Chagna & Ors. Vs State Of U.P.
Allahabad High Court · Lucknow Bench · 17 Nov 2026 · Abdul Moin, J · Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J
Judgment
(Dictated by Hon’ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Heard Sri Gaurav Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant no. 1 (Chugna), Sri Dheerendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for appellant no. 2 (Ram Bharosey) and Sri Arunendra, learned Additional Government Advocate (A.G.A.) appearing for the State-respondent.
The instant Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') has been instituted assailing the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.02.1989 passed by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri in consolidated Sessions Trial No. 59 of 1987 (State vs. Chugna) and Sessions Trial No. 225 of 1988 (State vs. Ram Bharosey and Guddu), arising out of Case Crime No. 83 of 1986, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and Section 504 IPC, Police Station Singahi, District Lakhimpur Kheri.
By means of the impugned judgment and order, the learned trial court convicted all three accused-appellants, namely Chugna, Ram Bharosey and Guddu, under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for Life. All three appellants were, however, acquitted of the charge under Section 504 IPC.
At the very outset, it is relevant to record that during the pendency of the instant appeal before this Court, an inquiry report dated 13.11.2025 submitted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri was received, communicating that appellant no. 3, Guddu, son of Raju Kori, died about 15 years ago due to an accidental fall from a tree. Consequently, vide order dated 28.07.2022 of this Court, Criminal Appeal No. 192 of 1989 has already been abated in respect of appellant no. 3 (Guddu). Hence, the present appeal survives and is being adjudicated on merits exclusively with regard to appellant no. 1 (Chugna) and appellant no. 2 (Ram Bharosey).
Brief Facts of the Case
The prosecution story, in brief, is that the deceased, Ram Kishan, son of Tulsi Ram, was a resident of Village Bhairampur, Police Station Singahi, District Lakhimpur Kheri. Prior to the date of occurrence, the deceased was employed as an ad-hoc forest watcher in the Dudhwa National Park / Forest Department. While discharging his duties, the deceased had caught the accused persons cutting and stealing forest timber. On that account, an altercation had taken place and the accused persons were taken to the Range Office, where they were let off upon tendering an apology. Owing to this incident, the accused persons harbored pre-existing enmity and grudge against the deceased.
On 04.10.1986, the deceased Ram Kishan along with his paternal uncle Ram Sahay (PW-4, the informant) and his brother-in-law (sala) Mishrilal (PW-1) had gone to the local Belrayan market to purchase vegetables. After making purchases, at about 6:00 P.M. (at sunset), while they were returning on foot from the forest pathway towards their village Bhairampur, the accused persons—Ram Bharosey armed with a country-made pistol (tamancha/katta) and Chugna and Guddu armed with knives suddenly emerged from the jungle.
It is alleged that the accused persons initially hurled abuses at Ram Kishan. Thereafter, accused Ram Bharosey discharged his country-made pistol at Ram Kishan. The firearm projectile struck Ram Kishan on the left side of his chest, causing him to fall to the ground. As per the initial written report (tahreer, Exhibit Ka-1), once Ram Kishan collapsed, all three accused persons assaulted him with knives. Upon alarms being raised by PW-1 and PW-4, witnesses Jwala Singh (PW-2) and Roj Ali (PW-3), who were also returning from the Belrayan market, rushed towards the spot, whereupon the accused persons fled into the jungle.
The injured Ram Kishan was carried from the place of occurrence towards Belrayan for medical treatment; however, he succumbed to his injuries on the way near the Belrayan Range Colony. Leaving the cadaver of the deceased on a Dunlop cart (bullock cart) in the compound of the Range Office, informant Ram Sahay (PW-4) got a written report scribed by one Shri Ram, carried it on foot to Police Station Singahi (situated about six miles away) and presented it at 23:15 hours on 04.10.1986. On that basis, Chik FIR No. 69 of 1986 (Exhibit Ka-3) and General Diary Entry No. 32 (Exhibit Ka-4) were registered under Section 302 IPC against accused Chugna, Guddu and Ram Bharosey.
Following the registration of the FIR, the investigation was entrusted to Station Officer Shakil Akhtar Khan (PW-7). Due to the absence of light during the night, the inquest proceedings could not be undertaken immediately. On the morning of 05.10.1986, starting at 07:00 A.M., S.O. Shakil Akhtar Khan conducted the inquest (panchayatnama, Exhibit Ka-5) on the dead body of Ram Kishan lying on the Dunlop cart at Belrayan. Along with the necessary police papers (Challan Lash Exhibit Ka-7, Photo Lash Exhibit Ka-6, specimen seal and post-mortem requisition), the dead body was dispatched for autopsy to the District Hospital, Lakhimpur Kheri through Constables Rajkishore Verma and Satish Chandra Pathak.
On 05.10.1986 at 05:00 P.M., Dr. S.K. Tewari (PW-5) conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of deceased Ram Kishan and prepared the autopsy report (Exhibit Ka-2).
In the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer inspected the crime scene, collected samples of plain and blood-stained earth along with one 12-bore empty cartridge (recovery memo Exhibit Ka-12) and seized the blood-stained tahmad worn by the deceased (recovery memo Exhibit Ka-10). The I.O. prepared the site plan (naksha nazri, Exhibit Ka-11). The accused persons having absconded, proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. were initiated against them pursuant to warrants issued by the C.J.M., Lakhimpur Kheri and attachments of their movable properties were executed (Fard Kurki Exhibits Ka-22, Ka-23 and Ka-24). Subsequently, accused Chugna surrendered before the court, while co-accused Guddu and Ram Bharosey were arrested. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the I.O. submitted charge-sheet Exhibit Ka-25 (P-11) against all three accused under Section 302 IPC.
