Shailendra Chauhan Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
Allahabad High Court · 19 Nov 2026 · Abdul Shahid, J
Judgment
Hon'Ble Abdul Shahid, J.
Heard Sri Dileep Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Raj Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Vinay Kumar Pandey, learned A.G.A. for the State and Sri Krishna Mani, learned counsel for the informant.
The present criminal appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 30.11.2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Court No. 1, Bhadohi, in Sessions Trial No. 394 of 2021 (State versus Shailendra Chauhan), arising out of Case Crime No. 251 of 2021, Police Station Bhadohi, District Bhadohi, convicting the appellant under Sections 354-A, 376, and 201 of the I.P.C., Section 67-B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Sections 9/10, 13/14, and 5(e)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
The learned Trial Court framed charges against the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan, under Sections 354-A, 376, and 201 of the I.P.C., Section 67-B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Sections 5(e), 6, 9/10, and 13/14 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The definitions of the aforesaid sections, for ready reference, are as follows:
354A. Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment.—(1)
A man committing any of the following acts--
(i)physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii)a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii)showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv)making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
(2)Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(3)Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
376. Punishment for rape.—
(1)Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine]
201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.—
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any infor-mation respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false; if a capital offence.— shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with imprisonment for life.— and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with less than ten years' imprisonment.— and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
67B. Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material depicting children in sexually explicit act, etc., in electronic form. – Whoever-
(a)publishes or transmites or causes to be published or transmitted material in any electronic form which depicts children engaged in sexually esplicit act or conduct; or
(b)creates text or digital images, collects, seeks, browses, downloads, advertises, promotes, exchanges or distributes material in any electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent or sexually explicit manner; or
(c)cultivates, entices or induces children to online relationship with one or more children for and on sexually explicit act or in a manner that may offend a reasonable adult on the computer resource; or
(d)facilitates abusing children online, or
(e)records in any electronic form own abuse or that of others pertaining to sexually explicit act with children, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either discription for a term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees:
Provided that provisions of section 67, section 67A and this section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting representation or figure in electronic form-
(i)the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing drawing, painting representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern; or
(ii)which is kept or used for bona fide heritage or religious purposes.
Explanation. -For the purposes of this section "children" means a person who has not completed the age of 18 years."
Section 5(e)-whoever being on the management or staff of a hospital, whether Government or private, commits penetrative sexual assault on a child in that institution or,
6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.—
Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person, and shall also be liable to fine, or with death.
9. Aggravated sexual assault. (a) Whoever, being a police officer, commits sexual assault on a child-
(i)within the limits of the police station or premises where he is appointed; or
(ii)in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or
(iii)in the course of his duties or otherwise; or
(iv)where he is known as, or identified as a police officer, or
(b)whoever, being a member of the armed forces or security forces, commits sexual assault on a child-
(i)within the limits of the area to which the person is deployed; or
(ii)in any areas under the command of the security or armed forces; or
(iii)in the course of his duties or otherwise; or
(iv)where he is known or identified as a member of the security or armed forces; or
(c)whoever being a public servant commits sexual assault on a child; or
(d)whoever being on the management or on the staff of a jail, or remand home or protection home or observation home, or other place of custody or care and protection established by or under any law for the time being in force commits sexual assault on a child being inmate of such jail or remand home or protection home or observation home or other place of custody or care and protection; or
(e)whoever being on the management or staff of a hospital, whether Government or private, commits sexual assault on a child in that hospital; or
(f)whoever being on the management or staff of an educational institution or religious institution, commits sexual assault on a child in that institution; or
(g)whoever commits gang sexual assault on a child.
Explanation. When a child is subjected to sexual assault by one or more persons of a group in furtherance of their common intention, each of such persons shall be deemed to have committed gang sexual assault within the meaning of this clause and each of such person shall be liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone; or
(h)whoever commits sexual assault on a child using deadly weapons, fire, heated substance or corrosive substance; or
(i)whoever commits sexual assault causing grievous hurt or causing bodily harm and injury or injury to the sexual organs of the child; or
(j)whoever commits sexual assault on a child, which-
(i)physically incapacitates the child or causes the child to become mentally ill as defined under clause (1) of section 2 of the Mental Health Act, 1987 (14 of 1987) or causes impairment of any kind so as to render the child unable to perform regular tasks, temporarily or permanently; or
() inflicts the child with Human Immunodeficiency Virus of any other life threatening disease or infection which may either temporarily on permanently impair the child by rendering him physically incapacitated, or mentally ill to perform regular tasks; or
(k)whoever, taking advantage of a child's mental or physical disability, commits sexual assault on the child: or
(l)whoever commits sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or
(m)whoever commits sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or
(n)whoever, being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent of the child, or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits sexual assault on such child; or
(o)whoever, being in the ownership or management or staff, of any institution providing services to the child, commits sexual assault on the child in such institution; or
(p)whoever, being in a position of trust or authority of a child, commits sexual assault on the child in an institution or home of the child or anywhere else; or
(q)whoever commits sexual assault on a child knowing the child is pregnant; or
(r)whoever commits sexual assault on a child and attempts to murder the child; or
(s)whoever commits sexual assault on a child in the course of [communal or sectarian violence or during any natural calamity or in any similar situations]; or
(t)whoever commits sexual assault on a child and who has been previously convicted of having committed any offence under this Act or any sexual offence punishable under any other law for the time being in force; or
(u)whoever commits sexual assault on a child and makes the child to strip or parade naked in public, is said to commit aggravated sexual assault.
(v)whoever persuades, induces, entices or coerces a child to get administered or administers or direct anyone to administer, help in getting administered any drug or hormone or any chemical substance, to a child with the intent that such child attains early sexual maturity;
10. Punishment for aggravated sexual assault. Whoever, commits
aggravated sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
13. Use of child for pornographic purposes. Whoever, uses a child in any
form of media (including programme or advertisement telecast by television channels or internet or any other electronic form or printed form, whether or not such programme or advertisement is intended for personal use or for distribution), for the purposes of sexual gratification, which includes-
(a)representation of the sexual organs of a child;
(b)usage of a child engaged in real or simulated sexual acts (with or without penetration);
(c)the indecent or obscene representation of a child, shall be guilty of the offence of using a child for pornographic purposes.
