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Tribunals and Commissions(2026) 11 CAT CK 3827

Kaloo Singh & Anr. Vs Union Of India & Ors.

Central Administrative Tribunal · Principal Bench, New Delhi (Nainital Circuit Sitting) · 18 Nov 2026 · Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A) · Ajay Pratap Singh, Member (J)

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Judgment

140 paragraphs · 9,215 words

Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):

MA 4897/2025

By filing the accompanying OA, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-

“(i.) To set aside the ICFRE letter No. 39-19/97-ICFRE/Pension (KS) dated 07.07.2025 along-with the enclosed calculation sheet of pension at the time of superannuation ICFRE letter No. 39-19/97-ICFRE/Pension (KS) dated 14.07.2025

(ii.) To set aside the ICFRE letter No. 63-19/2017-1CFRE (Representations) dated 20.03.2018 being unsustainable in law, which directly violate the Terms & Conditions of Appointment of Group C' & 'D' employees absorbed in Autonomous ICFRE from 01.04.1993, which were approved under the Constitutional Powers of Article 53(1) by His Excellency, the President of India vide Para 2 & 11 of ICFRE Order No 16-28/93-1CFRE dated 20.08.1993.

(iii.) To Re-fix the Revised Basic Pay in the 5th CPC Approved Pay Scale of Rs. 6,500/= to 10,500/= w.e.f. 01.01.1996 for the Post of Research Assistant Grade -I (General) as provided on Page 2 of ICFRE Notification No. F. 63-19/2016-CFRE dated 01.03.2017 in compliance of the Terms & Conditions of Appointment of Group C' & 'D' employees absorbed in Autonomous ICFRE from 01.04.1993 duly approved under the Constitutional Powers of Article 53(1) by His Excellency, the President of India vide Para 2 & 11 of ICFRE Order No 16-28/93-1CFRE dated 20.08.1993

(iv.) A direction to Grant Two Additional Increments as applicable as provided in clause 5 of ICFRE Circular No.39-10/93-ICFRE dated 08.09.1995 in the 5"CPC Approved Pay Scale of Rs. 6.500/- to 10,500/- with effect from 01.01.1996.

(v.) A direction to Re-Calculate the Pension and Pensionary Benefits based on the Re-fixed Basic Pay as per the Recommendations of 5h CPC at the time of Superannuation and on Two Additional Increments as provided in Clause 6 and at the rates as provided in Clause 5 of ICFRE Circular No. 39-10/93-ICFRE dated 08,09.1995 in the 5th CPC Approved Revised Pay Scale of Rs. 6.500/- to 10,500/-.

(vi.) A direction to Revise Pension of Pre-2006 Retirees based upon last pay drawn alone from 01.01.2006 and in compliance of ICFRE's own statement before Hon’ble Central Administrative Tribunal (PB), New Delhi in the Counter Affidavit dated 23.11.2016 in OA No. 4493 of 2015 on implementation of 6th Central Pay Commissions Recommendations as provided in Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions, Department of Pensions and Pensioners Welfare OM F. No. 38/37/08-P&PW (A) dated 01.09.2008 and OM dated 03.10.2008

(vi.) A direction to arrange to pay the arrears of difference in Pay, applicable two additional increments, Pension and Pensionary Benefits together with dearness allowance/dearness relief etc. from 01.01.1996 onwards till the date of actual payment along with interest calculated @9% per year.

(viii.) To Award the Cost of this Petition estimated @ Rs

(ix.) To award any other relief to which the applicants may be found entitled under the circumstances of this Case.”

2.

In nutshell, the grievance of the applicants is that the respondents have illegally and arbitrarily denied them the benefit of fixation of pay in the 5th Central Pay Commission revised pay scale of Rs.6,500–10,500 w.e.f. 01.01.1996, along with two additional increments admissible under Clause 5 of ICFRE Circular dated 08.09.1995, despite the same being allegedly mandated under the terms and conditions of absorption of Group ‘C’ and ‘D’ employees in ICFRE w.e.f. 01.04.1993, approved by the President of India vide ICFRE Order dated 20.08.1993. The applicants further assail the ICFRE communications dated 20.03.2018 and 07.07.2025, including the pension calculation sheet, as being legally unsustainable. They seek refixation of their pay, consequential recalculation and revision of pension and other retiral benefits, including revision of pension of pre-2006 retirees on the basis of last pay drawn w.e.f. 01.01.2006, together with arrears of pay, increments, pension, dearness allowance/dearness relief and interest @ 9% per annum, besides costs and other consequential reliefs.

