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Judgment
J.N. Sarma, J.—This Civil revision arises out of an individual fighting between two factions of Manipur People''s Party. Each faction claims to be real Manipur People''s party in this revision it is not necessary for us to decide that aspect of the matter as then will be decided in the suit itself. I will not observe anything in this revision so that it may cause prejudice in the disposal of the original suit.
This revision is directed against the order dated 28.6.95 passed in Misc Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1995 (1395) by the Court of the District judge, Manipur West, affirming and upholding the earlier order passed by the Court of the Sub-Judge, Manipur East by the order dated 15.5.95 passed in Judl. Misc. case No. 8/95 arising out of the original suit No. 1/95 and 2/95.
A suit was filed by one Thokchom Kiran Singh. He described himself as the General Secretary of the Manipur People''s party. There are as many as 11 Defendants in the suit and out of it the Defendant No. 2 Shri Raj Kumar Ranbir Singh at present M.L.A. of the Manipur Legislative Assembly. Defendant No.3 Nganram(sic) Rumarjit Singh, M.L.A. Sri Okram Joy Singh, M.L.A. of the Manipur legislative Assembly.
In the suit the following prayers were made.
(a) a decree be passed declaring that the Defendant No. 1 had cased to be a member and President of the Manipur People''s party with effect from the date of expulsion from the Plaintiff''s party.
(b) a decree be passed declaring the Defendant No. 2 to have ceased to be a member of the Plaintiff''s party with effect from the date of expulsion.
(c) a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Defendant No. 2 from as leader of M.P.P. Legislative party before the Assembly on 9.1.1995 and subsequent dates.
(d) a decree declaring that the Defendant No. 3 to 11 are not office bearer of Plaintiff''s party.
(e) a decree declaring that Akoijam Lanngam is President of the Plaintiff''s party.
(f) a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Defendant No. 1 to 11 from entering into the office of the Plaintiff''s party and its compound which is bounded on the North-Market place: South:-Vehicle park: East: by a Road and West:- Gate and Jain Mandir complex.
Along with the plaint an application for injunction was filed and the following is the prayer for injunction.
In the facts and circumstances stated above the Hon''ble court be pleased to pass an ex-parte ad-interim temporary injunction order thereby restraining the O.P./Defendants from entering into the office of the M.P.P. and its compound and the Defendant/O.P. No 1 and 3 to 11 from holding themselves or claiming or acting as office bearer of M.P.P legislative party before the Assembly on 9.1.95 and on subsequent dates, for the ends of justice, equity and good conscience.
In that application an order of injunction was passed by the learned Sub-Judge No. II, Manipur East to the following effect; "In the result, I hereby pass order restraining the Defendants/O.Ps. from being any office bearers or acting as such office-bearers of the MPP and also from entering the office and compound of the MPP It is also ordered that the Plaintiff/Petitioner shall be at liberty to exercise his powers and functions as the General Secretary of the MPP as per the party constitution. This order shall operate till disposal of the connected O.S. or till further order.
Schedule of the compound of the MPP.
North: Market place;
South: Vehicle park;
East: Road; and
West: Gali and Jain Mandir complex.
Send copy of this order to the O.C., Imphal
P.S. for information and necessary action.
There was an appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No. 15/95 and 13/95 by Shri Rajkumar Ranbir Singh, Defendant No. 2 and the earlier order of injunction was stayed on 7.6.95, Thereafter the matter was heard and on 28.6.95 the learned Judge, held inter alia as follows in the judgment:
The grant of such a temporary relief is discretionary, a judicial discretion and when the trial Court issued such an order not in a capricious manner, the appellate Court has no ground to interfere with its finding. In the present case in hands, the id. Subordinate Judge has rightly appreciated the facts on record and come to his findings and I see no misdirection of law or wrong appreciation of facts and I have no ground to interfere with his findings as an appellate Court. Authorities on The Saharanpur Co-Operative Cane Development Union Ltd. Vs. The Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. and Others, are relied upon. From all these, I find no merit in the appeal and the impugned order dated 15.5.1995 passed by the Id. Subordinate Judge, in his Judicial Misc. Case No. 3/95/2/95 with reference to O.S. No. 2 of 1995 is confirmed and upheld.