Explanation. For the purposes of this section, the expression "use a child" shall include involving a child through any medium like print, electronic, computer or any other technology for preparation, production, offering, transmitting, publishing, facilitation and distribution of the pornographic material.
[14. Punishment for using child for pornographic purposes. (1)
Whoever uses a child or children for pornographic purposes shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and shall also be liable to fine, and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years and also be liable to fine.
(2)Whoever using a child or children for pornographic purposes under sub-section (1), commits an offence referred to in section 3 or section 5 or section 7 or section 9 by directly participating in such pornographic acts, shall be punished for the said offences also under section 4, section 6, section 8 and section 10, respectively, in addition to the punishment provided in sub-section (1).]"
Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the alleged incident is dated 28.09.2021, whereas the F.I.R. was lodged after an inordinate delay on 08.10.2021, with no reasonable explanation offered for the same. The F.I.R. was registered solely against the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan, by the mother of the victim, who is the complainant. Initially, the F.I.R. was registered under Section 354-A of the I.P.C. along with Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act; however, Sections 5(e)/6, 9/10, and 13/14 of the POCSO Act and Section 67-B of the Information Technology Act were subsequently added. The primary charge sheet was filed only against the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan. Thereafter, a supplementary charge sheet was also filed against Dr. Manoj Chauhan, the proceedings of which have been stayed by this Court. Consequently, the file of Dr. Manoj Chauhan was separated, and the Sessions Trial was decided solely against the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan.
Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that three medical examinations of the victim were conducted: the first medical examination report (Ext. Ka-12), the second (Ext. Ka-13), and the third (Ext. Ka-14). He has submitted that neither any external nor any internal injury was found on the victim. He has further submitted that during the first and second medical examinations, both the victim and the complainant (the mother of the victim) refused her internal medical examination. Additionally, he has pointed out that the victim's first statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ext. Ka-3) was recorded on 08.10.2021, followed by her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ext. Ka-2) on 12.10.2021, and an additional statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 17.11.2021. He has argued that there are consistent variations and material improvements in the prosecution story as narrated by both the victim and the complainant.
Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the complainant, in her deposition as P.W.-1, stated that one Suraj Rai showed her a video; however, there is no Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report concerning the video, nor has the original video ever been produced in evidence. He has submitted that the alleged video which cannot be accepted as true and correct does not contain any picture of the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan. Furthermore, Suraj Rai, the person who allegedly showed the video to the mother of the victim, was never examined or produced by the prosecution. Hence, the foundational hypothesis sought to be created by the prosecution fails to culminate into a credible theory.
Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the victim (P.W.-2) stated in her testimony that her mother is active in politics and serves as the President of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is the ruling party in the State. Due to political pressure made by the mother, the entire investigation was distorted and a false charge sheet was submitted. It is further submitted that two separate charge sheets were filed under various sections, reflecting significant improvements during the further investigation.
Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that after the video was allegedly shown by Suraj Rai to the mother of the victim, she went directly to the police station where the Station Incharge dictated the F.I.R., upon which it was registered. Initially, the allegations were confined solely to the touching of the shoulder. Learned Senior Counsel has submitted, as an alternative argument (without admitting guilt), that even taking the entirety of the averments and collected evidence at face value, the alleged offence cannot stretch beyond the act of touching, punishable under Section 354A of the I.P.C.
It is further submitted that Dr. Shaila Qadir recorded the initial statement, wherein the only allegation was of touching, and no other allegations appeared in the victim's first statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. dated 08.10.2021. Subsequently, in the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 12.10.2021, there was likewise no allegation save for touching, and absolutely no mention of any kind of penetration or insertion of a finger. It was only in the additional statement of the victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded subsequently on 17.11.2021 that she completely improved and modified the prosecution story, an afterthought, that is neither legally admissible nor acceptable to a court of law.
Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the first charge sheet was filed by the initial Investigating Officer on 22.10.2021, after which further investigation was directed. It was for the first time during this further investigation recorded by the second Investigating Officer, Sri Chhotak Yadav, in the victim's additional statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 17.11.2021 the material improvement regarding the insertion of a finger was introduced. This constitutes a complete change in the prosecution story, which is neither justifiable nor acceptable in the eyes of law.
He has further pointed out that the second I.O., Chhotak Yadav, who deposed as P.W.-6, specifically stated that the victim refused her internal medical examination; hence, an adverse inference must be drawn against the victim, the complainant, and the entire prosecution case. Furthermore, the victim, while deposing as P.W.-2, stated that she never wept after the said incident, and there is no medical or corroborative proof of any finger insertion. After the registration of the F.I.R., nothing emerged during the initial investigation beyond the allegation of touching, and the theory of finger insertion finds no mention in either the written complaint or the First Information Report.
Learned counsel has also submitted that the alleged place of occurrence is an open, public area within the premises of a hospital. He contended that the F.I.R. was lodged out of ulterior motives due to pending house litigation, as well as collusion between the complainant and a former employee of the hospital. He argued that the victim, aged about 12 years, is a tutored witness, that there is no veracity in the alleged incident, and that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are illegal and perverse. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order are liable to be set aside, and the appeal deserves to be allowed.
Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State and learned counsel for the informant have opposed the appeal and submitted that the victim is a minor girl aged about 12 years, and the video in question was duly examined and was not found to be forged. They have further submitted that the place of incident was deliberately altered by the accused persons. It is argued that the prosecutrix has fully supported the prosecution version and is a wholly competent witness in a case of sexual assault. It is further submitted that there is neither any illegality nor any perversity in the impugned judgment, the criminal appeal is liable to be dismissed.