3.

Admittedly, there is delay in filing the accompanying OA, the applicants have filed the present MA for condonation of delay of 2100 days in filing the accompanying OA.

4.

Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply to the present MA as well as accompanying OA.

5.

In support of the present MA, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the applicants, by way of the accompanying OA, are challenging the orders dated 07.07.2025 and 14.07.2025, whereby their claim for grant of revised basic pay in the 5th CPC-recommended pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 for the post of Research Assistant Grade-I (General) w.e.f. 01.01.1996, along with two additional increments as stipulated under Clause 5 of ICFRE Circular No. 39-10/93-ICFRE dated 08.09.1995, in compliance with the terms and conditions of appointment approved by the President of India vide ICFRE Order No. 16-28/93-ICFRE dated 20.08.1993, has been rejected. The applicants are also seeking consequential benefits, including revision of pension. It was contended that the claim involves recurring financial consequences and, therefore, the delay deserves to be condoned.

5.1

Learned counsel further submitted that although the prescribed limitation for filing the OA was six months, the applicants could not approach this Tribunal within the stipulated period as they had been regularly pursuing their grievances before the respondents’ department in the hope of obtaining redressal. Learned counsel urged that the delay of 2100 days was neither deliberate nor intentional but had occurred on account of bona fide reasons.

5.2

Learned counsel also submitted that the applicants thereafter approached their counsel for filing the OA, who prepared the requisite pleadings, and the applicants are now pursuing their remedy before this Tribunal without any further delay. Learned counsel contended that the applicants have been pursuing their legitimate claims and that their valuable rights are at stake.

5.3

Lastly, learned counsel prayed that the delay in filing the accompanying OA be condoned in the interest of justice, failing which the applicants would suffer irreparable loss and injury.

6.

Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.4 vehemently opposed the instant MA seeking condonation of delay in filing the accompanying OA and submitted that the applicants have failed to make out any sufficient cause, much less any bona fide or justifiable ground, warranting exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in their favour. Learned counsel contended that the delay is attributable entirely to the inaction, negligence and lack of diligence on the part of the applicants and, therefore, the instant MA deserves to be dismissed.

6.1

Learned counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, has categorically held that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must not commence its consideration with the merits of the main matter. Rather, the Court is required to first examine the bona fides of the explanation furnished by the party seeking condonation. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as relied upon by Respondent No. 4, are reproduced below:

“16.

[...] Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

17.

We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

(Emphasis supplied)

6.2

Learned counsel further submitted that the instant MA is conspicuously silent regarding the steps allegedly undertaken by the applicants between the passing of the impugned orders and the expiry of the limitation period on 07.01.2026. Learned counsel also contended that the applicants were required to establish that some event or circumstance arising within the prescribed period of limitation prevented them from instituting the accompanying OA within time. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, wherein it was held as under:

“7.

[...] For example if the period of limitation is of 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day of limitation and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 : AIR 1981 SC 733).”

(Emphasis supplied)

6.3

On the strength of the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel contended that the applicants have failed to disclose any event or circumstance which prevented them from filing the accompanying OA within the prescribed period of limitation. Learned counsel submitted that the absence of any explanation for the period preceding the expiry of limitation is fatal to the instant MA and, therefore, the same deserves rejection on this ground alone.

6.4

Learned counsel further submitted that the explanation furnished by the applicants, namely, that they were regularly approaching the Respondent Department in pursuit of their grievances and thereafter approached counsel for preparation and filing of the accompanying OA, does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay. Learned counsel contended that merely pursuing departmental representations or allegedly availing a parallel remedy does not extend or suspend the statutory period of limitation for approaching this Tribunal. The applicants have failed to furnish any particulars whatsoever regarding their alleged representations, meetings or approaches to the Respondent Department. Neither the dates of such representations nor the particulars of any meetings or correspondence have been disclosed. Learned counsel submitted that vague and unsubstantiated assertions of regularly approaching the Department cannot constitute a legally acceptable explanation for the delay.