The cases were committed to the Court of Session, registered as Sessions Trial No. 59 of 1987 (State vs. Chugna) and Sessions Trial No. 225 of 1988 (State vs. Ram Bharosey and Guddu) and consolidated for trial, with S.T. No. 59 of 1987 being made the leading case. The learned trial court framed formal charges under Sections 504 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC against all the accused persons. The charges were read over and explained to the accused, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
Evidence on behalf of the prosecution
In order to substantiate its case and establish the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution produced and examined following seven witnesses:
Table – A: Summary of Examined Witnesses
| Witness No. | Name & Particulars |
| P.W. 1 | Mishrilal |
| P.W. 2 | Jwala Singh |
| P.W. 3 | Roj Ali |
| P.W. 4 | Ram Sahay |
| P.W. 5 | Dr. S.K. Tewari |
| P.W. 6 | H.C. Virendra Kumar Singh |
| P.W. 7 | S.O. Shakil Akhtar Khan |
The prosecution further proved and exhibited several contemporaneous documentary materials, which are tabulated hereunder:
Table – B: List of prosecution exhibits
| Exhibit No. | Description of Document / Material Object |
|---|---|
| Ex. Ka-1 | Written Complaint (Tahreer) |
| Ex. Ka-2 | Post-Mortem Examination Report |
| Ex. Ka-3 | Chik First Information Report |
| Ex. Ka-4 | General Diary Entry No. 32 (Kayami) |
| Ex. Ka-5 | Inquest Report (Panchayatnama) |
| Exhibit No. | Description of Document / Material Object |
|---|---|
| Ex. Ka-6 | Photo Lash |
| Ex. Ka-7 | Challan Lash |
| Ex. Ka-10 | Seizure Memo of Blood-stained Tahmad |
| Ex. Ka-11 | Site Plan (Naksha Nazri) of Spot |
| Ex. Ka-12 | Seizure Memo of Earth & Spent Cartridge |
| Ex. Ka-22 | Attachment Memo (Fard Kurki u/s 83 CrPC) |
| Ex. Ka-23 | Attachment Memo (Fard Kurki u/s 83 CrPC) |
| Ex. Ka-24 | Attachment Memo (Fard Kurki u/s 83 CrPC) |
| Ex. Ka-25 | Charge-Sheet (P-11) |
| Material Ex. | 56 Metallic Pellets (Chharre) |
Depositions of Prosecution Witnesses
P.W. 1, Mishrilal (Brother-in-law of the Deceased): 15. In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 1 deposed that the deceased Ram Kishan was his brother-in-law (bahnoi). On the date of occurrence, he, along with Ram Kishan and Ram Sahay (PW-4), were returning on foot from Belrayan market. At sunset, near the forest boundary of Dudhwa National Park, accused Ram Bharosey emerged holding a country-made pistol and accused Chugna and Guddu emerged holding knives. Accused Ram Bharosey fired upon Ram Kishan, hitting him in the left chest, whereupon he collapsed. Thereafter, the accused persons inflicted knife blows upon Ram Kishan.
In his cross-examination, P.W. 1 explicitly deposed: "चाकुओं से तीनों मुलजिमान ने 2-2, 3-3 बार किये थे और फिर मौके से भाग लिये थे।". He categorically admitted that the Investigating Officer recorded his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. for the first time 14 to 15 days after the incident. He further conceded that at the time of the incident, visibility in the forest was restricted to merely 25–30 paces.
P.W. 2, Jwala Singh (Independent Witness): In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 2 deposed that he was employed as a seasonal watcher in the forest department. On the fateful evening, he was returning from the market and was walking approximately 150 to 200 yards behind the deceased, Mishrilal and Ram Sahay. Upon hearing the sound of a gunshot, he rushed forward and arrived at the spot last. He saw Ram Kishan writhing in pain on the ground and only saw accused Chugna fleeing with a knife in hand, while he could not identify the other two fleeing persons. He specifically denied seeing any accused assaulting or stabbing the deceased. The prosecution declared this witness hostile.
In his cross-examination by the State, he denied giving any statement to the police that Ram Bharosey fired or that Chugna and Guddu inflicted knife blows in his presence. Significantly, the counsel appearing for accused Chugna conducted no cross-examination of this witness and the cross-examination on his behalf was recorded as NIL.
P.W. 3, Roj Ali (Independent Witness): In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 3 deposed that on the date of occurrence, he and Jwala Singh were walking approximately one furlong (approx. 200 meters) behind Ram Kishan, Mishrilal and Ram Sahay. He heard a gunshot and upon alarms being raised, he ran to the spot. He saw the three accused persons fleeing; Chugna had a knife, while Guddu and Ram Bharosey were carrying bags. He testified: "मैंने किसी भी मुलजिम को फायर करते और चाकुओं से मारपीट करते नहीं देखा". He claimed that he carried the bleeding body of Ram Kishan on his back to Village Bhairampur and his clothes were drenched in blood. The prosecution declared this witness hostile. Significantly, the counsel appearing for accused Chugna conducted no cross-examination of this witness and the cross-examination on his behalf was recorded as NIL.
P.W. 4, Ram Sahay (Informant / Paternal Uncle of the Deceased):
In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 4 reiterated the prosecution version that while returning from Belrayan market, accused Ram Bharosey fired from a katta, hitting Ram Kishan in the chest and after he fell down, accused Chugna and Guddu inflicted knife blows upon him.