The genesis of the prosecution case has been initiated from a written complaint (Ext. Ka-1) dated 08.10.2021 submitted by the mother of the victim. She stated in the written complaint submitted to Police Station Bhadohi that the victim is her daughter, aged about 12 years, her date of birth is 31.05.2009. She alleged that Dr. Shailendra Chauhan, whose hospital is located in front of her house as Parvati Hospital, called her daughter on the pretext of providing tuition and books, and touched her private parts. The victim did not disclose this immediately but refused to visit the place, occasionally trying to inform her mother without being able to explain properly. Initially unable to believe it, the complainant made inquiries. On 28.09.2021, when the victim was returning from the market, Dr. Shailendra Chauhan allegedly obstructed her in the lane (gali) and, on the allurement of providing books, attempted to touch her private parts. The victim ran away, came on the road, and narrated the incident to her mother. Upon further inquiry, a co-villager, Suraj Rai, showed the complainant a video, after which she questioned her daughter, who then disclosed that the accused had been committing such acts for the last several years. As per the statement, the date of birth of the victim is 31.05.2009 and her age was 12 years at the time of incident, the allegation that the acts had been occurring for "several years" appears contradictory and lacks credibility in light of the narration in the written complaint (Ext. Ka-1). On the basis of Ext. Ka-1, the check F.I.R. was registered on 08.10.2021 under Section 354-A of the I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act against the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan.
It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lal Mandi Versus State of West Bengal, (1995) 3 SCC 603, the court opined that in an appeal against conviction, appellate court is duty bound to appreciate the evidence on record and if two views are possible on the appraisal of evidence, benefit of reasonable doubt has to be given to the accused. It is also settled position of law that graver the punishment the more stringent the proof and the obligation upon the prosecution to prove the same and establish the charged offences. It is further relied on by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Davinder Kumar Versus State of Himachal Pradesh, 2017 SCC OnLine H.P. 1644.
It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kuldip Yadav and others Versus State of Bihar 2011(2) SCC (Cri.) 632, that in the matter of the appreciation of the evidence the credibility of the evidence is more. The credibility of the witness has to be tested on the touchstone of the credibility.
The statement of the mother of the victim was recorded as P.W.-1, wherein she reiterated that the victim's date of birth is 31.05.2009. The statement of Sri Rajendra Kumar Prajapati, Principal, was also recorded as P.W.-7, who proved from school records that the date of birth is 31.05.2009 (his statement was recorded on 20.09.2022). Consequently, there is no dispute regarding the minor age of the victim and her date of birth being 31.05.2009, making her around 12 years old at the time of the incident. P.W.-1 stated that Parvati Hospital is situated in front of her house, and her daughter visited it occasionally. She stated that she did not know who owned the hospital, but she knew Dr. Shailendra Chauhan as a person working there (though Shailendra Chauhan is not actually a qualified doctor). In her cross-examination, she admitted that Shailendra Chauhan did not commit any obscene act or incident in her presence; hence, she is not an eye-witness and is merely a hearsay witness. She further verified that she did not see any photograph or image of Shailendra Chauhan in the video shown to her, and her daughter had never personally told her that Shailendra Chauhan had committed any obscene activity or incident with her. She stated that she had no acquaintance with or visits to Shailendra Chauhan, and he never tutored the victim. She stated she did not know the phone number from which the video was recorded, nor did she know Suraj Rai well, despite him being a resident of her village, noting that her house is on the main road whereas Suraj Rai's house is situated inside the lanes. She admitted she had no knowledge of the source from which Suraj Rai obtained the video.
P.W.-1 deposed in her examination-in-chief that she lodged the report based on what others told her. In her cross-examination, she categorically accepted that she possessed no personal information regarding the incident and that the written complaint was prepared at the police station upon the dictation of the Station Incharge, Anjani Rai, which she simply transcribed. Thus, she is neither an eye-witness nor did she have any personal knowledge of the occurrence, having lodged the F.I.R. solely at the instance of other persons and police dictation.
As regards the testimony of the victim (P.W.-2), who is the primary witness of fact to the alleged incident, it is a settled principle of law that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, the statement of the prosecutrix cannot be treated as gospel truth; rather, it must be tested on the touchstone of credibility. The credibility and trustworthiness of the witness are paramount, and the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma vs. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2011 SC 200, in the criminal trial case, the evidence under section 101 and 104 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof is also always on the prosecution. More serious the crime more stricter proof is required. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdeep Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh; AIR 2011 SC 2088, if delay is properly explained for registration of FIR, then FIR has to be considered as valid.
It is also held by the Supreme Court in Vishwasnathan and other Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 593 that delay in lodging the FIR, offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC-prosecution case, held should not be thrown out only on the ground of delay in lodging the FIR.
It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 INSC 1054 (SC), that while it is true that on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, an accused can be convicted of rape but for such a conviction, it would also require that such statement of the prosecutrix must inspire the confidence of the court. It is further held that the prosecutrix denial of consent must be seen in the overall context of her testimony. If her evidence is taken as a whole, certainly a view can be taken that her version that the accused had sexual intercourse with her forcefully without her consent does not merit acceptance. The version the prosecutrix is not believable at all.
The victim, deposing as P.W.-2, stated in her examination-in-chief that she was studying in Class VIII at the time of her deposition, whereas at the time of the incident, she was studying in Class VI. She stated that the incident dates back to December 2020. She knows Shailendra Chauhan, whose hospital is situated in front of her house, and stated that she visited him whenever she required medicine. She visited Shailendra Chauhan to collect her mother's spectacles in November-December 2020, having visited several times previously for the same purpose, and claimed that she had been visiting his hospital since that time. She has accepted that she was a student of class VI at the time of the incident and she took tuition of class 10 at that time in advance. It is highly improbable and unconvincing. She further stated that she last visited in the year 2021 to collect eye medicine. However, since the victim herself stated that the entire incident occurred in the year 2020, the allegation made by her mother in the written complaint that the accused had been committing such acts "for the last several years" stands contradictory to the victim's own testimony, especially considering that the victim was only about 12 years old at the time of the incident.
