s name from the revenue records is refused, with liberty to approach the competent Revenue authority in accordance with law. In W.P. No. 16251/2023, articles taken in the course of the impugned action and remaining in the Respondents’ custody shall be returned against acknowledgment. The claim concerning articles alleged to have been removed but not returned is left open to be pursued in accordance with law. In W.P. No. 19980/2023, no right to remain in occupation is declared. Nothing in this judgment prevents the State from taking action under an independently applicable law after establishing its applicability and complying with the procedure prescribed by that law.

81. Answer to Point No. (xiii): What order?

81.1.

On the main issue the Petitioners succeed.

81.1.1.

The proposal in the 1920 notification was dropped on 11.01.1924, the notification has no operative effect, and no notification under Section 4(1) of the 1963 Act has been issued. The proclamations, notices and orders challenged rest on that notification and so have no legal foundation.

81.1.2.

On the rest, the Petitioners do not succeed. The main relief is established, so the petitions are not dismissed; the remaining reliefs cannot be granted on this record, so they are not allowed in full. The petitions are accordingly partly allowed.

81.1.3.

The statements of the learned Additional Advocate General, recorded under points (vi) and (x), bind the Respondents.

81.2.

The relief does not tie the State’s hands. Sections 3 and 4(1) of the 1963 Act let it constitute a reserved forest afresh, by a new decision and notification followed by the process in Chapter II, and Section 64A remains open against a person in unauthorised occupation of land of a kind the section covers, after a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

81.3.

The historical records disclose that, by Letter No. 712, received on 29.04.1923, the Conservator of Forests informed the Government that, during his recent tour of Hassan District, he had inspected the Moorkangudda area in response to protest petitions. He described the area as comprising “treeless, grassy plains, without any vegetation whatever” and expressed the opinion that it was not worth conserving the Block to the detriment of the villagers. He accordingly recommended that further proceedings be dropped and that the notification under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, be treated as cancelled. The personal name of the Conservator of Forests is not disclosed in the archival record placed before this Court.

81.4.

The historical assessment must be understood in the context in which it was made. The inspection appears to have proceeded principally on the visible absence of tree cover and the perceived utility of conserving the land at that time. The communication does not disclose any detailed ecological assessment of the area, its natural vegetation, biodiversity, wildlife habitats, hydrological functions or significance as a catchment. The description of the area as treeless or grassy was, therefore, a description of its visible physical condition at the time of inspection. It cannot, by itself, be treated as a scientific conclusion that the land was ecologically insignificant or incapable of forming part of a larger ecological system.

81.5.

The understanding of forests and ecological systems cannot remain confined to the visible presence of trees or the density of tree cover. A forest ecosystem is not necessarily defined by a continuous canopy of trees. Its ecological character must also be understood by reference to natural vegetation, biodiversity, soil, water systems, wildlife habitats and the relationship between its constituent ecological formations. An area which appears open or predominantly covered by grass may perform functions essential to the survival and integrity of a larger ecological system. The absence of trees on a particular tract is not, by itself, sufficient to conclude that the land is devoid of ecological significance.

81.6.

Natural grasslands are not wastelands or lifeless tracts merely because they do not support dense tree growth. They sustain distinct forms of vegetation, including grasses, herbs and flowers, and provide habitats for birds, insects, grazing species and other wildlife. Certain species are specially adapted to, and dependent upon, grassland habitats. Such areas may also provide ecological continuity between forest patches and contribute to the stability of the wider landscape.

81.7.

The ecological functions of grasslands extend well beyond the vegetation visible above the ground. Their natural vegetation and soil perform important functions in receiving and retaining rainfall, facilitating the infiltration of water, regulating surface runoff and contributing to groundwater recharge. Depending upon their characteristics and geographical setting, they may function as natural catchment areas and help regulate the movement and gradual release of water into streams and rivers. Their significance is not confined to the immediate land on which the grasses grow. It extends to the catchments, water sources and ecosystems which depend upon them.

81.8.

The same principle applies to wetlands, mangroves, riverine systems, scrub forests, open forest formations and other natural habitats. Each may perform distinct ecological functions essential to biodiversity, water security and environmental stability. The degradation of one component may impair the functioning of the other components of the landscape. Their conversion, fragmentation or destruction may result in ecological damage which is difficult to reverse.

81.9.