6.5

Learned counsel also pointed out that the applicants have not disclosed when they approached their counsel, when the accompanying OA was prepared, when the same was vetted or finalised, or what steps were taken thereafter for its institution. Further, the instant MA is equally silent regarding the explanation for the delay between the expiry of the limitation period on 07.01.2026 and the actual date of filing of the accompanying OA. Such omission, according to learned counsel, demonstrates that the applicants have failed to explain the entire period of delay and have not approached this Tribunal with due diligence.

6.6

Learned counsel further submitted that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be construed in a manner so as to condone delay occasioned by negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides. In this regard, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, wherein the principles laid down in Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, and Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92, were reiterated. The relevant observations reproduced in the aforesaid judgment are as follows:

“15.

The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the ‘sufficient cause’ which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

6.7

Learned counsel further submitted that the aforesaid principles make it clear that the discretion to condone delay is required to be exercised judiciously, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, and that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributable to the applicant(s).

6.8

Learned counsel also submitted that the applicants cannot seek refuge under the principle of adopting a liberal approach in matters of condonation of delay, as the said principle is not absolute or unqualified. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Sarla Devi v. Jagan Nath, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1541, wherein it was observed that although a liberal approach may be adopted to advance substantial justice, the Court must remain vigilant and cautious, particularly in view of the growing tendency to treat delay as a non-serious matter.

6.9

Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles governing condonation of delay and observed as follows:

“The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration... the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.”

(Emphasis supplied)

6.10

Learned counsel submitted that, in the present case, the conduct of the applicants is characterised by unexplained delay, absence of diligence and failure to disclose material particulars concerning the steps allegedly undertaken by them. Learned counsel also contended that the applicants have remained grossly lax and negligent and have failed to demonstrate bona fide conduct throughout the period of limitation as well as thereafter. Condonation of such delay, according to learned counsel, would not only overlook the settled principles governing limitation but would also cause prejudice to Respondent No. 4.

6.11

Learned counsel accordingly submitted that the instant MA is devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected by this Tribunal and consequently, the accompanying OA be also dismissed.

7.

In rebuttal, learned counsel for the applicants reiterated the submissions as noted above.

8.

We have heard learned counsel for the applicants as well as learned counsel for Respondent No.4 and other respondents and have carefully perused the pleadings available on record.

9.

The limited question requiring consideration at this stage is whether the applicants have demonstrated sufficient cause warranting condonation of the delay of 2100 days in filing the accompanying OA.

9.1

Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the delay occurred on account of their continuous pursuit of grievances before the respondent authorities and their bona fide expectation that the matter would be resolved administratively. Further contention is that the applicants subsequently approached their counsel, got the OA prepared and are now pursuing their remedy before this Tribunal. According to the applicants, the claim involves recurring financial consequences relating to pay fixation and pensionary benefits and, therefore, the delay deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice. However, on the other hand, learned counsel for Respondent No.4 vehemently opposed the instant OA and submitted that the applicants have failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation for the delay, particularly for the period during which the limitation expired. Learned counsel contended that the alleged pursuit of departmental representations, without particulars or supporting material, cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of such an inordinate delay. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (supra), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (supra) to contend that negligence, inaction and lack of bona fides cannot be condoned under the guise of a liberal approach.

10.

We have considered the rival submissions. It is well settled that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in the provisions governing condonation of delay is required to be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice; however, such an approach does not dispense with the obligation of the applicants to furnish a satisfactory and credible explanation for the delay. The discretion to condone delay is judicial and cannot be exercised mechanically merely because the applicants seek adjudication on merits.

10.1

While considering the question of delay at hand, it is important to refer to the decision of this Tribunal in OA No.2532/2021, titled All India Civil Accounts Employees Association and another vs. Union of India and another decided on 18.12.2024, wherein it was observed: -

“13.

To appreciate the first issue arising in the present OA, it will be necessary to notice the Scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. For ready reference Section 19, 20, 21 of Act and Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 reproduced as –

(A)

“Section- 19. Applications to tribunals. —(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “order” means an order made—

(a)

by the Government or a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any corporation 3[or society] owned or controlled by the Government; or

(b)

by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation 3[or society] referred to in clause (a).

(2)

Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee (if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) 4[in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes, as may be prescribed by the Central Government].