Thereafter this revision was filed and was admitted. It was numbered as Civil revision No. 9/95 at Imphal and this Court by order dated 6.7.95 stayed the operation of the earlier order, This matter further came up for orders before the learned single Judge at Imphal and on 28.3.96 the learned single Judge passed an order directing that this matter may be transferred to the principal seat, On 1.4.96 that order was revoked by Anr. single Judge. The matter was placed before the Administrative Judge and he passed an order that the earlier order dt. 28.3.96 should be upheld and the matter should be transferred to the principal seat. The matter was again being pursued in the Imphal Bench by the learned single Judge on 4.4.96 and he raised the following question. The question is "whether judicial order passed by him on 1.4.96 will prevail or the administrative order signed by the Hon''ble Judge (signature illegible) shall prevail in order to avoid controversy, the matter be laid before the Hon''ble Chief Justice and the Principal seat for passing necessary order." Thereafter this matter was placed before the Hon''ble Chief Justice and the Hon''ble Chief Justice directed that the matter may be transfered to the principal seat and may be heard at the principal seat. Accordingly, the matter is being heard today. In the meantime the parties also approached the Apex Court against the order dated 6.7.95 by which the stay was granted to the order of injunction and i.e, SLP No. 16976 of 1995 and on 7.8.95 the Supreme Court passed the following order: "In view of the fact that the impugned order is only an interim order pending revision in the High Court , we do not propose to go into the controversy though Shri Jaitly, learned senior counsel sought to contend on merits. Suffice to state that the entire matter is at large and the High Court is requested to dispose of the matter us expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of this order. The SLP is dismissed.
I have heard Sri B.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel for the Petitioners Sri N.M. Lahiri. learned Sr. counsel for the Respondent No. 1. Parties have filed (sic) affidavit-in-opposition as well as affidavit-in-reply. Before we go to decide in matter, let us look at the proposition regarding grant of injunction as well as the prayer (sic) of this Court to interfere with an order of injunction. The recent decision is State of West Bengal Vs. Gourangalal Chatterjee, and where in the Apex Court in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 has pointed out as follows:
It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entreated (sic) injunction as a matter of right or course Grant of injunction is (sic) the discretion of the Court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the Plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that unless the Defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an ireparable loss or damage will be caused to the Plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus to maintain the status quo. The Court grants such relief according to the legal principles-ex debito justitiae. Before any such order is passed the Court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the Plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him.
Under the changed circumstance with so many cases pending in Courts, once an interim order of injunction is passed, in many cases, such interim orders continue for months, if not for years. At final hearing while vacating such interim order of injunction in many cases it has been discovered that while protecting the Plaintiffs from suffering the alleged injury, move serious injury has been caused to the Defendants due to continuance of interim order of injunction without final hearing. It is a matter of common knowledge that on many occasions even public interest also suffers in view of such interim orders of injunction, because persons in whose favour such orders are passed are interested in perpetuating the contraventions made by them by delaying the final disposal of such applications. The Court should be always willing to extend its hand to protect a citizen who is being wronged or is being deprived of a property without any authority in law or without following the procedure which are fundamental and vital in nature. But at the same time the judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court.
Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the Court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case of In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke and Others Vs. Puna Municipal Corporation and Another, in paragraph 14 it has pointed out as follows:
It would thus be clear that in a suit for perpetual (Sic injunction) the Court should enquire on affidavit evidence and other material placed before the Court to find strong prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of granting injunction otherwise irreparable damage or damage would ensue to the Plaintiff.
The Supreme Court quoting the passages from different authorities regarding the law of injunction in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 has held as follows:
In Woodroffe''s law Relating to Injunctions. 2nd revised and enlarged Enr., 1992, at page 56 in para 30.01, it is stated that-
An injunction will only be granted to prevent the breach of an obligation (that is a duty enforceable by law) existing in favour of the applicant who must have a personal interest in the matter. In the first place, therefore, an interference by injunction is founded on the existence of a legal right, an applicant must be able to show a fair prima facie case in support of the title which he asserts.
At page 80 in para 33.02, it is further stated that
If the Court be of opinion that looking to these principles the case is not one for which an injunction is a fitting remedy, it has a discretion to grant damages in lieu of an injunction. The grounds upon which this discretion to grant damages, in lieu of an injunction should be exercised, have been subject of discussion, in several reported Indian cases.
