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High Courts(2026) 11 BOM CK 1991

Ajay Vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

Bombay High Court · Nagpur Bench · 07 Nov 2026 · Raj D. Wakode, J · Anil S. Kilor, J

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Judgment

244 paragraphs · 17,022 words

(Per : Anil S. Kilor, J.)

1.

Heard.

2.

Rule. The Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of learned counsel for the respective parties.

3.

The brief facts of the present case are as under:

(i)

The petitioners, in both the petitions, are the elected representatives/executive members of the respondent No.3- Market Committee.

(ii)

A general election of respondent No. 3- Market Committee was lastly held on 09/11/2021. Accordingly, the five year term of the petitioners in normal course would have come to an end in November 2026, i.e., in the current month.

(iii)

The respondent-State promulgated and published Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation)(Amendment) Ordinance, 2025. The said ordinance was the subject matter of challenge before this Court in Writ Petition No. 6410 of 2025.

(iv)

During the pendency of the said writ petition, the Bill No. XCIII of 2025 was presented to Legislative Assembly to convert the above referred Ordinance into the Act. Accordingly, both the Houses approved the bill.

(v)

The Hon’ble Governor of Maharashtra, thereafter, has accorded his assent to the Bill on 31/12/2025, w.e.f. 13/10/2025, and the same has been enacted as the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing Development and Regulation (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Maharashtra Act No.LII of 2025) [for short ‘the Amendment Act of 2025’].

(vi)

In both the present writ petitions, the constitutional validity of Sections 5-1A, 5-1B and 5-1C of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act of 1963’), is under challenge.

(vii)

Section 5-1A speaks about establishment of 'MNI'. Section 5-1B provides composition of Market Committee of 'MNI'. Section 5-1C deals with executive committee of Market of National Importance (for short, ‘MNI’) and Section 5-1D restricts application of certain provisions of the Act of 1963 to 'MNI'.

(viii)

A consequence of establishing or designating any existing Market Committee as ‘MNI’ under Section 5-1A, the Market Committee of Market, established under Section 5 would cease to continue as per the provision of Section 5-1B.

(ix)

Hence, for this reason and on other grounds as raised in the petition, according to the petitioners, the aforesaid provisions are unconstitutional, unfair, unjust, arbitrary, unreasonable, ultra-vires and having mala fide purpose, which can be categorized as colourable exercise of powers and hence, the same are violative of fundamental rights of the agriculturist, as envisaged under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

(x)

In Writ petition No. 1143 of 2026, a challenge is also made to the notification dated 02/06/2026, whereby the respondent No.3-Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Nagpur (APMC) has been declared as 'MNI'.

(xi)

Since the challenge in both the petitions is similar, both the petitions are heard together.

4.

We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties.

5.

Shri Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has taken us through various provisions of the principal Act, i.e., the Act of 1963, and has tried to canvass that the whole scheme of the Act demonstrates that Market Committee shall contiune to function even when the Committee is superseded and an Administrator is appointed. It is submitted that in order to continue the work of Market Committee, the Market Committee must be in existence otherwise market will not function. It is argued that when the statute provides for something to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in the same manner. He thus, submits that a statutory vacuum cannot be created by issuing notification under Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963, thereby, rendering the existing APMC mechanism inoperative without prescribing regulations and executive machinery. The impugned action has thus undone the existing statutory regime without creating an effective substitute. It is therefore argued that the Amendment Act of 2025 is unconstitutional and contrary to the object and purpose of the Act of 1963. To substantiate his arguments he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Chandra Kishor Zha .v/s. Mahavir Prasad1.

6.

Shri Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate further argues that the legislature may create a new statutory regime and alter an existing Committee, but once the statute prescribes a particular mechanism, the State can exercise such powers only in the manner provided by the statute itself. It is submitted that since Market Committee is a statutory creation, its constitution, alteration, replacement can only occur through statutory procedure and necessary notifications. It is submitted that a statutory body cannot come into existence merely because someone assumes office, like the Hon’ble Minister as a Chairman in this case. The constitution of the committee requires statutory notification, which is not published before the Hon’ble Minister took charge as Chairman. If the legislature intended to replace the existing committee by a Market Committee of 'MNI', it had to simultaneously create substitute machinery contemplated under Sections 5-1B and 5-1C of the Act of 1963.

7.

It is submitted that the action of the respondent-State, designating respondent No. 3-Market Committee as ‘MNI’ is arbitrary and capricious. The Amendment Act of 2025, has been enacted with an intention of taking control over the financially strong respondent No. 3-Market Committee. It is submitted that the Amendment Act of 2025 is nothing but a misuse of the legislative powers by the State, which is malice in law and amounts to colourable exercise of powers. For this purpose, he has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab2, Kangana Ranaut v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai3, Rajneesh Khajuria v. Wockhardt Ltd.4, Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania5, and union of India Vs. G.M. Kokil 6.

8.

Shri Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate argues that the Amended Act of 2025 empowers the State Government to designate any existing Market Committee established under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 as 'MNI'. The consequences thereof would be existing Market Committee would cease to function and consequently, all the existing committee members shall cease to hold their office. Thereupon, the existing market committee will be substituted by a Market Committee of 'MNI' as per Section 5-1B of the Act of 1963. Section 5-1B provides composition of Market Committee not constitution. He submits that such composition is by way of nomination. Therefore, there would be no effective representation to the local agriculturists and other major stake-holders, which will result into taking away the management of Market Committee from the local agriculturists.

9.

It is further argued that there is no basis to replace democratic setup with board by nominated members. It is submitted that in absence of strong reasons justifying such replacement, it can be said that the composition of market committee of ‘MNI’ is contrary to the scheme of the Act, i.e., the market should be run and managed by democratically elected body.

10.

At the same time, Shri Manohar, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners argues that the amendment falls foul of the twin test. It is submitted that there has to be a reasonable classifications based on intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. He thus argues that no such object and reasons are given for the insertion of Section 5-1A, 5-1B, 5-1C and 5-1D. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the decisions in the case of State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar7, State of T.N. v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Assn.8 , Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab9 and S. Seshachalam v. Bar Council of T.N.10 and State of Maharashtra vs. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawala11.

11.

Shri Manohar, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners argues that the composition of the Market Committee of 'MNI' is provided under Section 5-1B and as it stands 2/3rd of the Committee cannot be composed, for the reason that there is no provision who will select the 5 agriculturists, 3 traders and 2 agriculturists from the other States. There is no answer to the same. He therefore submits that Chapter I-1A of the Act of 1963 is not workable.

12.

It is further argued that Section 5-1C requires that the Executive Committee shall consist of such persons as may be prescribed. Therefore, the Executive Committee could not legally function until such persons and their qualifications are prescribed by the Rules. The day to day duties of the Market Committee are intended to be discharged by Executive Committee, consisting of persons "as may be prescribed". However, no such prescription has been made, thereby rendering statutory scheme unworkable.

13.

Shri Manohar, learned Senior Advocate, further submits that the expression used namely 'prescribed' under sub-section (2) of Section 5-1A is defined under Section 2(1)(m), which means prescribed by Rules made under the Act of 1963. Hence, it is required to be understood that as prescribed by Rules. The regulatory framework is required to be prescribed by Rules before statutory scheme could be implemented. He, therefore, submits that the notification designating the 'MNI' could not have been validly issued before the Rules contemplated in sub-section (2) of Section 5-1A had been prescribed. He further submits that the impugned amendment and the declaration of the 'MNI' have effectively undone the existing market committee without creating any functional substitute. It is submitted that a statutory vacuum cannot be justified by relying upon emergency provisions, like the appointment of an Administrator, which, in any case, cannot be treated as a substitute for the regular statutory regime. It is submitted that the statutory scheme shows legislative intention that the markets are ordinarily governed by a complete body consisting of several members and not by one or two nominees. Thus, while the legislature may undo one statutory institution, it cannot destroy the essential democratic and representative character of the institution.

14.

Shri Manohar, learned Senior Advocate further argues that other challenge is on the ground of excessive delegation. It is argued that until the regulations are framed, the provisions of the Act will govern and, when the regulations are framed, the regulation will prevail in view of non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything contained in the Act.” It is, therefore, submitted that this amounts not only excessive delegation but also impermissible delegation. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India12.

15.