[(3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.]

(4)

Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject-matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules.

(B)

Section 20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted.—(1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.

(2)

For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,—

(a)

if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or

(b)

where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired.

(3)

For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be of one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial.

(C)

Section 21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,—

(a)

in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;

(b)

in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where—

(a)

the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and

(b)

no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.

(3)

Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of subsection (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.”

(D) Section 5 of Limitation Act 1963 envisages that:-

“5.

Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

[Emphasis supplied]

14.

A bare reading of the Section 21 of A.T. Act, 1985 would indicate that sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides for limitation for redressal of the grievances in clauses (a) and (b) and specifies the period of one year. Sub-Section (2) amplifies the limitation of one year in respect of grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) and an outer limit of six months in respect of grievances covered by subsection (2) is provided. Sub-Section (3) postulates that notwithstanding anything contained sub-section (1) or sub-Section (2), if the applicants satisfy the Tribunal that they had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period enumerated in sub-section (1) and (2) from the date of application. The Tribunal has been given power to condone the delay on satisfy itself that the applicant has explained the delay in filing the application for rederssal of their grievances. The Sub-section (2) has given power, right for making applications within one year of the grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-Section (2). There is no need for the applicant to give any explanation to the delay having occurred during that period. Applicant entitled, as a matter of right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of their grievances. If the application to be filed beyond that period, then the need to satisfactory explanation for the delay caused till date of filing of the application must be given and then the question of satisfaction of the Tribunal in that behalf would arise. Sub-Section (3) starts with a non-obstante clause which rubs out the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 21 and the need thereby arises to given satisfactory explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the period prescribed in Sub-Section (1) & (2) thereof.

15.

Present OA has been filed under Section 19 of the A.T. Act, 1985 and intention of legislature is plain with opening words in subsection (1) of Section 19 that subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application. So also sub-section (3) of Section 19 provides that on receipt of such OA subject to other provisions of this AT Act, 1985 and coupled with the fact, the Tribunal shall if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the such application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.

16.

Thus the intention of the legislature is clear and object of the A.T. Act, 1985 is clear as evident from the scheme extracted herein above.”

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

23.

This Tribunal is empowered to consider application for condonation of delay only if proper explanation of delay is given. In present case in hand, the applicants have neither explained the factum of delay in para 3 nor filed any MA for condonation of delay.

24.

It is well settled in law in principles of service jurisprudence that the Central Administrative Tribunal is a creature of the statute (Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985) and the Tribunal is bound to function within four corners of provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and this Tribunal just does not have any jurisdiction to exercise power out of purview of provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

25.

So also the Division Bench of this Tribunal in case of Manoj Kmar Vc. Union of India, OA No. 842 of 2023 (Patna) dismissed the OA vide order dated 15.01.2024 and observed that there is no prayer for condonation of delay, in absence of any ground for condonation of delay, OA not maintainable under Section 21 of A.T. Act, 1985 and dismissed the OA on ground of limitation.

26.

This Tribunal does not have power to condone delay as in present case applicant had not given any explanation nor any MA for condonation of delay filed. So also Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of M.P., in case of Union of India &ors Vs. Raj Kumar Lodhi, M.P.No. 2448 of 2023 decided vide judgment dated 14.07.2023. Their Lordships held - “Tribunal has to function within four corners of the statute, i.e. A.T. Act, 1985 which in mandatory terms prescribes the period of limitation under Section 21 and also the parameters extending the period of limitation which admittedly are not satisfied in the present case”.

27.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in 3 Judge Bench decision in case of Secretary to Government of India and others versus ShivramMahadu Gaikwad, 1995, Supp (3) SCC 231. Their Lordships held-

“2.

The learned counsel for the Union of India raised a preliminary contention, namely, that the application was filed almost after about four years from the date of discharge and, therefore, it was clearly barred by Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. He pointed out that this question was squarely raised in the counter filed in answer to the respondent's application in the following terms:

“These respondents state that the applicant herein is challenging the order dated 7-10-1986 discharging him from the service and has filed this application on 14-9- 1990, as such this application is barred by the provisions of limitation under Section 21 of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.”