In her deposition, the victim further stated that during her first visit, the appellant touched her chest by inserting his hand inside her clothes, remarking that she had a stomach ache and that he needed to examine her stomach. On the pretext of examining her stomach, he inserted his hand inside her clothes towards her chest and urethra. This represents a complete and material improvement from her previous statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., as well as from the initial written complaint and check F.I.R., neither of which contained any such reference despite being registered with a delay. She stated that she objected, saying, "Uncle, I have to go for my coaching and complete my homework," to which he replied that he needed to examine her very carefully. She stated that as he did this consistently and it was causing her delay, she left the place. When he called her the next day to collect the spectacles, she did not go herself, but instead sent her maternal uncle. However, the appellant did not give the spectacles to her maternal uncle, telling him to come the next day. When her mother inquired over the phone, the appellant repeated that the spectacles would be handed over the following day.
The victim deposed that when she went the next day to collect the spectacles, the appellant pulled up her upper garments and lowered her lower garments down to her knees, inserting his finger into her urethra and pressing her breasts. When she asked him to give her the spectacles as she was getting late, she sat down in the hall, after which he handed them to her. The Court notes that these detailed allegations are substantial further improvements which find no place in the written complaint, the check F.I.R., the initial investigation, or her previously recorded statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. She further stated that she did not know whether any video or photographs of her had been captured, and that she returned home after collecting her spectacles. When her medicine finished, she visited him again; he provided the medicine, checked her eyes, and repeated the acts. She stated that she became frightened when Shailendra Chauhan threatened her, saying that if she told any member of her family, he would destroy her eyes with an injection that is the reason she did not disclose these facts to her mother. She stated that he always called her on the pretext of providing medicine and committed these acts whenever an opportunity arose, though never; when another person was present in the cabin. She stated that her last visit was in 2021, prior to her birthday in the month of May, whereas the complainant stated in the written complaint that the final incident occurred on 28.09.2021, demonstrating a glaring contradiction.
The victim further narrated that on another occasion, while returning after purchasing fruits for pooja, the appellant met her in a deserted lane and began doing the same acts in the street, whereupon she left her cycle and ran away. She admitted that she did not inform her mother about this incident until the video was shown to her mother, following which her mother questioned her and lodged the report. Additionally, she introduced a major new improvement by stating that Manoj Chauhan and Santosh Chauhan were occasionally present in the cabin and also committed similar acts against her. These continuous and material improvements in the prosecutrix's testimony render the prosecution story highly doubtful and unworthy of uncorroborated credence.
There is a major improvement in the introduction of allegations against Manoj Chauhan and Santosh Chauhan, reflecting consistent corroboration in the prosecution story by the victim. She deposed that the video had gone viral, and that her initial statement to the police was recorded by a lady constable, who allegedly told her to restrain herself; when she mentioned the names of Manoj Chauhan and Santosh Chauhan. She further stated that the police took her to the hospital for medical examination and subsequently brought her to the court for recording her statement. During her testimony, her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ext. Ka-2) was opened upon the order of the court, shown to her, and read over to her, whereupon she verified her photograph affixed to it. The victim admitted that it was the very same statement she had dictated to the Magistrate Madam, explaining as an afterthought that she had not narrated the complete story earlier due to fear and was disclosing the full version for the first time in court.
There was no allegation of this nature either in the written complaint, the check F.I.R., or in the victim's previously recorded statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., clearly indicating that an improved version was being set up for the first time during the trial. In her cross-examination, the victim stated that a spectacle shop belonging to Shailendra Chauhan is situated within the hospital premises. She further stated that in the said hospital, the appellant's brother, Manoj Chauhan, and his wife, Sunita Chauhan, are also doctors who reside on the first floor and examine patients on the ground floor. She noted that the hospital, presently known as Parvati Hospital, was previously called Chauhan Eye Care and operates 24 hours a day. The victim further stated that there was a consistent movement of patients in the hospital. She stated that she did not remember the clothes she was wearing when she visited the hospital, and confirmed that there were no blood stains on her clothes. At the time of the incident, she was not attending school and was going for coaching instead. She admitted that she never informed anyone about the incident, neither her friends nor any member of her family, and that she remained silent after the incident without raising any alarm in the hospital. She never told her mother or anybody else. Prior to and after the incident, she used to watch TV alone. She had started advanced coaching for Classes IX and X. Her mother had opened a beauty parlour, but her father did not provide any money to her mother, and household ration expenses were borne by her maternal grandfather (nana). She stated that she had known Suraj Rai for approximately 2 to 3 years, though he did not visit her house, and she did not know who showed the video at her house. She noted that her mother occasionally distributed blankets, following which newspaper reporters visited their house. Her mother is active in politics, serving as an executive member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and as the President of the Mahila Morcha, and previously as the District Secretary. She never visited Suraj Rai's house and did not know where he lived. She stated that litigation was pending between her parents, though she was unaware of the exact nature of the case.
The victim has specifically deposed that she never saw the video herself, but rather that it was seen by her mother. On the day following, the victim, her mother, and her maternal grandfather went to the police station, and after the registration of the case, the police took them to the hospital. Suraj Rai did not accompany them to the police station. The police visited her house two days after the F.I.R. was registered. While the victim stated that the application was written by her mother, the complainant (P.W.-1) had herself stated and admitted in her testimony that it was prepared at the police station upon the dictation of the Station Incharge. They reached the police station around 6:00 P.M. and returned around 12:30 in the night, though she could not remember the exact date. When the police first took her to the hospital, the doctor stated that her medical examination had not been conducted and initially refused to do so; however, following instructions from the DIG, the medical examination was conducted several days later, though she could not recall the exact number of days. Her mother accompanied her during the medical examination.
The victim stated that the police recorded her statement twice; first in writing at the time of the F.I.R. registration, and subsequently with video recording. After recording her statement before the Magistrate, the police recorded her statement once more, though she could not remember the time gap. She returned home directly after her statement before the Magistrate and never visited the Superintendent of Police along with her mother. Her mother was present when her statement was recorded by the police, whereas when she went to record her statement before the Magistrate, she was accompanied by her mother and the police.