At page 83, it is stated that "the Court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction in those cases where pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. The expression "adequate relief" is not defined, but it is probably used to mean such a compensation as would, though not in specie, in effect place the Plaintiffs in the same position in which they stood before. The determination of the question whether relief by injunction or by damages shall be granted depends upon the circumstances of each case.
In law of Injunctions by L.C. Goyle, at page 64, it is stated that "an application for temporary injunction is in the nature of a quia timet action. Plaintiff must, therefore, prove that there is an imminent danger of a substantial kind or that the apprehended injury if it does come, will be irreparable. The word imminent is used in the sense that the circumstances are such that the remedy sought is not premature. The degree of probability of future injury is not an absolute standard: What is aimed at is justice between the parties, having regard to all the relevant circumstances.
At Page 116, it is also stated that
in a suit for a perfected or mandatory injunction, in addition to or in substitution for, the Plaintiff can claim damages. The Court will award such damages if it thinks in to do so. But no relief for damages will be granted, if the Plaintiff has not claimed such relief in the suit.
In Modern Law Review, Vol 44, 1981 Ede., at page 214 R.A. Buckley states that "a Plaintiff may still be deprived of an injunction in such a case on general equitable principles under which factors such as the public interest may, in an appropriate case, be relevant. It is of interest to note, in this correction that it has not always been regarded as altogether beyond doubt whether a Plaintiff who does thus tail to substantiate a claim for equitable relief could be awarded damages. "In the Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 109, at page 432 (at p. 446) A.A.Z. Zuckerman under the title "Mareva Injunctions and Security for judgment in a Framework of Interlocutory Remedies" stated that
if the Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable or uncompensable damage, no interlocutory injunction will be granted then, provided that the Plaintiff would be able to compensate the Defendant for any unwarranted restraint on the Defendant''s right pending trial, the balance would tilt in favour of restraining the Defendant pending trial. Where both sides are exposed to irreparable injury pending trial, the Courts have to strike a just balance.
At page 447, it is stated that
the Court considering an application for an interlocutory injunction has four factors to consider: first, whether the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; secondly, whether this harm out weights any irreparable harm that the Defendant would suffer from an injunction; thirdly, the parties'' relative prospects of success on the merits; fourthly, any public interest involved in the decision. The central objective of interlocutory injunctions should therefore be seen as reducing the risk that rights will be irreparably harmed during the inevitable delay of litigation.
Injunctions by David Bean, 1st Edn., at page 22, it is stated that" if the Plaintiff obtains an interlocutory injunction, but subsequently the case goes to trial and he fails to obtain a perpetual order, the Defendant will meanwhile have been restrained unjustly and will be entitled to damages for any loss he has sustained. The practice has therefore grown up, in almost every case where an interlocutory injunction is to be granted, requiring the Plaintiff to undertake to pay any damages subsequently found due to the Defendant as compensation if the injunction cannot be justified at trial. The undertaking may be required of the Plaintiff in appropriate cases in that behalf.
In Joyce of Injunctions, Vol. 1, in para 177, at page 293, it is stated:
Upon a final judgment dissolving an injunction, a right of action upon the injunction bond immediately follows, unless the judgment is superseded. A right to damages on dissolution of the injunction would arise at the determination of the suit at law.
So, what can be gathered from these passages quoted above is that where a party is not entitled to perpetual injunction, no temporary injunction can be granted, because the temporary injunction is only a step in aid to perpetual injunction. No injunction can be granted where perpetual injunction is prohibited by law or where it cannot be granted in the facts and circumstances, the question of granting temporary injunction does not arise. That also is the law as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Managing Committee of Bhagwan Budh Primary Teachers Training College and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, Where in paragraph 14 the law has been pointed out as follows:
The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle, Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court''s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principle Gajendragadkar, J. In Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Josheph: (SCR 721)
...The principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton and Co. v. Jhanaton''....the law as to the reversal by a Court of appeal on an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case.
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.
