Sayyad Aslam Ali Vs The Central Bureau Of Investigation
Bombay High Court · Nagpur Bench · 05 Nov 2026 · Mehroz K. Pathan, J
Judgment
Heard Mr. Khandewale, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sathianathan, Special Public Prosecutor for C.B.I./respondent.
The present appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge (CBI) (under the Prevention of Corruption Act), Bhandara, in Special Criminal C.B.I. (A.C.B.) Case No. 7/2009, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.
The case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that on 02.09.2009, the accused visited the shop of the complainant, Ramu, and demanded an amount of Rs. 2,500/- from him, stating that if he wished to graze his cattle on the railway line, he would have to pay the said amount, failing which the accused would not permit him to graze his buffaloes on the railway line. The accused directed the complainant to pay the said amount on 03.09.2009 at Railway Gate, Sirsi. The accused also threatened the complainant that, in case of non-payment, he would implicate him in a false case. As the complainant was unwilling to pay the bribe amount, he approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.) Office, Bhandara, where he was advised to approach the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'the C.B.I.') Office at Nagpur. Accordingly, on 02.09.2009, the complainant visited the C.B.I. Office, Nagpur, and lodged a written complaint in Marathi against the accused, alleging a demand of bribe of Rs. 2,500/-. Thereafter, the Police Inspector of the C.B.I., Nagpur, prepared a plan of action and summoned two independent panch witnesses. The complainant was introduced to the panch witnesses, and the contents of the complaint were also shown to them. The C.B.I. officer thereafter undertook verification of the complaint by arranging for and recording the conversation between the accused and the complainant. During the course of negotiations between them, the amount of bribe demanded by the accused was allegedly reduced from Rs. 2,500/- to Rs. 1,800/-.
The demonstration regarding the use and detection of phenolphthalein powder was given to the complainant and the panch witnesses. The complainant produced three currency notes of Rs. 500/-denomination each and three currency notes of Rs. 100/- denomination each, totalling Rs. 1,800/-. Phenolphthalein powder was applied to the said currency notes, and the serial numbers thereof were duly noted down. Thereafter, the personal search of the complainant was conducted by the C.B.I. officers. Panch witness Shri Ghosh was instructed to accompany the complainant as a shadow witness, whereas the other panch witness, Shri Ashtikar, was instructed to remain with the C.B.I. raiding party, which was to conduct the raid upon receiving a pre-determined signal from the complainant. Accordingly, a detailed pre-trap panchanama was drawn up recording the aforesaid proceedings.
On 03.09.2009, the complainant, accompanied by Panch Witness No. 1, Shri Ghosh, proceeded to Sirsi Railway Gate on the complainant's Bajaj M-80 motorcycle. The complainant approached the accused, who was present at Sirsi Railway Gate. The accused allegedly demanded and accepted the bribe amount of Rs. 1,800/- from the complainant and kept the said amount in the right rear pocket of his black-coloured trousers. Thereafter, the complainant gave the pre-determined signal by wiping his face with his left hand. Upon receiving the said signal, the C.B.I. officers, along with Panch Witness No. 2, Shri Ashtikar, immediately rushed to the spot and challenged the accused regarding the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount of Rs. 1,800/- from the complainant. The C.B.I. officers thereafter conducted tests on the hands of the accused and the complainant using a sodium bicarbonate solution. Other requisite tests were also conducted using the said solution. Subsequently, a detailed post-trap panchanama was prepared. The tainted currency notes, the trousers worn by the accused and the chemical solutions used during the tests were seized by the C.B.I. officers under the seizure panchanama.