Shri Manohar, learned Senior Advocate, argues that if two separate classes are created, namely; democratic and nominated, to replace democratic setup stronger reasons will require. Similarly, to discriminate on the basis of democratic and undemocratic, democratic and nominated, stronger reasons are required. He submits that it is not his case that the democratic setup cannot be done away with, but, it can be done away with, unless legislature provides for very strong reasons. In absence of such strong reasons, such replacement of democratic setup by nominated setup cannot be permitted or it is illegal. Moreover, those chosen APMCs as 'MNI' and other APMCs including those which are not of ‘National Importance’, are being treated in a discriminative way because in similar circumstance, there will be a democratically elected committee on ordinary markets whereas, not on 'MNI'.

16.

Shri Manohar, learned Senior Advocate, argues that the object sought to be achieved is that, certain markets need better infrastructre and better facility for sale of agricultural produce. It is argued that Amendment Act of 2025 says nothing about the requirement of infrastructure likely to be there or what infrastructure is provided and how facility for sale of agricultural produce in a 'MNI' area is going to be achieved. It is further argued that it is the duty of the State to point out the nexus because it is the State, which has to justify why it is so unavoidable to do away with the democratically elected Committee and to appoint a totally State managed Committee while in other APMCs, the elected committee will continue and will operate.

17.

Per contra, Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, argued that Section 5-1A authorises the State Government to designate an existing Market Committe as 'MNI' on satisfying certain criterias or parameters or establish a new market as 'MNI' on satisfying those parameters. It is submitted that these petitioners are the managing committee members of erstwhile APMC, Nagpur, they are not excluded from any class. They complain that there is a class of markets. All markets must be treated as one class and that treating 'MNI' as a separate market and therefore, they are asking about nexus of the object to be achieved. In Maharashtra, there are principal market, subsidiary market and 'MNI'. The 'MNI' is now a new category of market, no petitioner can complain that this is a wrong classification because the complaint of classification can come from a person who is either not included or who is wrongly excluded from the class.

18.

It is submitted that there are enough guidelines and parameters provided in the statute itself as to which existing market or which new market will be established or designated as 'MNI'. He therefore submitetd that the argument made by the petitioners is misconceived. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance in the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar13.

19.

Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, submits that the legislature had itself declared the policy, object and purpose underlying the creation of 'MNI'. It has prescribed the object of statutory criteria in Section 5-1A. It is therefore, submitted that the Amendment Act of 2025 cannot be categorized as a colourable exercise of legislative power.

20.

It is submitted that the supersession of existing Market Committee is only consequence of such declaration and not the object of the legislature. No motive can be attributed to the legislature. It is submitted that the wisdom of the legislature is beyond judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that a true object of the amendment was the regulation of market having national importance because of their economic significance. He, therefore, submits that the mere fact that an elected market committee ceased to function after declaration of 'MNI' could not justify an inference that the legislature had enacted the amendment solely to remove the elected representatives. Whether to treat any market as a 'MNI' is entirely a matter of legislative policy and the Court cannot sit in appeal over the wisdom of such policy. To substantiate his argument, he has placed reliance on the following judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India R. S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat v. Ajit Mills Ltd.14 and the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Aurangabad Bench, in the case of Belhekarwadi Vividh Karyakari Seva Sahkari Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra15.

21.

Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, argues that APMC is a State’s creation under the Statute and, therefore, such replacement of democratic setup by nominated setup is permissible in absence of any such right vested in the elected body. It is submitted that it is settled law that right to vote or contest in the election is not a constitutional right, but it is a statutory right.

22.

Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, argues that Section 5-1A gives sufficient guidelines to the executive how the 'MNI' will be established or designated. It is submitted that the parameters are given by the legislature itself to the executive. In these cases, the executive may establish a market or designate an existing market as 'MNI' as per the guidelines provided. It is argued that Section 5-1B operates statutorily the moment notification under Section 5-1A is issued. Therefore, the Committee of 'MNI' comes into existence, the moment notification is issued and there is no separate notification required under Section 11 of the Act of 1963.

23.

Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, argues that the expression ‘prescribed’ is defined in Section 2(1)(m) to mean prescribed by Rules. He argues that despite the said expression ‘prescribed’, Section 5-1A(2) will not postpone the operation of Section 5-1A(1). Sub-section (2) merely provides that if rules were framed, they would prevail notwithstanding anything contained in the Act. It did not provide that Section 5-1A(1)cannot operate unless such rules are framed. Upon issuance of notification under Section 5-1A, the Market Committee was brought into existence automatically by virtue of Section 5-1B. It is submitted that no separate notification under Section 11 was required as Section 5-1B was made operative by notification issued under Section 5-1A itself.

24.

Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, further argues that the absence of rules prescribing the constitution of the executive committee under Section 5-1C would not prevent the functioning of the 'MNI'. The Market Committee and its management come into existence immediately upon issuance of the notification designating or establishment of 'MNI'. He therefore submits that non-framing of Rules or Regulations could not be a ground for invalidating the legislation. It is submitted that statutory scheme remained workable notwithstanding absence of subordinate legislation. Non-framing of rule will not render Chapter-I-1A inoperative. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate General placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Orissa State (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Board vs. Orient Paper Mills16 and Municipal Corporation, Kalyan Dombivali vs. Sanjay Gajanan Gharat17.

25.

Shri Sathe, learned Advocate General, argues that if there is sufficient guidelines in the Act itself for exercise of discretion by the Competent Authority, such Act cannot be held to be abnoxious to the equal protection of law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Section 5-1A provides sufficient guidence to the executive for exercise of discretion for designating or establishing Market Committee. It is therefore submitted that the argument that Section 5-1A confers unguided and unchanellised power, etc. is not correct. It is submitted that Section 5-1B provides the composition of Marketing Committee. There are five ex-officio members who are not required to be nominated. They may start functioning as a Market Committee and therefore, there is no void. In support of his argument, learned Advocate General has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs. Gopinath Gundachar Char18.

26.

The learned Advocate General further argues that the tenure of the existing Market Committee has been terminated by the statute and there is a new mechanism created by the statute. This is a creation of the statute made by the legislature, which is within its legislative competence. It is a State’s creation under the statute and that cannot be undone. He argues that the notification can be questioned only on two grounds; namely (1) the statute is ultra vires, and (2) it is void of any other provisions of the Constitution.

27.

Shri Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the intervenors, argues that unless the requirement provided under the statute is satisfied, no market could be designated/or established as 'MNI'. It is argued that taking into account the needs of the market which will be of ‘National Importance’ and the volume of the market which is envisaged under such markets, it became necessary in the wisdom of the legislature that there should be a nominated body for such huge markets. It is submitted that there is no challenge raised to the declaration of Market Committee at Bombay as 'MNI'. He submits that the 'MNI' is structurely different from an ordinary market committee. He then pointed out such difference; namely (a) unified single trading licences; (b) licence throughout the State, (c) interstate trading; (d) recognition of licences issued by other States; and (e) separate dispute resolution machinery.

28.

It is argued that challenge to Article 14 of the Constitution could succeed only where manifest arbitrariness is established. He further argues that isolated provisions could not be relied upon without reading the enactment as a whole. He, therefore, submits that there is no arbitrariness or discrimination or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

29.

Shri Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Advocate for the intervenors, argues that it is a wisdom of the legislature that there should be a nominated body for such huge market. It is argued that there is no constitutional imperative that the market committee must have an elected body. It is submitted that there is no such requirement in the Constitution.

30.

Shri Dharmadikari, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the intervenors submits that the expression ‘as may be prescribed’ is required to be read as ‘if prescribed’. Consequently, the operation of the statute could not be suspended merely because fresh rules had not yet been framed. It is submitted that the existing statutory rules continue to govern the functioning of the markets and that additional rules can be framed as and when required. In support of this submissions, he has placed reliance on the case of Orissa State (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Board (supra) and SEBI v. Gaurav Varshney19.

31.

He further submits that upon cessation of existing Market Committee and designation of existing Market Committee as a ‘Market of National Importance,’ even a single administrator could be appointed and in that event the activities of the Market Committee will continue and would not bring it to standstill.

32.