The protection of forests and natural ecosystems cannot, therefore, depend solely upon historical descriptions, revenue classifications or the outward appearance of the land. Scientific knowledge and ecological understanding develop over time. An area historically described as barren, open, rocky, grassy or vacant may, upon proper scientific examination, be found to possess the characteristics of a forest or to form an integral part of a larger forest, grassland or catchment ecosystem. Equally, the fact that an area lies near a forest does not automatically establish that it is itself forest land.

81.10.

The assessment must be based on the ecological characteristics of the particular land and its relationship with the surrounding landscape. It must take account of natural vegetation, soil characteristics, biodiversity, wildlife habitats, water retention, groundwater recharge, drainage patterns, catchment functions and the capacity of the area for ecological restoration. Areas which were formerly forests but have since been degraded, denuded, cleared or otherwise altered must also be examined, since their present physical condition may not disclose their original ecological character or their capacity for restoration.

81.11.

The State must distinguish between lands which satisfy the applicable legal meaning of forest, irrespective of whether they have been formally notified, and other ecologically sensitive areas which, though not classifiable as forests, require protection under an appropriate statutory or conservation framework. These categories must not be conflated. The determination of the legal status of each area must rest on objective scientific material and the applicable statutory criteria.

81.12.

Article 48-A of the Constitution places an obligation upon the State to endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country. This responsibility is not confined to preserving areas which have already been formally notified or classified as forests. It also requires the State to identify natural ecosystems which possess the characteristics of forests, including areas which have remained unclassified, unrecorded or outside the existing system of forest administration.

81.13.

The State's responsibility is not merely to protect what has already been recognised as forest, but also to identify areas which, on the basis of their ecological character and the applicable law, ought to receive such protection. The exercise cannot be confined to areas having dense tree cover or to regions traditionally recognised as forest belts. It must extend to every geographical region of Karnataka and take account of the diversity of its natural ecosystems. The coastal belt, the Western Ghats, the Malnad region, the Deccan plateau and the drier regions of the State may each contain different forms of natural vegetation and ecological systems requiring examination.

81.14.

The responsibility of the State is particularly significant in relation to fragile ecosystems whose functions extend beyond the boundaries of the land on which they exist. The State must not merely respond after degradation has taken place. It must identify such ecosystems and take timely measures to prevent their loss. The interests of future generations must inform the discharge of this responsibility. Natural forests, grasslands, wetlands and other ecosystems, once destroyed or substantially altered, may be difficult, and in some cases impossible, to restore to their original ecological condition.

81.15.

In the considered view of this Court, the State Government must undertake a comprehensive, scientific and State-wide exercise for the identification of all forests and forest-like areas in Karnataka which have not been notified, recognised, classified or adequately recorded. The Principal Secretary, Forest, Environment and Ecology Department is directed to get carried out such an exercise. The exercise must cover the entire State without restriction to any particular geographical region, forest type or category of land. It shall include:

81.15.1.

all areas which satisfy the applicable legal and ecological criteria for identification as forests, irrespective of whether they have been formally notified, recognised or classified as such, and irrespective of the ownership of the land;

81.15.2.

forest-like areas, unclassed forest lands and community forest lands which require examination;

81.15.3.

areas which were formerly forests but have been degraded, denuded, cleared or otherwise altered;

81.15.4.

natural grasslands, open forest formations, scrublands, wetlands, mangroves, riverine systems, catchment areas, sacred groves, ecological corridors and other natural ecosystems which may possess the characteristics of forests or require protection under a separate statutory or conservation framework; and

81.15.5.

Government and private plantations and other areas having substantial tree or natural vegetation cover, so that their actual ecological character and legal status may be properly assessed.

81.16.

The exercise shall be undertaken through a multidisciplinary Expert Committee to be constituted by the Principal Secretary, Forest, Environment and Ecology Department, or by suitably strengthening and updating the work of existing committees, with the participation of the Forest, Revenue, Environment, Ecology and Survey and Settlement Departments, together with experts in forestry, ecology, botany, hydrology, wildlife, soil science, biodiversity, geographical information systems and land survey.

81.17.

The identification exercise shall be based on a comprehensive review of historical forest and revenue records, settlement records, earlier notifications, survey maps, satellite imagery, forest-cover data, biodiversity records, hydrological material and other relevant information. Remote sensing and geographical information systems shall be supplemented by field inspections and ground verification. The exercise shall not be confined to the visible density of tree cover. It shall consider natural vegetation, soil characteristics, biodiversity, water retention, groundwater recharge, drainage patterns, catchment functions, wildlife habitats, ecological connectivity and the relationship of the land with adjoining ecosystems.

81.18.

