M/s Brahmacorp Limited & Anr. Vs Vijay Hiraman Wadkar & Ors.
Bombay High Court · 18 Nov 2026 · N. J. Jamadar, J
Judgment
This revision application is directed against an order dated 22nd May 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune on applications seeking rejection of the plaint, preferred by the defendants, including the applicants (defendant Nos. 13 and 14), in SCS No. 1903 of 2025, whereby the said applications came to be rejected.
The background facts leading to this application can be stated in brief as under:
Late Ramchandra Ganpati Galande had two wives. The first wife had a son, Dattatray, and a daughter, Satyabhama, by late Ramchandra Galande. The first wife passed away in the year 1943. Defendants Nos. 1 to 10 are the successor-in-interest of Dattatray.
After the demise of the first wife, late Ramchandra Galande solemnized marriage with Geetabai in the year 1947. At that time, Geetabai was a widow. Geetabai had a daughter Hirabai by her late first husband, Ramchandra Sopan Mate. The plaintiffs are the heirs of Hirabai.
Ramchandra Galande passed away intestate on 13th July 1980 intestate. The plaintiffs claimed, upon death of Ramchandra Galande, the land admeasuring 5H 35.64 R bearing Survey No. 37/1A situated at Village Vadgaon Sheri, Pune, (“the suit property”), which was the ancestral property of late Ramchandra Galande, devolved upon Geetabai, Dattatray and Satyabhama. The name of Hirabai was not mutated to the Record of Rights of the suit property as she was the step-daughter of Ramchandra Galande.
In the year 2000, Satyabhama, the daughter of Ramchandra, demanded her share in the joint family property left behind by late Ramchandra Galande. Pursuant to a compromise arrived at between the parties, a property bearing Survey No. 50/10 admeasuring 69R situated at Vadgaon Sheri, came to be separated and allotted to Satyabhama under a registered Partition Deed dated 1st March 2000. Thereafter, the plaintiffs assert, Geetabai, had one half undivided share in the suit property. Geetabai passed away on 21st March 2001. During the lifetime of Geetabai, there was no partition between late Geetabai and Dattatray.
Upon the death of Geetabai, the plaintiffs assert, Hirabai, being the only daughter of Geetabai, became the absolute owner of the one half undivided interest of late Geetabai in the suit property. Hirabai, in turn, passed away on 7th October 2023. The plaintiffs, being the legal heirs of late Hirabai, are thus entitled to one half undivided share in the suit property.
It is the case of the plaintiffs that, during her lifetime, Geetabai had permitted, late Ashsok Wadkar, the predecessor-in-title of plaintiff Nos. 5 and 6, and Vijay Wadkar, plaintiff No.1, to run a fabrication business from an area admeasuring 200 sq ft of the suit property. Though initially permissive, the plaintiffs claim, their possession over the said area wherefrom the business of Shivganga Enterprises was being carried, ripened into ownership as they became co-owners of the suit property upon the demise of Hirabai. The defendants were fully cognizant of the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit property, including the said portion of 200 sq ft. Yet, in February 2025, defendant Nos. 2, 6 and 9 alongwith their hirelings threatened the plaintiffs that they could no longer carry on the fabrication business from the suit property as they had no right in the suit property or any portion thereof.
In the wake of the aforesaid incident, the plaintiffs claim to have gathered relevant information and collected documents. It transpired that, during the lifetime of Geetabai, two false and fabricated registered Wills dated 8th December 1997 and 16th December 1998 were brought into existence. The defendants had executed five Sale Deeds alongwith late Geetabai and others in favour of defendant No.11 in respect of the portions of the suit property. However, the possession of those portions of the suit property has continued to remain with the defendants. The Development Agreements and Power of Attorney were also executed by the defendants in favour of defendant No.11. The latter executed a Deed of Assignment and Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.13 on 11th May 2006. By ascribing multifarious reasons, the plaintiffs assert that, the aforesaid documents executed by and between the defendants are illegal, null and void and do not bind the plaintiffs and those documents are liable to be cancelled.
The plaintiffs have thus instituted the suit seeking a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to one half share in the suit property, for partition and separate possession thereof and other consequential reliefs in regard to the above referred instruments.
