M/s Three Star Fruit Company Thru. Proprietor Umar Farooque Vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Krishi Vipran Evam Krishi Videsh Vyapar Lko & Ors.
Allahabad High Court · Lucknow Bench · 12 Nov 2026 · Alok Mathur, J · Amitabh Kumar Rai, J
Judgment
(Delivered by Hon’ble Amitabh Kumar Rai,J.)
Heard Shri Deepanshu Dass, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Anuj Kudesia, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri Nishant Shukla, learned counsel on behalf of State-respondent No.1 and Dr. V. K. Singh assisted by Shri Surendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4-Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, Lucknow.
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking following main reliefs :
“(a)Issue a writ, order or directions in the nature of Mandamus directing the opposite parties to permit the Entry and Trading of Fresh or Green Coconut within the Mandi Sthal.
(b)Issue an order of appropriate nature holding the amendment dated 30.01.1995 whereby Coconut has been entered into the “Schedule” of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 under Header “A Agriculture” and Sub Heading “III Oilseeds” at Serioa No.11 as Ultra Vires and further to direct for its entry under Header “B. Horticulture” and sub Heading “II. Fruits”.
It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents are restraining the petitioner from bringing in and trading in the agricultural produce, namely, green coconut at Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) in violation of the provisions of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1964”).
The grievance of the petitioner stems from the notification dated 30.01.1995 issued under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964, whereby coconut was included in the “Schedule” to the Act, 1964 under the heading “A-Agriculture” and Sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” at Serial No.11 disregarding the settled botanical definition of the term “coconut”, according to which coconut is not an oilseed but a fruit and therefore, ought to have been placed under the heading “B-Horticulture” and sub-heading “II-Fruits”.
It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is a wholesale trader in fruits and vegetables and has been issued a licence by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sahibabad, Ghaziabad. The petitioner has been trading in fruits and vegetables under the licence granted by the Mandi Samiti since 2003.
It has further been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that since 2003, when the petitioner commenced trading and was granted a licence by the Mandi Samiti, he had been permitted to trade in coconuts at the Mandi Yard and there was no prohibition on the entry of coconut into the Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard.
It has also been submitted that vide notification dated 08.05.1996 issued under Section 8 (1) (a) of the Act, 1964, Mandi Fee (Market Fee) was levied on coconut. However, the Director, Mandi Parishad, vide order dated 27.07.1996, clarified that taking into consideration representation of traders pending decision by State Government the mandi fee may be charged only on raw coconut (कच्चा नारियल) and not on dry coconuts (सूखे गरी गोले). Subsequently, vide Government Order dated 02.07.2003 and the consequential order dated 09.07.2003 issued by the Mandi Parishad, the levy of Mandi Fee on coconut was discontinued altogether.
It has been submitted that there was no prohibition on trading in coconut at Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) at any point of time. However, subsequently, after the year 2020, the User Charge regime was introduced under Section 17(iii)(c) of the Act, 1964 vide notification dated 11.05.2020 and in pursuance thereof State Government issued order dated 12.05.2020 allowing trading in 46 commodities in market yards which have been de-notified on payment of “User Charge”. The said notification dated 11.05.2020 provided for the trading of “non-specified” agricultural produce, such as cereals, legumes, oilseeds, fibres, narcotics, spices, horticultural produce including vegetables and fruits, viticultural produce etc. brought to the market for sale upon payment of User Charges. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that vide another notification dated 17.09.2021, 46 items were further de-notified as “non-specified” agricultural produce, which included coconut.
The grievance of the petitioner is that following the aforesaid developments and the introduction of the User Charge regime, the petitioner is now being restrained from trading in coconuts on the ground that coconut falls within the category of oilseeds and therefore, cannot be traded in the Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard, namely, Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) as the petitioner's licence permits it to trade in fruits and vegetables. The petitioner has challenged the action of the respondents in restraining it from trading in coconut despite having been permitted to do so under the same licence since 2003 on the following grounds:
There was no order passed by the competent authority prohibiting the entry of or trading in coconut at Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad. An oral or informal direction issued by the Mandi staff cannot substitute for the statutory exercise of power.
The amendment dated 30.01.1995 brought coconut within the Schedule to the Act, 1964. The subsequent notification dated 08.05.1996 provided for the levy of Mandi Fee while the order dated 27.07.1996 specifically dealt with green coconut. These measures are inconsistent with the proposition that the coconut was never intended to be traded within the regulated Mandi framework.
The Government Order dated 02.07.2003 and the consequential directions issued by the Mandi Parishad on 09.07.2003 discontinued the levy of Mandi Fee on coconut. However, these orders neither removed coconut from the Schedule to the Act, 1964 nor prohibited their trade at the Mandi Sthal. Therefore, the discontinuance of levy of market fee cannot be construed as an implied prohibition on the underlying trade.
Subsequent to the amendments to the Mandi Adhiniyam and the Mandi Rules, Section 17(iii)(c) of the Act and Rule 66-A of the Rules respectively provided for the trading of “non-specified” agricultural produce, such as cereals, legumes, oilseeds, fibres, narcotics, spices, horticultural produce including vegetables and fruits, viticultural produce etc. subject to payment of the prescribed User Charge. Thereafter, vide Government Order dated 17.09.2021, the State Government identified “non-specified” agricultural produce for the levy
of User Charge and included coconut under the category of oilseeds. The Mandi Parishad also issued directions for the levy of User Charge. Thus,
the regulatory framework contemplated the lawful movement and trading of such agricultural produce, subject to payment of the prescribed charge. The petitioner is not seeking exemption from the statutory dues but merely seeks permission to trade in coconuts.
Coconut was being traded at other Mandi Sthals in Uttar Pradesh, however, the petitioner was restrained from doing so at Sahibabad. If the same produce was permitted to be traded elsewhere under the same regulatory framework upon payment of User Charge and issuance of entry slips, the selective prohibition imposed at Sahibabad without any disclosed lawful basis, warrants judicial scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The petitioner has been carrying on the said trade for a considerable period and the restriction on the entry of coconuts has resulted in a loss of business and income. The said restriction, therefore, has a direct bearing on the petitioner's right to carry on his lawful occupation or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India subject of course, to reasonable restrictions authorised by law.
The amendment dated 30.01.1995 placing coconut under the category of “Agriculture-Oilseeds” is wholly misconceived and arbitrary. Coconut particularly fresh or green coconut is commercially and botanically regarded as a fruit and horticultural produce. The said classification, therefore, requires consideration in light of the nature of the produce and the consequences arising from such classification.