The victim admitted that when she recorded her statement before the Magistrate, she did not take the names of Manoj Chauhan and Santosh Chauhan as being involved in the incident. She explained that she had omitted their names both before the police and the Magistrate because the police had instructed her to stop when speaking to them, and told her before the Magistrate to stick strictly to what was shown in the video and not exceed it. However, she herself acknowledged that during the recording of her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, no one was present inside except herself and the Magistrate (Madam), thus belying any external police pressure inside the chamber. She further admitted that she had never stated before the police or the Magistrate that Shailendra Chauhan had inserted a finger into her urethra, claiming that a police official (uncle) had consistently scolded her, which is why she omitted it. Yet, she again conceded that during her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, no one else was present. She stated that when the police came subsequently to record her statement, they spoke very politely, which prompted her to narrate the entire story. She admitted that the doctor asked her nothing and that she never mentioned any finger insertion to the doctor. She also admitted that she never informed her mother about the finger insertion because her mother continued to send her to Shailendra Chauhan even after that incident, and that she had never visited Shailendra Chauhan prior to the alleged finger insertion, visiting the hospital only occasionally.
The victim stated that she did not inform the Magistrate, but told the police, that Shailendra Chauhan had threatened to destroy her eyes with an injection if she disclosed anything at home, and that police personnel had restrained her from telling the Magistrate. Regarding her earlier statements, she stated that she had mentioned the touching of her breasts in her first statement to the police (though she was unsure if it was recorded) and had stated that he pulled up her upper garments and lowered her lower garments down to her knees (though she did not know if the police recorded it). She stated that after the initial touching, he touched her again after 1–2 days when her mother went to the hospital to have her eyes tested. She had complained of stomach ache to her mother, but Shailendra Chauhan provided no medicine for stomach ache, prescribing eye medicine only. She stated that she had been given a prescription, but it was no longer available with her. She claimed that Shailendra Chauhan taught her eye chapters from a book and conducted practicals, though she did not note them down in her copy, and she did not know whether he tutored anyone else before or after her. She stated she did not know whether Suraj Rai was a driver for Manoj Chauhan, but confirmed that he worked with him. She stated that a video was prepared when she visited at night (having visited at night once with her mother, while otherwise visiting in the daytime), reiterating that the video was shown to her family members rather than to her directly. Finally, she noted that Shailendra Chauhan's elder uncle had a property dispute with the house where her family resided, claiming that the house belonged to them.
It is belied to state that that Shailendra Chauhan did not commit any wrongful act, he never treated her, he never raised her clothes, or he did not commit any bad acts on the pretext of treatment. She maintained that while he did not entirely disrobe her, he did raise her clothes. It is belied to state that he did not touch any portion of her body or insert the finger into her body. She stated that when the video was being recorded, she had no knowledge that it was being made, and noted that everyone was saying he had made the video viral.
It is further belied to state that at the instigation and pressure of her mother in collusion with Suraj Rai to extract illegal gratification from the accused I am falsely recording my statement. She has further stated that if nothing had happened, she would naturally feel hesitation, how much anybody would prepare or remember but it may be lost from the memory. It is belied to state that the police, journalist and politicians used to visit, hence, due to conspiracy I falsely implicated the accused. My mother used to distribute the blanket and the journalist used to visit at that time. The leader used to come because my mother is a leader of BJP. The police visited occasionally. It is belied to state that the accused has neither treated me nor taught. It is belied to state that the accused has never threatened me.
The constable Kiran Gaur has deposed herself as P.W.-3. She has recorded the statement of the victim under section 161 Cr.C. She has verified it as Ext. Ka-1. She has specifically deposed in her cross examination that it is true that neither there is mention of any touching or inserting of finger in her private parts in her statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. There has been no reference of any preparation of the video or making it viral in her statement. The victim has not recorded about touching of her breast. She did not mention that when her clothes were unsettled and when she was touched. I had recorded her statement in the police station in presence of her mother and maternal uncle. There has been video recording of the statement. She is the lady constable who has recorded the statement of the victim. She has specifically denied of any touching of her body or removal of her clothes or insertion of any finger in her private parts.
The constable Pushpendra Kumar has deposed himself as P.W.-4. He has registered the case Crime No. 251of 2021, under section 354-Ka I.P.C. and section 7/8 of POCSO Act. This was the first F.I.R. of the said incident. G.D. entry No. 54 is dated 08.10.2021 at 9:41 hours. He has verified the check F.I.R. as Ext. Ka-4 and G.D. Entry as Ext. Ka-5. He has specifically verified in his cross examination that the incident is dated 22.09.2021.The F.I.R. was registered on 08.10.2021. The F.I.R. was registered in the night at 9:41 hours. I have prepared the check F.I.R. on the basis of the written complaint. He has verified that there is only mention of one accused in the F.I.R. There has been no reference of any touching of the internal part of the victim in the F.I.R. There has been no reference of any insertion of finger also. It is categorically clear that neither in the statement of the victim under section 161 Cr.P.C. nor in the written complaint and check F.I.R. there is neither reference of any touching of any part of the body of the victim nor insertion of any finger in her private parts.
Sub-Inspector Avinash Prakash Rai deposed as P.W.-5. He was posted as Sub-Inspector at Police Station Bhadohi on 09.01.2021 and served as the first Investigating Officer (I.O.) of the case. Upon completing his investigation, he submitted a charge sheet against the accused, Dr. Shailendra Chauhan, under Section 354-A of the I.P.C. and Sections 9/10 and 13/14 of the POCSO Act. No offence under Section 376 of the I.P.C. or under the Information Technology Act was found to have been made out during the entirety of his investigation.