In his cross-examination, P.W. 4 made vital admissions: (i) He admitted that in the FIR (Exhibit Ka-1), he had specifically narrated that all three accused persons assaulted the deceased with knives after he fell. When confronted with this contradiction, he offered an explanation stating that since Ram Bharosey had grappled with the deceased after he fell, he had stated that all three stabbed him. (ii) He admitted that the forest was dense and visibility was poor: "जंगल घना था। जंगल में दूर की चीज़ नहीं दिखाई देती थी।" (iii) He admitted that as soon as the gunshot was fired, he and Mishrilal fled in fear in different directions: "हम लोग भी इधर उधर भागने लगे, कोई विशेष दिशा नहीं बता सकता।"
P.W. 5, Dr. S.K. Tewari (Autopsy Surgeon):
P.W. 5, Dr. S.K. Tewari, proved the Post-Mortem Examination Report (Exhibit Ka-2) and deposed that external examination revealed that the deceased was a moderately built male, aged about 35 years. He further testified that upon conducting the autopsy, he noted as many as ten ante-mortem injuries on the cadaver of the deceased, including an incised wound measuring 3 cm x 0.5 cm x bone-deep over the left forehead, situated 3 cm above the left eyebrow; an abrasion measuring 1 cm x 0.5 cm just above the medial end of the left eyebrow; an incised wound measuring 2 cm x 1 cm x bone-deep, located 2 cm behind the left ear; and another incised wound measuring 1.5 cm x 1 cm x bone-deep, situated 1 cm below the aforesaid injury. He next noted two abrasions, situated 1 cm apart from each other, each measuring 3 cm x 0.5 cm over the left side of the face; a through-and-through incised wound measuring 1.5 cm x 0.3 cm near the left extremity of the upper lip; and another through-and-through incised wound measuring 1.5 cm x 0.3 cm over the left extremity of the lower lip. He further deposed that he observed an incised wound measuring 2 cm x 1 cm x bone-deep slightly to the left side on the chin; an incised wound measuring 3 cm x 1 cm x bone-deep underneath the left jaw incised wound 2 cm x 1 cm bone deep below left side of chin and multiple firearm wounds of entry grouped together in an area of 8 cm x 7 cm on the left side upper chest, just above the nipple, having a central aperture measuring 2 cm x 1 cm x chest cavity deep, which was surrounded by multiple small entry wounds, each measuring approximately 0.3 cm x 0.3 cm of variable depth.
On internal examination, the left pleura, left lung and pericardium were found lacerated and 56 small metallic pellets along with 2 pellets from the heart wall were extracted. The thoracic cavity contained 1.5 litres of fluid blood. Dr. Tewari categorically opined that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage resulting from ante-mortem firearm injuries (Injury No. 10). Significantly, the cross-examination of Dr. Tewari on behalf of accused Chugna was recorded as NIL. In cross-examination by counsel for Ram Bharosey, the doctor admitted that the knife injuries were incised wounds and not punctured or penetrating wounds.
P.W. 6, H.C. Virendra Kumar Singh (Head Moharrir): P.W. 6 proved the Chik FIR (Exhibit Ka-3) and GD Entry No. 32 (Exhibit Ka-4).
P.W. 7, S.O. Shakil Akhtar Khan (Investigating Officer): P.W. 7 deposed regarding the steps taken during the investigation, including preparation of the inquest report (Exhibit Ka-5), recovery of the 12-bore spent cartridge (Exhibit Ka-12) and submission of the charge-sheet.
In his cross-examination, P.W. 7 made significant admissions, stating that he recorded the statement of the alleged eyewitness Mishrilal (PW-1) under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 19.10.1986, which was after an unexplained delay of nearly 15 days from the date of the incident. He further categorically admitted that witness Roj Ali (PW-3) had never stated to him during investigation that he had carried the deceased Ram Kishan on his back or that his clothes were soaked with blood, nor did he observe any blood stains on the clothes of Roj Ali. He next admitted that in the site plan (Exhibit Ka-11), he did not record the distance of the forest boundary from the spot, nor did he indicate the path from which the assailants emerged. He also admitted that no blood drops were found on the pathway between the place of occurrence and Village Bhairampur.
27. Statements of Accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. & Defence Plea
After the closure of prosecution evidence, the incriminating circumstances appearing against the accused persons were put to them under Section 313 Cr.P.C.. All the accused-appellants denied the allegations in toto, termed the prosecution evidence false and asserted that they had been falsely implicated due to enmity stemming from the forest timber incident. They chose not to lead any evidence in defence.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the parties
(I) Submissions on behalf of Appellant No. 1 (Chugna)
Sri Gaurav Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant no. 1 (Chugna) submitted that no specific role of assault has been established against appellant no. 1 by any reliable independent evidence, inasmuch as the independent witnesses, namely Jwala Singh (PW-2) and Roj Ali (PW-3), who were allegedly present near the spot, turned hostile and categorically refused to support the prosecution version of the assault. At the most, their evidence only indicates that they saw appellant Chugna running away from the spot, which by itself cannot establish his participation in the homicidal assault. He further submitted that the specific allegation of knife assault rests solely upon the uncorroborated testimonies of close relatives, namely PW-4 (uncle) and PW-1 (brother-in-law), whose statements suffer from material improvements and contradictions, particularly when in the FIR (Exhibit Ka-1), PW-4 had explicitly stated that all three accused persons inflicted knife blows, whereas before the court, PW-4 contradicted his own FIR by exonerating Ram Bharosey from the knife assault, while PW-1 persisted in deposing that all three accused inflicted knife blows and such fatal contradictions completely demolish the credibility of the ocular version.
He next submitted that the medical evidence completely excludes any fatal injuries attributable to the knife, as the autopsy surgeon, Dr. S.K. Tewari (PW-5), unequivocally established that the sole cause of death was shock and haemorrhage resulting from the firearm injury to the chest (Injury No. 10), which was attributed exclusively to Ram Bharosey, whereas the incised wounds found on the face and chin (Injuries No. 1 to 9) were merely superficial/bone-deep, did not penetrate any internal vital organ and were incapable of causing death in the ordinary course of nature. Further submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that there is complete absence of evidence establishing common intention under Section 34 IPC, as there is not a shred of evidence to show any prior meeting of minds or pre-arranged plan to commit murder and in the absence of proof that Chugna shared a common intention with Ram Bharosey to commit murder, he cannot be vicariously convicted under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 IPC.