Shri Bhangde, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the intervenors, argues that there is no provision or any authority cited by the petitioners to show that local authority must be governed by the local people and it must be managed and run by the elected body. It is argued that whenever the Constitution intended that the democratic principles should be there, it had so provided. He further submits that right to be elected was by the statute thus can taken away by statute. Therefore, there cannot be any complain about violation of fundamental right. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Anjum Kadari .v/s. Union of India20, Anajirao Rangrao Patil .v/s. Kolhapur Agricultural Produce Market Committee21 and Vijay .v/s. State of Maharashtra22.

33.

Shri Bhangde, learned Senior Advocate for the Intervenor, argues that a challenge on the ground of colourable exercise is wholly misconceived because nobody disputes the competency of the State legislature to enact the Amendment Act of 2025. It is argued that the plea of colourable exercise of power attracts where the legislature attempts to do indirectly what it cannot do directly owing to lack of legislative competence. It is submitted that since the legislative competence is not in dispute, the doctrine of colourable exercise of power has no application.

34.

Shri. Bhangade, learned Senior Advocate, argues that there is no specific challenge raised to the notification. Section 5-1B gives relevant criteria which are to be taken into account before designating or establishing a 'MNI'. Thus, there is no challenge to the notification on the ground that the State Government, without considering the prescribed criteria high-handedly issued the notification. There is no ground raised by the petitioners that criteria prescribed in Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963 has not been taken into account by the State Government.

35.

Shri. Bhangade, learned Senior Advocate argues that if the challenge is made on the ground that there is a violation of democratic right or democratic principles, the petitioners are duty bound to demonstrate that this principle is embodied in particular Article of the Constitution and that is violated. Otherwise, simply arguing that violation of democratic principles would not assist the petitioners. It is argued that right to be elected is a right created by a statute and therefore, can be taken away by the statute. It is submitted that, in absence of violation of any constitutional provision, merely because the composition of APMC is changed from elected body to nominated body, no complaint of violation of any fundamental right can be made.

36.

Having heard the rival contentions and having perused the record, we now proceed to examine the challenge raised to the constitutional validity of Section 5-1A, 5-1B, 5-1C and 5-1D of the Act of 1963.

37.

The challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 5-1A, 5-1B and 5-1C of the Act of 1963 is on the ground that the said provisions are unfair, unjust, arbitrary and ultra vires and having mala fide purpose.

38.

It is argued that the provisions of Section 5-1A, 5-1B and 5-1C of the Act of 1963, fall foul of the twin tests i.e. there is no reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia and further there is no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, therefore, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

39.

It is a settled law that law must be valid and binding having regard not merely to the competency of the legislature and the subject it relates to but it must not also infringe any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution (as held in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar23).

40.

It is evident from the record that the petitioners are the elected representatives/executive members of the respondent no.3-Market Committee. If the notification under Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963 declaring the APMC at Nagpur as ‘MNI’ was not issued, the five years tenure of petitioners would have come to an end in this month of November 2026.

41.

The term of the office of the petitioners came to an end from the date of the notification, dated 02.06.2026, issued declaring the respondent no.3-Market Committee as ‘MNI’ under Section 5-1A(1) of the Act of 1963. This gave a cause of action to the petitioners to approach this Court by filing the present writ petitions.

42.

In this backdrop, let us first consider the object of the Act of 1963 and then the object of the Amendment Act of 2025.

43.

Preamble of the Act of 1963 states that it was enacted to develop and regulate the marketing of agricultural and certain other produce in market areas and markets including private markets and farmer consumer markets to be established therefore in the State, to confer powers upon Market Committees to be constituted in connection with or acting for purposes connected with such markets; to establish market fund and for purposes of the Market Committees and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.

44.

It thus evident that the purpose and object of the Act of 1963, is to provide market to regulate the marketing of agricultural and other produce for the benefits of farmers.

45.

It is to be noted that in the matter at hand initially an ordinance was promulgated on 8th October, 2025, which was converted into an Amendment Act of 2025. The relevant Statement of Object and Reasons of the Ordinance reads thus:

“3.

Considering need of special requirement of infrastructure and better facilitation of sale of agricultural produce in any existing market, which is handling not less than eighty thousand metric tons agriculture produce and in which agricultural produce comes from not less than two other States, it is considered necessary to establish it as Market of National Importance or to establish any such market as Market of National Importance.

The provision is also made for establishment of Market Committee of Market of National Importance and Executive Committee for carrying out day to day duties of such Market Committee.

4.

The provision is made to provide for resolution of disputes regarding quality or weight or payment of any agricultural produce between and amongst the Unified Single Trader Licensees, farmer, seller and Market Committee.

5.

These amendments will ensure that the farmers in the State will get maximum benefit from the competitive prices of agricultural produce”.

46.

It is thus evident from the above referred Statement of Object and Reasons that considering the need of special requirement of infrastructure and better facilitation for sale of agricultural produce in any existing market, which is handling not less than 80000 tons of agricultural produce and annual agricultural produce comes from not less than two other States, it is felt necessary to establish a ‘MNI, or to designate any market as ‘MNI’ . Furthermore, it is provided to ensure that the farmers in the State will get maximum benefits from the competative prices of agricultural produce.

47.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia (supra) had an occasion to examine what is reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation and while doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:

“11.

The principal ground urged in support of the contention as to the invalidity of the Act and/or the notification is founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution. In Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court at pages 1048-49 explained the true meaning and scope of Art. 14 as follows:

" The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. The Union of India, State of Bombay v. F. N.Balsara, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Kathi Baning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. State of Bombay, Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad and Habeeb Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of the article in question. It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, filled namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there 'Must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure."

The principle enunciated above has been consistently a dopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of this Court further establish-

(a)

that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself;

(b)

that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;

(c)

that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;

(d)

that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest;

(e)

that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and

(f)that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.

The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and -violative of the equal protection of the laws.

12.

A close perusal of the decisions of this Court in which the above principles have been enunciated and applied by this Court will also show that a statute which may come up for consideration on a question of its validity under Article 14 of the Constitution, may be placed in one or other of the following five classes:

(i)

A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjitlal Chowdhri v. Union of India, State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, V.M. Syed Mohammad & Company v. State of Andhra and Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar.

(ii)

A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but, no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar.

(iii)

A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may -leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no Classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal v. Anwar, Ali Sarkar, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradeshand Dhirendra Krishna Mandal v. The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs.

(iv)

A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification, the court will uphold the law as constitutional, as it did in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra.

(v)

A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court, e. g., in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra that in such a case the executive action but not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional.

In the light of the foregoing discussions the question at onace arises: In what category does the Act or the notification impugned in these appeals fall?”

48.

It is beneficial to referred to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in judgment in the case of Mathews J. Nedumpara and others vs. Union of India and others24, which reads thus:

“14.

On what is a limited legal scrutiny, the rest being the opinion and rantings of the petitioners, is the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions of the said Act. Suffice to say that the constitutional validity of a specific provision cannot be challenged in abstract, but when the provisions violate any fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III or contravenes any provision of the Constitution, or the legislature lacks law-making competence. If a provision violates a fundamental right, such a violation must directly and inevitably affect the people and cannot be premised on an ostensible use of violation of the provision. We may usefully refer to the observations in Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn. v. State of U.P. (SCC p. 120, para 26)

26.

The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds viz. (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provisions. In State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. [State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., this Court has opined that except the above two grounds there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the aforementioned two grounds.”

15.

The classification of advocates as Senior Advocates and other advocates under Section 16 of the said Act is a classification made by the legislature. The legislature has a broad discretion to make such classifications, 9 and while there must be a reason for classification, the reason need not be a good one. The Court can only review the classification it it is palpably discriminatory and arbitrary.”

16.

In Union of India v. Nitdip Textile Processors observed as under : (SCC p. 245, para 47)

“47.

It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that a particular classification is proper if it is based on reason and not purely arbitrary, caprice or vindictive. On the other hand, while there must be a reason for the classification, the reason need not be a good one, and it is immaterial that the statute is unjust. The test is not wisdom but good faith in the classification. It is too late in the day to contend otherwise. It is time and again observed by this Court that the legislature has a broad discretion in the matter of classification. In taxation, ‘there is a broader power of classification than in some other exercises of legislation’. When the wisdom of the legislation while making classification is questioned, the role of the courts is very much limited. It is not reviewable by the courts unless palpably arbitrary. It is not the concern of the courts whether the classification is the wisest or the best that could be made.”