The committees shall prepare a district-wise inventory with maps identifying the lands examined, their geographical boundaries, village particulars and survey numbers, together with their existing legal and revenue classification. Where historical survey numbers have changed, they shall be correlated with the present survey particulars to the extent possible. The reasons for the classification adopted in respect of each identified area shall be recorded.

81.19.

The draft inventory and the material supporting the proposed classification shall be published in an accessible manner, including on the official website of the State Government. Affected landholders, local communities, local bodies and other interested persons shall be given an opportunity to submit objections and supporting material. A period of not less than sixty days shall be provided for this purpose. The committees shall consider the objections, undertake further field verification wherever required and record reasons for accepting or rejecting material objections.

81.20.

The final report shall separately identify lands which satisfy the applicable legal criteria for recognition as forest, forest-like areas, former or degraded forests, community and unclassed forest lands, and other ecologically sensitive areas requiring protection under a different legal framework. The classification of a parcel as forest land, its inclusion within a reserved forest and its recognition as an ecologically sensitive area are distinct legal questions and shall not be conflated.

81.21.

The exercise must not end with the preparation of an inventory or an academic report. Once the areas have been identified, the State Government shall examine their legal status and take consequential action under the appropriate statutory framework. In respect of lands found to satisfy the applicable legal requirements for constitution or recognition as forest, the competent authorities shall initiate and pursue the necessary statutory proceedings for their formal notification, declaration or other legally recognised protection. Where constitution as a reserved forest is proposed, the procedure prescribed under Sections 3 and 4 of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, and the subsequent provisions of Chapter II, shall be followed.

81.22.

The Principal Secretary, Forest, Environment and Ecology Department shall also ensure the preparation, updating and maintenance of the consolidated records in respect of the categories of land covered by all enactments.

81.23.

In respect of ecologically sensitive areas which do not fall within the statutory meaning of forest, the State Government shall examine and take appropriate measures under the applicable environmental, wildlife, land and conservation laws. The absence of a forest notification shall not prevent the State from examining whether such an area requires protection under another law. Equally, the identification of an area as ecologically sensitive shall not, without compliance with the applicable statutory requirements, be treated as a declaration that it is a reserved forest or forest land.

81.24.

The State Government shall utilise the Expert Committee and the State, regional and district-level committees already constituted for the identification of forests and forest-like areas, wherever such committees are functioning and are competent to undertake the exercise. Where no competent committee has been constituted, or an existing committee is not adequately equipped to undertake the exercise, the State Government shall constitute, reconstitute or suitably strengthen the committee concerned. The State Government shall place the constitution, composition, terms of reference, methodology and present status of the committees before this Court by an affidavit within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.

81.25.

The State-wide identification and mapping exercise, including publication of the draft inventory and consideration of objections, shall be completed within nine months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Within three months thereafter, the State Government shall take reasoned decisions on the final recommendations and initiate the necessary statutory proceedings for notification, declaration or other protection, as the case may be. Where the applicable statute prescribes a particular procedure or period for completion of such proceedings, the same shall govern.

81.26.

The exercise shall take into account the rights and interests of persons who may be affected by the identification or proposed notification of any land. The preparation or publication of the inventory shall not, by itself, operate as an adjudication of private title or extinguish any right recognised by law. Any consequential restriction, declaration or notification shall be made only under the applicable law and after following the procedure prescribed by it.

81.27.

These observations and directions arise from the State's continuing constitutional responsibility to preserve natural resources and ecological systems for present and future generations. The historical withdrawal of the proposal relating to Moorkangudda in 1924 does not curtail that responsibility, nor does it prevent the State from identifying and protecting the same area or any other area in Karnataka on the basis of its present ecological character and under the law presently in force. Conservation must rest on current scientific understanding and lawful statutory action. It cannot rest on a withdrawn historical proposal, nor can it be defeated by the absence of an earlier notification.

81.28.

For the avoidance of doubt, this Court has not declared the entirety of Moorkangudda Block, or any particular petition schedule property, to be a Shola forest, grassland forest, forest-like area or forest land. No parcel-wise determination of that nature is made in these proceedings. Nor do these observations revive the proposal contained in the 1920 notification or validate any action previously taken on its basis. They recognise that the State's constitutional obligation and statutory power to identify, assess and protect forests and other ecologically significant lands extend throughout Karnataka and must be discharged through a fresh, informed and legally compliant process. 81.29. In the light of the answers to the points this court passes the following

ORDER

(i)

The writ petitions, W.P. No. 29656/2024, W.P. No. 16251/2023, W.P. No. 19980/2023, W.P. No. 29690/2025, W.P. No. 33767/2025 and W.P. No. 700/2026, are partly allowed in the terms stated below.