When we turn to the judgment of the Tribunal, we find that there is no mention about the question of limitation even though it stared in the face. It would immediately occur to anyone that since the order of discharge was of 7- 10-1986 and the application was filed in 1990, it was clearly barred by limitation unless an application for condoning the delay was made under Section 21(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. No such application was in fact made. Even if it was the contention of the employee that he was suffering from schizophrenia, that could have been projected as a ground for condonation of delay under sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the said statute. Even otherwise without insisting on the formality of an application under Section 21(3) if the Tribunal had dealt with the question of limitation in the context of Section 21 we may have refrained from interfering with the order of the Tribunal under Article 136, but it seems that the Tribunal totally overlooked this question which clearly stared in the face. Even the employee made no effort to explain the delay and seek condonation. We find no valid explanation on record for coming to the conclusion that the case for condonation of delay is made out. In the circumstances, there is no doubt that the application was clearly barred by limitation. It is also difficult to understand how the Tribunal could have awarded full back wages even for the period of delay for which the employee was solely responsible. However, since application itself is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, it deserves to be dismissed.”

[Emphasis supplied]

28.

In D.C.S. Negi Vs. Union of India & Ors decided on 07.03.2011 in SLP (C) No.7566/211, Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed the provision of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 and held as –

“A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit on application unless the same is made within the time specified in Clause (a) and (b) of section 21(1) or section 21(2) or an order is passed in term of Sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since section found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under section 21(3).”

[Emphasis supplied]

29.

In Balwant Singh vs Jagdish Singh and Ors (2010) 8 SCC 685, Their Lordships held on the law of limitation as under:

“26.

The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his action vigilantly.”

[Emphasis supplied]

10.2

In OA No.1356/2025, titled Naresh Kumar vs. Union of India and others, decided on 07.09.2026.

“9.

Present OA has been filed under Section 19 of the A.T. Act, 1985 and intention of legislature is plain with opening words in sub section (1) of Section 19 that subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application. So also subsection (3) of Section 19 provides that on receipt of such OA subject to other provisions of this AT Act, 1985 and coupled with the fact, the Tribunal shall if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the such application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.

…..

20.

In S.S. Rathore Versus State of M.P.reported in AIR 1990 SC 10. Their Lordship’s has held that the repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law shall not have the effect of extending the period of limitation.

21.

P.S. Sadasiva Swamy Versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 2271. Their Lordship’s observed that “in promotion matters the petitioner should approach the court at least with six months or at the most a year after promotion of his junior, because to unsettle things settled long back is unjust and improper.”

22.

In case of Shibha Shankar Mohapatra & Ors. Vs. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 47. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “it is well settled in service matters the question of seniority should not be reopened after lapse of a reasonable period because that result in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable.”

23.

We have already examined the scheme of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 20 of A.T. Act, 1985 specifically provides that this Tribunal shall not admit an application under Sec 19 of Act, 1985, where a final order has been made. The limitation prescribed under section 21 of Act, 1985 is that the Tribunal shall not admit an application, in case a final order has been made in connection with the grievances, unless the application is made within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. Applicant has himself filed final order dt. 3.7.2008 and 2.9.2009 made by the competent authority, rejecting claim of the applicant for retrospective promotion w.e.f. 1.10.1997. The applicant has not approached this Tribunal, within limitation prescribed under Section 21 A.T. Act, 1985. So also not a single reason, no sufficient cause shown to explain the sufficient cause for delay in filing the OA, when original date of cause of action had arisen on 8.9.1997, the date of non-consideration for promotion against SC-point in the roster for promotion to the post of Senior Radiographer.

24.

The aforesaid analysis, shows clear case of negligence on the part of applicant in approaching this Tribunal within a year of original cause of action and not a single reason and no sufficient cause shown in the application for condonation in delay in filing this OA.

25.

We are of the considered opinion that the applicant has miserably failed to show any sufficient cause in filing the present OA after enormous delay and in absence of sufficient cause, delay cannot be condoned.

26.

It is well settled in law in principles of service jurisprudence that the Central Administrative Tribunal is a creature of the statute (Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985) and the Tribunal is bound to function within four corners of provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and this Tribunal just does not have any jurisdiction to exercise power out of purview of provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

27.

The Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of M.P., in case of Union of India &ors Vs. Raj Kumar Lodhi, M.P. No. 2448 of 2023 decided vide judgment dated 14.07.2023. Their Lordships held - “Tribunal has to function within four corners of the statute, i.e. A.T. Act, 1985 which in mandatory terms prescribes the period of limitation under Section 21 and also the parameters extending the period of limitation which admittedly are not satisfied in the present case”.

28.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) 7956 of 2011 in case of D.C.S. Negi versus Union of India & Ors, decided on 07.03.2011 (2018) 16 SCC 721. Their Lordships held as under:-

“10.

The explanation given by the Petitioner for delayed filing of the special leave petition is wholly unsatisfactory and there is no valid ground for exercise of power by this Court Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

11.

With the above observations, the special leave petition is dismissed.

12.

Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to note that for quite some time, the Administrative Tribunals established under the Act have been entertaining and deciding the applications filed Under Section 19 of the Act in complete disregard of the mandate of Section 21, which reads as under:

21.

Limitation.- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,-

(a)

in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;

(b)

in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in Subsection (1), where-

(a)

the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and

(b)

no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in Clause (a), or, as the case may be, Clause (b), of Subsection (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.

(3)

Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in Sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.

13.

A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced Section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of Sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed Under Section 21(3).

14.

In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non-applicant is not at all relevant.

15.

A copy of this order be sent to the Registrar of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal, who shall place the same before the Chairman of the Tribunal for appropriate order.” [Emphasis Supplied]

29.

In Balwant Singh vs Jagdish Singh and Ors (2010) 8 SCC 685, Their Lordships held on the law of limitation as under:

“26.

The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his action vigilantly.” [Emphasis supplied]

30.

In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Seshachalam (2017) 10 SCC 137, Their Lordships held –

“16.

Filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or latches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” [Emphasis supplied]

31.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chand Sharma Vs. Udham Singh Kamal and Others (1999) 8 SCC 304, where departmental representation against non-promotion was rejected on 02.07.1991. OA was filed on 02.06.1994, i.e., after three years. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in view of Section 21(1)(a) of the A.T. Act, the Tribunal could not admit the application and decide it on merits. The delay was sought to be covered by pleading some new facts. The plea for which no foundation was laid before lower court or Tribunal was not entertained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

32.

For the reasons stated hereinabove and law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent decision in case of Shivamma (Dead) By LRS versus Karnataka Housing Board & Ors, 2025 Live Law (SC) 899 - In condonation of delay is not a matter of right, liberal approach is preferred to achieve substantial justice but at the same time negligence, inaction, and ingredients of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act were not fulfilled and exercise of discretion was clearly wrong.

33.

In Result, M.A. No. 2445 of 2025, Application for condonation of delay in filing the OA is hereby dismissed.

34.

We have analysed in detail the issue and in the light of aforesaid analysis. Accordingly, findings on the issue is decided against the applicant and in favour of the respondent.

35.

Accordingly, M.A. No. 2445/2025, Application for condonation of delay in filing O.A. No. 1356 / 2025 is hereby dismissed. 36.

Resultantly, the OA is dismissed on account of delay and latches.

11.

The aforesaid principles have been considered in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Others (supra), Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025, decided on 12.09.2025, reported as 2025 INSC 1104. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the principles governing condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ requires an objective assessment of the explanation furnished by the litigant and that the entire period of delay must be satisfactorily explained. It was further held that although the length of delay is not, by itself, determinative, the conduct, diligence and bona fides of the party seeking condonation are material considerations. The law of limitation cannot be permitted to become an instrument for condoning indolence, negligence or prolonged inaction.

11.1

The Hon'ble Supreme Court also cautioned that the question of condonation cannot be decided merely by examining the merits of the underlying claim. The first and foremost requirement is to ascertain whether the applicant has established sufficient cause for not approaching the Court within the prescribed period. For facility of reference, we reproduce the relevant paras of the said judgment as under:-

“261.

Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

262.

The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

263.

Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264.

No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

265.

In the result, this appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is hereby set aside. Apart from the costs of Rs 25,000/- imposed by the High Court, to be paid by the respondent no. 1 to the appellant, we impose an additional cost of Rs 25,000/- on the respondent no. 1, to be paid to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period of four weeks from today.

266.