19.

In R.K. Garg v. Union of India", it is observed as under: (SCC p. 690, para 7)

"7.

Now while considering the constitutional validity of a statute said to be violative of Article 14, it is necessary to bear in mind certain well-established principles which have been evolved by the courts as rules of guidance in discharge of its constitutional function of judicial review. The first rule is that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. This rule is based on the assumption, judicially recognised and accepted, that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on adequate grounds. The presumption of constitutionality is indeed so strong that in order to sustain it, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation."

49.

In the case of S.Seshachalam vs. Bar Council of T. N. 25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed thus:

“21.

Article 14 of the Constitution of India states that:

“14.

Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification. The classification, however, must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive” but must be based on some real and substantial bearing, a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. Article 14 applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. But where equals and unequals are treated differently, Article 14 does not apply. Class legislation is that which makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons all of whom stand in the same relation to the privilege granted and between those on whom the privilege is conferred and the persons not so favoured, no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privilege.

22.

While Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. But classification must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. Classification to be reasonable must fulfil the following two conditions: firstly, the classification must be founded on the intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group. Secondly, the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are two distinct things. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act. It is only when there is no reasonable basis for a classification that legislation making such classification may be declared discriminatory.”

50.

In the case of State of M. P. vs Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed thus:

“4.

Authority of the Part 'C' State of Bhopal to enact the Act, as it originally stood, is not in dispute, nor are the provisions of section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act and the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurent Subjects) Order, 1956, challenged as incompetent. The plea that there is infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution is advanced on the sole ground that in the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh formed under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, agricultural income-tax is levied within the territory of the former State of Bhopal and not in the rest of the territories of Madhya Pradesh. Prima facie, a differential treatment is accorded by the State of Madhya Pradesh to persons carrying on agricultural operations in the Bhopal Region, because the State subjects them to pay tax on agricultural income, which is not imposed upon agricultural income earned in the rest of the State. But that by itself cannot be a ground for declaring the Act ultra vires. The State is undoubtedly enjoined by Article 14 of the Constitution not to deny to any person equal protection of the laws within the territory, but a proper classification bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute does not on that account become impermissible. All persons who are similarly circumstanced as regards a subject-matter are entitled to equal protection of the laws, but it is not predicated thereby that every law must have universal application irrespective of dissimilarity of objects or transactions to which it applies, or of the nature or attainments of the persons to whom it relates. The Legislature has always the power to make special laws to attain and for that purpose has authority to select or classify persons, objects or transactions upon which the law is intended to operate. Differential treatment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not supported by a rational relation with the object of the statute. This Court has held in several cases, that where application of unequal laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons a geographical classification founded on those historical reasons would be upheld : Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1), The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd. and others (2), Maharaj Kumar Prithviraj and others v. The State of Rajasthan and others (3) and Anant Prasad Lakshminivas Ganeriwal v. State of Andhra Pradesh (4). The decision of this Court in The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji (5), does not lay down any contrary principle. In that case the Court accepted that historical reasons may justify differential treatment of separate geographical regions provided it bears a reasonable and just relation to the matter in respect of which it is proposed, but the differentiation in that case was regarded as infringing the equal protection of the laws because members of the same class were treated in a manner ex facie discriminatory and no attempt was made by the State to justify the treatment as founded upon a rational basis having a just relation to the impugned statute.”

51.

In the case of Dharmendra Kirthal vs. State of U.P.27, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed thus:

“23.

At this juncture, we may profitably recapitulate that it is the duty of the Court to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute and that there is always the presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to the decision in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India wherein it has been ruled thus:

“10.

… it is the accepted doctrine of the American courts, which I consider to be well founded on principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles.”

24.

In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, this Court had ruled that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is on him who challenges the same to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles and it is the duty of the Court to sustain that there is a presumption of constitutionality and in doing so, the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of the legislation.

In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. the said principle was reiterated.”

52.

We may profitably recapitulate from the above referred observations, as under:

(i)

That it is the duty of the Court to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute and that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment;

(ii)

Constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds viz.(i) lack of legislative competence and (ii) violation of any fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions;

(iii)

There is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated;

(iv)

The grounds of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the aforementioned two grounds;

(v)

The burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;

(vi)

The legislature has a broad discretion in the matter of classification;

(vii)

A particular classification is proper if based on reason, not purely arbitrary, caprice or vindictive;

(viii)

There must be a reason for classification, the reason need not be a good one and it is immaterial that the statute is unjust;

(ix)

The test is not wisdom but good faith in the classification;

(x)

When the wisdom of the legislation while making classification is questioned, the role of Courts is very much limited. It is not reviewable by the Courts unless palpably arbitrary; and

(xi)

It is not concern of the Courts whether the classification is wisest or the best that could be made.

53.

Admittedly, there is no challenge raised in this petition as regards legislative competence. Thus, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 5-1A, 5-1B, and 5-1C of the Act of 1963 would narrow down to the only ground, as to violation of fundamental rights under Part-III of the Constitution or any constitutional provision.

54.

It is evident from the scheme of Principal Act of 1963 that the State may by notification declares its intention under Section 3 of the Act of 1963, as regards regulating marketing of such agricultural produce, in such areas as may be specified in the notification.

55.

The State Government thereupon, shall consider the objections and suggestions received on publication of notification under Section 3 of the Act of 1963. If the State Government considers necessary it can hold an enquiry in the manner prescribed.

56.

Thereafter, State Government may by another notification declare that the marketing of the agricultural produce specified in the notification will be regulated in the area specified in the notification. Area so specified, shall be the market area declared under Section 4 of the Act of 1963.

57.

Upon declaration of market area, the Director shall by notification establish any place to be the principal market for the marketing of the agricultural produce specified in the notification or establish by same notification or like notification, establish in any other like places in the market area, subsidiary markets for the marketing of such agricultural produce. Such establishment of market is under Section 5 of the Act of 1963.

58.

Section 11 of the Act of 1963 empowers the State Government to establish marketing committee for every market area and different market committees may be established for regulating the marketing of different kinds of agricultural produce for the same or any part thereof.

59.

The constitution of such Market Committee is provided under Section 13 of the Act of 1963.

60.

The scheme of Principal Act of 1963, thus, provides declaration of market area, establishment of market for such market area and to establish market committees to manage and run such markets.

61.

Let us now examine and compare the procedure to be followed while establishing or designating any existing market as ‘MNI’.

62.

For this purpose, the relevant provisions are Section 5-1A and 5-1B of the Act of 1963, which read thus:

“5-1A. Establi The test is shment of Market of National Importance

(1)

The State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, designate any existing market established under section 5 as "Market of National Importance or establish any market as "Market of National Importance", after consideration of such aspects regarding marketing of agricultural produce like total throughput value, upstream catchment area, down-stream number of consumers served and special infrastructure requirements therefor, requiring regulation by Market of National Importance:

Provided that, the market handling not less than eighty thousand metric tons agricultural produce or such annual tonnage or such annual value, as may be specified by the Government by an order, from time to time, and in which agricultural produce arrives from not less than two other States, may be considered for designating the Market of National Importance.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the regulation of marketing in Market of National Importance shall be in such manner as may be prescribed.”

5-1B Composition of Market Committee of Market of National Importance

(1)

The Market Committee of Market of National Importance shall consist of the following members, namely:-

(i)

Minister of Marketing -Chairman;

(ii)

Minister of State for Marketing-Vice-Chairman;

(iii)

Commissioner of Agriculture or his representative, who shall not below the rank of Joint Director;

(iv)

Director of Marketing or his representative, who shall not be below the rank of Joint Registrar of Department of Co-operation;

(v)

Executive Director, Maharashtra State Agriculture Marketing Board Pune or his representative, who shall not be below the rank of Joint Registrar of Department of Co-operation;

(vi)

Four agriculturists from the revenue division in which the Market of National Importance is situated, out of them two agriculturists shall be from the area of the Market Committee (of which one shall be woman and one shall be a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes or De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis) or Nomadic Tribes); (one each from two other States), wherefrom maximum arrivals of agricultural

(vii)

If required, two agriculturist recommended by other State Governments (one each from two other States), wherefrom maximum arrivals of agricultural produce are received in the Market Yard of National Importance, to be nominated by the State Government of Maharashtra;

(viii)

Three members holding the licence of Trader of the concerned Market of National Importance, out of them one shall be from agro-processing industry who has experience of minimum three years as a Director or partner in concerned processing industry (of which one shall be woman and one shall be a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes or De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis) or Nomadic Tribes);

(ix)

One person nominated by the Government who is an expert in any of the fields of finance, marketing, co-operation, management or import-export.

