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Judgment
B. Sudershan Reddy, J.—The petitioner in the instant writ petition challenges the order passed by the first respondent herein in T.A. No. 1/85 and T.A. No. 6/86 dated 22-10-1990 remanding the matter to the lower Tribunal for further enquiry.
Before adverting to the question that falls for consideration, it may be necessary to notice the relevant facts:
One Tadeparthy Ramanadha Swamy filed a claim petition claiming ryotwari patta for an extent of Ac. 21.20 cents in R.S. No. 61, 62/1, Rushikonda Village. It is claimed that the lands were purchased under different sale deeds in the year 1943 by Venkata Ramanadhaswamy, the claimant. The lands were under his personal cultivation. The petitioner herein claims to be the successor in interest of the said Venkata Ramanadhaswamy. The Settlement Officer granted ryotwari patta for an extent of Ac. 5.77 cents only. The said Ramanadhaswamy died during the pendency of the proceedings.
The petitioner herein filed appeal. No. 1/85 before the District Judge-cum-Estates Abolition Tribunal u/s 15(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short ''the Act''). The Tahsildar, presently the Mandal Revenue Officer, Vishakhapatnam also filed an appeal in T.A. No. 6/86 against the very same order insofar as it concerns the grant of ryotwari patta for an extent of Ac. 5.77 cents to the petitioner. In the said appeal, the Tahsildar filed an interlocutory application LA. No. 464/89 to receive additional evidence.
The Estates Abolition Tribunal having heard the matter received the additional evidence and remitted the matter for fresh consideration by the lower Tribunal. The said order is challenged in this writ petition.
Sri N.V. Ranganadham, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would contend that the Tribunal constituted under the Act is a Tribunal with limited jurisdiction and not a Court and the whole of CPC is not applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal. The learned senior Counsel contended that the Tribunal constituted under the Act is required to decide the matter finally. It has no jurisdiction to remit the matter for fresh consideration. In nutshell, it is the submission of the learned senior Counsel that the appeal has to be heard and decided on merits one way or the other.
Sri Madan Mohan Rao, learned Government Pleader for Revenue contended that the order passed by the Tribunal does not suffer from any legal infirmities or jurisdictional errors requiring any correction by this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction. The learned Government Pleader contends that the Tribunal constituted under the Act is entitled to exercise all the powers of an appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure.
It may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 8 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the Government to constitute as many Tribunals as may be necessary for the purposes of the Act and each such Tribunal shall consist of a single Member who shall be either a District Judge or an officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge. Each Tribunal shall have such jurisdiction, and over such estates or parts thereof, as the Government may, by notification from time to time, determines. The Section further declares that every Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil Court to compel the attendance of the witnesses and the production of documents. Section 15 of the Act confers jurisdiction upon the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of all the lands in respect of which the landholder claims a ryotwari patta Under Sections 12,13 and 14, as the case may be and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed.
In the instant case, the petitioner claims to have submitted an application u/s 13 of the Act.
Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 15 of the Act which is relevantfor our purpose reads as follows:
"Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under Sub-section (1), the Government may, within one year from the date of the decision or if such decision was given before the commencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1957, within one year from such commencement, and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law."
The learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that Sub-section 4 of Section 8 clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to exercise all the powers of a civil Court to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and does not confer any other power under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Tribunal can exercise only such power conferred upon it and not any other power under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the submission of the learned senior Counsel that the power of remand unless specifically conferred upon the appellate Tribunal, cannot be exercised by the Tribunals of limited jurisdiction unlike civil Courts.
In my considered opinion, a plain reading of Section 15 of the Act would make it abundantly clear that the Tribunal while deciding an appeal against a decision of the Settlement Officer is entitled to pass such order in its discretion and such decision shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. The expression ''decision'' used in Sub-section 2(a) of Section 15 of the Act is of wide connotation. Such decision includes the power to annul, set aside, modify the order passed by the Settlement Officer. The power to decide includes the power to remit the matter for fresh consideration.
This is further clarified by the rules made u/s 67 of the Act regarding the powers of the Tribunal constituted u/s 8(1) of the Act. Rule 1 of the said Rules declares that every Tribunal constituted u/s 8(1) of the Act and every special Tribunal constituted u/s 51(1) of the Act shall have all the powers exercisable by a civil Court in the trial of suits and in appeals. That is the power conferred upon the Tribunal constituted u/s 8 of the Act for hearing and disposal of the appeals. The Tribunal thus exercises all the powers of a civil Court in the trial of suits and in appeals. Of course, Rule 2 says that the proceedings of a Tribunal shall be summary and shall be governed as far as practicable by the provisions of tine Code of Civil Procedure, particularly in regard to (a) issue and service of summons, (b) examination of parties and witnesses, (c) production of documents, (cc) payment of compensation or any other money and (d) the passing of orders.