The cumulative effect of the statutory history, the User Charge regime, the past practice, the representations made by the petitioner and the differential treatment meted out to the petitioner demonstrates that the impugned action of the opposite parties constitutes an arbitrary restriction. The petitioner ought, therefore, to be permitted to bring in and trade in fresh/green coconut subject to compliance with the provisions of the Mandi Adhiniyam, the Rules framed thereunder and the applicable User Charge requirements.
In support of his aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon following judgments :
Continental Seeds and Chemicals Ltd. v. Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow reported in 1988 SCC OnLine 606 in which a Division Bench of this Court has held that the Schedule, divides produce into categories and an item cannot be subjected to levy merely by an expansive interpretation when it is not included in the Schedule in the requisite form.
State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Agricultural Input Dealers Association reported in (1996) 5 SCC 479 in which Hon’ble Supreme Court has stressed that entries in a market-law Schedule cannot automatically be enlarged to cover distinct products or derivatives and that where separate products are intended to be included, the Schedule should say so expressly. This supports a close examination of the exact statutory entry and the commodity actually traded.
Shayara Bano v. Union of India reported in (2017) 9 SCC 1 in which a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised manifest arbitrariness as a ground for invalidating legislation under Article 14 in following words- "Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14."
Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India reported in (2018) 11 SCC 1 in which Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that manifest arbitrariness can invalidate legislation under Article 14 and explained that legislation may be invalid where it is capricious, irrational, without adequate determining principle, or excessive/disproportionate.
Shri Nishant Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, representing State-respondent No.1, on the other hand, submits that the challenge by the petitioner to the notification dated 30.01.1995 issued under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964 is misconceived, devoid of merit and liable to be rejected. It is submitted that the petitioner is a licensed trader operating at Navin Phal-Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) and cannot be permitted to trade in “coconut” within the said Mandi Sthal. Coconut has been included under the heading “A-Agriculture” and sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” and therefore, this commodity cannot be permitted to be traded in a Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard.
It has further been submitted that vide notification dated 08.05.1996 issued under Section 8 of the Act, 1964, “coconut” was included in the list of “specified agricultural produce” thereby making it liable to the levy of market fee. However, vide notification dated 18.07.2003, “coconut” was excluded from the list of notified agricultural produce, thereby exempting it from the levy of market fee and development cess.
It has been submitted that following the amendments to the Act of 1964, Section 17(iii)(c) empowered the State Government to permit trade in non-notified agricultural produce within Mandi Sthals upon payment of user charges. Pursuant thereto, the State Government, vide order dated 17.09.2021, permitted trade in 46 additional non-notified agricultural commodities subject to the payment of user charges. “Coconut” was also expressly included in the said order and categorised under the heading “Oilseeds”.
The submission of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel is that Navin Phal-Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) is a specialised market where trade is permitted only in 7 notified and 77 non-notified commodities falling under the category of “Fruits and Vegetables”. Since “coconut” has been classified by the State Government as an “Oilseed”, its trade is not permissible within the said Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard.
It has further been submitted that the petitioner is, however, at liberty to trade in coconut at the designated Cereal Mandi at Ghaziabad (New Food Grain Market Site, Govindpuram) upon payment of the applicable user charges or alternatively to trade in the same anywhere outside the Mandi premises without any restriction. Thus, the petitioner may continue to trade in coconut either at the designated Cereal Mandi at Ghaziabad, upon payment of user charges or anywhere outside the Mandi premises but not at Navin Phal-Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad), which is a specialised Market Yard exclusively meant for commodities falling under the category of “Fruits and Vegetables”.
Shri Nishant Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, with regard to the challenge to the notification dated 30.01.1995 concerning the classification of “coconut” as an “Oilseed”, submits that the kernel of coconut, when dried (copra) is a major source of edible oil, which is used for human consumption and in the manufacture of soaps, cosmetics and other industrial products. It is further submitted that the classification of coconut as an “Oilseed” is logical and consistent with the purpose and object underlying the classification under the Act, 1964.
It has further been submitted that the petitioner’s challenge to the notification dated 30.01.1995 on the ground that it is ultra vires, is devoid of merit. It is a well-settled principle of law that there is a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality lies heavily upon the person challenging it.
In support of his submissions, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. and Others v. McDowell & Co. and Others, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 709, wherein it has been held that a legislative enactment can be struck down by courts on only two grounds viz. (i) lack of legislative competence and (ii) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision.
Reliance has also been placed on the cases of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Others v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Others, reported in AIR 1958 SC 538, and Hamdard Dawakhana & Another v. The Union of India & Others, reported in AIR 1960 SC 554, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the legislature is presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of its own people and its laws are directed towards problems made manifest by experience.
Accordingly, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the classification of “coconut” as an “Oilseed” is based on its primary commercial and industrial use for the extraction of oil, a fact recognised under various statutes and commercial practices.
The submission is that the right to carry on any trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions. Since the Act of 1964 is a regulatory statute enacted for the betterment of agricultural marketing, the designation of specific Market Yards for specific categories of agricultural produce constitutes a reasonable restriction aimed at ensuring the orderly conduct of business, preventing congestion, and maintaining hygiene and infrastructure. Accordingly, it is submitted that “coconut” having been classified under the category of “Oilseeds” cannot be traded in a “Fruits and Vegetables” Market Yard and can be traded only in a Grain Market Yard upon payment of the prescribed user charges.
It has also been submitted that the petitioner-firm has outstanding arrears of Rs.2,55,125/- towards Mandi Fees, Development Cess, User Charges, for the recovery of which a notice dated 07.11.2023 has also been issued. As such, the petitioner-firm, being in default, is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has further been submitted that the petitioner has created a false impression by making an incorrect averment that it has paid the fees as required under the Act, 1964 from time to time whereas in fact, it has committed a default in making statutory payments.
Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ram Kumar Nand Kumar reported in 1972 SCC OnLine All 451. In a reference made under Section 11(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1958, the question referred for consideration was whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, “coconut” is an “Oilseed” or a “Dry Fruit”.
Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that coconuts yield non-volatile edible oil, which is extensively used for cooking purposes throughout the country, particularly in the southern regions. The oil is also used in the manufacture of vanaspati, soaps and perfumed hair oils. Although green coconut is regarded as a fruit and copra (dried coconut) is regarded as a dry fruit in North India, this does not mean that coconut ceases to be an oilseed.