(2)

(a) The Market Committee may invite the following persons as special invitees for the purpose of assisting or advising it on any matter or matters, namely:-

(i)

One representative of Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA), after obtaining prior permission of the concerned authority of the Government of India;

(ii)

Managing Director of Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation or his representative (who shall not be below the rank of Joint Registrar of Department of Co-operation);

(iii)

Administrative Head of the Local Government Body or an Officer, not below the rank of Officer of Group A nominated by him in the area where the Market of National Importance is situated.

(b)

Such special invitees may take part in the meetings of the Committee, but shall have no right to vote.

(3)

An officer from Agriculture, Marketing, Co-operation, Revenue Department or Government Officer from any other Department, who is holding an equivalent post of Joint Registrar of Department of Co-operation, to be nominated by the State Government shall be the Secretary of the market committee.

(4)

The persons nominated by the State Government to be the members of Market Committee of Market of National Importance shall hold office for the period of five years from the date of nomination or until the pleasure of the State Government.

(5)

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, as soon as the notification of establishment of Market of National Importance is issued under Section 5-1A by the State Government, the existing Market Committee shall cease to function and all the existing Committee members shall cease to hold their office.

63.

From the language of Section 5-1A(1) of the Act of 1963, it is evident that the State Government by notification may designate any existing market established under Section 5 as ‘MNI’ or established any market as ‘MNI’. The State Government while doing so, needs to consider certain aspects regarding marketing of agricultural produce requiring regulation by ‘MNI’, namely, total throughput value, upstream catchment area, down-stream number of consumers served and special infrastructure requirements therefor.

64.

In addition to above referred four aspects, the Government shall consider further requirements while designating any Market as ‘MNI’. Such requirements are, handling of not less than 80000 metric tons agricultural produce or such annual tonnage or annual agricultural, as may be prescribed by the State Government and agricultural produce arrives from not less than two States.

65.

It is significant to note that the distinguishing factors between the Market established under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 and the ‘MNI’ established or designated under Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963, can be stated as under:

(a)

In order to establish market under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, no conditions or requirements are to be fulfilled except having a declared market area; and

(b)

Converse to the same, to establish ‘MNI’ or designate any existing market as ‘MNI’, the aspects are provided to be considered and pre-requirements are stipulated which are to be fulfilled as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963.

66.

Moreover, for ‘MNI’ special infrastructure is to be provided considering the aspects enumerated under Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963.

67.

Such aspects and requirements are as pre-condition and unless it is complied with, no ‘MNI’ may be established or designated. Whereas, there is no mention of providing of any special infrastructure to the ordinary market.

68.

From the above referred distinctions noted of ordinary market and ‘MNI’, which are eminent and sufficient to say that both the markets, i.e. ordinary market and ‘MNI’ cannot be treated as markets of the same class.

69.

This distinction justifies the difference in between the constitution of Market Committee for the market established under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, and composition of Market Committee constituted/established/designated under Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963.

70.

If we compare the constitution of Market Committee of ordinary market and composition of Market Committee of ‘MNI’, it can be revealed that there is a vast difference in both.

71.

Considering the purpose and object of establishing market under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, constitution of its Market Committee is provided. Such Market Committee shall consist of elected 15 agriculturists, 2 members from Traders and Commission Agents and 1 from Hamals and Weighmen, Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies or his representative and Secretary.

72.

It is to be noted that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Market Committee shall be elected by the Committee from amongst its elected agriculturist members, that is, from amongst the fifteen agriculturists who are residents of the market area. This shows that the constitution of Market Committee of market is restricted to the persons who are residents of the market area.

73.

Let us now to examine the composition of Market Committee of ‘MNI’. It is pertinent to state that, the composition of Market Committee of ‘MNI’ is not of elected members but of nominated members.

74.

From the composition of ‘MNI’, it is evident that there are five ex-officio members, including two Hon’ble Ministers. There are four agriculturists, licence holder traders and other members. Four agriculturists members shall be from revenue division where the ‘MNI’ is situated. If required, two agriculturists from the area receiving maximum arrivals of agricultural produce.

75.

Contrary to it, we have noted that in the constitution of Market Committee of Market, it is required that all the 15 agriculturists members shall be resident of the market area.

76.

The requirements namely, market in which the agricultural produce arrives for not less than two other States and market handling of not less than 80000 metric tons agricultural produce or such annual tonnage or annual value as may be specified by Government and further requirement of special infrastructure required considering the total throughput value, upstream catchment area, down-stream number of consumers served, sufficiently show that the huge volume of agricultural produce to be regulated for marketing and how the ‘MNI’ is structurally different from an ordinary market. The structural difference can also be seen from the provisions made for MNI; namely, (a) unified trading single licence (b) licence throughout the State (c) inter-state trading (d) recognition of licence issued by other State and (e) separate dispute resolution machinery.

77.

Thus, from the above referred distinguishing factors between the ordinary market and ‘MNI’ and further considering the object sought to be achieved by establishing or designating ‘MNI’, we are of the considered view that the classification made in this matter is founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes both markets i.e. ordinary market constituted under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 and the market established or designated as ‘MNI’ constituted under Section 5-1A(1) of the Act of 1963. Furthermore, it has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act of 1963. We, therefore, find no merit in the contentions advanced by the learned Senior Advocates appearing for the petitioners that the said classification is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

78.

The next argument was that, no strong grounds are provided or offered for replacement of elected body by the Board of nominated members on Marketing Committee of ‘MNI’.

79.

It is a settled law that a right to vote or a right to contest election are not the constitutional rights, but the same are the statutory rights.

80.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Tanajirao Rangrao Patil v. Kolhapur Agricultural Produce Market Committee28, has held thus:

11.

Right to vote to the members of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee was given generally to all by section 13 of the Act. During the working of the Act in the past several years it was observed that some of the persons belonging to some of the categories need not have a voting right as it can lead to undemocratic results and therefore the amending Act was introduced.

12.

The contention therefore is that this taking away of voting rights is arbitrary exercise of powers and therefore violative of Article 14 consequently requires to be quashed. The submission in effect is that there is no reasonable nexus between the object to be achieved by doing away with the voting rights of some categories while retaining the same for others and therefore it is liable to be struck down. It will be seen that the basic purpose of the Act is to regulate marketing of agricultural produce in the State of Maharashtra. Consequently it is the agriculture producer or agriculturist who is mainly concerned with the implementation of these provisions which regulate the marketing of his produce. For proper implementation of the scheme of the Act it is absolutely necessary that the agriculturist members of the Committee are able to function dispassionately and without fear or favour. A right to vote to persons covered by section 13(1)(c), (d) and (e) can have this effect and it would take away the very purpose of regulating market of agriculture produce accordingly the interest of the agricultural producers/agriculturists will be defeated. All the three clauses are representative in nature and in their own field guide the Society and protect the interest of the agriculturists. Their role therefore basically is that of the advisors and therefore by the amending Act it is provided that they can participate and discuss in the meeting but cannot vote.

13.

It is an established canon of law that right to vote is creature of the statute. In fact elections the manner in which they are to be held, who can vote, where he can vote, what shall be the period etc. are all rights which flow from the statute which provide for such elections. A statute which can provide for the right to vote can therefore also provide the right to take away such vote. There is therefore nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in taking away right to vote of these guiding authorities. The purpose of the Act can be better achieved by permitting free vote to the members/agriculturists after they have listened the advice from the representatives mentioned in clauses (c), (d) and (e). It is pertinent to note that no injury of any kind would be caused by denying right to vote to all these persons. In fact the effect of their voting in a particular manner may result in undemocratic decision and therefore they are kept away from the voting aspect of the Committee. No right of the society which they represent or body which they represent is in any manner hurt. It cannot in the circumstances be said that the action of doing away with the right to vote by amending Act is in any manner arbitrary.

14.