(ii)

Declaration in W.P. No. 16251/2023, W.P. No. 19980/2023, W.P. No. 29690/2025 and W.P. No. 33767/2025:

It is declared, as between the Petitioners in those petitions and the Respondents, that the proposal contained in the notification dated 05.02.1920, No. R.8806-Ft.43-15-6, issued under Section 4 of the Mysore Forest Regulation, 1900, was dropped by the Government Order dated 11.01.1924 (IC 4236.8); that the notification has been abandoned and has lapsed; and that it has no operative effect so as to found any proceeding against those Petitioners or their lands under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. The prayers for a declaration, namely prayer 4 in W.P. No. 16251/2023, prayer (ii)A in W.P. No. 19980/2023, prayer (c) as amended on 24.11.2025 in W.P. No. 29690/2025, and the first limb of prayer (iii) in W.P. No. 33767/2025, are allowed to that extent.

(iii)

W.P. No. 29656/2024.

a. The notices dated 04.06.2024, 28.08.2024 and 10.09.2024 bearing No. A.Vya/Hassan/Aranya Adisoochane/GL-09/2024-25, issued by the Forest Settlement Officer (Respondent No. 13), and the notices dated 20.09.2024 and 18.10.2024 bearing No. Sakapu/UV/Sakapu/Amo-08/2024-25, issued by the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Hassan (Respondent No. 7), are quashed (prayer (i)).

b. Prayer (ii) is allowed in this form: the Respondents shall not disturb or interfere with the possession of the Petitioner over the lands described in the petition, on the strength of the notification dated 05.02.1920 or of the proceedings quashed by this order, except in accordance with law.

c. The order of the Forest Settlement Officer dated 24.10.2025 is not the subject of any prayer in this petition. It is neither set aside nor upheld. The Petitioner may take such remedy against it as the law provides, and any question of limitation is for the forum concerned. The Respondents shall not rely on that order, or on the proceedings of which it forms part, as authority to disturb the possession of the Petitioner except in accordance with law.

d. Prayer (iii) calls for no separate order.

(iv)

W.P. No. 16251/2023.

a. The order dated 26.07.2022 passed by the Deputy Conservator of Forests (Forest Mobile Squad), Hassan, No. YOLESUM/ASUMDAL/HASSAN/HOTUVARI /AMO. 60/2022-23 (Annexure-J), and the notice dated 18.07.2023 issued by the Range Forest Officer, Sakleshpur Range (Annexure-J-1), are quashed (prayer 1).

b. The proclamation dated 09.11.2023 bearing No. A.VYA/Hassan/ARANYA ADHISUCHANE/JL-10/2023-24 (Annexure-S) is quashed insofar as it concerns the Petitioners and their lands (prayer 5).

c. Prayer 2 is allowed in part. The Respondents shall not disturb the possession of the Petitioners over the land described in the schedule to the petition, including the resort known as “Stone Valley Nature Resorts” and the dwelling house, to the extent that they stand on that land, in pursuance of the notification dated 05.02.1920, the order dated 26.07.2022 or the notice dated 18.07.2023, except in accordance with law. The Respondents state that the resort has been unsealed and restored to the Petitioners, and no direction to restore possession is called for.

d. Any article of the Petitioners seized from the resort or the dwelling house on 18.07.2023 and still in the custody of the Respondents shall be returned to the Petitioners against acknowledgment, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The claim that other articles, including gold and silver articles, were removed and not returned is not decided and is left to the remedies available to the Petitioners in law.

e. The declaration in prayer 4 is granted as stated above. Prayer 3 calls for no separate order.

f. For land outside the schedule to the petition, nothing here decides the Petitioners’ title or right to possess, and the State may act in accordance with law, after identifying the land and hearing its occupants.

g. If there is any encroachment, liberty is reserved to the Respondent authorities to take action regarding the same by following due procedure of law.

(v)

W.P. No. 19980/2023.

a. The order dated 26.07.2022 bearing No. UASM/ASMDL/HASSAN/UTTUVARI/AM.60 /2022-23 (Annexure-K) and the notice dated 18.07.2023 bearing No. SAKAPU/VAA/UTTUVARI01/2023-24 (Annexure-L) are quashed (prayers (i) and (ii)).

b. The proclamation dated 09.11.2023 bearing No. A.VYA/HASSANA/ARANYA ADHISUCHANE/GL-10/2023-24 (Annexure-P) is quashed insofar as it concerns the Petitioner (prayer (ii)B).

c. The declaration in prayer (ii)A is granted as stated above.

d. No right of the Petitioner to remain in occupation of the land is declared. No restoration of possession is prayed for, and none is directed. The proceedings under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act on the Petitioner’s applications for regularisation, and the appeal that he states is pending, are not affected by this order.

