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High Courts(2026) 11 AHC CK 3547

Rakesh Kumar Pathak & Anr. Vs The State Of U.P. & Ors.

Allahabad High Court · 18 Nov 2026 · Kshitij Shailendra, J

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Judgment

43 paragraphs · 2,778 words

Hon'Ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.

THE ISSUE INVOLVED : WHAT DOES ‘POSSESSION’ MEAN IN MATTERS OF MUTATION BASED UPON SUCCESSION

1.

Heard Sri Adya Prasad Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 and Shri Raj Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for respondent no. 5.

THE DISPUTE

2.

The dispute in the present writ petition is regarding natural succession flowing from one Anil Kumar Pathak who was none other than real brother of both the petitioners. He died on 04.12.2016, whereas his wife Sheela Pathak had already died in the year 2009.

BRIEF FACTS

3.

After the death of Anil Kumar Pathak, the names of the petitioners were recorded in the revenue records on 04.05.2017 by way of a P.A. entry (i.e., uncontested succession); however, later on, respondent no. 5, claiming himself to be the son of Anil Kumar Pathak, moved an application before the Tehsildar, pursuant whereto the order dated 04.05.2017 was set aside on 05.11.2024 and respondent no. 5 was held to be the son of Anil Kumar Pathak.

4.

The petitioners challenged the order dated 05.11.2024 in appeal, which was allowed on 08.08.2025 and the matter was remanded to the Tehsildar to decide it afresh. After remand, the Tehsildar, by order dated 13.02.2026, again decided the matter in favour of respondent no. 5 holding him to be the son of Anil Kumar Pathak. The said order was upheld in appeal on 10.04.2026 and further revision preferred by the petitioners there-against was also dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on 22.10.2026.

THE CHALLENGE AND THE SUBMISSIONS

5.

This writ petition has been filed challenging the orders dated 13.02.2026, 10.04.2026 and 22.10.2026 and submissions have been advanced that in proceedings under Sections 33/34 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, intricate and complicated questions of title vis-a-vis heir-ship cannot be adjudicated and, therefore, all the authorities/courts have acted without jurisdiction. It is further submitted that there was no evidence on record to establish that the respondent no. 5 was either born out of the wedlock of Anil Kumar Pathak and Sheela Pathak or had ever been adopted by them and, therefore, the courts have erred in placing burden of proof upon the petitioners to establish the contrary, by observing that if respondent no. 5 is not the son of Anil Kumar Pathak and Sheela Pathak, then whose son he is.

6.

It is further submitted that in an affidavit filed before the Nagar Nigam after the death of Sheela Pathak in 2009, Anil Kumar Pathak had stated that he was the only heir of his wife and, therefore, once father of respondent no. 5 himself had not recognized him as his son in the proceedings before the Nagar Nigam, no contrary view could be taken in the present proceedings.

7.

Placing reliance on Sahed Jan @ Bonde and others vs. Board of Revenue UP at Lucknow and others: 2004 (96) RD 656, Smt. Kalawati vs. Board of Revenue and others: 2022 (155) RD 169, Amar Nath Arora vs. Board of Revenue, Lucknow and others: 2019 (142) RD 331 and Smt. Hadisul Nisha vs. Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Faizabad and others: 2021 (152) RD 426, it is contended that mutation proceedings based upon succession or transfer are to be decided on the basis of possession only and question relating to title should be left open for adjudication by the competent court of jurisdiction. Submission is that since the respondent no. 5 never came in actual and physical possesion of the land that remained in actual and physical possession of the petitioners, the orders impugned cannot be sustained.

8.

Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has made submissions that the arguments based upon possession are misconceived, inasmuch as, possession in mutation proceedings has to be understood as ‘legal possession’ in contrast to ‘actual and physical possession’ and correct findings based upon proper appreciation of the material available on record have been recorded which need not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the writ petition is, otherwise, not maintainable as the same arises out of mutation proceedings and the petitioners may establish their rights before the competent court.

9.

Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 also has supported the orders impugned by contending that the material evidence produced by the parties has been perfectly appreciated by all the three courts.

10.

As regards the maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present case falls within the exceptions carved out by this Court in the case of Smt. Kalawati (supra), as the orders impugned have been passed without jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

11.

I have considered the submissions made and have perused the material available on record.

12.