He next submitted that there has been a patent failure to ensure effective legal aid to appellant no. 1, resulting in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as appellant Chugna remained an indigent person incarcerated throughout the trial and was represented by an Amicus Curiae appointed by the court, who conducted the defence in a perfunctory and nominal manner by conducting NIL cross-examination of PW-2, PW-3, PW-5 (Doctor) and PW-6 and merely asking four innocuous questions of PW-1, which failure to provide effective legal representation has caused grave prejudice to the appellant, thereby vitiating the trial. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly submitted that the alleged weapon of offence (knife) was never recovered by the investigating agency and moreover, the site plan (Exhibit Ka-11) demonstrates that the witnesses were situated at Point 'B', approximately one furlong (200 meters) away from Point 'A' and at 6:30 P.M. in the month of October inside a dense jungle, it was physically impossible to observe the specific role of wielding a knife from a distance of 200 meters, which cumulative deficiencies render the prosecution case highly doubtful against appellant no. 1.
(II) Submissions on Behalf of Appellant No. 2 (Ram Bharosey)
Sri Dheerendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant no. 2 (Ram Bharosey), submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the shooter beyond reasonable doubt. He argued that the FIR was lodged after immense deliberation and consultation and the alleged motive regarding cutting forest wood was trivial, especially when the matter had already been compounded before the Forest Ranger. He further contended that independent witnesses PW-2 and PW-3 did not support the shooting by Ram Bharosey and the presence of PW-1 and PW-4 at the spot was highly doubtful, given the fact that PW-1's statement was recorded after an unexplained delay of 15 days.
Learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts in Sovaran Singh Prajapati vs. State of U.P. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 351 : 2025 INSC 225), Tarun Sharma vs. State of Haryana (2025 INSC 1139) and Raj Kumar @ Suman vs. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2023) 7 SCC 615 : 2023 INSC 520) contending that where direct fatal role is attributed to another accused and the injuries attributed to the co-accused are non-vital/superficial without any pre-arranged concert or common intention, constructive liability under Section 302/34 IPC cannot be fastened upon such co-accused.
(III) Submissions of Learned A.G.A. Appearing for the State
On the other hand, Sri Arunendra, learned A.G.A. appearing on behalf of the State-respondent, vehemently contended that the prosecution has successfully proved its case against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. He submitted that the presence of PW-1 (Mishrilal) and PW-4 (Ram Sahay) on the spot was completely natural and probable, inasmuch as they were returning together with the deceased from the weekly Belrayan market after purchasing household provisions and merely because they happen to be close relatives of the deceased, their testimonies cannot be brushed aside or discarded out rightly. In this regard, he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gulab vs. State of U.P. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 1211) to contend that relationship is not a ground to discard the ocular account if the testimony of such an interested witness otherwise inspires confidence.
He further submitted that even though the independent witnesses, namely PW-2 (Jwala Singh) and PW-3 (Roj Ali), were declared hostile by the prosecution, their evidence cannot be effaced from the record in toto and the same clearly corroborates the core of the prosecution case to the effect that they heard the gunshot and immediately saw the accused persons running away from the place of occurrence armed with weapons. In support of this contention, learned A.G.A. placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in C. Muniappan & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu ((2010) 9 SCC 567) to submit that the settled legal proposition permits reliance upon that part of the testimony of a hostile witness which supports the prosecution story and further that mere lapses or defective investigation on the part of the Investigating Officer cannot be made a ground to extend the benefit of acquittal to the accused.
He next submitted that the non-recovery of the weapon of offence (knife) is not fatal to the prosecution case, as the direct ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses is fully available on record and fortified his submission by citing the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Om Pal vs. State of U.P. (2025 INSC 1262) and Gulab (supra). Further submission of learned A.G.A. is that the ocular account stands fully corroborated by the medical evidence, inasmuch as the 12-bore empty cartridge recovered from the crime scene (Exhibit Ka-12) squarely matches with the 56 small metallic pellets extracted from the thoracic cavity of the deceased during autopsy and in this context, he placed reliance upon Jagdish Narain & Anr. vs. State of U.P. ((1996) 8 SCC 199) to argue that the discharge of a firearm from close range clearly establishes homicidal intent.
Learned A.G.A. lastly submitted that all three accused persons, armed with lethal weapons including a firearm and knives, ambushed the deceased together in a pre-planned manner and fled together into the jungle after executing the crime, thereby fully attracting the mandate of Section 34 IPC regarding shared common intention and therefore, the learned trial court has committed no error whatsoever in convicting and sentencing the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and the appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.
Points for Determination
Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, the following points emerge for determination in this appeal:
I. Whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt?
II. 38. Whether the failure of the court-appointed Amicus Curiae to cross-examine material prosecution witnesses (PW-2, PW-3, PW-5 and PW-6) caused grave prejudice to appellant no. 1, thereby vitiating the trial?
III. Whether the findings and conviction recorded by the learned trial court are sustainable in the eyes of law?
As all the aforesaid points for determination are intrinsically interlinked, they are being taken up and considered collectively.
Discussions, Reasons and Conclusion Thereof
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and thoroughly scrutinized the original trial court record.
At the outset, it is averred that deceased Ram Kishan was employed as an ad-hoc forest watcher in Dudhwa National Park. While he was discharging his duty, the deceased had caught accused persons cutting and stealing forest timber. On that account, an altercation had also taken place between them. The accused persons were taken to the Range Officer, where they were let off upon tendering an apology. Owing to that incident, the accused persons had enmity and a grudge against the deceased.