Then it was contended that by taking away voting rights of the categories covered by clauses (c), (d) and (e) equals have been treated unequally and therefore the intent of Article 14 is violated. All categories mentioned in section 13 are various constituents of the Marketing Committee; except three now excluded all others have voting rights. This exclusion therefore amounts to treating them unequally with others who according to the petitioners are equal. We are unable to except this contention for the simple reason that all the categories mentioned in section 13(1) are not equals. Merely because they become members of the Agricultural Produce Committee it cannot be said that they are equals. For example an agriculturists cannot be equated with the Chairman of Processing Co-operative Society or Chairman of Panchayat Samiti or President of local authority. By no stretch of imagination the President of Municipality or Chairman of Panchayat Samiti or even Sarpanch is equal to an agriculturist residing in that village. On face of it therefore the contention is liable to be rejected. Apart from that even if they are assumed to be equals there can be classification or categorization amongst equals and if such categorization is reasonable with the object of the Act it can be done as has been done by amending Act. These three categories consist of heads of certain organizations or local bodies and Governments within whose jurisdiction the Committee is to function. They are there to aid and advise the members of the Committee. Their right to advise is not taken away, their right to participate is not taken away. All that has been taken away is their right to vote which if exercised in a particular manner may have influence for proper implementation of the Act.”

81.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vijay .v/s. State of Maharashtra29 has held that the right to be elected was created by a statute and, thus, can be taken away by statute.

82.

In the teeth of above referred well settled principles of law that, right to vote or right to contest elections are statutory rights and not the constitutional rights, it is to be noted that, like Panchayats or Municipalities, the Constitution of India has not mandated to have elected body for markets established under the provisions of the Act of 1963.

83.

The elected body for managing the Market Committee by a market constituted under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, is provided by a statute. It is well settled law that where the statute creates any rights, the same may be withdrawn in similar way.

84.

In the present case, if the statute in its wisdom has provided elected members to run and manage the Market Committees of the markets constituted under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, the same cannot be therefore, of any help to petitioners to cite it as a mandate for the legislature to provide similarly elected body for the Market Committee of ‘MNI’.

85.

Herein above we have noted the distinctions in both the Market Committees i.e. Market Committee of ordinary market and the Market Committee of ‘MNI’. Their constitution and composition is based upon their structural differences and the volume of marketing of agricultural produce they would require to regulate for marketing. If the statute accordingly, thought it proper to have a board of nominated members, for composition of Market Committee as ‘MNI’, there is no unfairness in it. Furthermore, it will not amount to discrimination or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground that while all other market committees constituted under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would have elected body, whereas the Market Committee of ‘MNI’ would run and manage by the board of nominated body.

86.

If the statute provides two different constitution and composition considering the nature of work, volume of agricultural produce to be marketed and structural differences, in both the markets, i.e., ordinary market and ‘MNI’, the statute only in its legislative power can decide whether the elected body or body of nominated members would run and manage the Marketing Committee.

87.

In these circumstances, it cannot be held that Sections 5-1A, 5-1B and 5-1C of the Act of 1963 are unconstitutional.

88.

Let us move to examine the allegations relating to malice in law or mala fides in enacting the provisions in question or the allegation of colourable exercise of powers by the State with political intention to grab the respondent No.3-Market Committee, which according to the petitioners, is a financially sound Market Committee.

89.

In the case of Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had held that the courts cannot infer the legislative malice for passing the statute. The inference is restrictive and in case that too on the constitution aspects and not beyond the same. Legislative malice is beyond the pale of jurisdiction of the Court of Law. While defining malice in law, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kangana Ranaut (supra), has held thus:

“162.

The principles which can thus be deduced from the aforesaid Judgments, as well as the Judgments referred to in the respective written submissions of the parties, are as under:

i.

An action is said to be vitiated by malice in fact when the same lacks good faith and is motivated by personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The malice in fact needs to be pleaded, the party concerned against whom malice in fact is alleged, needs to be impleaded and an opportunity has to be given to the party so impleaded, to respond to the allegations. The said allegations have to be established before the Court.

ii.

An Order or action can be said to be vitiated by malice in law in one or more of the following circumstances:

(a)

From doing of a wrongful act intentionally without any just cause, or excuse, or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of exercise of statutory power.

(b)

It is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretention of gaining legitimate goal. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by consideration outside those for the promotion of which the power is vested, the Court calls it colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion.

(c)

It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others.

(d)

It is an actGurudevdatta taken with an oblique or indirect object.

(e)

Conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its injurious acts.

(f)

Passing an Order for unauthorized purpose.

iii.

Malice in law need not be pleaded and does not need proof. For malice in law, intention is immaterial.

iv.

There are no strict guidelines for proving malice in a case where there is material from which the Court can infer malice. The Court is empowered to draw inference on the basis of facts disclosed and material produced before the Court and arrive at a conclusion, which according to its opinion may not be of much doubt and could be supported by justifiable reasons. The party against whom allegations are made is expected to cover up its decision or action and dress it up in a manner to give colour or justification, but the Court has to discover whether the action is colourable on the basis of material, looking beyond the apparent. Malafide cannot be established by direct evidence. It may not be discernable from the Order impugned, or from the note made in the file preceding the Order, and can be deduced as a reasonable and unescapable inference from true facts.”

90.

The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Belhekarwadi Vividh Karyakari Seva Sahkari Society Ltd (supra), has held thus:

“8.

One of the principal objects sought to be achieved by the Act of 1963 is securing fair price to the agriculturist for his produce, by elimination of middlemen and other detracting factors. The Act is also intended to regulate marketing of agricultural and certain other produce. The Act provides for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment of market for agricultural produce in the State. The original Act of 1963 is amended substantively by Maharashtra Act 48 of 2005 and new concepts of direct marketing, farmer-consumer market and private markets are introduced. The L.A. Bill No. IV of 2016 was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 10th March, 2016 to amend the Act in order to ensure more efficient and smooth functioning of the market Committees constituted under said Act. The Statement of objects and reasons annexed to the Bill reads thus:

“2.

In order to ensure more efficient and smooth functioning of the Mabelhekrket Committees constituted under the said Act, the Government of Maharashtra considered it expedient to appoint experts in the field of agriculture, agricultural processing, agricultural marketing, law, economics or commerce as special invitees on the Market Committees so that the market committee will be benefited by the knowledge of such experts. It was also proposed to provide that special invitees shall have a right to take part in the discussions of the Committees, but shall not have a right to vote. For that purpose, it was proposed to insert a new subsection (1C) in section 13 of the said Act.”

9.

The purpose and object of the enactment would also be relevant in considering the challenge to the validity of section 13(1C) of the Act of 1963.

10.

The legislation is subject to only constitutional limitations. The Apex Court in a case of Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra (supra) observed that, the Courts cannot infer legislative malice in passing a statute. The interference is restrictive in nature and that too on the constitutional aspect and not beyond the same. Legislative malice is beyond the pale of jurisdiction of the law Courts.”

91.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Pratap Singh (supra), has held thus :

“8.

Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by Government of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill-will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man's mind, for that is what the appellant has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done (See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice²). The difficulty is not lessened when one has to establish that a person in the position of a minister apparently acting in the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. We must, however, demur to the suggestion that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence that is that it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the notings in the file which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts.”

92.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kangana Ranaut (supra) has held thus :

“162.

The principles which can thus be deduced from the aforesaid Judgments, as well as the Judgments referred to in the respective written submissions of the parties, are as under:

i.

An action is said to be vitiated by malice in fact when the same lacks good faith and is motivated by personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The malice in fact needs to be pleaded, the party concerned against whom malice in fact is alleged, needs to be impleaded and an opportunity has to be given to the party so impleaded, to respond to the allegations. The said allegations have to be established before the Court.

ii.

An Order or action can be said to be vitiated by malice in law in one or more of the following circumstances:

(a)

From doing of a wrongful act intentionally without any just cause, or excuse, or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of exercise of statutory power.

(b)

It is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretention of gaining legitimate goal. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by consideration outside those for the promotion of which the power is vested, the Court calls it colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion.

(c)

It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others.

(d)

It is an act taken with an oblique or indirect object.

(e)

Conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its injurious acts.

(f)

Passing an Order for unauthorized purpose.

iii.

Malice in law need not be pleaded and does not need proof. For malice in law, intention is immaterial.

iv.