In the instant case I am exercising the revisional power and my power is very limited. I must find out that the discretion has been exercised by Court arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or the Court had ignored the settled principle of law regarding grant of temporary or interlocutory injunction. If that is not the position in the instant case, the question of interfering with the impugned order shall not arise as urged by Shri Lahiri.
Let us have look on the case. On 15.2.91 one Bhuban Singh claiming to be President of the Manipur People''s party passed the order of expulsion against Petitioner No. 2 R.K. Ranbir Singh. On 16.2.91 similar order of expulsion was passed expelling the Petitioner No. 1 Y. Yaima Singh. Another person was also lapelled (sic) by the Respondents. On 16.2.91 the expelled the members called a meeting of the Central Committee and it is alleged that the said meeting was neither attended of the party President or vice President of the party and one S. Manihar Sharma decided over the meeting and took some resolutions although the meeting itself is alleged to be void. Thereafter Anr. quarrel started. The Petitioner No. 2 R.K. Ranbir Singh filed a suit namely original Suit No. 8 of 1991 in the Court of Sub-Judge No. 1 Manipur East against the President of Manipur People''s party and ors and prayed for injunction. But no injunction was granted. That suit was abandoned thereafter. On 26.4.91 Anr. person i.e. one N. Kumarjit Singh the present Defendant No. 3 filed a suit namely Original suit No. 22/91 in the same Court on the same cause of action and prayed for injunction in Jud, Misc case No. 80/91 and obtained exparte order of injunction on 26.4.91. On 16.2.91 one O. Joy Singh, Defendant No. 4 moved the Election Commission claiming that H. Bhuban Singh was no longer President and Election Commission passed order on 8.4.91 holding that as per records Bhuban Singh is the President of the party. This order of the Election Commission was challenged in Civil Rule No. 2399/91 before this Court and obtained an interim stay on 18.4.91. On 29.4.91 after obtaining the injunction and stay as noted above, those Petitioners got their names recorded in the records of Election Commission on 29.4.91 on the basis of the meeting held on 16.2.91 and subsequent meeting following the same. Thereafter, both the Civil Rules as well as both the suits mentioned above were dismissed not being pressed. So, the round of game ended therein. Thereafter the present round of Robin league started and a case was filed by Shri Akoijam Lanngam praying to be declared as President, that was original suit No. 6/94 as against the 8 Defendants. There the following prayers were made:
i) for a decree declaring that the Defendants have no legal rights, status to act/claim as office Bearers of the Manipur People''s party; or in the alternative, for a degree declaring that the Plaintiff is the President of the Manipur People�s party.
ii) for a decree of perpetual injunction to restrain the Defendants from claiming themselves to be the present office Bearers of the Manipur People''s party.
As noted above the suit was filed by Akoijam Lanngam the person in whose favour a declaration is sought as President of the Manipur people ''s party in the case an exparte interim injunction was granted, but ultimately that was vacated by order dated 6.4.94 by reasoned judgment of the learned Munsiff at Imphal. Thereafter on 19.1.95 the Plaintiff filed an application for allowing him to withdraw the suit. That application is available at page 110 as Annexure-B/14 in this revision application and in that application an order was passed on 19.1.95 allowing him to withdraw the suit and the case was disposed of. Before that the Plaintiff Akoijam Lanngam who sought declaration in his favour filed an application to the President Manipur People''s party, Imphal that the earlier order by which he was expelled from the party that may be revoked. The signature as well as the contents in his application is disputed by Sri Lahiri, learned Sr. Advocate for the Respondents. I do not understand as to how the learned Counsel can dispute the signature as well as contents, because he does not represent that person and that person is not a party in that suit, nor he is a Defendant in the suit. But it is correct that an affidavit - in opposition has been filed by this person denying averments as well as signature and the fact of filing such an application be has as a may, for disposed of the revision, it is not necessary to decide that aspect of the matter. But that appears that this person i.e. Akoijam Lanngam consested the 1995 election as independent candidate and not as candidate of Manipur People''s party and ultimately he was as independent and thereafter he became the Minister of the Stale of Manipur and it is not understood how a person who contested the election as independent against the party candidate of Manipur People''s Party can claim to be the president of that party itself. For disposal of the revision I am not inclined to decide that aspect of the matter, but I am mentioning that aspect of the matter only to complete the factual aspect of the case. One of the prayers made in that suit is that the decree for permanent injunction be passed restraining the Defendant No. 2 from posing as leader of