Here, it is expedient to mention that motive is not a sine qua non for the commission of a crime. Moreover, it takes a back seat in a case of direct ocular account of the commission of the offence by a particular person. In a case of direct evidence, the element of motive does not play such an important role as to cast any doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses even if there be any doubts raised in this regard. If the eyewitnesses are trustworthy, the motive attributed for the commission of crime may not be of much relevance. Failure to prove motive or absence of evidence on the point of motive would not be fatal to the prosecution case when the other reliable evidence available on record unerringly establishes the guilt of the accused. In this context, reference may profitably be made to the series of authoritative pronouncements rendered in Sanaullah Khan Vs. State of Bihar [2013 (81) ACC 302 (SC)], Subal Ghorai Vs. State of W.B. [(2013) 4 SCC 607], Deepak Verma Vs. State of H.P. [2012 (76) ACC 794 (SC)], Durbal Vs. State of U.P. [2011 CrLJ 1106 (SC)], Brahmaswaroop Vs. State of U.P. [AIR 2011 SC 280], Dharnidhar Vs. State of U.P. [2010 (6) SCJ 662], State of U.P. Vs. Nawab Singh [2005 SCC (Criminal) 33], Rambabujha Vs. State of U.P. [2003 (46) ACC 892 (Allahabad – D.B.)], Shivraj Bapuray Jadhav Vs. State of Karnataka [(2003) 6 SCC 392], aur Thaman Kumar Vs. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh [(2003) 6 SCC 380].
Keeping in view the above propounded legal propositions, as the prosecution case rests upon entire ocular evidence and the prosecution had adduced the motive with regard to commission of crime, which is corroborated by the oral evidence, therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution could not assert and establish the motive for commission of crime. Though it is not necessary in a case of direct evidence, as held in the above rulings, therefore, we do not find any substance in the argument or contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard.
The foremost question that requires determination is the actual cause of death of deceased Ram Kishan. The autopsy was conducted by Dr. S.K. Tewari (PW-5), who proved the post-mortem report (Exhibit Ka-2). A perusal of Exhibit Ka-2 and the testimony of PW-5 reveals that the deceased sustained two distinct sets of injuries: (a) Firearm Injury (Injury No. 10): Multiple firearm entry wounds on the left upper chest, cavity deep, fracturing ribs, extensively lacerating the pleura, left lung and pericardium, resulting in 1.5 litres of fluid blood in the chest cavity, from which 56 small metallic pellets and 2 pellets from the heart were retrieved. Dr. Tewari unequivocally opined that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage resulting from this chest firearm injury. (b) Incised/Slash Wounds (Injuries No. 1 to 9): These injuries were situated on the forehead, eyebrows, ear, lips, chin and mandible. In his cross-examination, Dr. Tewari admitted that these were incised wounds and not punctured or penetrating wounds. Crucially, internal examination of the head and neck showed that the skull, brain and major blood vessels were completely intact and healthy (NAD). Not a single internal vital organ or major blood vessel in the neck or face was severed.
The medical evidence demonstrates that the cause of death of the deceased was shock and haemorrhage resulting from ante-mortem injuries. It is neither the case of the appellant-convicts nor is there any material on record to infer that the alleged ante-mortem injuries were suicidal or accidental in nature. The nature and site of the injuries found on the person of the deceased clearly demonstrate that the death of the deceased was homicidal, which stands fully corroborated by the ocular evidence of the eyewitnesses. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the death of the deceased was homicidal.
Now, it has to be seen as to who was responsible for causing the death of the deceased and whether appellant-convicts Chugna and Guddu, who are alleged to have inflicted blows with knives, are also responsible for causing the death of the deceased.
Applying the settled legal principles to the present case, it is clear from the record that a dispute arose out of an altercation in the forest regarding timber cutting, which had already been settled before the Forest Ranger. As per the recitals of the FIR, accused Chugna and Guddu were armed with knives, while Ram Bharosey was armed with a country-made pistol. Accused Ram Bharosey fired a single shot on Ram Kishan from his country-made pistol and thereafter the remaining accused persons inflicted blows with knives on him.
B. Principles Governing Joint Liability & Common Intention Under Section 34 IPC
The crucial legal issue is whether appellant no. 1, Chugna, can be held constructively liable under Section 302 IPC with the aid of Section 34 IPC. Section 34 of the IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. To attract Section 34 IPC, two essential conditions must be satisfied: (i) there must be a common intention to commit the criminal act and (ii) there must be participation of the accused in the commission of the offence in furtherance of that common intention.
In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad ((1954) 2 SCC 826), wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 30 observed as under:
"30.Now in the case of Section 34 we think it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all : Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor [Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine PC 5 : (1944-45) 72 IA 148 at p. 154] , IA pp. 153-54. Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely, the intention to kill and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case : Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor [Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, 1924 SCC OnLine PC 49 : (1924-25) 52 IA 40 at p. 52] (at p. 49) and Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor [Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine PC 5 : (1944-45) 72 IA 148 at p. 154] . As their Lordships say in the latter case : (IA p. 154)"
Similarly, in Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana ((1999) 3 SCC 102), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"10.To apply Section 34 IPC apart from the first thing that there should be two or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention and (ii) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. If a common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and a common intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case, it is not possible to have direct evidence of a common intention. It has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case."
In addition to the above, it would also be apposite to recapitulate the landmark decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mahbub Shah vs. King Emperor (Privy Council Appeal No. 64 of 1944, reported in AIR 1945 PC 118), wherein it was held as under:
"The essence of the joint liability under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. It must be shown that the criminal act was done by one of accused persons in the furtherance of the common intention of all. 'Common intention' within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. The inference of common intention within the meaning of the term in section 34 should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case. Same or similar intention must not be confused with common intention."
Reiterating and expounding the aforesaid principle, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu and Others vs. State of Karnataka (reported in (2022) 7 SCC 521), approving its earlier decision in Surendra Chauhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2000) 4 SCC 110), observed as under:
"22.... The essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result. Such consensus can be developed on the spot and thereby intended by all of them. The existence of a common intention can be inferred from the attending circumstances, the nature of the weapon used, the site of the injuries and the conduct of the accused before, during and after the occurrence."
