Balkrishna Ganpat Gaikwad & Ors. Vs Kumudani Eknath Joshi & Ors.
Bombay High Court · 05 Nov 2026 · M.M. Sathaye, J
Judgment
Above petitions are filed challenging common judgment and order dated 29.10.1999 passed by Designated Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune (‘the Tribunal’ for short) in MRT-P-X-5/95 (B-185/95) and MRT-P-X-6/95 (B-186/95). By the said common impugned order, revisions filed by landlord under section 76 of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, (‘the said Act’, for short) against common tenant are allowed and orders of the lower authorities viz. Sub Divisional Officer, Junnar, Sub Division, Khed (Pune) (‘SDO’ for short) and Tahsildar / Agricultural Land Tribunal Khed (Pune), (‘ALT’, for short) are set aside. In effect, the applications filed by common Respondent/Agriculture tenant for fixing purchase price, are rejected.
Subject matter property of Writ Petition No. 849 of 2000 is Survey No. 81/2, which is subsequently converted to Gat No. 448 situated at Village Vadgaon, Patole, Taluka Khed, District Pune. Subject matter property of Writ Petition No. 852 of 2000 is Survey No. 35/4B which is converted into Gat No. 1007 situated at same village. In both the cases, original Petitioner Balkrishna Ganpat Gaikwad claimed to be tenant of the respective lands who had applied for fixing purchase price under section 32G of the said Act. Mr. Eknath Joshi was the original landlord.
The case of the Petitioner in short is as under.
That his name was recorded as tenant by Mutation Entry No. 2373 in June 1953. That he was cultivating the subject matter property on the Tiller’s day i.e. 01.04.1957. That in March 1958, the landlord partitioned the properties amongst family members leading to Survey No. 81 being subdivided into Survey Nos. 81/1 and 81/2 and division of Survey No. 35/4 into Survey Nos. 35/4A and 35/4B. That by Mutation Entry No. 2911 the partition was recorded in 1959. That while giving effect to the partition, the Petitioner’s name was not shown as tenant (kul) in respect of Survey No. 81/2 and Survey No.35/4B.
That Petitioner filed 32G proceedings and got the purchase price fixed. However, due to his illiteracy, he was under the impression that he has got purchase price fixed in respect of entire land i.e. Survey No. 81 and Survey No. 35/4; however, the proceedings took place and purchase price was fixed only in respect of half portions i.e. Survey No. 81/1 and 35/4A. That sometime in 1972, the consolidation scheme was implemented in the village and Survey No. 81/2 was given Gat No. 448 and Survey No. 35/4B was given Gat No. 1007.
The Petitioner realized that only half land is sold to him by fixing purchase price and he therefore approached Tahsildar by making fresh application under Section 32G of the said Act in respect of Survey No. 35/4B-Gat No. 1007 in March 1986 and in respect of Survey No. 81/2-Gat No. 448 in 1991.
That the concerned Tahsildar/ALT fixed purchase price of Survey No. 35/4B-Gat No. 1007 on 26.03.1987. The Respondent/landlord filed appeal, which was partly allowed by concerned SDO on 25.01.1991 thereby remanding the matter back for fresh inquiry.
On 30.03.1994 the concerned Tahsildar/ALT after fresh inquiry, post remand, held that the Petitioner is tenant whose name was subsequently removed while effecting partition. Purchase price of Survey No.35/4B-Gat No.1007 was fixed. Similarly, the concerned Tahsildar / ALT fixed purchase price for Survey No. 81/2-Gat No. 448 on 17.10.1994.
Both these orders were challenged by the Respondent/landlord by filing TNC Appeal No. 38 of 1994 and TNC Appeal No. 27 of 1994 under Section 74 of the said Act, before concerned SDO. On 26.07.1995, both these appeals were dismissed confirming the orders of the Tahsildar/ALT.
Against these orders the Respondent/ landlord filed the aforesaid revisions under Section 76 of the said Act before the Tribunal, in which impugned orders are passed as explained above.