In his cross-examination, P.W.-5 stated that while the incident was mentioned in the F.I.R. as having occurred on 28.09.2021, the F.I.R. itself was registered at the police station on 08.10.2021. Upon questioning, the complainant informed him that she had no knowledge of the incident on 28.09.2021, and she lodged the F.I.R. only after viewing the video and making inquiries. He further stated that the complainant never approached him for the registration of an F.I.R. prior to 08.10.2021. He specifically verified that during the course of his investigation, he did not recover any mobile phone from Shailendra Chauhan or from the complainant, he did not recover any clothes of the victim or make any phone calls to Shailendra Chauhan. He further admitted that he neither recorded the statement of Suraj Rai, seized Suraj Rai's mobile phone, nor visited Suraj Rai's house during the investigation, stating that he did not even know Suraj Rai. Although there was a reference to the arrival of one Neelmani in the General Diary of the police station. However, he did not record the statement of Neelmani.
He stated that he recorded the statement of the complainant on 09.10.2021, during which he obtained the video provided by her. However, he admitted that he did not know whether the video was an original or a copy, nor did he send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for scientific examination to ascertain whether any manipulation or interpolation had been committed. He stated that the complainant opened and showed him the video on a mobile phone, yet he neither took custody of that mobile phone nor ascertained the source or specific device from which the video had been obtained or recorded. He further admitted that he failed to record the statement of the victim's maternal uncle and did not collect any digital or mobile device evidence.
Regarding the victim's statements, P.W.-5 testified that when the victim recorded her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., her mother was present, and the statement was recorded in his presence. The victim did not state in her Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement that Shailendra Chauhan had inserted a finger into her private parts, nor did she state that he had touched her private body parts, nor did she take the names of Manoj Chauhan and Santosh Chauhan. He stated that he prepared the site plan of the place of occurrence; while he did not show the location of the victim's house in the site plan, he showed Shailendra Chauhan's chamber situated in front of his house with its door facing east, opening towards eastern gallery used by patients, alongside the chambers of Sunita Chauhan, Manoj Chauhan, and the Manager. He also visited the court for the recording of the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and perused the same, confirming that the victim made no mention of any finger insertion in her private parts in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
P.W.-5 further testified that he took the victim to the doctor twice, accompanied by her mother, and on both occasions, the victim refused to give her consent for an internal medical examination, due to which no internal examination could be conducted. He also recorded the statement of the examining doctor, who confirmed that the victim had refused both her external and internal medical examinations. He stated that he deleted Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act during the investigation, completed the entire investigation with nothing left pending across six parchas (case diary papers), and noted that the victim never made any complaint to him regarding the investigation. He has stated that it is belied to state he had prepared a faulty charge sheet. Thus, the first Investigating Officer fully corroborated the fact that the victim, in the presence of her mother, twice refused her external and internal medical examinations before the doctor, and that she never alleged any insertion of a finger in her statements recorded during his investigation.
It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 499, in paragraph no. 10, as follows:
"10.The afore-extracted portions make it amply clear that the prosecutrix and her parents themselves never fully co-operated with the medical staff, thereby adversely impacting the credibility of their version of events. It is a well-settled proposition of law that non-allowance of medical examination by an alleged rape-victim raises negative inferences against them. (Assessment of the Criminal Justice System in Response to Sexual Offences, In re, (2020) 18 SCC 540; Dola v. State of Odisha, (2018) 18 SCC 695) We cannot ascribe any good reason to the complete lack of assistance that the complainants tendered to the authorities, apart from their contradictory stances before the Court. We are further doubtless in this regard as the High Court, while discussing the prosecutrix's testimony, has come to the invariable conclusion that she was not mentally unsound – given that she was able to clearly comprehend the question and answer during the cross-examination."
Chhotak Yadav, the second Investigating Officer, deposed as P.W.-6. He stated that although the investigation had previously been completed and a charge sheet filed by Sub-Inspector Avinash Prakash Rai, further action on it was halted by the Superintendent of Police, Bhadohi, who ordered a fresh investigation, pursuant to which he commenced investigating the matter. On the basis of video footage and its perusal, he added Sections 376 and 201 of the I.P.C., Section 5(e)/6 of the POCSO Act, and Section 67-B of the Information Technology Act. He recorded the statement of Suraj Rai, who stated that the accused, Shailendra Chauhan, had uploaded the obscene video of the victim onto Facebook and deleted it after some time. Upon concluding his investigation, P.W.-6 submitted a charge sheet against Shailendra Chauhan under Sections 354-A, 376, and 201 of the I.P.C., Sections 5(e)/6, 7/8, 9/10, and 13/14 of the POCSO Act, and Section 67-B of the I.T. Act, and also filed a charge sheet under Section 201 of the I.P.C. against Dr. Manoj Chauhan, whose name surfaced during the second investigation.
During his cross-examination, P.W.-6 verified that the F.I.R. had originally been registered under Section 354-A of the I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act, though he did not know whether any preliminary inquiry had been conducted prior to its registration. He has verified this content that upon perusing the F.I.R., the victim's initial statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and the complainant's statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., there was no reference whatsoever to the insertion of a finger into the private parts of the victim. He noted that when the victim was first brought to the hospital for medical examination, her mother refused consent for an internal examination, and admitted that he neither recorded the statement of the doctor before whom the victim was first produced nor visited the doctor who conducted the second medical examination on 15.11.2021. He further verified that he did not recover any clothes of the victim during his investigation. P.W.-6 also admitted that upon perusing the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., he found no mention of any finger insertion, yet he did not get the victim's statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. a second time. Instead, he recorded an additional statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which was videographed. He admitted that he never asked the victim why she had omitted the allegation of finger insertion in her earlier statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., stating that he was satisfied with her statement and therefore, he opined that there is no need to produce her before a Magistrate again. He confirmed that the previous Investigating Officer had completed the investigation and signed the charge sheet on 22.10.2021, and admitted that no written application or complaint had ever been submitted before him alleging any defect in the first investigation. Moreover, he could not explain the basis on which the Superintendent of Police ordered further investigation on 15.11.2021.