Sub-rule (2) (sic. Rule 2) merely clarifies the summary nature of the proceedings and the procedure applicable for disposal of the appeals. Whereas Rule 1 of the Rules deals with the power and jurisdiction of the Tribunals in the trial of suits and appeals. But for the purpose of hearing and disposal of the appeal, the Tribunal is entitled to exercise all the powers of a civil Court. Practically, there is no distinction between the power conferred upon a civil Court under CPC and the Tribunal in the matter of hearing an appeal under the provisions of the Act. The power exercisable by the Tribunal under the Act is akin to that of the power of an appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 107(1) of the CPC declares that subject to such conditions and limitations as may be described, an appellate Court shall have power (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. Sub-section (2) of Section 107 of the CPC declares that the appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed upon the Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of the suits instituted therein. It is thus clear that an appellate Court has the power not only to finally decide the appeal but also remit the same for fresh consideration in appropriate cases. The same power of an appellate Court so constituted under the CPC to remit the matters for fresh consideration is also available to a Tribunal constituted under the Act as such power is conferred upon the Tribunal under the Rules.
Neither Section 8 of the Act nor Section 15 and the rules framed thereunder would suggest any limitation upon the power of the Tribunal to remit an appeal for fresh consideration by the Settlement Officer. The power of the Tribunal to remit the matter for fresh consideration is not taken away expressly or by necessary implication. No restriction into the power and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to remit the matter for fresh consideration by the original authority can be read into.
However, the learned senior Counsel places reliance upon a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Vedanthacharisivami v. Muthaiah Chetti 1955 (1) MLJ 229 in support of his submission that the Tribunal can exercise only such power which is conferred upon it by the Act. In the said decision, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that there is no right conferred on an aggrieved person under the Act to file memorandum of cross-objections in an appeal. There is no provision in the Act attracting all the provisions of the CPC including the right to file cross-objections. The right of an aggrieved person is restricted to an appeal u/s 51 of the Act. Evidently, the question that came up for consideration before the Division Bench was as to whether the aggrieved person can avail a remedy not provided by special enactment and prefer cross-objections when right of appeal itself is restricted to an aggrieved person. Under those circumstances, the Division Bench took the view that no right is conferred upon an aggrieved person under the Act to file a memorandum of cross-objections in the appeal
In the instantcase, we are concerned with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and its power to remit the matter for fresh consideration by the original authority. We are not concerned with the rights of an aggrieved person.
The question raised in the instant writ petition in fact is not res integra. Same question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Radha Bai Vs. Banka Chinnayya and Others, . The Full Bench of this Court while interpreting Section 89 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act held that the appellate Tribunal had inherent power to remand in the interest of justice. The Full Bench relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Thimmasamudram Tobacco Co. Vs. Asst. Collector of Central Excise, Nellore Dn. Nellore, in which it is held thus:
"The conferment of the appellate jurisdiction on a Tribunal, in our opinion, necessarily implies that it has as much power to remand as it has to confirm, alter or annul and incidentally it has the power to hear the appeal. Without such power it is difficult for the appellate authority to dispose of an appeal satisfactorily. If the appellate authority finds that the procedure prescribed by a provision of law has been violated by an officer he has either to allow the appeal without directing any fresh inquiry or dismiss the appeal, if the argument of the appellant''s Counsel were to prevail and thus cannot be regarded as a satisfactory state of affairs. We, therefore, feel that the power of remand is inherent in the appellate jurisdiction conferred on an appellate authority."
The Full Bench after extracting that portion referred to above expressed its respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench. The Full Bench accordingly declared that the Collector, exercising his appellate jurisdiction u/s 92 of the Act has the power not only to set aside the order in appeal but has also the power ex debito justitiae to direct a remand of the case for disposal to the original authority.
It is thus clear that the Tribunal constituted u/s 8 of the Act has necessary power even to remit the matter for fresh consideration by the original authority. The appellate power of the Tribunal is not restricted in any manner whatsoever. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to annul, set aside or modify the order under appeal and such power includes the power to remit the matter for fresh consideration.
In the circumstances, I express my inability to accede to the submission made by the learned senior Counsel.
However, it is next contended that the powers of the Settlement Officer are now conferred upon the Joint Collector of the district who represents the Government in all matters including the Government''s interest under the Act. Therefore, the decision of the Joint Collector would not be free from bias. This question really does not fall for consideration as there is no factual foundation laid as such in the affidavit filed by the petitioner. There is no pleading whatsoever on this aspect of the matter. The plea therefore fails and it is accordingly rejected.
No other point is urged. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit whatsoever in this writ petition requiring any interference with the order passed by the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal while disposing of the matter dismissed T.A. No. 1/85 preferred by the petitioner by observing that the matter is remanded to the lower Tribunal for fresh enquiry and allowed T.A.6/86 preferred by the respondents. The expression dismissed obviously is an inadvertent mistake. It is clarified that the whole matter is remitted for fresh consideration by the original authority. The original authority shall dispose of the matter in accordance with law uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court as well as the appellate Tribunal.
The writ petition shall stand dismissed subject to me above clarification. No costs.