In a nutshell, the submission of learned State Counsel is that coconut cannot cease to be classified as an oilseed merely because green coconut is regarded as a fruit. While classifying coconut under the heading “A-Agriculture” and sub-heading “Oilseeds” in the Schedule appended to the Act of 1964, the Legislature has not made any distinction between green coconut and dried coconut. Accordingly, the term “coconut” must be understood in accordance with its classification under the heading “Oilseeds” in the Schedule.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and before adverting to the rival contentions raised by them, it would be appropriate to examine the statutory provisions of the Act, 1964.
The Act of 1964 was enacted by the State Legislature with the assent of the President and came into force on 10.11.1964. The preamble reads as follows:
“An Act to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefor”.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons as published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 04.08.1964 provides insight into the material contents and background of the Act of 1964 :
“The present chaotic state of affairs as obtaining in agricultural produce markets is aft acknowledged fact. There are innumerable charges, levies and exactions which the agricultural, producer is required to pay without having any say in the proper utilisation of the amount so paid by them. In matters of dispute between the seller and the buyer, the former is generally put at a disadvantage by being given arbitrary awards. The produce is also denied a large part of his produce by manipulation and defective use of weights and scales in the market. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country have also been inviting the attention of the State Government from time to time towards improving the conditions of these markets. The proposal to enact a marketing legislation was first taken up in 1938; but it could not go through as the then Ministry went out of office soon after its inception. The Planning Commission stressed long ago the legislation in respect of regulation of markets should be enacted and enforced by 1955-1956. Most of the other States have already passed legislation in this respect. The proposed measure to regulate the markets in this State has been designed with a view to achieving the following directions:-
(1)to reduce the multiple trade charges, levies and exactions charged at present from the producer-seller;
(ii)to produce the verification of accurate weights and scale and see that the producer-seller is not denied his legitimate due;
(iii)to establish market committees in; which agricultural producer will have his; representation;
(iv)to ensure that the agricultural producer has his say in the utilisation of market funds for the improvement of the market as a whole:-
(v)to provide for fair settlement of disputes relating to the sale of agricultural produce:-
(vi)to provide amenities to the producer seller in the market;
(vii)to arrange for better storage facilities;
(viii)to stop inequitable and unauthorised charges and levies from the producer-seller; and to make adequate arrangements for market intelligence with a view to posting the agricultural producer with the latest position in respect of the markets dealing with his produce".
To appreciate the narrow contention arising in the instant writ petition, a glance at the relevant provisions of the Act of 1964 is indispensable.
The term “agricultural produce” is defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, 1964 as follows :
“’agricultural produce' means such items of produce of sericulture, agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule, and includes admixture of two or more of such items, and also includes any such item in processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery;" Market Area" is defined in Section 2(k) to mean "an area notified as such under Section 6 or as modified under Section 8". Principal Market Yard is defined under Section 2(o) of the Act, 1964 to mean the portion of a Market Area as declared under Section 7. “Special Commodity Market Yard” is defined under Section 2(s-2) to mean a market yard as notified under Section 7-C. "Specified agricultural produce" is defined in Section 2(t) to mean "agricultural produce specified in the notification under Section 6 or as modified under Section 8". "Sub-Market Yard" is defined in Section 2(w) to mean "a portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section 7". Section 4-A which was introduced in the Act by U.P. Act 10 of 1970 conferred power on the State Government to amend the Schedule. It reads as under:
"4-A. The State Government may by notification in the Gazette, add to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule, and thereupon the Schedule shall stand amended accordingly." Section 5 of the Act, 1964 provides for a declaration of intention to regulate and control sale and purchase of agricultural produce in any area. Where the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to regulate the sale and purchase of any agricultural produce in any area, and for that purpose to declare that area as a market area it may, by notification in the Gazette, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, declare its intention so to do, and invite objections against the proposed declaration. Section 6 of the Act, 1964 provides for the declaration of market area in respect of agricultural produce set out in the notification issued under Section 5 after considering the objections. A combined reading of Sections 5 and 6 would show that in order to be an effective declaration, the notification must set out the market area that is its geographical boundaries as also the agricultural produce in respect of which the market area is so declared. Section 7 of the Act, 1964 confers power to carve out market yard and Sub-Market Yards in a market area. Section 8 confers power on the State Government to alter market area as also modification of the list of agricultural produce in respect of each market area. If a change in the geographical limits of a market area becomes necessary or addition or omission in the list of agricultural produce in respect of a market area is desired, section 8 of the Act, 1964 confers power on the State Government by a notification to that effect in the Gazette to so alter the market area or modify the list of agricultural produce. Every agricultural produce set out in the notification declaring a market area under Section 6 or alterations made under Section 8 becomes specified agricultural produce for the purposes of the Act, 1964. Section 9 (i) sets out the effects of a declaration of a market area, the principal being that no one within the market area can set up, establish or continue or allowed to be set up, established or continued, any place for the sale-purchase, storage etc. of the specified agricultural produce, except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted by the Market Committee. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 confers power on the Market Committee to give licence to carry on business as a trader etc. in the Principal market yard or Sub-Market Yard. Section 17 enumerates the powers of the Market Committee which has to be set up for each market area as required by Section 12, which inter alia includes the power to levy and collect market fee in the circumstances therein mentioned. The relevant portion of it reads as under:
"17.A Committee shall, for the purposes of the Act, have the power to-
(iii)levy and collect
(a)*
(b)market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one percentum and not more than one and half percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner-
(1)if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the Committee;
(2)if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee;
(3)if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and
(4)in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee:
Provided that no market fee shall be levied or collected on the retail sale of any specified agricultural produce where such sale is made to the consumer;………..” The Schedule appended to the Act enumerates various species of agricultural produce as required by Section 2(a) as well as Section 4-A.
Now, coming to the contentions raised by the rival parties, the questions that arise for consideration before this Court are as follows:
Whether the petitioner-firm having a licence for the Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard can be permitted to trade in coconut, which has been categorized under the heading “A-Agriculture” and sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” in the Schedule to the Act of 1964 ?
Whether the categorization of coconut as an oilseed under the heading “A-Agriculture” and sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” in the Schedule to the Act of 1964, vide notification dated 30.01.1995 issued under Section 4-A of the Act of 1964, is ultra vires ?
Adverting to Issue No.1, we find that Section 5 of the Act of 1964 provides for the State Government’s intention to declare an area as a Market Area for the purpose of regulating the sale and purchase of any agricultural produce and for that purpose, objections are invited.