The defendants, including the applicants-defendant Nos. 13 and 14, filed applications seeking rejection of the plaint, primarily on two counts. First, since late Hirabai was not the daughter born to Geetabai by late Ramchandra Galande, she was not entitled to inherit the property left behind by late Ramchandra Galande. Thus the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. Second the suit was hopelessly barred by law of limitation.
The applications were resisted by the plaintiffs.
By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge was persuaded to reject the application observing, inter alia, that the plaint did disclose a cause of action as Hirabai, being a biological daughter of Geetabai, was entitled to succeed to the estate left behind by Geetabai irrespective of the fact that she was not born to Geetabai by late Ramchandra Galande. Second, the learned Civil Judge was of the view that the averments in the plaint, if read as a whole, indicated that the plaintiffs had knowledge about the various testamentary instruments executed by late Hirabai and the instruments inter vivos executed by Geetabai and other defendants, in the year 2025 only. Therefore, the suit instituted in the year 2026 seeking declaration qua those instruments was ex-facie not barred by law of limitation. Thus, no case was made out for the rejection of the plaint at the threshold by invoking the power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”).
Being aggrieved, defendant nos. 13 and 14 have preferred this revision application.
I have heard Mr. Girish Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate, for the applicants, Mr. Atul Damle, the learned Senior Advocate, for respondent Nos. 1 to 4, Mr. Surel Shah, the learned Senior Advocate, for respondent Nos. 5 to 8, Mr. Shreyas Zarkar, the learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 9, 11 to 13, 15, 16 and 18 and Mr. Prashant Jadhav, the learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 10, 14 and 17. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record, especially the averments in the plaint.
Mr. Girish Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate for the revision applicants, submitted that the learned Civil Judge did not properly appreciate the object of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. A suit of the present nature, where the successor-in-interest of a step-daughter of the original holder of the suit property, who was under no circumstances entitled to succeed to the estate of such original holder, have approached the Civil Court, after the demise of the step-daughter, the provision contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code finds its practical application. The very object of nipping a frivolous and abortive proceeding in the bud would be defeated if the plaint of the present nature is not rejected by exercising power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The learned Civil Judge unjustifiably declined to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him though a very strong case was made out from the very averments in the plaint, submitted Mr. Godbole.
Mr. Godbole laid emphasis on the fact that, Hirabai lived for almost 23 years of the demise of Geetabai. Yet, during her lifetime, Hirabai never asserted her right, title and interest in the suit property in her capacity as the daughter of Geetabai. Nor Hirabai ever questioned any of the transactions entered into by the defendants during the said 23 long years. What accentuates the situation is the fact that, the plaintiffs claim to be very much on the suit property, albeit in a small portion of 200 sq ft for running a business and, yet, the plaintiffs feigned ignorance about the transactions executed by the defendants and Geetabai during her lifetime, and by resorting to clever drafting baldly asserted that the cause of action arose in the year 2025 when they were allegedly restrained from continuing the fabrication business from the suit property. The learned Civil Judge thus ought to have read the plaint in a meaningful and not a formalistic manner. The Courts have frowned upon such clever drafting which creates an illusion of a cause of action. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Godbole placed reliance on a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kumar Beharay Properties LLP, through its Authorized Signatory Vs Rajesh Chandrakant Shinde and Ors.1
Mr. Godbole further submitted that, even if the case of the plaintiffs is taken at par by way of demurer, yet, it becomes evident that during her life time, Geetabai had divested herself of all the right, title and interest in the suit property, initially by executing the registered Wills and, thereafter, by executing various instruments in favour of defendant No.11. Thus, on the date Geetabai passed away, she had not left behind any estate and, therefore, the claim of the plaintiffs that Hirabai became the absolute owner of one half interest in the suit property is ex-facie untenable.
Emphasis was laid by Mr. Godbole on the fact that all the instruments in respect of which declarations are sought by the plaintiffs have been duly registered. This factor singularly demolishes the case of the plaintiffs that they had no knowledge about the instruments in question as the registered instruments constitute a constructive notice.