We have also perused the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, namely Sovaran Singh Prajapati (supra), Tarun Sharma (supra) and Raj Kumar @ Suman (supra). In those cases, the co-accused were exonerated of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC because the evidence therein clearly established that they neither shared any common intention with the main assailant nor was there any pre-concert and the fatal act was committed by an individual accused on the spur of the moment beyond the scope of any common design. However, the legal position is that the applicability of Section 34 IPC depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances established in each case. Where, as in the instant case, the accused emerged together armed with lethal weapons (firearm and knives) and repeatedly assaulted the victim on vital parts even after he collapsed, the ratio of Sovaran Singh Prajapati (supra), Tarun Sharma (supra) and Raj Kumar @ Suman (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and does not come to the rescue of the appellants.
C. Appreciation of Ocular Testimony & Role of Appellants
PW-1, Mishrilal, who was examined as an eyewitness to the occurrence, deposed that on the fateful day, he, deceased Ram Kishan and informant Ram Sahay were returning together from the Belrayan market. As they reached near the boundary of the Dudhwa National Park forest, the accused persons, namely Ram Bharosey, Chugna and Guddu, suddenly emerged from the jungle. Out of them, Ram Bharosey was armed with a country-made pistol, while Chugna and Guddu were armed with knives. They started hurling abuses and accused Ram Bharosey shot gunfire on Ram Kishan, which struck him on the left side of his chest, causing him to fall down. Thereupon, the other accused persons inflicted knife blows on him. In his cross-examination, he stated that Ram Bharosey fired upon the deceased and the other accused persons inflicted two to three knife blows on Ram Kishan. He reiterated that Guddu and Chugna were having knives, while Ram Bharosey was armed with a country-made pistol and when Ram Kishan fell down after sustaining the firearm injury, Guddu and Chugna inflicted knife blows on him.
Although PW-1, Mishrilal, is a real brother-in-law of the deceased Ram Kishan as stated by him in examination-in-chief, that does not mean that the testimony of any relative who had witnessed the incident with his naked eyes could not be given importance. He has clearly stated that he very well knows the accused persons Chugna, Guddu and Ram Bharosey @ Bharosey. Accused Chugna had close friendship with the remaining accused persons Guddu and Bharosey. He also stated that as a watcher, it was the duty of deceased Ram Kishan to look after his area in the jungle, to save the theft of wood and forest produce, to save the forest from fire and to do his job effectively, he used to wander and patrol in the jungle. Prior to this incident, the accused persons had cut down woods from the jungle and the deceased made a complaint against them to the Forest Ranger and also beat Guddu; therefore, they had enmity towards him.
PW-1 was cross-examined deeply to check his veracity, wherein he stated that when they were returning from Belrayan market, they were moving side by side after some gap. When he had seen the accused persons at first instance, they were present at a distance of three hands ('teen haath ki doori'). He repeated that suddenly Ram Bharosey fired from gun which struck the chest of the deceased Ram Kishan and when the deceased fell down, then the accused persons assaulted him with knives. Here, it is also notable that this witness was cross-examined over several days; therefore, it was natural for some minor deviation to occur in his testimony. On being further cross-examined, he stated that only Ram Bharosey was having a country-made pistol, while Guddu and Chugna were armed with knives and Ram Bharosey had fired, resultantly deceased Ram Kishan fell down, then Guddu and Chugna inflicted knife blows, but Ram Bharosey did not inflict knife blows.
On behalf of accused Chugna, nothing substantial was suggested or elicited in the cross-examination of this witness which could demonstrate that he was not present at the time of the incident or that he had not inflicted blows. The accused were having were deadly and lethal weapons, which clearly demonstrates their intention. After the deceased sustained the firearm injury, accused Chugna and Guddu inflicted repeated knife blows on him. If they had no intention to kill the deceased or if there was no prior concert among them, then no occasion would have arisen to inflict repeated knife blows after the deceased had already collapsed upon sustaining a gunshot injury. Here, it is also to be made clear that all the injuries inflicted with the knives were found on the upper vital parts of the body of the deceased, including the forehead, cheek, lips, chin and mandible. Thus, the lethal weapons used and the seats of the injuries on the body clearly demonstrate their intention. One more aspect of the matter is that to determine participation in the commission of an offence with common intention, the separate intensity of each individual weapon is not to be considered in isolation; rather, it has to be seen in totality. The fact that the persons who were armed with knives inflicted repeated blows on the fallen victim demonstrates their shared common intention to cause his death. Thus, in view of the law cited above, on a perusal of the testimony of the witnesses and attending circumstances, it stands firmly established that in causing the death of the deceased, there was a shared common intention of the accused persons.
D. Analysis of Contradictions, Conduct of Witnesses & Minor Discrepancies
Learned counsel for the appellants emphasized on the inconsistencies which occurred in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. As per the FIR, the armed persons inflicted blows with knives and the deceased fell down. PW-1, who was examined as an eyewitness, deposed in his evidence in examination-in-chief that after the deceased fell on the ground, the accused persons inflicted knife blows. But during cross-examination, he stated that only Ram Bharosey was armed with a country-made pistol, while Guddu and Chugna were having knives; accused Ram Bharosey shot with a gun on Ram Kishan, resultantly he fell down and then Guddu and Chugna inflicted knife blows on him and Ram Bharosey did not inflict a knife blow.
Here, it is to be made clear that contradictions and inconsistencies which do not corrode the core or genesis of the prosecution case cannot be given much importance.
In the case of Ramesh Harijan vs. State of U.P. ((2012) 5 SCC 777), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that normal discrepancies in evidence are bound to occur due to human fallibility and unless they affect the core of the prosecution case, the testimony of a witness cannot be rejected.
Similarly, in C. Muniappan vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2010 (6) SCJ 822 : (2010) 9 SCC 567), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if there are no material discrepancies or contradictions in the testimony of a witness, his evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the basis of some normal, natural, or minor contradictions, inconsistencies, exaggerations, or embellishments.