Subsequently, under Section 6 of the Act, 1964, an area is declared to be a Market Area if, after considering the objections, if any, the State Government comes to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to declare such area as a Market Area in respect of the agricultural produce specified in the notification issued under Section 5 of the Act, 1964.
Section 7-C of the Act, 1964 provides for the establishment and notification of a “Special Commodity Market Yard”. It stipulates that the State Government, where it considers it necessary or expedient in the public interest to do so, may, by notification, declare an existing Market Yard, established under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 as a Special Commodity Market Yard or may notify any new Market Yard as a Special Commodity Market Yard for all or any of the specified agricultural produce in respect of a Market Area.
Section 8 provides for the alteration of a Market Area and modification of the list of agricultural produce. It empowers the State Government, where it considers such action necessary or expedient in the public interest to do so by issuing a notification in the Gazette and in such other manner as may be prescribed with effect from the date specified in the notification to -
include any agricultural produce in, or exclude any agricultural produce from, the list of agricultural produce specified in the notification under section 6;
include any area in, or exclude any area from, the Market Area specified in the notification under section 6;
divide a Market Area specified in the notification under section 6 into two or more separate Market Areas;
amalgamate two or more Market Areas specified in the notification under section 6 into one Market Area; or
declare that a Market Area specified in the notification under section 6 shall cease to be such area.
Section 9 of the Act of 1964 deals with the effects of the declaration of a Market Area. It provides that from the date of declaration of an area as a Market Area, no Local Body or any other person shall, within such Market Area, set up, establish or continue or permit the setting up, establishment or continuation of, any place for the sale, purchase, storage, weighment or processing of the specified agricultural produce except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted by the concerned Market Committee, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, custom, usage, or agreement. Meaning thereby, after the declaration of a Market Area, no trade can be conducted within such Market Area in respect of any commodity other than the specified agricultural produce notified for that Market Area. It further provides that for the purpose of trading in the specified agricultural produce, a licence must be obtained from the concerned Market Committee. However, certain exceptions are also provided under Section 9 of the Act of 1964, particularly in respect of agricultural produce produced, reared, caught, or processed by a producer, or purchased or stored by any person for their domestic consumption.
Section 17(iii) of the Act of 1964 empowers the Market Committee to levy and collect fees for the issuance and renewal of licences as well as market fees on transactions involving the sale or purchase of specified agricultural produce in the Principal Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards from such persons and at such rates as may be prescribed provided that such fees shall not exceed two per cent of the price of the “specified agricultural produce” sold or purchased therein.
Before a transaction of sale of agricultural produce as contemplated under Section 17(iii)(b) of the Act of 1964, becomes exigible to the levy of market fee, the agricultural produce must first be notified as “specified agricultural produce” by an appropriate notification issued under Section 6 or Section 8 of the Act, 1964. Until such notification is issued, the agricultural produce, even if enumerated in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964, does not attain the status of “specified agricultural produce”. Consequently, no market fee can be levied on any transaction involving the sale of such agricultural produce.
Section 17(iii)(c) of the Act, 1964 was inserted by U.P. Act No.18 of 2020, thereby empowering the Market Committee to levy and collect user charges in consideration of the materials or services provided in the principal market yard, sub-market yard or market sub-yard as prescribed by the State Government.
The aforesaid scheme of the Act, 1964 thus clearly provides that trade in “specified agricultural produce” can be carried out only within a Market Area in accordance with the provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act, 1964. Further, a Market Area declared under Section 6 of the Act, 1964 is confined to the agricultural produce specified in the notification issued at the time of declaration of such Market Area.
Thus, before an agricultural produce can attain the status of “specified agricultural produce” in respect of a Market Area, certain steps, as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act, 1964, are required to be taken, including inviting objections, followed by the issuance of a further notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1964 making the requisite declaration both in respect of the Market Area and the agricultural produce. Upon completion of these two steps, the agricultural produce specified in the notification issued under Section 6 attains the status of “specified agricultural produce” in relation to the Market Area so notified.
Section 8 of the Act of 1964 confers upon the State Government the power to alter the Market Area or modify the list of agricultural produce in respect of such Market Area. It is only upon taking these steps that the agricultural produce enumerated in the notification issued under Section 6 or Section 8 of the Act of 1964 would assume and acquire the status or character of “specified agricultural produce”, in respect of the sale transactions of which market fee may be levied by the Market Committee.
Thus, the issuance of a notification under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964, amending the Schedule, in the absence of any corresponding notification under Section 8 of the Act, 1964, would not confer upon such agricultural produce the status or character of “specified agricultural produce” qua the concerned Market Area.
In the present case, we find that, by notification dated 30.01.1995, issued under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964, coconut was included under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” at Serial No. 11 of the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964. Subsequently, by another notification dated 08.05.1996, issued under Section 8(1)(b) of the Act, 1964, coconut was added to the existing list of specified agricultural produce in respect of the concerned Market Area. Consequently, coconut became exigible to the levy of market fee. Thereafter, another notification dated 18.07.2003 was issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964, whereby coconut was excluded from the list of “specified agricultural produce”.
Thus, irrespective of any Government Orders issued during the period between 08.05.1996, when coconut was included in the list of “specified agricultural produce”, and 18.07.2003, when it was excluded therefrom by a notification issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964, the fact remains that coconut ceased to be “specified agricultural produce” upon the issuance of the notification dated 18.07.2003. Consequently, no market fee could be levied on transactions involving coconut thereafter.
The State Government, vide order dated 12.05.2020, permitted the levy and collection of user charges on 45 commodities in respect of which a proposal for denotification was pending before it. The said order provided that trade in these 45 commodities would be permitted within the Market Yards upon payment of user charges at a rate not exceeding 2%, as prescribed under Section 17(iii)(c) of the Act, 1964. This arrangement was made in view of the time required to develop the necessary infrastructure to facilitate trade in such commodities outside the Mandi Yards. It was further envisaged that traders would continue to conduct trade in these 45 commodities within the Market Yards until appropriate infrastructure and arrangements were developed outside the Mandi Yards to facilitate such trade. Subsequently, a notification dated 24.05.2020 was issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964, whereby the aforesaid 45 commodities were excluded from the list of “specified agricultural produce”.
