K. Krishnamurthy Vs Union of India & Anr.
Central Administrative Tribunal · Chennai · 27 Oct 2026 · M.L. Srivastava, Member (A) · M. Swaminathan, Member (J)
Judgment
This OA has been filed by the applicant seeking the following relief:
“To call for the records relating to the impugned order of the first respondent in C-18013/1/2018-Admn dated 16.02.2018 and quash the same and direct the respondents to re-fix the pay of the Applicant by granting first financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme and second and third financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme by duly protecting his pay as prayed for in his representation dated 9.3.2015 and grant him all consequential benefits including refund of the Central Administrative Tribunalamounts recovered from him and render Justice”.
The facts and circumstances giving rise to the filing of the OA are as follows:
The Applicant was appointed as Assistant Editor in the Films Division, Mumbai, on 15.09.1979. He was subsequently selected and appointed as Editor in the Films Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, on 19.10.1981. By order dated 04.09.1982, he was selected for appointment as Film Editor in the Central Board of Film Censors on deputation for one year. Pursuant thereto, he was transferred to the Central Board of Film Certification, Chennai, by order dated 27.07.1983, and joined duty on 06.08.1983. He was appointed in a quasi-permanent capacity as Editor with effect from 19.10.1984. Despite the expiry of his deputation period, he was neither absorbed nor repatriated to the Films Division and continued to serve in Chennai until his permanent absorption with effect from 22.12.1994. He retired as Film Editor on 31.05.2014. The Applicant contends that he stagnated in the post of Editor from 19.10.1981 and was not granted financial upgradation under the Assured Career Progression (ACP) Scheme, effective from 09.08.1999. Subsequently, after the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme came into effect on 01.09.2008, he was granted the first, second and third MACP benefits only by order dated 24.04.2015, after his retirement, resulting in monetary loss. Despite repeated representations regarding pay fixation and the grant of ACP/MACP benefits, including a detailed representation dated 09.03.2015 enclosing the relevant rules and documents, the Respondents, by reply dated 17.03.2016, stated that the first ACP had not been granted due to administrative reasons and that the three MACP benefits had subsequently been sanctioned by order dated 24.04.2015. Aggrieved by the delay and denial of his claim, the Applicant filed O.A. No. 26/2018 before this Tribunal. By order dated 05.01.2018, the Tribunal directed the Respondents to consider his representation and pass a reasoned and speaking order within two months of receiving a copy of the order. However, the Respondents rejected his claim by a cryptic and non-speaking order dated 16.02.2018. Aggrieved thereby, the Applicant has filed the present Original Application.
The principal contention of the learned counsel for the Applicant is that the reason assigned by the first Respondent in the impugned order for denying financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme is unreasonable, arbitrary and legally unsustainable. The impugned order merely states that no monetary loss was caused to the Applicant, without addressing the substance of his claim. It is an undisputed fact that the Applicant submitted a detailed representation dated 09.03.2015, relying on relevant Office Memoranda and Fundamental Rules governing pay fixation and explaining the manner in which his pay ought to have been fixed. This Tribunal, taking note of the said representation, specifically directed the first Respondent to consider the Applicant’s claim and pass a reasoned and speaking order. However, the first Respondent failed to examine or address the relevant rules and contentions raised by the Applicant, thereby rendering the impugned order contrary to the Tribunal’s directions.
The learned counsel further contended that the Applicant’s lawful entitlement to pay and allowances constitutes property protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and cannot be denied except in accordance with law. Such a valuable constitutional right cannot be defeated by a mere assertion that no monetary loss was caused, particularly when the Applicant’s claim for proper pay fixation has not been adjudicated on its merits. The Respondents have neither disclosed nor explained the alleged administrative reasons for denying the first ACP benefit. The impugned order, having been passed mechanically and arbitrarily without due consideration of the relevant rules and the Applicant’s submissions, is therefore liable to be set aside.
The learned counsel further submitted that, during the Applicant’s deputation from the Films Division to the Central Board of Film Censors, he was entitled to the pay scale applicable to the post of Film Editor in his parent department until his permanent absorption in the borrowing department. Upon such absorption, his pay ought to have been re-fixed in accordance with the applicable rules, duly protecting his existing pay. The Applicant’s representation dated 09.03.2015 sets out in detail the basis for the claimed pay fixation, supported by the relevant rules and official memoranda. Since the claim is substantiated by the applicable provisions governing pay fixation, the learned counsel submitted that the Applicant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the present Original Application.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents vehemently opposed the Applicant’s contentions, primarily relying on the grounds of limitation and the averments made in the reply statement. He submitted that the Applicant was appointed on deputation from the Films Division with effect from 06.08.1983 in the pay scale of Rs. 470–760. Referring to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting’s letter F.No. 805/11/2008-F(C) dated 02.02.2010, issued in connection with O.A. No. 580/2008 filed by the Applicant before this Tribunal, he submitted that the Department of Personnel and Training had agreed to the Applicant’s absorption in the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) with effect from 22.12.1994. Accordingly, by CBFC Order No. C-18/95-Admn. dated 05.03.2010, the Applicant was regularised in the post of Film Editor with effect from 22.12.1994, while his service from 06.08.1983 to 21.12.1994 was treated as deputation. Since the Applicant’s absorption was pending and was formally approved only in 2010, the first financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme was not granted in 1999.