The distinction between material discrepancies and normal discrepancies is that while minor discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. In the present case, where this witness was cross-examined at length on several dates, some deviation was naturally bound to occur. However, he remained consistent on the material fact that accused Chugna and Guddu inflicted knife blows, while accused Ram Bharosey discharged the firearm. There is no deformity or contradiction regarding the specific role of accused Ram Bharosey firing from the country-made pistol and accused Chugna and Guddu using knives. Therefore, the minor inconsistencies which occurred between the recitals of the FIR and the oral depositions have got no much importance, as they do not corrode the prosecution case.
Ram Sahay, PW-4, who is the informant and author of this case, has also claimed to be an eyewitness of this incident. He deposed that on the fateful day, he was returning from Belrayan market along with Ram Kishan and Mishrilal at about 6:00 P.M. When they reached the Bhairampur jungle, suddenly Chugna, Ram Bharosey and Guddu emerged out. Of them, Ram Bharosey was armed with a country-made pistol, while Chugna and Guddu were having knives. They hurled abuses at Ram Kishan and Ram Bharosey inflicted a gunshot injury on him. When he fell down, Chugna and Guddu inflicted knife blows on him. He also stated that he had got scribed the written tahreer (Exhibit Ka-1) from one Shri Ram, who wrote on his dictation and the same was given to the police station.
PW-4 further stated that the deceased was his nephew, who was on duty as a watchman in the jungle. Prior to this incident, deceased Ram Kishan had caught accused Chugna and Guddu cutting wood, had beaten them and made a complaint to the Forest Ranger. On being cross-examined, he stated that Ram Bharosey had not been caught cutting wood on that earlier occasion and that Guddu used to cut wood. Here, some minor discrepancy has occurred with regard to the cutting of wood by the accused persons, but it is not so significant that their presence and specific roles in the present incident can be doubted. He categorically stated that Ram Bharosey fired the gun and at that time, Ram Bharosey was 8 to 10 paces away from him. When deceased Ram Kishan fell down, the remaining two accused persons used knives to inflict injuries on the deceased, whereas Ram Bharosey did not use a knife. Guddu and Chugna were having knives and he had stated this fact in the FIR. Chugna and Guddu were close friends for the past 3 to 4 years. Chugna had inflicted 2 to 3 knife blows. PW-4 also stated that he could not make an endeavour to defend the deceased, since he himself had to run to save his own life.
Now, the question arises that when the deceased was being caused injuries, why this witness and the other accompanying witness did not come forward to protect him.
In this regard, the law is very much clear. In the case of Rana Pratap and Others vs. State of Haryana ((1983) 3 SCC 327), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the natural behaviour and conduct of eyewitnesses, held as under:
"6.... Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way."
This witness has stated that when Ram Kishan fell down after sustaining the gunshot, he and the other witnesses started wandering and running here and there and could not confront the armed assailants. This conduct does not negate his presence on the spot as the law is very much clear. Thus, there is no infirmity or material contradiction regarding the specific role of accused Ram Bharosey firing from the pistol and accused Chugna and Guddu using knives. The minor discrepancies occurring in their testimony are not of such a nature which could corrode the core of the prosecution case, rather there is uniformity in their statements with regard to mode and active participation of accused persons, which is convincing and establishes their common intention to eliminate the deceased.
In so far as the submission of learned counsel for the appellants with regard to the delayed examination of witnesses during investigation is concerned, here it is made clear that if the Investigating Officer has committed any error or delay in conducting the investigation, that does not adversely affect the prosecution case. Where in the trial the witnesses have deposed their evidence, then if any delay was caused by the I.O. in recording their statements during investigation, their testimony on this basis cannot be doubted, particularly when the informant, who is also an eyewitness, promptly lodged the FIR, supported the prosecution case and specifically named the witnesses in the report.
In this regard, in the case of Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 627, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that delayed examination of a witness by the Investigating Officer cannot be a ground to discard his otherwise credible and trustworthy ocular account. The relevant observations are reproduced herein below: -
“Insofar as the delay of 2/3 days in recording the statements of the eye-witnesses under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) is concerned, the said delay has been thoroughly explained by the witnesses, including the Investigating Officer, to the effect that there were riots in the area. On this score, the Investigating Officer was involved in maintaining law and order in the affected area. In the attendant facts and circumstances, the course of action adopted by the police cannot be termed unjustified and no adverse inference can be drawn on this count. No doubt that Court has laid down that an inordinate delay in recording witness statements can prove to be fatal for the prosecution, as pointed out by three learned Judges in Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371; however, therein, the delay in recording statements of the material witnesses was accompanied by a delay in registering of the FIR and the surrounding circumstances, which led the Court to hold that there was a ‘a cloud of suspicion on the credibility of the entire warp and woof of the prosecution story.’ In Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 689 and State of A.P. v. S Swarnalatha, (2009) 8 SCC 383, the Court held in favour of the convict/accused, as the inordinate delays therein could not be sufficiently explained. Delay of about 27 days, in a case where communal violence had broken out, was held not fatal, in Lal Bahadur v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 4 SCC 557. Delay of over 2 years in recording witness statements was deemed not fatal, when explained, in Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 473. Delay in recording witness statements was held not fatal per se in Sunil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 9 SCC 283 and V K Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588. Delay in recording statements of witnesses was held to have cast serious doubts on the prosecution version in Shahid Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 4 SCC 96 and Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440. It was held, in Goutam Joardar v. State of W. B., (2022) 17 SCC 549, by a Coordinate Bench that ‘there was some delay in recording the statements of the eyewitnesses concerned but mere factum of delay by itself cannot result in rejection of their testimonies.’ Per our understanding, Ganesh Bhavan Patel (supra) is not an authority to contend that delay in recording witness statements is always fatal to the prosecution's case. Thus, stricto sensu, delay in recording witness statements, moreso when the said delay is explained, will not aid an accused. Of course, no hard-and-fast principle in this regard ought to be or can be laid down, as delay, if any, in recording statements will have to be examined by the Court concerned in conjunction with the peculiar facts of the case before it. Our reading of the above shall apply on all fours to delays in the context of Section 164 of the Code.”