The investigation of the case was conducted by P.I. (C.B.I.) Patil. Upon completion of the investigation, the case papers were forwarded to the Assistant Divisional Engineer, S.E.C. Railway, Tumsar Road, for obtaining sanction to prosecute the accused. Accordingly, sanction for prosecution came to be accorded by the said authority on 28.11.2009. As the investigating officer found sufficient evidence against the accused, P.I. (C.B.I.) Patil, charge-sheet was filed against him for the offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Khandewale, submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredient of demand of illegal gratification. It was contended that, as per the complaint lodged by the complainant, the accused-appellant had allegedly demanded an amount of Rs.2,500/-. However, the amount allegedly accepted by the appellant as illegal gratification was Rs. 1,800/-. The learned counsel submitted that even the alleged demand of Rs. 1,800/-has not been established by the prosecution. It was further submitted that there was no proper verification of the alleged demand made by the appellant on 02.09.2009. The witnesses examined by the prosecution have denied having heard the appellant making any demand for illegal gratification. The conversation between the complainant and the accused was not heard by the shadow panch witness. It was also contended that the complaint dated 02.09.2009 was not duly verified. The learned counsel further pointed out that Prosecution Witness No.1- Rama Madankar, in his deposition, stated that he had merely handed over an amount of Rs.1,800/-to the accused. There was also a material discrepancy in the evidence regarding the person who had taken out the currency notes from the pocket of the appellant. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt.
The learned counsel for the appellant, further submitted that, Prosecution Witness No. 3- Sujitkumar, in his evidence with regard to the verification panchanama, admitted that the accused had not made any demand of Rs. 1,800/- from the complainant. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the prosecution had grossly failed to establish the demand of illegal gratification by the accused-appellant. It was contended that, in the absence of proof of demand, the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, could not be invoked to sustain the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 13 of the said Act. The learned counsel further submitted that the pre-trap panchanama was recorded on 02.09.2009 between 08:00 a.m. and 12:45 p.m., whereas Prosecution Witness No. 3 admitted that Prosecution Witness No. 1 had given the pre-determined signal at 12:30 p.m. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the alleged acceptance of the bribe amount had taken place even before the completion of the pre-trap panchanama. He submitted that the prosecution's case was rendered doubtful by this material inconsistency, particularly when Prosecution Witness No.1 had stated in his deposition that he had given the signal for conducting the trap at 12:30 p.m., whereas the pre-trap panchanama indicates that it was being prepared between 08:00 a.m. and 12:45 p.m. It was further pointed out that the printout of the pre-trap panchanama was taken at 12:45 p.m. and that the panch witnesses had thereafter appended their signatures to the said document. According to the learned counsel, these circumstances create serious doubt regarding the genuineness and authenticity of both the pre-trap and post-trap panchanamas. He contended that the said documents were concocted and prepared at the convenience of the prosecution with a view to somehow implicate the appellant in the present crime. The learned counsel submitted that the learned Trial Court had failed to consider these vital discrepancies in the prosecution evidence while recording the conviction of the appellant. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.
The learned counsel, further submitted that, Prosecution Witness Nos. 1 and 3 had stated that the complaint bore the signatures of the complainant and the panch witness. However, Prosecution Witness No. 4-Rajendra, in his deposition, stated that the complaint had been signed by the complainant, the panch witness and the Superintendent of Police (S.P.). The learned counsel pointed out that the complaint (Exhibit 35) does not bear the signature of the Superintendent of Police. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the testimony of Prosecution Witness No. 4 is inconsistent with the depositions of Prosecution Witness Nos. 1 and 3, thereby creating further doubt regarding the prosecution's case.
The learned counsel for the appellant, further submitted that, the aforesaid discrepancy was material and went to the root of the matter. Therefore, the prosecution evidence, being inconsistent is liable to be discarded. The learned counsel further submitted that the post-trap panchanama commenced at 12:45 p.m. and concluded at 17:25 hours on 03.09.2009. However, the prosecution had examined only one panch witness, whereas Panch Witness No. 2-Ganesh Ashtikar, was not examined by the prosecution. It was further contended that the evidence of the examined panch witness suffers from several discrepancies when compared with the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence. In this regard, the learned counsel pointed out that Prosecution Witness No. 3 admitted that Prosecution Witness No. 1, the complainant, had given the pre-determined signal at 12:30 p.m. However, the post-trap panchanama indicates that Prosecution Witness No. 3, while narrating the incident for the purpose of recording the panchanama, stated that he, along with the complainant, had proceeded towards the Sirsi Gate at 13:05 hours. Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is a material discrepancy between the timings mentioned in the pre-trap and post-trap panchanamas and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. These inconsistencies, according to him, go to the root of the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court, therefore, ought to have disbelieved the prosecution evidence.