The Court of Principle Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi, is directed to proceed with the execution of the decree in favour of the appellant in E.P. No. 2 of 2011, and shall ensure that the proceedings conclude within a period of 2 months from the date of this judgment.

267.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 268.

Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts.”

12.

From the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphatically held that administrative delay, lethargy, or procedural laxity cannot constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the courts must not condone delay on casual, superficial, or routine grounds, particularly when the applicant is a State authority. The object of limitation laws is to ensure finality of litigation as reopening of matters after inordinate delay defeats justice. Further, the State stands on equal footing with private litigants and cannot claim special indulgence merely due to bureaucratic inefficiencies. Condonation of delay is permissible only when bona fide, diligent, and continuous efforts are demonstrated, establishing a genuine “sufficient cause.” However, allowing delayed litigation prejudices private parties, especially those with limited means, and leads to prolonged and unjust harassment. Thus, no litigant should be permitted to misuse the process of law through negligent or apathetic conduct. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reinforced that delay must not be condoned unless strictly justified, and that the courts should refuse to entertain time-barred matters where no credible explanation exists, thereby upholding procedural discipline and fairness in litigation. Though the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were rendered in the context of governmental action, the legal principles enunciated therein are of general application. The same, therefore, apply mutatis mutandis to private parties/applicant seeking condonation of delay in instituting the main proceedings, and is/are required to be adhered to with equal rigor.

13.

The aforesaid pronouncement assumes significance in the present matter. Further, in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasized that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court must first examine the bona fides of the explanation offered and cannot commence its consideration with the merits of the main matter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation is founded upon sound principles of public policy and equity and cannot be treated as a mere technicality. Thus, the question before us is not whether the applicants may have an arguable claim concerning pay fixation or pensionary benefits, but whether they have satisfactorily explained their failure to approach this Tribunal within the prescribed period.

14.

In the present case, the applicants have sought to explain the delay primarily on the ground that they were regularly approaching the respondent authorities for redressal of their grievances. However, the MA does not disclose the dates of such representations, the particulars of the correspondence exchanged, or any specific assurance or circumstance which prevented them from instituting the accompanying OA within the prescribed period. The mere assertion that departmental remedies were being pursued, without supporting particulars, cannot by itself establish sufficient cause for the entire period of delay.

15.

We also find substance in the objection raised by Respondent No.4 that the applicants have failed to explain what prevented them from approaching this Tribunal within the period of limitation. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the cause preventing the institution of proceedings within limitation must be traceable to a circumstance arising during the period of limitation itself. Subsequent events may explain further delay in filing proceedings, but cannot, by themselves, justify the initial expiry of limitation. In the present case, no such circumstance has been satisfactorily established by the applicants.

16.

The applicants have also failed to furnish any particulars regarding the date on which they approached their counsel, the time taken in preparation or finalisation of the OA, or the steps undertaken thereafter for its institution. The explanation furnished is thus general and lacks the necessary particulars to demonstrate continuous diligence throughout the period of delay. We are unable to accept that the mere subsequent engagement of counsel and preparation of the OA would, in the absence of any explanation for the preceding period, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 2100 days.

17.

The contention of the applicants that their claim relates to recurring financial consequences and pensionary benefits also does not, by itself, furnish a sufficient ground for condoning the delay in instituting the OA. The nature of the substantive claim cannot substitute for the requirement of explaining the delay. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (supra), the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant considerations, and the principle of liberal approach cannot be applied to the exclusion of the interests of the opposite party.

18.

We are conscious that the law relating to condonation of delay does not require an unduly pedantic approach and that substantial justice is an important consideration. Nevertheless, substantial justice cannot be advanced by disregarding the statutory period of limitation where the party seeking condonation has failed to establish sufficient cause. In the present case, the applicants have neither furnished a cogent explanation for the delay nor demonstrated that they acted with reasonable diligence. Their explanation is vague, unsupported by particulars and insufficient to account for the inordinate delay of 2100 days.

19.

In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (supra), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (supra) and Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Others (supra), we are of the considered view that the applicants have failed to make out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing the accompanying OA. The explanation furnished does not inspire confidence and does not justify exercise of discretion in their favour.

20.

In view the above discussion, we dismiss the instant MA seeking condonation of delay of 2100 days in filing the accompanying OA. Consequently, the accompanying OA, being barred by limitation, is also dismissed.