Subsequently, the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow, issued another Government Order dated 17.09.2021, based on the recommendations made at a meeting of the Board of the Mandi Parishad, providing for the permission to trade in 46 commodities, as mentioned in the Schedule under Section 2(a) of the Act, 1964, upon payment of user charges at the rate of 1%. The order dated 17.09.2021 issued by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow provided for the levy and collection of user charges at the rate of 1% on the trade of 45 commodities that had been denotified as “specified agricultural produce” vide notification dated 24.05.2020 as well as on 46 agricultural commodities enumerated in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964. Those 46 items were not “specified agricultural produce” and finds mention only in the Schedule referable to Sections 2(a) and 4-A of the Act, 1964. Accordingly, they were not subject to any market fee and could not be traded within the Market Yard. The effect of order dated 17.09.2021 was that these 46 items could also be traded in Market Yards subject to payment of User Charges.
A bare perusal of the order dated 17.09.2021 issued by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow indicates that out of the 46 items, 32 were categorised as fruits and vegetables (16-each) while the remaining 14 were categorised under grains, legumes, oilseeds, and spices. Coconut also finds mention in the said order dated 17.09.2021 issued by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow under the category of “Oilseeds”.
The aforesaid Government Orders and the statutory provisions discussed hereinabove clearly indicate that trade in coconut in Market Yards was not permissible after the issuance of the notification dated 18.07.2003, whereby coconut was excluded from the list of “specified agricultural produce”. It was only upon the issuance of the order dated 17.09.2021 that trade in coconut became permissible within the Market Yards, subject to the payment of user charges at the rate of 1%.
The question that now arises for consideration is whether, after the issuance of the order dated 17.09.2021 by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow, the petitioner can be permitted to trade in coconut at Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad, Ghaziabad under the licence granted to it pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, 1964 read with Rule 70(2) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules of 1965”).
Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) is an official recognized fruit and vegetable mandi operating under the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Ghaziabad. The commodities in respect of which Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) has been notified as a Market Yard can be traded within its premises. Since coconut is not categorised as a fruit under the Schedule appended to the Act of 1964, but is rather categorised under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds”, its trade cannot be permitted within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad).
The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was permitted to trade in green coconut without any objection or restraint from the authorities. This is a factual aspect for which the concerned authorities may be held responsible as they permitted the trade in coconut, which, having regard to the scheme of the Act, 1964, could not otherwise have been permitted within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) at any point of time, since coconut was not categorised as a fruit or vegetable under the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964.
Even after the issuance of the order dated 17.09.2021 by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow, whereby trade in coconut was permitted within the Market Yards upon payment of user charges, such trade could not be permitted within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) as the said Market Yard is specifically designated for the trade of fruits and vegetables. Further, since coconut has been identified and categorised under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964, its trade could be permitted only in a Market Yard designated for grains and other commodities which are not categorised as fruits and vegetables under the said Schedule.
Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) is a fruit and vegetable Market Yard and as such, only those commodities falling under the category of fruits and vegetables as specified in the order dated 17.09.2021 along with those commodities mentioned in (अनुसूची-क) of the notification dated 24.05.2020 can be permitted to be traded within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) upon payment of user charges. In other words, a total of 77 commodities comprising 45 items mentioned in the notification dated 24.05.2020 and 32 items specified under the heading “Fruits and Vegetables” in the order dated 17.09.2021 can be traded within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) upon payment of the prescribed user charges.
It is pertinent to note that a notification issued under Section 6 or Section 8 of the Act, 1964 pertains not only to the area designated and declared as a Market Area but also to the “specified agricultural produce” in respect of which such declaration is made under Sections 6 and 8 of the Act, 1964. Accordingly, any commodity or article which does not find mention in the declaration issued under Section 6 or Section 8 of the Act, 1964 cannot be traded within such Market Area.
Further, Section 7 of the Act, 1964 provides for the declaration of a Principal Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards. It stipulates that a portion of the Market Area may be designated as the Principal Market Yard, while another portion may be designated as a Sub-Market Yard within the district. Such declarations must also be consistent with the declarations made under Sections 6 and 8 of the Act, 1964.
Section 7-C of the Act, 1964 provides for the establishment and notification of a “Special Commodity Market Yard” which must be consistent with the “specified agricultural produce” notified in respect of the concerned Market Area. This means that trade within a Special Commodity Market Yard must be confined to the “specified agricultural produce” notified for that particular Market Yard and no commodity that has not been so notified can be permitted to be traded therein.
The Schedule containing the list of agricultural produce identifies and categorises different commodities under distinct headings and sub-headings. This classification serves a specific purpose, namely, to identify and categorise the commodities enumerated in the Schedule, which, in terms of Section 2(a) of the Act, 1964 are defined as “agricultural produce”, read with Section 4-A of the Act, 1964 so that they may subsequently be notified for a particular Market Area. While issuing the notification dated 30.01.1995 under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964, the State Government included coconut under the heading “A-Agriculture” and sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” at Serial No.11. Such inclusion was independent of the notifications issued under Sections 6 or 8 of the Act, 1964.
Subsequently, by notification dated 08.05.1996 issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964, coconut was included in the list of “specified agricultural produce” contained in Schedule “A” to the said notification in respect of the Market Areas specified in Schedule “B” thereto. Schedule “B” comprised 262 Market Areas including the Ghaziabad Market Area situated in District Ghaziabad mentioned at Serial No.26. The effect of the notification dated 08.05.1996 was the coconut became a “specified agricultural produce” for the Ghaziabad Market Area and could, accordingly, be traded therein upon payment of the requisite market fee.
Thereafter, by notification dated 18.07.2003, issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964, coconut was denotified and excluded from the list of “specified agricultural produce” contained in Schedule “A” to the said notification in respect of the Market Areas specified in Schedule “B” thereto. Schedule “B” comprised a total of 243 Market Areas including Sahibabad, Hapur and Muradnagar, all situated in District Ghaziabad. This meant that upon the issuance of the notification dated 18.07.2003, coconut ceased to be a “specified agricultural produce” in respect of the Market Areas of Sahibabad, Hapur and Muradnagar situated in District Ghaziabad and consequently, trade in coconut could no longer be permitted in these Market Areas.
However, despite its exclusion from the list of “specified agricultural produce” in respect of the aforesaid Market Areas, coconut continued to find mention as an agricultural produce under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964 with reference to Section 2(a) read with Section 4-A of the Act, 1964, which defines the expression “agricultural produce”.
Section 7 of the Act, 1964 provides for the establishment of Principal Market Yards and Sub-Market Yards within a Market Area declared under Sections 6 and 8 of the Act, 1964. On the other hand, Section 7-C of the Act, 1964 provides for the establishment of a Special Commodity Market Yard by declaring an existing Market Yard established under Section 2(b) of the Act of 1964 or by notifying a new Market Yard as a Special Commodity Market Yard for all or any of the “specified agricultural produce” in respect of the concerned Market Area.