The learned counsel for the appellant, further submitted that the panch witnesses must be shown to be independent and reliable witnesses before their testimony can be relied upon to establish recovery. According to him, in the present case, the evidence of the panch witness does not inspire confidence and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to establish the alleged recovery of the tainted currency notes. The learned counsel further challenged the validity of the sanction granted by Prosecution Witness No. 2, the sanctioning authority. He submitted that the sanctioning authority had admitted in his cross-examination that he was not the appointing authority of the appellant. According to the learned counsel, the authority competent to remove the appellant from service alone was competent to grant sanction for his prosecution. He pointed out that the sanctioning authority was working as a Senior Divisional Engineer and had himself admitted that he was not the appointing authority of the appellant and was not competent to remove him from service. On the basis of the aforesaid admission, the learned counsel contended that the sanction order was invalid and contrary to the protection contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, such an invalid sanction could not have been relied upon by the learned Trial Court to record the conviction of the appellant. The impugned judgment and order is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside.
The learned counsel further submitted that Prosecution Witness No. 2 had narrated an entirely different version regarding Virendra Bisen Deshmukh, the relative of Prosecution Witness No.1, and the alleged demand made approximately 15 days prior to 02.09.2009. According to the learned counsel, this version was inconsistent with the prosecution case and further created doubt regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the allegations levelled against the appellant.
The learned counsel for the appellant, further submitted that, the aforesaid story was not even narrated by the complainant in his complaint dated 02.09.2009. He contended that the sanction order refers to an incident pertaining to Shri Virendra Deshmukh, which was never mentioned in the original complaint. According to the learned counsel, the inclusion of such an incident in the sanction order clearly demonstrates non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the sanction granted for prosecution of the appellant was invalid and unsustainable in law. The impugned judgment and order, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned counsel for the appellant, further submitted that the prosecution had failed to duly prove the voice sample of the appellant and the alleged transcription of the conversation. He contended that mere reliance upon selected words allegedly spoken by the appellant could not, by itself, establish his guilt. It was further submitted that, in the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the alleged electronic transcription was wholly inadmissible in evidence and could not have been relied upon by the learned Trial Court to record the conviction of the appellant. On this ground also, the impugned judgment and order is liable to be quashed and set aside and the appellant deserved to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him.
The learned counsel further submitted that the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is not automatic and cannot be invoked mechanically. Such a presumption can be drawn in favour of the prosecution only after the prosecution initially discharges its burden of establishing the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification in accordance with law. In the absence of proof of the essential ingredient of demand, the presumption under Section 20 of the said Act could not be invoked to sustain the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 13 of the Act. It is further contended that mere recovery of tainted currency notes from the possession of the appellant would not, by itself, be sufficient to establish his guilt. The appellant had specifically taken a defence that the amount of Rs.1,800/- was intended to be handed over to one Kasimbhai and was not meant for the appellant. The learned counsel submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish that the said amount was demanded or accepted by the appellant as illegal gratification.
The learned counsel for the appellant, reiterated that the sanction order was doubtful, the panch witnesses had not fully supported the prosecution case. He further submitted that the alleged demand of Rs.2,500/- attributed to the appellant was also not established through reliable and cogent evidence. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is based on weak piece of evidence. He accordingly prayed that the appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence be quashed and set aside, and the appellant be acquitted of the offences charged against him.