(vi)

W.P. No. 29690/2025.

a. The proclamations dated 19.07.2023 bearing No. AA.VYA/HASSAN/ARANYA ADISUCHANE/JL-10/2023-24 (Annexures A to C) are quashed insofar as they concern the lands of the Petitioners (prayer (a)). The notices dated 11.08.2025 and 26.08.2025 issued in proceedings No. SAKAPU/VUU VE/SAKAPU/AAMO/-201/2021-22 (Annexures D and E), and the enquiry notice dated 30.06.2025 bearing No. AA.VYA/HASSAN/ARANYA ADISUCHANE/JL-09/2024-25 (Annexure F), are quashed (prayer (b)).

b. Prayer (c), as amended on 24.11.2025, is allowed in this form: the Respondents shall not proceed with the enquiry, or initiate penal action, against the Petitioners in pursuance of the notification dated 05.02.1920. The notification does not bind the lands of the Petitioners, in the sense that it cannot be enforced against them. No finding is made on the location of those lands in relation to the boundaries of the notification.

(vii)

W.P. No. 33767/2025.

a. The proclamations and notices listed in prayer (i), insofar as they concern the Petitioners and their lands, are quashed. All further proceedings pursuant to them, including the inquiry and report, insofar as they are founded upon the impugned proclamations/notices are quashed as against the Petitioners.

b. The notices issued by Respondent No. 5 and listed in prayer (ii) are quashed insofar as they concern the Petitioners.

c. The declaration in the first limb of prayer (iii) is granted as stated above. The further relief in that prayer, that the name of the Forest Department be deleted from the revenue records in respect of the properties of the Petitioners, is refused. The Petitioners are at liberty to apply to the competent revenue authority, in accordance with law, for correction of any entry.

d. The statement of the learned Additional Advocate General that the State will not proceed against the lands to the extent of the claims admitted in respect of Petitioners Nos. 13, 14, 15, 25, 26 and 50 is recorded, and the Respondents are bound by it.

(viii)

W.P. No. 700/2026.

a. The notice dated 30.06.2025 bearing No. A.VYA/Hassan/Aranya Notification/GL-09/2024-25, issued by the 4th Respondent, the Deputy Conservator of Forests (Annexure-A), is quashed (prayer (i)).

b. Prayer (ii) is allowed in this form: the Respondents shall not proceed with the enquiry proceedings, or initiate penal action, against the Petitioner in pursuance of the notification dated 05.02.1920.

(ix) DIRECTIONS COMMON TO ALL THE PETITIONS.

a. The quashing and the directions in this order operate in favour of the Petitioners in these petitions and in respect of the lands described in them. They do not affect any proceeding against a person who is not a party to these petitions.

b. No finding is made on the title to, the extent of, the boundaries of or the location of any land; on the validity of any grant, auction, conversion, licence or registration; on the character of any land as forest on any footing other than the notification dated 05.02.1920; or on the application of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. These questions remain open.

c. Nothing in this order prevents the State Government from deciding, in accordance with the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, to constitute any land a reserved forest, by a fresh decision and notification under Sections 3 and 4(1), with a Forest Settlement Officer appointed in accordance with Section 4(2), and by following the procedure in Chapter II. Nothing in this order prevents a Forest Officer of the rank required by Section 64A(1) from acting under that section against a person in unauthorised occupation of land of a kind to which it applies, after giving that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Nothing in it affects the powers of the Revenue authorities under the land revenue law.

(x)

All interim orders passed in these writ petitions, including the order dated 10.08.2023 in W.P. No. 16251/2023, merge in this order and cease to operate. The protection against disturbance of possession is as stated in this order.

(xi)

All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.

(xii)

There shall be no order as to costs.

(xiii)

The Registry shall place a copy of this common order in the record of each of the connected writ petitions.

(xiv)

Though the above matter stands disposed of, relist on 12.03.2027 for the Principal Secretary, Forest, Environment and Ecology Department to submit a report on the progress in compliance as regards the above general directions.

This Court has been assisted by Ms. Harshada R.B., Law Clerk, in the formulation of this judgment.