However, the fact remains that coconut ceased to be a “specified agricultural produce” in respect of the Sahibabad Market Area situated in District Ghaziabad vide notification dated 18.07.2003 issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964. In view thereof, it cannot be said that trade in coconut was permissible within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) after 18.07.2003. If the petitioner continued to trade in coconut within the said Market Yard after 18.07.2003 and the authorities did not restrain it from doing so, such inaction on the part of the authorities cannot be construed to mean that the petitioner was legally entitled to trade in coconut.
Since coconut is categorised under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” whereas Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) is a fruit and vegetable Market Yard, the position remains that even after the introduction of the user charge regime and the issuance of the order dated 17.09.2021 by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow trade in coconut can be permitted only in those Mandi Yards where commodities falling under the heading “A-Agriculture” are permitted to be traded upon payment of user charges. Such trade cannot be permitted within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) where only those agricultural produce categorised under the heading “Fruits and Vegetables” in the Schedule appended to the Act of 1964 read with the order dated 17.09.2021 issued by the Director, Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow can be traded upon payment of user charges.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we conclude that even after the introduction of the user charge regime, trade in coconut cannot be permitted within the premises of Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) even upon payment of user charges as coconut has not been categorised as a fruit or vegetable in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964.
Having decided the first issue, we now proceed to consider the second issue, namely, whether the description of coconut in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964 is ultra vires. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that according to the botanical classification of coconut, it falls within the category of fruits and therefore, ought not to have been categorised or placed under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds”.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on an extract from a report/book published by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research–Central Plantation Crops Research Institute, Kasaragod, Kerala, which has been annexed as Annexure No.16 to the writ petition. The said extract mentions that a coconut is botanically classified as a drupe, which is a type of fruit.
The reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the aforesaid extract itself indicates that a drupe is a type of fruit associated with coconut. However, this cannot be interpreted to mean that coconut, in its entirety, is necessarily a fruit. Rather, it indicates that a particular stage of development of coconut, namely, the drupe, has been classified as a type of fruit.
In ordinary commercial parlance, coconut is understood in several forms, namely, green coconut, watery coconut, dried coconut, and copra, all of which fall within the expression “coconut”. Green coconut contains coconut water and its kernel remains in the tender stage. Green coconuts are generally consumed during the summer season by cutting them open to extract and drink the water contained therein.
A watery coconut is a fully ripened coconut that enters the market after the removal of its outer fibrous covering. It is commonly referred to as a coconut or watery coconut (brown coconut). The water is consumed as a drink, while the kernel is used for culinary purposes. Once the coconut has fully matured, it is plucked from the tree and after the removal of its outer fibrous covering to reduce its weight, is sent to the market for commercial purposes.
Although a tender coconut may be regarded as a green fruit, a watery coconut (brown coconut) is not commercially understood as a fruit but is treated as a distinct commodity in its own right. Thus, the expression “coconut” cannot be interpreted to mean only green or tender coconut; rather, it encompasses several forms, including tender coconut, watery coconut, dried coconut and copra.
The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that green coconut, which is being traded by the petitioner, is a tender coconut and constitutes a form of fruit. Therefore, trade in the same should be permitted upon payment of user charges as it falls within the category of fruits.
The submission so advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted for the reason that green coconut (tender coconut) does not find mention in the Schedule appended to the Act of 1964 wherein agricultural produce has been categorised and defined in terms of the definition contained in Section 2(a) of the Act, 1964 read with notification issued under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964. Had the intention of the State Legislature been to identify green coconut (tender coconut) as a commodity distinct from coconut, it would certainly have included green coconut as a separate commodity or item in the Schedule under the heading “Fruits”.
As stated hereinabove, coconut, in ordinary commercial parlance, is understood in several forms, all of which fall within the expression “coconut”. Accordingly, the categorisation of coconut under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” cannot be held to be illegal or incorrect. Conversely, it can also be contended that coconut as a commodity in its entirety, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be classified as a fruit, since dried coconut and copra cannot be categorised as fruits.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh vs. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain reported in (2000) 5 SCC 511 while deciding the issue of whether “watery coconut” was liable to payment of entry tax and whether “copra” and “coconut” were commercially distinct commodities, held that “watery coconut” eventually becomes dry coconut or copra. Therefore, it could not be contended that “watery coconut” is a distinct commodity and, as such, cannot be subjected to entry tax. The relevant paragraphs 3 to 6 of the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:
“3.The view taken by the High Court in this case has lost sight of the expression in the opening clause of the entry “Oilseeds, that is to say”. The phrase “that is to say” has been the subject-matter of interpretation by this Court in State of T.N. v. Pyare Lal Malhotra [(1976) 1 SCC 834 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 102 : (1976) 37 STC 319] . The expression “that is to say” is descriptive, enumerative and exhaustive and circumscribes to a great extent the scope of the entry. The entry provides for “Oilseeds, that is to say coconut”, which again says, “i.e. copra and coconut including any other commodity”. An oilseed botanically means a seed which is a flowering plant's unit of reproduction or germ capable of developing into another such plant. Seed which can yield oil is an oilseed. If a seed by reason of application of a scientific method produces oil it is not necessarily understood to be an “oilseed” in common parlance. If a commodity possesses all the qualities of an oilseed it cannot be excluded from the ambit of the expression “oilseed”. Oil is generally extracted from dry coconuts, but in some parts of India it is extracted even from copra recovered from fresh coconuts. Copra of watery coconut before it dries up may not yield as much oil as dried copra. The oil which it yields may also contain some watery substance which may have to be eliminated for the purpose of recovering pure coconut oil. At the same time, it yields sufficient quantity of oil. Thus “watery coconut” while yielding oil merely because it yields some watery substance does not cease to be an “oilseed” and, therefore, it falls within the entry.