In opposition to this, Mr. Atul Damle, the learned Senior Advocate, for respondent Nos.1 to 4-plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 stoutly submitted that the very premise of the applicants that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action was completely misconceived. It is not the requirement of law that the son or daughter who succeeds to the estate of a female Hindu dying intestate under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ought to have been born to the husband whose property the female Hindu had inherited. The only qualification to succeed to the property left behind by Hindu female, who dies intestate, is to be a son or daughter. Therefore, in the case at hand, the fact that Hirabai was born to Geetabai by her first husband was not determinative of Hirabai's entitlement to succeed to the estate left behind by Geetabai. Hirabai was entitled to succeed to the estate left behind by Geetabai to the exclusion of the heirs of her husband. To buttress this submission, Mr. Damle placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Rama Ananda Patil Vs Appa Bhima Redekar and Ors.2
Mr. Damle further submitted that, in any event, limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. In the backdrop of the averments in the plaint, by no stretch of imagination, could it be said that the suit is ex-facie barred by law of limitation. At any rate, even if the prayer for declarations in regard to the instruments in question is considered to be barred by limitation yet since the plaintiffs are seeking partition and separate possession of their share in the suit properties, the plaint cannot be rejected in part. To this end, a strong reliance was placed by Mr. Damle on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain and Ors,3 wherein it was enunciated that there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code and even if one relief survives, plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.
Mr. Surel Shah, the learned Senior Advocate for respondent-defendant Nos. 5 to 8 also supplemented the submissions of Mr. Damle. It was urged that the application for rejection of the plaint proceeded on an erroneous impression of law. The plaintiffs had pleaded a clear cause of action.
On the aspect of the limitation, Mr. Shah would urge, at the stage of consideration of an application for rejection of the plaint, the averments in the plaint in regard to the knowledge of essential facts and documents which furnish a cause of action, will have to be accepted as correct. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs have made clear and unequivocal averments that they came to know about the instruments in question and the intent of the defendants in the year 2025 only, when they were tried to be restrained from carrying out the business from the suit property.
In such a situation the fact that the instruments in question have been executed prior to certain years, cannot be a sustainable ground for the rejection of the plaint. In order to lend support to the aforesaid submission, Mr. Shah placed a very strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Daliben Valjibhai and Ors Vs Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai and Anr.4
The contours of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of the Code which empower the Court to reject the Plaint for the causes set out in clause (a) to (f) of sub-rule (1) are fairly well recognized. The power under Order VII Rule 11 can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The stage of the proceeding does not matter. What is of decisive signifcance is the averments in the Plaint. To arrive at a decision as to whether a plaint is required to be rejected, for not disclosing a cause of action or being barred by any law, only the averments in the Plaint are germane. The pleas in defence are wholly irrelevant. The Plaint is required to be read as a whole. The averments in the Plaint are required to be read in a meaningful manner. It is not the formal reading of the Plaint but a meaningful reading which would serve as the light-house to find out whether the Plaint discloses a cause of action or by resorting to clever drafting an illusion of a cause of action is created. These principles are well settled by a catena of decisions. (T. Arivandandam vs T. V. Satyapal & Another,5 The Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. M/s Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee6 and Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (d) Thru L.Rs. & Ors.7)
Evidently, the first ground of the plaint not disclosing a cause of action was premised on late Hirabai not being the daughter of late Ramchandra Galande. A contention was sought to be advanced before the trial Court that since Geetabai had succeeded to the estate of late Ramchandra Galande, even if the plaintiffs case was taken at par, Hirabai could never be the heir of late Ramchandra Galande and, therefore, she was not entitled to succeed to the estate of late Ramchandra Galande. The said contention was justifiably repelled by the learned Civil Judge.
From perusal of the averments in the plaint, it becomes explicitly clear that the plaintiffs case was that after the demise of late Ramchandra Galande, the suit property devolved on Geetabai; the widow, Dattatray; the son, and Satyabhama; the daughter of Ramchandra Galande. Subsequently, there was a partition among Geetabai, Dattatray and Satyabhama. Only the share of Satyabhama was carved out and Geetbai and Dattatray continued to remain joint as is evident from the Partition Deed dated 1st March 2000. During the lifetime of Geetabai, there was no partition between her and Dattatray. Therefore, after the demise of Geetabai, Hirabai; her daughter, could lay claim over one half undivided share in the suit property on the premise that she succeeded to the entire estate left behind by Geetabai.