He further admitted that he did not record the statement of the previous Investigating Officer regarding the place of occurrence, and had never visited the site prior to commencing his investigation. During his investigation, he did not recover any mobile phone, nor did he send any material for DNA examination. Regarding the video, he initially stated that the complainant provided it on 19.11.2021, before contradicting himself by saying it had been provided prior to his investigation in the form of a Compact Disc (C.D.) prepared by the complainant. He admitted that he never sent this C.D. to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for examination, nor did he attempt to obtain any technical report to verify whether the C.D. had been edited, tampered with, or interpolated. Despite adding Section 376 of the I.P.C. solely on the basis of this C.D., he made no effort to trace its original source, stating that he never viewed the video on any mobile phone as Shailendra Chauhan's mobile was not recovered, leaving the origin of the video completely untraced. He further confirmed that neither the victim nor the complainant had mentioned the involvement of Santosh Chauhan or Manoj Chauhan in their initial statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He did not recover any wrist watch from the accused, admitting he could not discern the brand of the watch or the time displayed on it in the C.D., nor did he collect any voice sample of the accused. When questioned about the footage, the accused denied any involvement, and P.W.-6 admitted that no face was visible in the video he viewed.
Concerning Suraj Rai, P.W.-6 admitted that he found Suraj Rai's role to be doubtful and discovered during the investigation that Suraj Rai had previously worked as a driver for Manoj Chauhan. Suraj Rai stated to him that he had received the video via WhatsApp from the mobile of Dr. Vijay Bharti (who had allegedly received it from a journalist of Amar Ujala), and subsequently showed it to the complainant. Despite this chain, P.W.-6 admitted that he failed to trace the original source of the video and made no inquiry whatsoever with Dr. Vijay Bharti, the Director of Shraddha Hospital, or the journalist from Amar Ujala regarding the mobile phone in question. He acknowledged learning during the investigation that the complainant was a leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party in Uttar Pradesh at the relevant time and continuing in power. He has submitted that it is belied to state that the Superintendent of Police ordered the further investigation under political pressure, or that he recorded false statements, pressured the doctor for an incorrect medical report, and submitted a false charge sheet to harass the accused and malign the hospital.
The second Investigating Officer has verified that there was no complaint against the initial investigation, that he was completely unaware of any valid basis for the fresh investigation ordered by the Superintendent of Police, and that he failed to trace the original source of the alleged video. Furthermore, having verified that neither the victim's nor the complainant's earlier statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., nor the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., contained any reference to finger insertion, he failed to question them regarding this glaring omission. The Investigating Officer's admission that no justifiable ground was ever assigned for ordering a fresh investigation, the possibility of undue external pressure cannot be ruled out.
Dr. Shaila Qadir deposed as P.W.-8. She stated that on 08.10.2021, she was posted as a Medical Officer at M.B.S. Government Hospital. On that day, at around 01:41 hours, lady constable Kiran Gaur brought the victim, aged about 12 years, for a medical examination. She stated that she was required to examine the victim externally only, as no sections of the POCSO Act were invoked at that stage. She verified the first medical examination report as Ext. Ka-12. Subsequently, on 12.10.2021 at around 16:00 hours, lady constable Kiran Gaur brought the victim for a further medical examination in Case Crime No. 251 of 2021 under Section 354-A of the I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act. The mother of the victim was also present. After obtaining the mother's consent, she commenced the external medical examination. The victim was unmarried, and her last menstrual period was recorded as 21.10.2021 (noting that the victim was experiencing her menstrual period at that time). Upon inquiring about the incident, the victim informed her that for the past several years, the accused, Dr. Shailendra Chauhan, had been touching her private parts and molesting her. She verified this second medical report as Ext. Ka-13.
Thirdly, on 15.11.2021, the victim was brought by lady constable Moni Yadav for an internal medical examination in the same case. After obtaining consent from the mother for the internal medical examination, she proceeded to examine the victim internally. The age of the victim was noted to be around 12 years, with her date of birth being 31.05.2009. Upon inquiry, the victim stated that the accused, Shailendra Chauhan, had molested her, and noted that she had suffered an injury to her knee on 28.09.2021 while running away during the incident of molestation. The doctor noted that there was no internal injury on the victim's private parts. She verified this third medical report as Exhibit Ka-14.
In her cross-examination, Dr. Shaila Qadir verified that during the victim's first visit, there was no external injury on her private parts, and that both the victim and her mother refused to undergo an internal medical examination. She confirmed that when the victim's statement was recorded for the first time, she did not disclose that any finger had been inserted into her private parts. She reiterated that she medically examined the victim on three occasions in the presence of police personnel. She further clarified that on the second occasion, both the victim and her mother again refused to give consent for an internal medical examination. Although she recorded the statement of the victim during her third medical examination, even on that occasion the victim did not disclose or state that any finger had been inserted into her private parts. Thus, across the consistent medical examinations conducted on three separate occasions, the victim and her mother refused consent for internal examination during the earlier visits, no external injury was found on the person of the victim even during the third medical examination, and when consent for internal examination was eventually accorded, the victim did not disclose any allegation of finger insertion by the accused into her private parts.
In view thereof, there is a complete inconsistency and lack of corroboration from the inception of the F.I.R. right up to the third medical examination conducted during the investigation by the second Investigating Officer. Even during the said third medical examination, the victim did not disclose to the doctor the alleged insertion of a finger into her private parts.
The statement of the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan, was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances put to him and stated that the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses against him was false and incorrect. He further stated that the present case had been instituted against him due to enmity and conspiracy. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he specifically clarified that he was not a doctor and was merely running an optical shop for selling spectacles. He stated that Dr. Manoj Chauhan is his brother, that Parvati Hospital was being run in the name of his brother, and that Dr. Manoj Chauhan and his wife who are both qualified doctors used to examine patients and provide them with medical treatment.