4.In this context, it is necessary for us to refer to the decision of this Court in Sri Siddhi Vinayaka Coconut & Co. v. State of A.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 835 : 1974 SCC (Tax) 319] on which strong reliance has been placed by the High Court. In that case this Court was concerned with the entry as contained in the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The entry therein merely contained “coconuts” in the Third Schedule and “tender coconuts” in the Fourth Schedule which are useful only for drying purposes and which were exempt from tax. An explanation was added to the Third Schedule to state that the expression “coconuts” would mean fresh or dried coconuts, shelled or unshelled including copra, but excluding tender coconuts. Again by another amendment another explanation was added to state that the expression “coconuts” in the Schedule would mean dried coconuts, shelled or unshelled, including copra but excluding tender coconuts. Thus this Court was concerned in that case with two sets of entries — one contained in the Central Sales Tax Act, which is similar to the provisions with which we are concerned in the present case, and the other as stated in the Third and Fourth Schedules to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. In that context, this Court had to consider whether a “watery coconut” could be taxed within the permissible restrictions as also “dried coconut” that resulted from the drying of the same watery coconut. It was contended that under the State statute though “watery coconut” and “dried coconut” were treated separately there is a provision for refund when “watery coconut” had suffered tax and became “dried coconut”. In that context that decision was rendered and we are concerned with a different kind of entry for tax.
5.This Court in Ganpat Lal Lakhotia v. State of Rajasthan [(1997) 10 SCC 455] quoted with approval what was stated in Sri Krishna Coconut Co. v. CTO [(1965) 16 STC 511 (AP)] wherein it was stated as follows:
“In a tender coconut, the kernel is hardly formed or is only in the initial stages of formation. In a dried coconut the kernel has formed and fully developed and further the water inside the coconut has dried up leading to the drying of the kernel also. But a fully grown coconut with a well-developed kernel which contains water cannot be called either a tender or a dried coconut. This is the well-known variety of coconuts used for culinary purposes and on auspicious occasions and as part of the offerings in temples. I do not think it is correct or reasonable to describe this class of coconuts as either dried or tender.” It was noticed therein that a “watery coconut” in due course becomes “dried coconut” or “copra” and, therefore, it could not be stated that “watery coconuts” are outside the scope of the entry. If for purpose of the benefit arising under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, which was the subject-matter of consideration before this Court, it has taken the view that the “watery coconuts” are not outside the scope of the said provision, there is no reason to state that the “watery coconuts” in the present cases fall outside the scope of the Act. In the light of this analysis, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that “watery coconut” is not taxable under the relevant entry of the Act. In the result, we set aside the order made by the High Court and restore that of the Tribunal. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
6.The appeals are allowed accordingly.”
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedbad and others reported in AIR 1991 SC 494 while deciding the issue of whether brown coconut (watery coconut) falls within the definition of green fruit and is, therefore, liable to octroi duty held that watery coconut i.e. brown coconut is not a green fruit but a distinct commodity in its own right. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, contained in paragraphs 3 to 6 of the aforesaid judgment, are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
“3.The question is whether brown coconut (watery coconut) is a green fruit or not? In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Asstt. STO [(1961) 12 STC 286 : AIR 1961 SC 1325 : (1962) 1 SCR 279] and CST v. S.N. Brothers [(1973) 3 SCC 496 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 254 : (1973) 31 STC 302] , this Court held that the expression occurring in schedules to the Sales Tax Acts have to be considered with reference to their meaning in ordinary commercial parlance and should not be considered according to the strict scientific meaning. In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad case [(1961) 12 STC 286 : AIR 1961 SC 1325 : (1962) 1 SCR 279] , this Court held that betel leaves, though vegetable leaves in the strict scientific sense, cannot be considered to be vegetables. In ordinary commercial language in the common parlance, betel leaves cannot be considered as vegetables. Coconut in the ordinary commercial sense is understood in several forms as tender coconut, watery coconut, dried coconut and copra and all these come under the expression coconut. Tender coconut contains juicy water and the kernel is at the tender stage. The tender coconuts are used generally during summer (autumn) season to drink the watery juice therein after cutting it. A watery coconut is a ripened coconut and enters the market after the removal of the outer cover of its fibre. It is called coconut or watery coconut. For the purpose of the case it is called brown coconut. The water is used as a drink and the kernel for culinary purposes. After the coconut is fully grown it is plucked from the trees and after removing the outer fibre (to reduce weight), it is sent to the market for commercial purposes. As stated earlier it is called coconut or watery coconut (brown coconut). The question, therefore, is whether the brown coconut (watery coconut) is a green fruit. The word green is defined in Chambers Dictionary at page 463 as adjective of the colour usually in leaves between blue and yellow in spectrum … unripe, fresh, undried, raw or colour of green things.
4.In Webster Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 509, the word ‘fruit’ has been defined as the edible, pulpy mass covering the seeds of various plants and trees. They are classified as fleshy, as gourds, melons, oranges, apples, pears, berries, etc.; drupaceous as cherries, peaches, plums, apricots, and others containing stones; dry as nuts, capsules, ashenia, follicles, legumes, etc. In flowering plants, the mature seed vessel and its contents, together with such accessory or external parts of the inflorescence seemed to be integral with them. Any vegetable product used as food or otherwise serviceable to man; as grain, cotton, or flax; also such products, collectively: the fruits of the earth. Therefore, in the context of the octroi it could be legitimate to conclude that all kinds of fresh fruits are exempted articles.
5.In P.A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Addl. Appellate Asstt. Commissioner [(1985) 4 SCC 30 : (1985) 60 STC 80] , this Court was to consider whether ripened coconut which is none other than watery coconut is an exempted article as vegetable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act (1 of 1959). This court held that fresh fruits and vegetables being household articles of everyday use for the table, these will have to be construed in the popular sense, meaning the sense in which every householder will understand them. Viewed from this angle, the most apposite test would be an answer to a simple question: Would a householder when asked to bring home some ‘fresh fruits’ and some ‘vegetables’ for the evening meal, bring coconut too? Obviously the answer is in the negative. Accordingly this Court held that ripened coconut is neither a fresh fruit nor vegetable. The watery coconut is no doubt a ripened coconut used for several purposes like offerings to a deity in a Hindu temple being broken or used on auspicious occasions or used in preparation of the daily table food or in confectionery like biscuits or in the extraction of oil when it is fresh or dried kernel. When a person in the commercial market goes and asks for coconut no one will consider brown coconut to be vegetable or fresh fruit, much less a green fruit. No householder would purchase it as a fruit. No doubt in some English dictionary, coconut is called a fruit or nut but it is to be understood in its ordinary commercial parlance. In Sri Krishna Coconut Co. v. CTO [(1965) 16 STC 511 : AIR 1966 AP 128] , the Andhra Pradesh High Court was to consider whether fully grown coconut with well developed kernel containing water i.e. watery coconut could be called tender or dried coconut. In that context considering the scope of an explanation to Schedule III of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957 which exempted tender coconut from the sales tax under the Act, it was held that in a tender coconut, the kernel is hardly formed or is only in the initial stages of formation. In a dried coconut the kernel is formed and fully developed and further the water inside the coconut has dried up leading to the drying of the kernel also. But a fully grown coconut with a well developed kernel, which contains, water cannot be alleged either a tender or a dried coconut. This is well known that coconut is used fo culinary purposes and on auspicious occasions and as part of the offerings in temples. It was held in that case that the watery coconuts are fully developed coconuts and they are exigible to sales tax. In Kunchi Rajeshwara Sastry & Sons v. Asstt. CCT [(1976) 37 STC 399 (AP HC) : 1976 Tax LR 1786] , the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was to consider whether copra is an oil seed within the meaning of Item (vi) of the list of declared goods mentioned in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and whether it is exigible to sales tax under the Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1957. In that context it was held that copra is an oil seed and it is a declared good within the meaning of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The watery coconuts are made liable to tax at the point of last purchase and that, therefore, copra would be taxed till that period at the point of last purchase and the coconut of all varieties would include copra also. Therefore, it is a declared goods. The Division Bench while considering whether copra is an oil seed held thus :
Coconut is understood in several forms, namely, tender coconut, watery coconut, dried coconut and copra, and all these come under the expression ‘coconut’. Except in the case of tender coconut from which oil cannot be extracted, in all other cases, oil can be extracted and all of them are regarded in common parlance as oil seeds.”
In Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries v. State of Karnataka [(1980) 46 STC 404 (Karn HC)] , the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was to consider whether desiccated coconut falls within the entry coconut, which is one of the declared goods under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and is also included at Entry 5 of the Fourth Schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. In that context the meaning of the word oil seeds was extensively examined by the Division Bench and held that desiccated coconut is a coconut and a declared good under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. In Deputy Commissioner of Agrl. Income Tax and Sales Tax, Kerala v. A.P. Raman [(1960) 11 STC 263 (Ker HC)] , the Kerala High Court also took the same view. In CST v. Ram Kumar Nand Kumar [(1973) 31 STC 321 : 1973 Tax LR 2165 (All HC)] , the Allahabad High Court also held that coconut is an oil seed within the definition of Section 3-AA(1)(vi) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
6.In the light of the above discussion we conclude that the watery coconut (brown coconut) is not a green fruit but is a separate entity by itself. It cannot also be considered to be a dry fruit within the meaning of Entry 11 of Rule 4. Dried fruit is distinct from the coconut. Therefore, the watery coconut (brown coconut) does not fall within the meaning of Item 13-B of Rule 4 of the Rules also. All articles or goods which are not specified elsewhere in the schedule or in the list of exempted articles or goods would fall under Item 55 of Rule 14. Brown coconut is not an exempted article among the list of articles in Item 10 of Rule 4, namely, green fruit (brown coconut) (watery coconut) would fall within Item 55 of Rule 14 of the Rules and is exigible to octroi.”
The aforesaid judgment clearly indicates that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that watery coconut (brown coconut) is not a green fruit. Accordingly, the contention of the petitioner that coconut ought to be placed under the heading “Fruits” is wholly misconceived.
A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Jayprakash Pramod Kumar and others vs. U.P. Raj Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, U.P., Lucknow and others reported in 2005 SCC OnLine All 1708 while deciding the issue of whether persons carrying on the business of sale and purchase of bamboo could be required under the Act of 1964 to obtain a licence for conducting such business and to pay market fee on transactions involving the sale and purchase of bamboo within the respective Market Areas, considered the question of whether bamboo falls within the category of “wood” under the heading “Forest Products” contained in the Schedule to the notification issued under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act, 1964. After considering several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench held that bamboo is an item covered by the entry “wood” as specified in the Schedule to the Act, 1964. The Division Bench further held that an entry in a taxing statute must be interpreted in accordance with the meaning attributed to it in common parlance, that is, the meaning in which it is understood by persons dealing in the commodity concerned.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramavatar Budhaiprasad vs. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola reported in AIR 1961 SC 1325 held that entries in taxation statutes must not be construed in a technical sense or from a botanical point of view but must be understood in their common parlance. Where a word has not been defined in the statute and is a word of everyday use, it must be construed in its popular sense, that is, in the sense in which persons conversant with the subject matter of the statute would understand it. Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the word “vegetables” as used in a taxing statute must be understood in its common parlance, denoting a class of vegetables grown in a kitchen garden or on a farm and used for the table. Accordingly, betel leaves cannot be classified as vegetables.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1962 SC 660 held that sugarcane does not fall within the definition of the expression “green vegetables”.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Saraswati Sugar Mills vs. Haryana State Board reported in (1992) 1 SCC 418 has held that the term “vegetable” must be understood in its common parlance sense and not in its botanical sense so as to include sugarcane.
In the present context, we find that the term “coconut”, in ordinary commercial parlance, is understood to encompass several forms, one of which is green coconut. However, this, by itself, does not imply that all other forms of coconut can also be classified or categorised as fruits. Thus, we are of the view that the State Legislature has rightly placed coconut, as understood in common parlance, under the heading “A-Agriculture” and the sub-heading “III-Oilseeds” in the Schedule appended to the Act, 1964. Such classification cannot be said to be defective or illegal in any manner. Accordingly, we hold that the notification dated 30.01.1995 issued under Section 4-A of the Act, 1964 is ultra vires.
We would also like to observe that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the legislative wisdom of the Legislature, has consistently held that the Legislature is presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of its people. Such legislative wisdom cannot be questioned or interfered with except on the grounds of lack of legislative competence, violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution or contravention of any other constitutional provision.
We do not find any such ground in the present case. The licence granted to the petitioner pertains exclusively to trade within Navin Phal Sabzi Mandi Sthal, Sahibabad (Ghaziabad), which is a Fruit and Vegetable Market Yard. The petitioner-firm, at no point of time, had any legal right to trade in green coconut. However, it continued to do so as the authorities did not restrain it from carrying on such trade. Mere inaction on the part of the authorities cannot, by itself, create any right in favour of the petitioner-firm to continue trading in green coconut when such trade is otherwise not legally permissible.
As indicated hereinabove, the right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restrictions. We find that the licence granted to the petitioner did not, at any point of time, authorised it to trade in coconut. It was not legally permissible for the petitioner to trade in green coconut, which is merely one of the form of coconut under the pretext that certain reports describe green coconut as a fruit and that according to botanical classification, it also falls within the category of fruits.
The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