There are no strict guidelines for proving malice in a case where there is material from which the Court can infer malice. The Court is empowered to draw inference on the basis of facts disclosed and material produced before the Court and arrive at a conclusion, which according to its opinion may not be of much doubt and could be supported by justifiable reasons. The party against whom allegations are made is expected to cover up its decision or action and dress it up in a manner to give colour or justification, but the Court has to discover whether the action is colourable on the basis of material, looking beyond the apparent. Malafide cannot be established by direct evidence. It may not be discernable from the Order impugned, or from the note made in the file preceding the Order, and can be deduced as a reasonable and unescapable inference from true facts.”

93.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of R. S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat (supra), has held thus:

“13.

Bearing in mind the quintessential aspects of the rival contentions, let us stop and take stock. The facts of the case are plain. The professed object of the law is clear. The motive of the legislature is irrelevant to castigate an Act as a colourable device. The interdict on public mischief and the insurance of consumer interests against likely, albeit, unwitting or "ex abundanti cautela" excesses in the working of a statute are not merely an ancillary power but surely a necessary obligation of a social welfare state. One potent prohibitory process for this consummation is to penalize the trader by casting a no-fault or absolute liability to "cough up" to the State the total "unjust" takings snapped up and retained by him "by way of tax" where tax is not so due from him, apart from other punitive impositions to deter and to sober the merchants whose arts of dealing with customers may include "many a little makes a mickle'. If these steps in reasoning have the necessary nexus with the power to tax under Entry 54 List Il, it passes one's comprehension how the impugned legislation can be denounced as exceeding legislative competence or as a "colourable device" or as "supplementary, not complementary'. But this is precisely what the High Court has done, calling to its aid passages culled from the rulings of this Court and curiously distinguishing an earlier Division Bench decision of that very Court - a procedure which, moderately expressed, does not accord with comity, discipline and the rule of law. The puzzle is how minds trained to objectify law can reach fiercely opposing conclusions.

14.

Expressions like "colourable device" and "supplementary and not complementary' have a tendency to mislead. Logomachy is a tricky legal trade; semantic nicety is a slippery mariner's compass for courts and the three great instrumentality have, ultimately, to render account to the justice-constituency of the nation. The true diagnosis of interpretative crises is as much the perplexity of deciphering the boundaries of constitutional power as attitudinal ambivalence and economic predilections of those who sit to scan the symbols and translate their import. Shakespeare unconsciously haunts the halls of justice: "Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought" (Henry IV, Scene 5). In our view, the true key to constitutional construction is to view the equity of the statute and sense the social mission of the law, language permitting, against the triune facets of justice highlighted in the Preamble to the Paramount Parchment, read with a spacious signification of the listed entries concerned. If then we feed this programme into the judicial cerebration, with the presumption of constitutionality super-added, the result tells us whether the measure is ultra vires or not. The doctrine of ancillary and incidental powers is also embraced within this scheme of interpretation.

15.

…

16.

Before scanning the decisions to discover the principle laid down therein, we may dispose of the contention which has appealed to the High Court based on "colourable device'. Certainly, this is a malignant expression and when flung with fatal effect at a representative instrumentality like the legislature, deserves serious reflection. If, forgetting comity, the Legislative wing charges the Judicature wing with "colourable" judgments, it will be intolerably subversive of the rule of law. Therefore, we too must restrain ourselves from making this charge except in absolutely plain cases and pause to understand the import of the doctrine of colourable exercise of public power, especially legislative power. In this branch of law, "colourable" is not "tainted with bad faith or evil motive' ; it is not pejorative or crooked. Conceptually, "colourability" is bound up with incompetency. "Colour', according to Black's Legal Dictionary, is "an appearance, semblance or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real ... a deceptive appearance... a lack of reality'. A thing is colourable which is, in appearance only and not in reality, what it purports to be. In Indian terms, it is maya. In the jurisprudence of power, colourable exercise of or fraud on legislative power or, more frightfully, fraud on the Constitution, are expressions which merely mean that the legislature is incompetent to enact a particular law although the label of competency is stuck on it, and then it is colourable legislation. It is very important to notice that if the legislature is competent to pass the particular law, the motives which impel it to pass the law are really irrelevant. To put it more relevantly to the case on hand, if a legislation, apparently enacted under one Entry in the List, falls in plain truth and fact, within the content, not of that Entry but of one assigned to another legislature, it can be struck down as colourable even if the motive were most commendable. In other words, the letter of the law notwithstanding, what is the pith and substance of the Act? Does it fall within any entry assigned to that legislature in pith and substance, or as covered by the ancillary powers implied in that Entry? Can the legislation be read down reasonably to bring it within the legislature's constitutional powers? If these questions can be answered affirmatively, the law is valid. Malice or motive is beside the point, and it is not permissible to suggest parliamentary incompetence on the score of mala fides.”

94.

If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives with which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. [Dharam Datt Vs. Union of India (2004) 1 SCC 712].

95.

It can be deduced from the above referred observations that he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any Act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or misuse by Government of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose or bad faith or personal ill will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man’s mind. Whereas, malice in law need not be pleaded, does not need proof. For malice in law, intention is immaterial. There are no direct guidelines for proving the malice in a case where there is material from which the Court can infer malice. The Court is empowered to draw inference on the basis of facts disclosed and material produced before the Court and arrive at a conclusion, which, according to its opinion, may not be of much doubt and could be supported by justifiable reason.

96.

Moreover, the mala fide can be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from true facts.

97.

Furthermore, it is evident that the motive of the legislature is irrelevant to castigate an Act as a colourable device.

98.

From the above referred observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, it is evident that the Courts cannot examine the intention or wisdom of legislature as long as it has constitutional power to make the law and the law does not violate the Constitution where the allegations are of political or improper motive. It is held that Courts cannot strike down a law merely because they believe the legislature acted for political reasons or the law cannot be strike down for the simple reason that the people think that it was made for political reason.

99.

mala fide, It is further a settled law that where the statutory power is vested with the Government, if the Authority exercising that power as mala fide, the action is vitiated. Every statutory power must be exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred. If the power is exercised for collateral purpose and establish for extraneous purpose, or irrelevant consideration are taken into account the exercise of powers is invalid and when public purpose is exercised to achieve private or collateral purpose, it amounts to colourable exercise of powers.

100.

Applying the above referred well settled principles of law and if we revert to the pleadings in these petitions, it can be said that there is no material available on record from which it can be infemala fide,mala fide,rred that the provisions in question are suffered from malice in law. As far as political motive as alleged in enacting the provisions in question, the motive of legislature is irrelevant to castigate an Act as a colourable device.

101.

Furthermore, there is nothing on record from which it can be inferred that by enacting the provisions in question, the legislature is trying to do something indirectly which it has no power to do it directly. Thus, the challenge on the ground of malice in law/mala fide or colourable exercise of power fails.

102.

Another challenge is on the ground that sub-section (2) of Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963 confers arbitrary and unguided power upon the State Government to declare ‘MNI’.

103.

It is further, the case of the petitioners that in absence of Rules prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 5-1A, the provmala fide,isions namely, Section 5-1A, 5-1B and 5-1C would be unworkable and a vacuum will be created.

104.

It is argued that in absence of Rules, MNI cannot function. It is submitted that because Section 5-1A(2) states that regulation shall be in such manner as may be prescribed, the entire chapter cannot operate until Rules are framed.

105.

This issue is no more res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Manohar S. Prabhu v. Union of India31, has held thus:

“12.

In Jyoti Pershad's case, (AIR 1961 SC 1602), the constitutional validity of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, fell for consideration. The Court held that the Act does not violate the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. It further held that though S. 19 of the Act does not in terms lay down any rules for the guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion under S. 19(1) of the Act, there is enough guidance in the Act which can be gathered from the policy, and purpose of the Act as set out in the preamble and in the operative provisions of the Act. Such guidance may thus be obtained from or afforded by the preamble read in the light of the surrounding circumstances which necessitated the legislation, taken in conjunction with well-known facts of which the Court might take judicial notice or of which it is appraised by evidence before it in the form of affidavits, or even from the policy and purpose of the enactment which may be gathered from other operative provisions applicable to analogous or comparable situations or generally from mala fide,the object sought to be achieved by the enactment. It was further observed that so long as the Legislative indicates, in the operative provisions of the statute, with certainty the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those entrusted with administering the law, it affords no basis either for the contention that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. If the power or discretion has been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating the law. Therefore, the principle that can be inferred from this decision is that if there is sufficient guidance in the Act itself in the exercise of discretion by the competent authority, such Act cannot be held to be obnoxious to the equal protection of law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. The preamble read in the light of the surrounding circumstances which necessitated the legislation, together with the well-known facts of which the Court might take judicial notice or even from the policy and purpose of the enactment which may be gathered from other operative provisions applicable to analogous or comparable situations or generally the object sought to be achieved by the enactment, constitutes relevant factor for determining whether there is or not guidance for the exercise of the discretion.”