Mr. Sathianathan, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the C.B.I./respondent, submits that the impugned judgment and order is legal, proper and justified and, therefore, deserves to be maintained. In support of his submissions, he places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mukut Bihari and Another v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 642, and submits that the testimony of a reliable witness does not necessarily require corroboration by another witness, particularly when such testimony stands corroborated by other material available on record. Mr. Sathianathan further submits that even assuming that the shadow witness has not supported the prosecution's case, as contended by the appellant, the same would not, by itself, render the entire testimony of the other prosecution witnesses unreliable. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submits that when tainted currency notes are recovered from the possession of an accused, it is incumbent upon the accused to explain the circumstances in which he came into possession of such money. In the present case, the tainted currency note has been recovered from the possession of the appellant, who has failed to offer any satisfactory explanation in that regard. According to him, such recovery, coupled with the absence of any explanation from the appellant, justifies drawing an adverse presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. He, therefore, submits that the learned Trial Court has rightly relied upon the said circumstance while recording its findings, and no interference with the impugned judgment and order is warranted. Mr. Sathianathan, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, also refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D. and Another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 753. However, he fairly submits that the said judgment deals with the issue of conducting a preliminary enquiry in cases involving disproportionate assets and, therefore, the same has no direct relevance to the controversy involved in the present appeal. Lastly, the learned Special Public Prosecutor submits that the impugned judgment and order has been passed after appreciation and discussion of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment and order does not call for any interference and prays that the appeal be dismissed as being devoid of merit.
I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge (CBI) (under the Prevention of Corruption Act), Bhandara, in Special Criminal C.B.I. (A.C.B.) Case No. 7/2009. I have also perused the evidence of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. The record reveals that the initial complaint lodged by the complainant was to the effect that the accused/appellant had demanded an amount of ₹2,500/- by way of illegal gratification for permitting the complainant to graze his cattle on the land belonging to the Railway Department. The complaint dated 02.09.2009 specifically refers to the alleged demand of ₹2,500/-. However, the prosecution has failed to establish that the said demand was duly verified. The testimony of prosecution witness No.1 (PW-1) is silent on the aspect of verification of the initial demand. Furthermore, there is no specific evidence establishing that the accused/appellant had subsequently demanded an amount of ₹1,800/-. Nevertheless, the prosecution alleges that the said amount of ₹1,800/- was accepted by the accused/appellant on 03.09.2009. Though PW-1 has deposed that the accused/appellant accepted an amount of ₹1,800/-, his testimony, when considered in the light of the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses, raises material doubts regarding the alleged demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. There is also a material discrepancy in the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3 regarding the place from which the alleged bribe amount of ₹1,800/- was recovered and the person who actually recovered the same. Furthermore, PW-3 has categorically stated that he did not hear the conversation between the accused/appellant and the complainant relating to the alleged demand of ₹1,800/-. PW-3 has also admitted that the accused/appellant did not demand an amount of ₹1,800/-from the complainant. It is well settled that the demand for illegal gratification is a sine qua non for establishing an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes, in the absence of cogent and reliable evidence establishing the demand for illegal gratification, would not, by itself, be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.
There are serious discrepancies in the evidence relating to the verification of the initial demand and the subsequent alleged demand for illegal gratification. The initial complaint was in respect of an alleged demand of ₹2,500/-, whereas the amount allegedly accepted by the accused/appellant was ₹1,800/-. The complaint was lodged on 02.09.2009, whereas, according to the panch witnesses, the verification of the complaint was carried out on 03.09.2009 while they were travelling in the vehicle. Thus, the prosecution evidence does not satisfactorily explain the circumstances in which the alleged demand of ₹1,800/- came to be made in place of the original demand of ₹2,500/-. There is yet another material discrepancy concerning the timing of the pre-trap proceedings. The pre-trap panchanama is stated to have been prepared between 08:00 a.m. and 12:45 p.m. on 03.09.2009. However, as per the deposition of PW-3, the pre-decided signal was given at 12:30 p.m. The record further indicates that the printout of the pre-trap panchanama was taken at 12:45 p.m. If the pre-trap panchanama was still being prepared and its printout was taken at 12:45 p.m., the version of PW-3 that the pre-decided signal had already been given at 12:30 p.m. raises a serious question regarding the chronology of the trap proceedings. The same, therefore, casts a serious doubt on the prosecution's version of the trap proceedings. Furthermore, the complaint dated 02.09.2009 is alleged to have been verified on 03.09.2009 by the panch witnesses in the presence of the Investigating Officer, Rajendra. In this regard, PW-1 and PW-3 have stated that the complaint bears the signatures of the complainant and PW-3, who was Panch No. 1. However, PW-4, in his deposition, has stated that the complaint bears the signatures of the complainant, the panch witnesses and the Superintendent of Police. A perusal of Exhibit-35, however, reveals that the same does not bear the signature of the Superintendent of Police. Thus, the statement of PW-4 is clearly at variance with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3, as well as the documentary evidence on record. These discrepancies relate to the verification of the initial demand, the amount allegedly demanded, the chronology of the pre-trap proceedings and the authenticity of the documentary record relied upon by the prosecution. These inconsistencies go to the root of the prosecution case and create a serious doubt regarding the reliability of the alleged trap proceedings.