It is in these circumstances that the present petitions were filed. The Petitions are admitted on 17.08.2000. No interim relief is granted in favour of the Petitioner/Tenant. During pendency of the petitions, the legal heirs of parties were brought on record.
SUBMISSIONS
Learned counsel Mr. Kanetakar appearing for the Petitioner/Tenant submitted that there is no limitation provided for proceedings under Section 32G of the said Act and therefore, the aspect of delay considered by the Tribunal is perverse. He relied upon the judgment of L.J. Kriplani since deceased by his legal heirs Vs. Manik Aditwar Patil & Ors. 2000(4) Bom.C.R. 366 in support of this submission about limitation. He submitted that written agreement is not required for the case of agricultural tenancy and there was sufficient material in the form of revenue record, especially Mutation Entry No. 2373 to indicate landlord-tenant relationship between parties. He submitted that the angle of ‘maintaining relationship with the landlord’ as noted by the Tribunal is perverse, as there is no such requirement under law. He submitted that the mutation entry showing tenancy rights are not challenged. He submitted that the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction, has committed serious illegality by interfering in the concurrent findings by the concerned Tahsildar/ALT and SDO. He relied on Bhimrao Hanmant Patil since deceased by his L.Rs. Ramrao Bhimrao Patil and Ors. Vs. Naganath Santoba Bubane and Anr. 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 232 and Maruti Bala, Raut Vs. Dashrath Babu Wathare and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 2051 in support of his case. He further submitted that the Tribunal could not have acted as a Court of first instance or as an appellate Court while dealing with the evidence.
On the other hand, Mr. Limaye learned counsel for the Respondent/Landlord submitted that the subject matter property is recorded as 'grassland' (charau-pad) which cannot be considered as agricultural activity and this aspect was directed to be considered in remand order. Inviting the Court’s attention to the evidence of the tenant, he submitted that the tenant has given various admissions about showing complete ignorance about the landlord and not paying any rent for the last 35 to 40 years. He submitted that if this evidence is minutely seen, it clearly indicates that at least since 1952, the tenant has not paid rent and therefore he cannot be considered as tenant on Tiller’s day (01.04.1957). He submitted that when the tenant himself has admitted about not paying rent, contrary mutation entry should not have been considered by the authorities. He further submitted that the rent receipts relied upon by the Petitioner/ Tenant are not in the name of Respondent/Landlord (Joshi) but the receipts are standing in the name of some Mr. Dixit; therefore the Respondent/Landlord has no concern with those rent receipts. He submitted that the Tribunal definitely had power to correct perversity which power has been exercised and therefore, no interference is required in limited writ jurisdiction. He relied on the judgment of Rahimatulla Rahiman Sarguru Vs. Bapu Hari Mane and Anr. AIR 1979 SC 1326 in support of his case that in appropriate cases the Tribunal has power to interfere with the impugned order. He also relied upon Nathubhai Gandabhai Desai Vs. State of Bombay 1954 DGLS(Bom) 16 and Pune Panjarpole Trust Vs. Baban Gabaji Saste & Ors. 2007(6) Bom.C.R. 505, in support of his case that ‘'grassland'’ cannot be considered as agricultural land and therefore, the Petitioner cannot be considered as agricultural tenant.
Mr. Kanetkar then submitted in the rejoinder that the Respondent/Landlord has not raised the ground of 'grassland' before the lower Courts.
REASONS AND CONCLUSION
I have considered the submissions carefully and perused the record.
At the outset, it is necessary to note that there is no merit in the submission of the Petitioner that the ground of subject matter property being 'grassland' is not raised before the lower authorities. Bare perusal of order passed by concerned Tahsildar/ALT dated 30.03.1994 indicates that by making clear reference to the order of remand dated 25.01.1991 in Tenancy Appeal Case No.TNC/A/7/87, ALT has mentioned that the landlord has pointed out that subject matter property Survey No. 35/4B is shown as 'grassland'. Further contention of the landlord that rent receipt is not produced is also recorded by Tahsildar/ALT. In fact, the Tahsildar has discussed this aspect of subject matter property being claimed as 'grassland'. In that view of the matter, whether subject matter property was 'grassland' or not has been a point of dispute since beginning and therefore can not be ignored.