He further stated that a local resident, namely Suresh Rai, was working as the driver of Dr. Manoj Chauhan. Upon coming to know about his alleged criminal activities, Dr. Manoj Chauhan removed him from service, following which a quarrel took place between Suresh Rai and the appellant. He further alleged that the complainant, being a leader of the ruling political party, colluded with Suresh Rai and hatched a conspiracy with a view to extorting illegal gratification and bringing disrepute to his brother's hospital. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, they fabricated the present case and falsely implicated him. He asserted that he is innocent and has not committed any offence.
In defence, Prahlad Yadav was examined as D.W.-1. He stated that Parvati Hospital was managed by Dr. Manoj Chauhan, and that Dr. Manoj Chauhan and his wife, Smt. Sunita Chauhan, provided medical treatment to patients in the hospital and resided in the front-side room of the premises. He stated that Shailendra Chauhan ran an optical shop where he prepared and sold spectacles, while he (D.W.-1) used to sit near Shailendra Chauhan's room and prepare registration slips for the patients. He stated that CCTV cameras are installed in the hospital and that Shailendra Chauhan's room is fitted with transparent glass. His duty hours at the hospital were from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. He testified that neither the complainant, nor the victim, nor the complainant's sister ever visited the hospital or Shailendra Chauhan's shop for the preparation of spectacles, and that they never frequented the premises. He further stated that litigation was pending between the families of the complainant and Shailendra Chauhan. He added that he knew Suraj Rai, who had worked as Dr. Manoj Chauhan's driver before being removed from service approximately fifteen to sixteen months prior due to his alleged involvement in criminal activities and bad character. Following his removal, Suraj Rai came to the hospital, quarreled with Shailendra Chauhan, and threatened to get Parvati Hospital shut down. D.W.-1 maintained that Shailendra Chauhan had not committed any act of sexual harassment against anyone, nor was any such act ever seen or heard by anyone, noting that the hospital is situated in a congested residential area and that no modification or alteration had been made to the adjoining optical room, which remained as it was.
However, upon evaluating the testimony of D.W.-1, it is evident that he is an employee of the said hospital whose duty hours were restricted from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., meaning he was not present at the hospital all time. Although he sat near Shailendra Chauhan's chamber, it cannot be presumed or believed that he was aware of every occurrence and incident taking place within the hospital. Furthermore, being an employee of the hospital, the possibility of undue pressure or bias in favour of the accused cannot be completely ruled out, and his testimony cannot prevail over that of the prosecutrix.
While the prosecutrix is undoubtedly a minor aged about 12 years, her testimony reveals a complete lack of consistency in the prosecution story from its very inception.Section 376 of the I.P.C. and the other graver provisions of the POCSO Act were added solely on the basis of the alleged video footage, yet the original source of that video footage was never recovered, nor was any Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report obtained to establish its authenticity or rule out any tampering, modification, or interpolation.
The victim was medically examined on three separate occasions by the same medical officer (P.W.-8), who deposed that on all three occasions she recorded statements from the victim. During her first and second medical examinations, both the victim and her mother explicitly refused to undergo an internal medical examination. Consent for an internal examination was accorded only on the third occasion, upon which the doctor found no internal injuries whatsoever. Furthermore, during the first medical examination, no external injuries were found on the person of the victim.
It is a vital and undisputed fact that there was no reference or mention of any insertion of a finger into the private parts of the victim by the appellant-accused anywhere in the written complaint, the check F.I.R., or in the initial statements of the victim and her mother/complainant recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. The doctor specifically verified that even during the statements recorded prior to and during the medical examinations including the third time the victim never stated that any finger had been inserted into her private parts by the appellant-accused or by any other person. The theory of finger insertion was introduced as an afterthought only during the further investigation conducted by the second Investigating Officer. This occurred despite the fact that no complaint had ever been made against the first Investigating Officer, who had already completed the investigation and submitted a charge sheet solely under Section 354-A of the I.P.C. and Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act.
Moreover, no basis or justification was ever assigned by the Superintendent of Police for ordering a fresh investigation. It was only in the subsequent additional statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that the victim improved upon her version to introduce the theory of finger insertion by the accused. Despite this major development, the second Investigating Officer did not get the victim's statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. for a second time. Throughout the consistent medical examinations, no injury either external or internal was ever detected on the victim.
Finally, the prosecution miserably failed to establish the original source of the video footage. No Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report was ever obtained to verify the authenticity of the video or to ascertain whether any alteration, modification, or interpolation had been made. Nor has the prosecution produced any concrete and cogent evidence regarding any alteration of the scene of the occurrence, any act on the part of the accused aimed at causing the disappearance of evidence, or the furnishing of false information regarding the crime scene.
Hence, the accused/appellant can be convicted and sentenced for the offense under Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act. The ingredients of Section 354A of the I.P.C. are also proved. Hence, the conviction of the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan, has been confined to Section 354A of the I.P.C. and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, in light of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, 2012, which reads as follows:
"42.Alternate punishment.—Where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB], [376E, section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000)], then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment under this Act or under the I.P.C. as provides for punishment which is greater in degree."
In view of the entire evidence, facts, and circumstances on record, the prosecution has failed to establish the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Sections 5(e)/6, and 13/14 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court convicting the appellant under the aforesaid major provisions are perverse, unsustainable in the eyes of law, and are hereby set aside.
The conviction of the appellant under Section 354A of the I.P.C. and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act is hereby confirmed/sustained.
Accordingly, the appellant, Shailendra Chauhan, is acquitted of the charges under Sections 376 and 201 I.P.C., Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Sections 5(e)/6 and 13/14 of the POCSO Act, 2012. He is held guilty of convicted and sentenced under Section 354A of the I.P.C. and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act. The sentence passed by learned trial court under section 354-A I.P.C. and under section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, is hereby confirmed.
The appeal is partly allowed.
All sentences shall run concurrently. Since the accused is already in jail, he need not surrender. The period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant shall be adjusted against the substantive sentence awarded herein.
A copy of this judgment along with the trial court records shall be sent to the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bhadohi, for necessary compliance.