In the backdrop of these aforesaid facts, it becomes abundantly clear that the plaintiffs claim does not rest on Hirabai being a heir of Ramchandra Galande but is premised on Hirabai being the only daughter of Geetabai and thus having succeeded to the estate left behind by Geetabai, exclusively. In this situation, the source of the property becomes inconsequential. What assumes significance is, whether Geetabai had left behind any estate intestate and not the source from which Geetabai had inherited the said estate.
The expression “sons and daughters” under Section 15 (1)(a) of the Hind Succession Act, 1956, simply means the sons and daughters born to the female Hindu dying intestate, without any reference to the husband by whom those sons and daughters, were born to her. Therefore, the endeavour on the part of the applicants to link the entitlement of Hirabai to succeed to the estate of Geetabai with the source from which the property had devolved upon Geetabai, cannot be countenanced.
The reliance by Mr. Damle on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rama Ananda Patil (Supra) is well founded. In the said case, the Division Bench considered the question, whether a son by the first husband of a female Hindu is entitled to succeed to the property on her death inherited by her from her second husband under Section 15 of the Act, 1956.
After a textual and contextual interpretation of the provisions contained in Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Division Bench concluded that there was no warrant to assume that the legislature intended to deprive the sons and daughters or their children from inheritance of the property left by a female Hindu dying intestate merely because they were born to her from some other husband than the one from whom the property in dispute was inherited by the female Hindu.
The Division Bench inter alia observed that the property contemplated in Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 is all property held by female Hindu at the time of her death without reference to the source whether acquired by her either by her own learning and exertions or by a gift or under a Will or by inheritance from some relatives other than those referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 15. The sources of the acquisition of the property by a female Hindu could be diverse and any of her husbands may not have any connection even directly or indirectly with such acquisitions. The sons and daughters referred to in Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 15, therefore, can mean her sons and daughters born to her from any of her husband.
The aforesaid being the position in law and in the light of the clear and categorical avermenrts in the plaint that Hirabai succeeded to the estate left behind by Geetabai as her daughter, the plaint discloses a clear cause of action. The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, will within his rights in observing that the plaint did disclose a cause of action.
On the aspect of the bar of limitation, the fulcrum of the submission on behalf of the applicants was that the registered instruments were executed by Geetabai, during her lifetime. Geetbai had executed two testamentary instruments bequeathing the properties to Dattatray. Geetbai had also executed five Sale Deeds on 29th December 2000 alongwith late Dattatray and his family members. Subsequently, registered Development Agreement and Power of Attorney were executed on 13th August 2002, and, thereafter Deed of Assignment and Power of Attorney were executed by defendant No.11 in favour of defeated No.13, the applicant herein. Though Hirabai passed away after 23 years of the demise of Geetabai, during her lifetime Hirabai never challenged any of the aforesaid registered instruments nor sought partition of the suit properties on the premise that she succeeded to the one half share of Geetabai. Registered instruments constitute a constructive and public notice. Therefore, the learned Civil Judge ought not to have considered the self-serving averments in the plaint that the plaintiffs became aware of those instruments in the year 2025.
Mr. Godbole would urge that the decision in the case of Kumar Beharay Properties LLP, through its Authorized Signatory (Supra) is on all the four with the facts of the case at hand as in that case as well, the suit was instituted after a decade of the demise of the father of the plaintiffs therein. In the said case, this Court, after following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi Vs Anand Kumar8 and applying the principle therein to the facts in that case, observed that the plaintiff was attempting to reignite the case after his father who had notice of the registered instruments slept over the same during his lifetime for 24 long years. The father of the plaintiffs therein had not challenged the registered instruments and thus the suit instituted by the plaintiff after the death of his father was clearly barred by law of limitation.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law that where it is evident from the averments in the plaint that the suit is hopelessly barred by law of limitation, plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, irrespective of the fact that the issue of limitation is generally a mixed question of law and fact and has to be decided after appraisal of evidence (Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. V/s. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Anr9). However, to invoke the provisions contained in Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11, to reject the plaint at the threshold on the ground that it is barred by law of limitation, the Court after perusal of the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto, ought to be in a position to draw an exonerable inference that the suit is ex-facie barred by law of limitation. Generally, the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and warrants adjudication at the trial. It is equally well-settled that the bar of limitation ought to be self-evident from the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto and the defence raised by the defendant, is not at all germane at that stage.