M.P.P. Legislative party before the Assembly on 9.1.1995 and on Subsequent dates. I do not understand how this prayer or decree can be passed regarding this prayer. The power of recognizing a party and to give status/reorganision of the leader of the opposite party is on the Speaker, and the court usually has no role to play in such a matter. So, this declaration and the decree sought for is absolutely beyond the jurisdiction of the court and for this prayer the suit is not maintainable. The next thing which comes is the prayer whether declaration that the Defendant No. 3 to 11 are not office bearer of the Plaintiff''s party. As indicated above, the original suit was filed by one Kiron Singh as the General Secretary. Nowhere in the plaint it has been stated that this suit has been filed by the Manipur People''s party. He has come to the court only to ventilate individual and/or personal reverence and in such a suit it is not understood how he can claim to the prayer or of the declaration of decree as indicated above. He may be a member of the Manipur People''s party, but he cannot represent the party and this suit is also not under Order l, Rule 8 of the of CPC So, this cannot deemed to be a suit in representative capacity. Curiously enough in this case the suit was filed on 17.1.95 and Ranbir Kr. Singh was recognised as the leader of the opposition by the Speaker on 28 .1.95. Thereafter one Angom Jugin Singh filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10(1)(2) read with Section 151 of CPC for striking the name of the Plaintiff and add him as a plaintiff in the suit. I do not understand how a stranger can file an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) for striking name of the original Plaintiff with further prayer that he be added as Plaintiff. The application is quoted below:
That, the Judicial Misc. case No. 8/95/2 of 1995 referred to above was filed by Shri Thokchom Kiran Singh as the General Secretary of the Manipur People''s party.
That, the Plaintiff/Petitioner, Shri Thokchom Kiran Singh made resignation application from the office of General Secretary of the Manipur People''s party on 14.1.1995 to the President of the party which is accepted to-day, i.e., the 20th January, 1995.
That, while accepting the resignation of the Plaintiff, Shri Thokchom Kiran Singh, the President entrusted the Petitioner who is also a General Secretary of the Party, to look after legal matters.
That, situated thus, the Petitioner is seeking leave of the Courts to strike out the name of the Present Plaintiff/Petitioner Shri Thokchom Kiran Singh, and in its the name of the Petitioner be put.
The Defendants by filing written statement claimed inter alia that they were expelled without any authority and the "Central Committee meeting" which was a requisitioned one, revoked the expulsion and also removed the then president H. Bhuban Singh and thereafter in a special "Party Conference", the Defendant No. 3 Shri Y. Yaima Singh was elected as President.
The paragraphs of the plaint application are verified as below:
Verified that the statement made in paragraphs No. 1 to 12 of the accompanying petition/plaint are true facts to the best of my knowledge and those in paragraphs No. 13 and 14 are based on the information received from my counsel which I verify believe to be true and correct and rest are my humble prayer. In that application an order was passed allowing substitution. Prima facie this order of substitution itself also appears to be bad. I am not going to that aspect of the matter and leave it open for the present. Be that as it may on the strength of this order, Angom Jugin Singh was made the Plaintiff in the suit and the name of the original Plaintiff was struck off. There was no other amendment of the plaint save and except the change of name of the Plaintiff and thereafter the matter was heard and interim order was passed and also the appellate order was passed. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is regarding discretion of court as to declaration of status or right and this Section is analogous to Section 42 of the old Act except illustrations of that section which have been deleted in the present Act. Section 42 of the Act has come up for consideration in a large number of cases. But taking resort to Section 34 a person cannot take cudgel in favour of a third person or stranger who is not a party in the case. In this particular case as pointed out above, a person for whom declaration is sought in not before this Court and earlier he filed a suit for that particular relief and that suit was withdrawn where the prayer for injunction was rejected and that suit was withdrawn without leave to file a fresh suit. This has been filed on the same cause of action and the same relief is sought in the present suit also. A bare perusal of Sub-rule 1(4) of Rule 23 will show that such a person shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim. The argument cannot be advanced that it is not the same Plaintiff who instituted the suit but Anr. person instituted the case, if that is allowed that will mean that series of suits can be filed by different persons on the same cause of action, on the same subject matter. That cannot be purpose of object of law because as pointed out carlier on the same subject matter/claim earlier suit was abandoned and/or withdrawn by the Plaintiff of that suit and now it is sough to be reagitated again by Anr. person in a different garb. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that on this count also the suit is not maintainable. The next thing which should be considered is regarding grant of injunction with regard to the prayer No. (f). The Code of Civil Procedure, Order 7, Rule 3 provides that where subject matter of the suit is immovable property it should contain sufficient description to identify the property. It is the duty of the court to pass such decree which can be executed with specific identification. But no doubt for that purpose and process the court may call upon the party to furnish particulars and allow him to amend the plaint. A reading of the plaint and injunction petition itself will show there is no statement whore the office of the Manipur People''s party is situated but inspire of it order of injunction was granted by the learned trial court and it directed the Officer in charge Imphal police station to execute the order as if by importing his personal knowledge that it is situated at Imphal. Sri Lahiri joins issue on that count and submit; that both the parties knew what was the property and there was no confusion and/or question regarding identity of the property and that cannot be a ground to throw out the prayer for injunction. As pointed out by me above, Sri Lahiri is correct that it cannot be the ground to reject the prayer, but at die same time that reflects the mechanical and predetermined approach the court without application of the mind by the court. The last authority relied on by Sri Goswsuni, learned Sr. Advocate for the Petitioner is AIR 1990 Kerala 171 (T.P. Peethambaran v. T.H. Musthafa and Ors.). That also was a suit , regarding. He relies on paragraph 14 which is quoted below:
It is no doubt true the Supreme Court in Sediq Ali''s case has observed that the Commission in deciding disputes under CI. 15 of the Symbols Order decides only the question as to whether any of the rival sections or groups of a recognised political party, each Claiming to be that party, is that party and that the decision pertains only to elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures and does not relate to disputes about property, the proper forum for the adjudication of which is the civil court. In the present case, however, the parties have joined issue on the question as to which among the rival groups Constitutes the original Indian National Congress, the District Committee of f which owned the property. The Plaintiff has rested his claim for relief only on 5the basis that his group constitutes the original organisation. The Plaintiff has attempted to adduce evidence and prove that a large majority of the members majority of the members of the Congress Party supported his group after 1.1.1978, It is the common contention of both parties that on 1.1.1978 the members of the and each organisation formed into two groups, each electing their own leaders mid each , claiming to the exclusion of the other that his group constitutes the original organisation, Each of them contended that the other is defeated group and expelled each other on the basis that the expelling group constitutes the original organisation. Admittedly both groups fought out the proceedings before the Election Commission on the basis that the original organisation, namely, the Indian National Congress still exists. Each group had put forward their river claims to be recognised as the original Congress in preference to the other, and that was the dispute that was decided by the Election Commission after allowing both parties opportunity to adduce evidence. The dispute now fought out before court is not in any way different from the dispute that was fought out before the Election Commission. It is the common case of both parties that the property in dispute originally belonged to the Indian National Congress, It is also their further case that title to the property would vest in the group of party constituting the original organisation. In fact both parties relied or, the decision, of the Election Commission in support of their respective contestations. In the nature of the contentions raised by parties, the only point 10 be decided is which of the two groups constitutes the original organisation and that was precisely the question decided by the Election Commission. Merely for the reason that the decision of the Election Commission was for the purpose of CI 15 of the Symbols Order, it cannot be said that die same cannot be relied on by the civil court in considering the question as to which among the rival groups constitutes the original organisation. In the absence of any other material in support of the Plaintiff''s claim of title to the property in dispute, we are clearly of the view that the property should be held to belong to the party who had been recognised as constituting the original organisation.
The facts of that case squarely apply to the present case inasmuch in this particular case also die Defendants fought the last election as nominee of the Manipur People''s party. The speaker has recognised them as MLAs of Manipur People''s party. The Speaker further recognised the Petitioner No. 2 Mr. R.K. Ranbir Singh as the leader of the opposition and as the leader of Manipur People''s party.