PW-3 has deposed that Panch No. 2 took out the alleged bribe amount from the right-side back pocket of the trouser worn by the accused/appellant. However, the complainant, in his deposition, has stated that the said amount was taken out by the CBI officials. Thus, there is a material discrepancy in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the person who actually recovered the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused/appellant. Significantly, Panch No. 2-Ganesh Ashtikar, who is stated by PW-3 to have recovered the amount, has not been examined by the prosecution. Consequently, the aforesaid discrepancy has remained unexplained. This omission assumes significance in the facts of the present case and further creates a serious doubt regarding the prosecution's version of the alleged recovery. Furthermore, on perusal of the post-trap panchanama, it appears that PW-3 has stated that he, along with the complainant, proceeded towards Sirsi Railway Gate at 13:05 hours. However, PW-3 has also admitted that PW-1 had given the pre-decided signal at 12:30 hours. Thus, the chronology of events emerging from the pre-trap and post-trap panchanamas, when considered with the oral testimony of PW-3, gives rise to material inconsistencies regarding the sequence of events during the trap proceedings. The material discrepancies concerning the alleged demand, the sequence of trap proceedings and the recovery of the tainted currency notes collectively create a serious doubt regarding the prosecution's case. It is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for establishing the offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the absence of cogent and reliable evidence establishing such demand, mere recovery of tainted currency notes, by itself, cannot be treated as sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredient of demand beyond reasonable doubt.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B. Jayaraj vs State of A.P, reported in (2014)5 SCC (Cri.) 543 was pleased to observe as under :
“7.In so far as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma Vs. State of A.P. and C.M. Girish Babu Vs. C.B.I.
8.In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P-11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive in so far as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.
9.In so far as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”
Thus, from the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), it is evident that the prosecution must first establish the demand for illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. Unless such foundational fact is established, the presumption contemplated under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be invoked in favour of the prosecution. The initial complaint was not duly verified, and the shadow panch was merely a witness to the alleged acceptance of the amount and not to the demand of illegal gratification. Furthermore, the evidence on record does not satisfactorily establish that the accused/appellant had made the alleged demand. Thus, the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the essential ingredient of demand of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Now, insofar as the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant regarding the invalidity of the sanction for prosecution is concerned, it is pertinent to note that PW-2, the Sanctioning Authority, has admitted in his deposition that he was not the appointing authority of the appellant. Furthermore, the sanction order dated 28.11.2009 suffers from serious infirmities and reflects apparent non-application of mind. A perusal of the said sanction order reveals that it narrates an entirely different factual story concerning one Virendra Bisen Deshmukh and refers to an alleged demand made approximately fifteen days prior to the incident in question. Significantly, no such allegation finds place in the complaint dated 02.09.2009, the pre-trap panchanama, the post-trap panchanama or even in the deposition of PW-1, the complainant. Interestingly, Virendra Bisen Deshmukh, whose name and alleged involvement find mention in the sanction order, has not been examined as a witness by the prosecution. The aforesaid circumstances raise a serious doubt as to whether the Sanctioning Authority had independently applied its mind to the facts and material collected during the course of investigation before according sanction for prosecution of the appellant. The incorporation of an entirely different factual narrative, which does not find support in the prosecution evidence, is a material circumstance indicative of non-application of mind. Furthermore, the competence of the authority granting sanction is also required to be examined in the light of the applicable statutory provisions and the authority competent to remove the appellant from service. The admission of PW-2 that he was not the appointing authority of the appellant assumes significance in this context and requires consideration while determining the validity of the sanction. In view of the aforesaid material infirmities, particularly the apparent non-application of mind reflected in the sanction order dated 28.11.2009, the validity of the sanction granted for prosecution of the appellant becomes seriously doubtful. The learned Trial Court, therefore, could not have mechanically relied upon such sanction while recording the conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Another important aspect which requires consideration is the admissibility and evidentiary value of the audio recording relied upon by the prosecution. Admittedly, the audio recording is not accompanied by a certificate as contemplated under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Furthermore, the