The learned Civil Judge was of the view that from the perusal of the averments in the plaint, it prima facie appeared that the knowledge about the aforesaid registered instruments was obtained by the plaintiffs in the year 2025, after they were prohibited from conducting business from the suit properties. Conversely, it did not became evident from the averments in the plaint that the plaintiffs had knowledge about the said instrument at a prior point in time.
The aforesaid view of the learned Civil Judge cannot be said to be in dissonance with the law. The knowledge about the essential facts which gives rise to cause of action to seek declaration, actual or constructive, ought to be discernible from the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto. In all cases where the challenge is to the registered instruments, it cannot be laid down an immutable rule of law that the person challenging those instruments must be deemed to have knowledge about the same from the date of registration. The attendant facts and circumstances bear upon the aspect of knowledge.
In the case of Daliben Valjibhai and Ors (Supra), on which reliance was placed by Mr. Shah, the Supreme Court did not approve the view of the High Court that in cases where the document was registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration. The Supreme Court, after adverting to the earlier precedents in the cases of P. V. Guru Rai Reddy Vs P. Neeradha Reddy10 and Chhotanben Vs Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar11 concluded that the High Court was not justified in holding that the limitation period commenced from the date of registration. The observations of the Supreme Court, in paragraphs 10 to 13 read as under:
“10.The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration.
11.This Court had to deal with a similar situation in P. V. Guru Rai Reddy (Supra). A suit instituted by the plaintiff in the year 2002 for cancellation of sale deed of year 1979 on the ground that the knowledge of fraud was acquired only in 1999, was objected to by the defendant in an application under Order 7 Rule 11 on the ground that it is barred by limitation. This Court held:
“5.Rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC is a drastic power conferred in the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. The conditions precedent to the exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, therefore, are stringent and have been consistently held to be so by the Court. It is the averments in the plaint that have to be read as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law. At the stage of exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11, the stand of the defendants in the written statement or in the application for rejection of the plaint is wholly immaterial. It is only if the averments in the plaint ex facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof the suit appears to be barred under any law the plaint can be rejected. In all other situations, the claims will have to be adjudicated in the course of the trial.
6.In the present case, reading the plaint as a whole and proceeding on the basis that the averments made therein are correct, which is what the Court is required to do, it cannot be said that the said pleadings ex facie disclose that the suit is barred by limitation or is barred under any other provision of law. The claim of the plaintiffs with regard to the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action as pleaded will have to be accepted as correct. At the stage of consideration of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 the stand of the defendants in the written statement would be altogether irrelevant.”
12.Further, in Chhotanben (Supra) where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:
“15.What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18-10- 1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant- plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us. … … …
19.In the present case, we find that the appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d)CPC.”
13.In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.”
In the case of P. V. Guru Rai Reddy (Supra), the Supreme Court has enunciated in clear and explicit terms that the claim of the plaintiff with regard to the knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action as pleaded will have to be accepted as correct.
If the averments in the plaint in regard to the knowledge of the plaintiffs of the aforesaid registered instruments are appraised in the light of the aforesaid principles, the view of the trial Court appears justifiable.
In any event, the plaintiffs are seeking partition and separate possession of their share in the suit properties. The said relief, cannot be said to be barred by law of limitation. It is trite, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected as partial rejection of the plaint is impermissible. Thus, no interference is warranted with the impugned order.
It is, however, necessary to clarify that the aforesaid observations or for that matter the observations in the impugned order, were confined to determine the prayer for rejection of the plaint and the trial Court shall adjudicate the issue of limitation without being influenced by the observations in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the impugned order that all the reliefs in the plaint appeared to have been sought well within the limitation and were not barred by law of limitation.
Hence, the following order:
: O R D E R :
Civil Revision Application stands rejected.
No costs.