Next let us have a look at the impugned orders. In the first order learned Sub Judge No. II Manipur East passed inter alia the following order:
(a) It is also ordered that the Plaintiff/Petitioner shall be at liberty to exercise his powers and functions as the General Secretary of the M.P.P. as per the party constitution. This order shall operate till disposal of the connected original suit till further order. I have quoted die prayers in the plaint and injunction petition, no such prayer was made by the Plaintiff and the learned Judge granted something which was not asked for and that was upheld at die time of final order as wel''s as in appeal. This nothing, but arbitrary and capricious exercise of power.
(b) Next is question of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Earlier also on the same question there was Anr. suit by one Lai Randhir being Original Suit No.14/95, 19/95 in the court of Subordinate Judge No. II, Manipur East. There was many as five Defendants including Ranbir Singh, Brajamatii Singh, Okram Jay Singh. In the suit following reliefs were prayed:
a) a decree for declaration that the Plaintiff is empowered and authorised by lie Constitution of M.P.P. to convene the party Conference for die election of the Residing of the party;
b) a decree for allowing the Plaintiff to call and convene the party-conference of M.P.P. on 6.10.1995 or on any subsequent dates;
c) a decree for allowing the Plaintiff to discharge his duty without any hinderance and disturbance from the Defendants;
d) a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant No. 1 and any other to call and com me a party-conference of the M.F.P. on 6.10.1995 5 or on am subsequent dates.
There a preliminary issue was framed: whether the suit is maintainable or nor. The learned Judge by his order dt. 4.12.95 by reasoned order here that right of authority as claimed/asserted by die Plaintiff cannot be dealt with by the court Accordingly die suit was dismissed, in the present suit also virtually the s�ance question arises. No doubt u/s 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 declaratory decrees may not operate as judgment interim. But judicial discipline, decorum, discipline and prudence demand that the Court muse look to the post events to chalk out its future course of action. The past cannot be braised aside, or discretion out of have a clean state to write a judgment according to the own wisdom, discretion of a particular Judge. That will introduce element of uncertainty and indiscipline. The earlier judgment may not be binding on him, but he must meet the sons/grounds mentioned in the earlier judgment to enable him to grant the relief. The things regarding earlier suits etc. were mentioned in the written statement/objection of the Defendants, but they have been properly considered that it is doubtful whether a person can come to Court to seek declaration for the office of a pontifical party as die Court may not be able to enforce the constitution of a political party. The Court can not play the role of an umpire/arbitrator in an inner fight between two factions of a political party. The political battle must be fought and decided in the proper arena and they should not be encouraged to make a beeline to the Court to sort out those problems. The learned appellate court found that it is a case within the disputed areas of ''Office boaters'' and "party members" of M.P.P. He also delved into the theory/question of legislature party and political party in the ground level. This was necessary as already the Speaker has recognised the legislature Party of Ranbir Singh as the Manipur People''s Party. Then he went to the question of Constitution and by-laws of M.P.P. He holds that a change in politics will not automatically bring the checkmate on civil suit. But the learned Judge failed to consider that Election Commission recognised the faction of Ranbir Singh as Manipur People''s Party and the same thing has been done by the Speaker. How this can be nullified by the civil court. The very substrances of the suit is not in existence and inspite of it injunction was granted and affirmed by the appellate court. This is nothing, but ignoring the real situation and an attempt to bring to existence an illusory state of affairs in order to give relief. This is an arbitrary and fanciful exercise of power.
c) The lower appellate court made some reference to equity. But equity must not be allowed to tilt in favour of a party, it must be exercised in such a manner as to hold the balance in an even manner to do justice in accordance with law.
d) I find that the Plaintiff does not have a prima facie case, the othei two ingredients balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury ate in favour of the Defendants.
In that view of the matter, the prayers made in the suit have become almost infructuous and that aspect of the matter shall have to be borne in mind both by the trial court as well as by the lower appellate court. Accordingly, I find that the was arbitrary, capricious and perverse and both the courts below ignored the settled principle of law regarding the grant of injunction. I find that the discretion was not exercised reasonably and in a judicial manner.
In that view of the matter, this revision application is allowed. Both the orders passed by the trial court as well as by the appellate court shall stand quashed, The prayers for injunction made in the suit stand rejected. I leave the parties to bear (sic) their own costs.