Admittedly, Sheela Pathak died on 04.08.2009 and her husband Anil Kumar Pathak died on 14.12.2016. There is no dispute about the fact that respondent no. 5 was born on 08.05.1997, i.e. when his mother died in 2009, he was about twelve years of age. Under the said circumstances, if, for the purposes of getting his name recorded in the municipal records, Anil Kumar Pathak had submitted any affidavit (which is not on record) assuming not indicating the name of his son, the same would not be read against the interest of respondent no. 5, nor would it be sufficient to hold that he is not his son, inasmuch as he was minor at that time and it was not required to indicate his name as a successor-in-interest of his mother.

13.

As regards other evidence, it has come in the orders passed by the authorities that when respondent no. 5 was got admitted in Little Flower Primary School at the age of four years in the year 2001, his parentage was recorded as Anil Kumar Pathak and Sheela Pathak. Apart from this, in the nomination made in the Life Insurance Policy as well as in the bank account maintained by Anil Kumar Pathak in Punjab National Bank, respondent no. 5 was also described as his son.

14.

It has also been recorded that after the death of Anil Kumar Pathak, a dispute regarding mutation of residential House No. 540-E was contested inter se the petitioners and respondent no. 5, however, the Assistant Municipal Commissioner discarded the objections filed by the petitioners and directed entry of name of respondent no. 5 in the municipal records.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

15.

To appreciate the submissions on the point of law, as advanced on behalf of the petitioner, the Court now deems it appropriate to reproduce Section 33 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, which reads as under:

“33.

Mutation in cases of succession.- “(1) Every person obtaining possession of any land by succession shall submit report of such succession to the Revenue Inspector of the circle in which the land is situate in such form as may be prescribed.

(2)

On receipt of a report under sub-section (1) or on facts otherwise coming to his knowledge, the Revenue Inspector shall -

(a)

if the case is not disputed, record such succession in the record of rights (Khatauni);

(b)

in any other case, make such inquiry as may appear to him to be necessary and submit his report to the Tahsildar.

(3)

Any person whose name has not been recorded by Revenue Inspector or who is aggrieved by the order passed by the Revenue Inspector under clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (2) may move an application before Tahsildar.

(4)

The provisions of this section shall mutatis mutandis apply to every person admitted as a Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights or as an asami by the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti in accordance with the provisions of this Code or any enactment repealed by it.”

16.

It may be noted here that though claim for mutation in this case was raised and decided inter se parties based upon succession and, thus, the matter was covered by Section 33 of the Code, the authorities have wrongly indicated Section 34 in the orders impugned; however mere indication of a wrong provision of law would not change the nature of proceedings and, therefore, the discussion is being made in relation to applicable provisions of Section 33 only.

17.

It is, thus, clear that when the succession is uncontested, the case would fall under Section 33(2)(a) of the Code and in any other case, i.e., when it is contested, an inquiry is contemplated at the level of the revenue authorities. As to what is the scope of such inquiry and the jurisdiction to be exercised by the mutation court, the same has been left at the wisdom of the authorities and there appears to be no specific statutory indication as to what kind of inquiry would be conducted. As a matter of fact, the language used in sub-section (2) of section 33 clearly indicates that the dispute is regarding uncontested and contested succession, i.e. to say that when a question of inquiry comes before the court, the same necessarily relates to examine as to whether the deceased has left behind some successor or not, otherwise there would have been no distinction between sub-Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 33.

POSSESSION- WHAT IT MEANS IN MUTATION MATTERS

18.

Sections 33 does not use the words "actual and physical possession" and, therefore, when any person claims to have come into possession as a result of death of a tenure-holder, the word "possession" has to be understood as “legal possession” only. The expression “possession”, as employed by the Legislature in the context of mutation proceedings founded upon succession, cannot be construed in a narrow or restrictive sense so as to mean only actual and physical cultivatory possession over the land in question. Had the legislative intent been to make actual and physical possession an indispensable condition for claiming mutation on the basis of succession, the Legislature would have employed appropriate expressions such as “actual possession” or “physical possession”. The conscious omission of such qualifying words cannot be rendered meaningless by importing into the statutory provision a requirement which the Legislature itself has not prescribed.

19.

The use of the expression “possession”, read in conjunction with the expression “succession” occurring in the same provision, assumes considerable significance. The two expressions are required to be understood harmoniously and in a manner that advances the legislative intent underlying the provision. Where a person succeeds to the estate of a deceased tenure-holder by operation of law, such succession carries with it the legal entitlement to the estate and, consequently, the concept of de jure possession would come in play, notwithstanding the fact that such successor may not, at the relevant point of time, be in actual physical occupation or cultivatory possession of the land. Any contrary interpretation would lead to consequences which are not only manifestly inequitable but also wholly inconsistent with the very object of recognizing succession as an independent basis for seeking mutation.