transcript of the said recording has not been duly proved by the prosecution. It is also pertinent to note that the Investigating Officer has failed to establish that proper precautions were taken with regard to the sealing, safe custody, preservation, accurate documentation and timely forwarding of the relevant articles to the Court. The record further indicates that only selected words from the alleged conversation have been relied upon by the prosecution for the purpose of establishing the identity of the voice of the appellant. The voice spectrographic analysis, at the highest, establishes that the specimen voice sample collected by the prosecution matches with the questioned voice recorded during the alleged conversation. In the absence of the requisite certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, wherever such certificate is legally required, and in view of the failure of the prosecution to duly prove the transcript and establish the authenticity of the electronic record, the admissibility and evidentiary value of the audio recording become seriously questionable. The learned Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence on record, has failed to consider these material aspects relating to the admissibility, authenticity and evidentiary value of the electronic record. The finding recorded by the learned Trial Court, insofar as it relies upon such electronic evidence to support the alleged demand of illegal gratification, therefore, cannot be sustained.
The learned Single Judge of this Court, in Shobha Sonba Raut v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1621, has held that mere recovery of tainted currency notes, by itself, would not be sufficient to raise the statutory presumption unless the prosecution first establishes the demand for illegal gratification. The learned Single Judge has observed as under:
“18.Now, turning towards the electronic evidence, it is to be noted that the said panchanama including the transcript of the dialogues exchanged is stated to have been prepared on the basis of what was heard from the voice recorder. No doubt, it appears that by taking out hash value the said voice recorder was sent to the forensic lab for analysis with the sample of the voice, but no efforts appears to have been taken by the prosecution to play that voice recorder or the CD prepared therefrom during the course of the testimony of P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.5. Mere submission of the certificate will not absolve the prosecution from identifying the voice before the Court. The report of the forensic lab would be in the form of opinion of an expert and the concerned authority may come to a conclusion that the voice, which has been heard in both the devices, are of the same person. But it has to be concluded that, the said voice is of the accused and that can be done only before the trial Court. Therefore, taking into consideration all the abovesaid evidence, scanning thereof and the reasons aforesaid, it cannot be said that the offence was proved by the prosecution against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, the point is answered in the negative. The appeal deserves to be allowed.”
It is well settled that the standard of proof required to be discharged by the prosecution is distinct from the standard of proof applicable to the accused. Even in cases where the burden shifts to the accused, the prosecution is required to establish the foundational facts before calling upon the accused to explain the circumstances in which the amount in question was found in his possession. Unless such foundational facts are established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be expected to discharge the burden of offering an explanation. Furthermore, while considering the applicability of the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the explanation offered by the accused is required to be examined on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, a scrutiny of the testimony of the complainant and the other prosecution witnesses, coupled with the material discrepancies and cross examination clearly shows that the complainant was nurturing grudge against the appellant/accused for quarreling and not allowing the complainant to graze his cattle near Railway line and therefore lodged FIR. The admission of the complainant in his examination brings the accused’s case within the realm of preponderance of probability. The prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offences through cogent evidence. Upon an overall appreciation of the evidence on record, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the charges against the appellant cannot be sustained. The learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material legal infirmities emerging from the prosecution evidence and has not examined the factual and legal aspects of the matter in their proper perspective. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, therefore, suffer from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence. In view of above discussion, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained. The impugned judgment and order, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Hence, I proceed to pass the following order:
ORDER
The appeal is allowed.
The impugned judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge (CBI) (under the Prevention of Corruption Act), Bhandara, in Special Criminal C.B.I. (A.C.B.) Case No. 7/2009, is hereby quashed and set side.
The appellant is acquitted for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act of 1988 for which he was charged.
The bail bonds stands cancelled.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