106.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Gopinath Gundachar Char32, has held thus:

“3.

In Dundee Harbour Trustees v. D. & J. Nicol, Viscount Haldane, L.C said: “The answer to the question whether a corporation created by a statute has a particular power depends exclusively on whether that power has been expressly given to it by the statute regulating it, or can be implied from the language used. The question is simply one of construction of language, and not of presumption.” Bearing in mind this statement of law, let us consider whether the appellant had the power to appoint officers and servants and to lay down their conditions of service in the absence of regulations framed under Section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The appellant is an autonomous Corporation incorporated under the Act for the purpose of operating road transport services in the State and extended areas. For the proper discharge of its functions, it is necessary for the Corporation to appoint officers and servants. Section 14(2) expressly confers upon the Corporation the incidental power to appoint such officers and servants as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. Section 19(1)(c) empowers it to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service. Section 14(3) provides that the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of its officers and servants shall be such as may subject to the provisions of Section 34 be determined by regulations made under the Act. Section 45(2)(c) empowers the Corporation to frame regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government prescribing the conditions of appointment, service and scales of pay of the officers and servants. If the State Government issues any directions under Section 34 relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees, the Corporation must obey those directions. The conjoint effect of Sections 14(3)(b),34 and 45(2)(c) is that the appointment of officers and servants and their conditions of service must conform to the directions, if any, given by the State Government under Section 34 and the regulations, if any, framed under Section 45(2)(c). But until such regulations are framed or directions are given the Corporation may appoint such officers or servants as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its duties on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. There is necessarily a time-lag between the formation of the Corporation and the framing of regulations under Section 45(2)(c). During the intervening period, the Corporation must carry on the administration of its affairs with the help of officers and servants. In the absence of clear words, it is difficult to impute to the legislature the intention that the Corporation would have no power to appoint officers and servants and fix the conditions of service unless the regulations under Section 45(2)(c) are framed.”

107.

In the case of Orissa State (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Board v. Orient Paper Mills (supra) , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“13.

Thus, in case manner is not prescribed under the rules, there is no obligation or requirement to follow any, except whatever the provision itself provides viz. Section 19 in the instant case which is also complete in itself even without any manner being prescribed as indicated shortly before to read the provision omitting this part “in such manner as may be prescribed”. Merely by absence of rules, the State would not be divested of its powers to notify in the Official Gazette any area declaring it to be an air pollution control area. In case, however, the rules have been framed prescribing the manner, undoubtedly, the declaration must be in accordance with such rules.”

108.

From the above referred observations, it is evident that, it is a well settled law that the law does not become unconstitutional just because it gives some discretion to the Government. The Government can be given decision making power as long as the law clearly explains its purpose and policy, which acts as a guide for exercising that power.

109.

Admittedly, in the present matter, the amended provisions provide a clear objective and purpose which will act as a guide for exercising that power, and since the statute itself confers a substantive power, that power can be exercised even if the regulations contemplated under the Act have not yet been framed.

110.

In the present matter, the statute has not expressly made the frammala fide,ing of regulations a condition precedent for the operation of the provisions in question. There is always a time gap between the creation of a statutory body and the framing of subordinate legislation, and if it is held that the statutory body cannot function until regulations are framed, the provisions in question would become unworkable.

111.

The expression used in sub-section (2) of Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963, namely “as may be prescribed”, shall be interpreted in a way that it is directory and therefore, where the manner is not prescribed under the Rules, there is no obligation or requirement to follow any, except whatever the provision itself provides. In the circumstances, the argument advanced portraying that the powers to frame Rules are uncontrolled and unguided, therefore, this is case of excessive delegation needs to be rejected.

112.

The expression “as may be prescribed” used in sub-section (2) of Section 5-1A of the Act of 1963, leaves scope for future prescription and does not suspend the operation of the statute until rules are framed. The powers vested in an authority would not cease to exist merely because rules have not been framed prescribing the manner of their exercise.

113.

In the circumstances, the amended provisions should not be rendered unworkable merely because Rules have not yet been framed. The provisions of Section 5-1A, 5-1B and 5-1C of the Act of 1963, therefore, cannot be held as inoperative or it would create vacuum because of non-framing of Rules.

114.

In the case of Municipal Corporation Kalyan, Dombivali vs. Sanjay Gajanan Gharat33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that a statute is designed to be workable, and its interpretation by a court should be such as to secure that object unless a crucial omission or clear direction makes such interpretation untenable. It is further held that it is the duty of the Court to make the best possible sense of a statute, meaning that statutes are meant to be operative and not inept, and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a Court to declare a statute unworkable.

115.

Since the statute has taken care in providing the guidelines for establishing or designating MNI, composition of market committee of MNI and the executive committee such guidelines can be considered for functioning of the MNI and there is nothing for this Court to declare the amended provisions as non-workable.

116.

The judgments cited in the cases of Gaurav Kumar (supra) and Devi Das Gopal Krishnan (supra) are of no help to the petitioners, as we have held that there is no excess legislative delegation in this case. As far as judgment in the case of State of T.N. v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Assn.(supra), there cannot be any doubt about the law laid down in the said case in respect of reasonable classification. Since the judgments in this regard are on the same point, are referred by us, to avoid multiplicity, the same has not been referred to. The judgments in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawala (supra) and Opto Circuit (India) Ltd. ..vs.. Axis Bank34 (supra) are distinguishable. Hence, we are of the opinion that they are of no help to the petitioners. As regards judgment in the case of Kalabharati Advertising (supra), the principles laid down in the said judgment about malice in law has been discussed and to avoid multiplicity, the same has not been referred to. Furthermore, the judgments in Chandrakishor Zha .v/s. Mahavir Prasad35 and Rajneesh Khajuria (supra), the same are distinguishable on facts and hence, the same are of no help to the petitioners.

117.

Having held that the provisions of Section 5-1A, 5-1B, and 5-1C cannot be held unconstitutional for the reasons recorded herein above, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the present matters and the same need to be dismissed.

118.

Accordingly, we pass the following order :

Both the writ petitions are dismissed.

Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Footnotes

  1. 1.(1999) 8 SCC 266
  2. 2.AIR 1964 SC 72
  3. 3.2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3132
  4. 4.(2020) 3 SCC 86
  5. 5.(2010) 9 SCC 437
  6. 6.1984 Supp SCC 196
  7. 7.(1952) 1 SCC 1
  8. 8.(2021) 15 SCC 534
  9. 9.1967 SCC OnLine SC 108
  10. 10.(2014) 16 SCC 72
  11. 11.2011 (6) MHLJ 691
  12. 12.(2025) 1 SCC 641
  13. 13.1958 SCC OnLine SC 6
  14. 14.(1977) 4 SCC 98
  15. 15.2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1192
  16. 16.(2023) 10 SCC 421
  17. 17.(2024) 20 SCC 238
  18. 18.1967 SCC Online SC 319
  19. 19.(2016) 14 SCC 430
  20. 20.(2025) 5 SCC 53
  21. 21.2006 SCC OnLine Bom 160
  22. 22.(2006) 6 SCC 289
  23. 23.AIR 1952 SC 75
  24. 24.(2024) 1 SCC 1
  25. 25.(2014) 16 SCC 72
  26. 26.1964 Mh.L.J. 697
  27. 27.(2013) 8 SCC 368
  28. 28.2006 SCC OnLine Bom 160
  29. 29.(2006) 6 SCC 289
  30. 30.(2001) 4 SCC 534
  31. 31.1986 SCC OnLine Bom 35
  32. 32.1967 SCC Online SC 319
  33. 33.(2024) 20 SCC 238
  34. 34.(2021) 6 SCC 707
  35. 35.1999 (8) SCC 266