20.

There exists a well-recognized distinction in law between de facto possession and de jure possession. The former denotes possession in fact, that is, actual, physical and effective control or occupation of the property, irrespective of whether the person exercising such control possesses a lawful entitlement to do so. On the other hand, de jure possession signifies possession recognized or attributable to a person in the contemplation of law. It flows from a legal right, title, status or entitlement and is founded upon the juridical relationship which the law recognizes between the person and the property.

21.

To illustrate, where a deceased tenure-holder is survived by several lawful successors, it is quite possible that only one of them may be cultivating the land, whereas the remaining successors may be stationed elsewhere, residing at distant places or may simply not be physically available at the spot at the time when an inquiry into mutation is conducted. If actual and physical possession were to be treated as the decisive and exclusive criterion, the successor who happens to be physically present upon the land would alone be entitled to secure mutation to the exclusion of the other lawful successors who have equally succeeded to the estate of the deceased. Such an interpretation would, in effect, confer an undue and legally unwarranted advantage upon the successor in physical occupation and result in exclusion of other successors whose rights have devolved upon them by operation of law.

JUDGMENTS CITED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

22.

The judgment in the case of Sahed Jan @ Bonde (supra) is based upon the facts of that case wherein the dispute was raised as to whether respondent no. 4 was son of one Nanku or as to whether the petitioners were his sons. A suit under Section 229-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 was filed, which was dismissed and, by making observations regarding the findings recorded by the mutation courts qua the heir-ship of one of the parties, this Court found it not in a position to record a finding as to whether the order dismissing the suit under Section 229-B had become final or not. By remanding the matter to the concerned Tehsildar, it was left open for the Tehsildar to examine as to whether the proceedings were to be continued or to be dropped. There was no detailed discussion of material facts and evidences led by the parties before the concerned courts and, therefore, the judgment being distinguishable on facts and not directly applicable to the present case, the petitioners cannot get any advantage of the same.

23.

The judgment in the case of Smt. Hadisul Nisha (supra) is also distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as, in that case, revisional court, despite availability of some evidence, chose to believe the report of area Lekhpal, which was based upon the statements of the residents of the village and had come in existence without notice to the parties aggrieved. Under those circumstances, this Court found that the revisional court had exceeded its jurisdiction to record a finding which affected the title of the parties without recording any finding with regard to possession and the mutation in that case had been directed not on the basis of possession but simply on the basis of some title deed.

24.

In the present case, there is no title deed in existence nor it is a case where some material evidence has been ignored by the authorities; rather the discussion is well directed within the scope of Section 33 and it cannot be expected that the authorities dealing with the matters of mutation would keep their eyes shut of the documents produced before them, when they have to take a decision regarding entry based upon succession, which is a contested one.

25.

The judgment in the case of Amar Nath Arora (supra) deals with mutation based upon ‘transfer’ as contemplated under Section 34 of the Code and does not relate to mutation based upon succession under Section 33 of the Code and, therefore, the same would also be of no assistance to the petitioner.

CONCLUSION

26.

In the present case, the inquiry which has been conducted by the revenue officers and the orders passed by the Tehsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer and the Commissioner clearly establish that all the documents which were placed before them, were given a thoughtful consideration. This Court could have recorded many other findings based upon the provisions of the Evidence Act where an opinion as to the relationship between the parties can be formed, however, considering the scope of this petition, the Court refrains itself from going into such depth of the issue and once Section 39 of the Code, 2006 itself provides for establishment of any rights qua the land by way of a suit under Section 144 thereof and the law is settled to the effect that orders passed by the mutation courts are subject and subservient to the adjudication made by the competent court in regular proceedings, this Court is of the opinion that all the three courts have not erred in deciding the contested mutation proceedings and the orders passed by them cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.

27.

In view of the above discussion, while declining to interfere with the orders impugned, the writ petition is disposed of with the observation that if, in any regular proceedings, either before the revenue court or the civil court, the petitioners are able to establish that the respondent no. 5 did not succeed to the estate of the deceased in law, the orders impugned would abide by said adjudication. So long as the orders under challenge remain not interfered with and exist as they are, factual and legal consequences arising therefrom shall follow.