Learned counsel for the Respondent/Landlord has fairly accepted that there is no limitation for filing an application under Section 32G of the said Act, as explained in the case of L.J. Kriplani (Supra). However, he is right in submitting that the conduct of the Petitioner in not taking any action for a very long time from 1961 to 1986 in the case of Survey No. 35/4B and from 1961 to 1991 in the case of Survey No. 81/2 for filing fresh application under Section 32G on a self-serving and self-suiting convenient ground that ‘tenant was under impression that the entire land has been sold to him instead of only half’ must be considered. This aspect requires serious attention in my considered view.
There is nothing on record which is pointed out to the Court as to why the Petitioner/Tenant waited for such a long time of 25 to 30 years to start fresh proceedings under 32G in respect of the remaining half portion of both the survey numbers. Going by the Petitioner’s case, even after consolidation proceedings took place in the village and the concerned survey numbers were converted into gat numbers, his name did not appear as tenant. Under the consolidation proceedings, the law requires issuance of notice and recording of statements which obviously took place before the lands were converted from survey numbers to gat numbers. Therefore, the very case of the Petitioner/Tenant that he was under wrong impression being illiterate is unbelievable. Tenant obviously knew what he had applied for under 32G of the said Act, which has been granted to him. It is not in dispute that the tenant has applied and got purchase price fixed in respect of Survey Nos. 81/1 and 35/4A.
It is not in dispute that the tenant has given oral evidence in the proceedings before the concerned Tahsildar/ALT. It is also not disputed that the tenant has admitted that after the death of original Landlord Mr. Eknath Joshi, he has not paid any rent to the legal heirs for last 35 to 40 years. This evidence is recorded in March 1987 and therefore taking best case for Tenant, the admission would clearly mean that the tenant has not paid any rent to the landlord at least from 1952 onwards. The original Tenant in his own application under 32G proceedings filed in the year 1986 in respect of Gat No.1007 has admitted/stated that original Landlord Eknath Joshi expired in 1954-55. If that be so, on Tiller’s day (01.04.1957) he could not have been Tenant and can not be considered as ‘deemed purchaser’. The Tribunal has considered various admissions given by the tenant and has also considered that the rent receipts produced on record do not mention gat numbers and the rent is shown to have been received by one Mr. Dixit, who is not at all the Respondent/Landlord (Mr. Joshi).
In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not believed the case of the Petitioner about being agricultural Tenant of the subject matter property. It is not in dispute that remaining half portions of both the original survey numbers viz. Survey No. 81/1 and 35/4A have been received by the Petitioner under 32G proceedings for which purchase price was fixed and he has become owner to that extent. In this context, the inaction on the part of the Petitioner for a long time in taking steps to file present 32G proceedings claiming to be tenant of remaining portions of lands also must be seen and is accordingly seen by the Tribunal.
Lastly, as noted earlier, the subject matter property being 'grassland' (charau-pad) has been a point of dispute between parties. In this respect, Division Bench of this Court, way back in 1954, in Nathubhai Gandabhai Desai (Supra), in paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 has held that the activity of cutting grass or putting up fence or keeping watch to protect the grass is not an agricultural activity/operation, either within the extended meaning of agriculture given under said Act or within its natural meaning. This view has been thereafter followed by learned single judge of this Court in the case of Pune Panjarpole Trust (Supra) in respect of lands given for grazing cattle and to cut grass.
The word charau-pad means grazing land or 'grassland'. In that view of the matter, the nature of the subject matter property ('grassland') coupled with admission of the tenant before concerned authority that no rent is paid to the heirs of original landlord dating prior to the Tiller’s day, must be considered and is accordingly considered by the Tribunal.
In Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel (2022) 4 SCC 181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“15.xxxx The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. xxxx.” (emphasis supplied)
Since the final finding in the impugned order is found justified, there is no need to interfere. Therefore, considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, view taken in the impugned order is the most probable view. This is not a fit case to interfere. Accordingly, writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.
All concerned to act on duly authenticated or digitally signed QR verifiable copy of this order.