E. Evidentiary Value of Hostile Witnesses (PW-2 & PW-3)
Now, coming to the evidence of the witnesses who were declared hostile, the law is very clear in this regard.
In the case of Siddhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2010) 69 ACC 833 : (2010) 6 SCC 1), it was held that if the prosecution witness has turned hostile, the court may rely upon so much of his testimony which supports the case of the prosecution and is corroborated by other evidence.
Similarly in Veer Singh vs. State of U.P. ((2014) 2 SCC 455) and Shyamal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal ((2012) 7 SCC 646), it was held that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be rejected outrightly and both parties are entitled to rely on such part of his evidence which assists their case.
Keeping in mind the law propounded by the Apex Court in the above rulings, on a perusal of the record, it reveals that two witnesses who were examined as eyewitnesses, namely PW-2 and PW-3, turned hostile.
Jwala Singh (PW-2) deposed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was on the duty of watcher in Dudhwa National Park. On that fateful day, he, Ram Kishan, Mishrilal, Ram Sahay and Roj Ali had gone to the Belrayan market and were returning. On way back, they were behind each other. He heard gunfire and Ram Sahay made an alarm. He rushed towards the place of occurrence and saw that the body of Ram Kishan was lying, who was writhing in pain (chhatpata raha tha). He also stated that he had seen a knife in the hand of accused Chugna who was fleeing away and two other miscreants were also fleeing, but he could not identify them.
On being cross-examined after being declared hostile, he denied the statement given to the I.O. during investigation. Thus, from his testimony, it reveals that although he had not seen the initial firing by Ram Bharosey, he had seen accused Chugna having a knife and two other persons fleeing from the spot while the deceased was lying there, meaning thereby, even if we do not give importance to his testimony as an eyewitness, his testimony is admissible as circumstantial evidence. Thus, this part assists the prosecution.
In the same manner, Roj Ali (PW-3) stated that he heard the gunshot and saw the accused persons fleeing from the spot, with Chugna carrying a knife. Thus, the testimony of both these witnesses cannot be rejected outrightly. That portion of their testimony which corroborates the presence of the accused at the crime scene, their possession of weapons and their flight immediately after the incident provides corroboration to the prosecution case and assists the prosecution.
F. Legal Aid Representation & Non-Recovery of Weapon
So far as the submission of learned counsel for appellant no. 1 regarding the failure of the court-appointed Amicus Curiae to cross-examine certain witnesses is concerned, from a perusal of the record, it emerges that appellant no. 1 was duly represented by an advocate provided through legal aid. The testimony of the witnesses of fact was thoroughly tested in cross-examination by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of co-accused Ram Bharosey, whose interest was identical on the point of occurrence, time, place and identity of the assailants. Furthermore, no failure of justice or specific prejudice has been demonstrated to have been caused to the appellant. Mere brevity or economy in cross-examination by an advocate cannot vitiate an otherwise proved and established trial.
So far as the non-recovery of the knife and country-made pistol is concerned, it is a settled proposition of law that non-recovery of the weapon of offence is not fatal to the prosecution case where the charge is established by cogent and reliable direct ocular testimony, supported by medical evidence. In this regard, in the case of Mrityunjoy Biswas vs. Pranab @ Koti Biswas and another (AIR 2013 SC 3334 : (2013) 12 SCC 796, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that when there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence, mere non-recovery of weapon from the accused does not affect the prosecution case relating to murder. In the present case, the ocular testimony of PW-1 and PW-4 is fully corroborated by the post-mortem report (Exhibit Ka-2), which recorded as many as nine incised and slash wounds on the face, chin and neck of the deceased, alongside the fatal firearm entry wound on the chest.
Findings & Conclusions of the Court
Thus, upon a holistic consideration of the entire facts, circumstances and evidence available on record, we find that the prosecution has successfully established its case beyond all reasonable doubt against both appellant no. 1 (Chugna) and appellant no. 2 (Ram Bharosey). All the accused persons, armed with deadly weapons, ambushed the deceased together in the jungle pursuant to prior enmity, executed the crime jointly by firing upon him and inflicting repeated knife blows on vital parts of his body and fled together. Their shared common intention to commit the murder of Ram Kishan stands firmly established within the meaning of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Trial Court has meticulously analyzed the evidence in its correct legal perspective and the findings of conviction recorded by the Trial Court suffer from no illegality, infirmity, or perversity. Therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court with the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence.
ORDER
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present Criminal Appeal is hereby dismissed.
The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.02.1989 passed by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri in Sessions Trial No. 59 of 1987 (State vs. Chugna) and Sessions Trial No. 225 of 1988 (State vs. Ram Bharosey and Guddu), convicting and sentencing the appellants, namely Chugna (Appellant No. 1) and Ram Bharosey (Appellant No. 2), to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for Life under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, is hereby upheld and affirmed. The appeal in respect of Appellant No. 3 (Guddu) has already abated vide earlier order of this Court on account of his death.
As per the record, appellant no. 1, Chugna, is currently lodged in jail. He shall remain in custody to serve out the remaining sentence of life imprisonment awarded to him. 82. As per the record, appellant no. 2, Ram Bharosey, was released on personal bond and undertaking in October 2023. His personal bond and bail bonds are hereby cancelled and his sureties are discharged. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining sentence of life imprisonment awarded to him.
Any application pending in this criminal appeal shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
Let the original trial court record along with a certified copy of this judgment and order be transmitted forthwith to the learned trial court, Lakhimpur Kheri for immediate necessary and strict compliance.