The learned counsel further submitted that, by the time the Applicant’s absorption was approved in 2010, the ACP Scheme had been superseded by the MACP Scheme in 2008. Accordingly, in terms of the applicable MACP provisions, the Applicant was granted the first and second financial upgradations with effect from 01.09.2008 and the third MACP with effect from 19.10.2011, vide CBFC order dated 21.04.2015. He contended that the Applicant’s representation had been duly examined by the Department with reference to the relevant audit objection, rules and regulations, following which a reasoned and speaking order dated 16.02.2018 was issued. According to the Respondents, the Applicant’s contentions had been duly considered and found to be without merit.
The learned counsel also contended that the Applicant had himself furnished an undertaking expressing his willingness to be absorbed in the CBFC despite the post of Film Editor carrying a lower pay scale. Having accepted the terms of absorption, the Applicant could not question the same after several years. He further argued that the Original Application was liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches, particularly as the Applicant had approached this Tribunal after his retirement. Relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2025 INSC 565, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, perused the pleadings and materials made available on record.
The principal question that arises for consideration in the present Original Application is whether the Applicant’s claim is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches, as contended by the Respondents.
Upon perusal of the records, it is evident that the Applicant submitted a representation dated 09.03.2015 and subsequently approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 26/2018 in 2018. Thus, there was a delay of approximately three years in approaching this Tribunal. It is a settled principle of law that repeated representations or belated representations do not, by themselves, give rise to a fresh cause of action or extend the period of limitation.
In the present case, the Applicant’s grievance relates to the grant of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of theCentral Administrative Tribunal earlier ACP Scheme. The MACP Scheme, which came into effect on 01.09.2008, superseded the ACP Scheme and provides for financial upgradation in accordance with the prescribed conditions. An employee who has been granted the admissible financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme cannot ordinarily claim additional financial benefits under the superseded ACP Scheme, except where such entitlement is specifically supported by the applicable rules or transitional provisions. Therefore, the Applicant’s claim requires consideration in the light of the relevant scheme provisions and the financial upgradations already granted to him.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others, by order dated 24.04.2025, reported in 2025 INSC 565, considered a related issue. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted below for consideration:
“36.On such premise as explained above, the respondent should have, if she felt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her benefits of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of the ACP Scheme, availed the remedy before the Tribunal immediately after her rights were affected. She ought not to have waited for so long for ventilating her grievance through a belated representation. Filing of Central Administrative Tribunalsuch belated representation, which was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing the cause of action and stretching the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed within time.
37.Both fora, i.e., the Tribunal as well as the High Court, did not rule on the objection of maintainability of the O.A. despite such objection being sound. The reasons that we have assigned would lead to the irresistible conclusion that the O.A. was time-barred and should not have been entertained by the Tribunal. The High Court too erred in law by failing to entertain the challenge to the Tribunal’s order on the specious ground that the decision in B.D. Kadam reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4772 covered the issue without, however, examining whether the O.A. was maintainable”.
It is also appropriate to refer to the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M. K. Sarkar v. Union of India, reported in 2009 INSC 1288, concerning stale or dead claims. The Hon’ble Apex Court held, inter alia, that the consideration and rejection of a belated representation in respect of a stale or dead claim does not give rise to a fresh cause of action or extend the period of limitation. The question of delay and laches must be examined with reference to the original cause of action and not the date of disposal of the belated representation. The Hon’ble Court further observed that, before directing consideration of a representation, the Court or Tribunal must examine whether the claim relates to a live issue or a stale or dead dispute.
Applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that the applicant submitted a representation in the year 2015, after his retirement, seeking the benefit of financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme. Thereafter, the applicant approached this Tribunal in the year 2018. If the applicant was aggrieved by the grant of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of the ACP Scheme, he ought to have approached the appropriate forum within the prescribed period of limitation from the date on which the alleged cause of action arose. The applicant cannot, by submitting a belated representation and subsequently approaching this Tribunal upon its rejection, revive a stale claim or obtain a fresh cause of action so as to overcome the bar of limitation. The rejection of such a representation does not extend the period of limitation or cure the delay and laches attributable to the applicant.
16.Central Administrative Tribunal In view of the foregoing discussion and the legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that the present Original Application is barred by delay and laches and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.
In the result, the Original Application is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. There shall be no order as to costs.
