Yesoda and Others vs Kunju Moideen, Vidyadharan and The Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

One Appukkuttan died in a motor accident on 4.1.1987. His father, Thevan, as his dependant, filed O.P. (M.V.) No. 961/1996 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mavelikkara on 11.2.1996 claiming compensation for death of Appukkuttan. During the pendency of the original petition, the said Thevan died. The appellants are the legal heirs of said Thevan, who are also the sisters and brothers of deceased Appukkuttan. They got themselves impleaded as the legal heirs of Thevan and prosecuted the O.P. (M.V). The Tribunal held that although after the amendment of Section 166 in 1994, there is no limitation for filing claim petition u/s 166 of the Act, since the appellants have not explained the unreasonable delay, the original petition is liable to be dismissed and consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the original petition. The award of the Tribunal is under challenge by the appellants. The contention of the appellants is that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. C. Padma and Another, , there is no limitation for filing motor accident claims and the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the accident took place. This is opposed by the 3rd respondent-insurance company, who would rely on the decision of this Court in Chappathi Narayanan v. V.V. Koran and others, ILR 2002(2) Ker. 337.

We have considered the rival contentions in detail.

We are of opinion that the Tribunal has not dismissed the petition on the ground of limitation. In fact the Tribunal has stated that though petition is not barred by the law of limitation, it is bad for unreasonable delay. The Tribunal noted that the explanation offered by the appellants is that the original applicant had entrusted the matter to an advocate, who did not file the petition, since the file was misplaced. But the Tribunal found fault with the appellants for not even examining the said advocate to prove the same and not even filing an affidavit in support of the assertion. But still, we have to consider whether the explanation offered by the appellants can be accepted. For that, we are of opinion that reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in C. Padma''s case (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court relied thereon viz., Dhannalal Vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Others, is worthwhile. In those decisions, the Supreme Court has noted the object of deleting Section 166(3) which provided for limitation. In that decision the Supreme Court noted that in death cases, the dependants may have a host of reasons as to why they could not file the petition in time and it is recognizing such difficulties and to avoid rejecting their claim petition only on account of limitation that the Parliament has decided to remove the great injustice and injury on account of the limitation prescribed. The case has to be considered in the light of that decision of the Supreme Court. Admittedly, till 1994 the limitation period was still in force. The amendment may have come to the notice of the appellants only later. The claimant had filed the O.P. within two years from the date of amendment of Section 166 by which the period of limitation was dispensed with. We are of opinion that the explanation should be considered applying relaxed standards insofar as this is a beneficial legislation. In the above circumstances, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the delay in filing the claim petition, insofar as there is no period of limitation prescribed and the claimant had filed the O.P. within two years from the amendment of Section 166, the claim should be decided on merits. Accordingly, the award in O.P. (M.V.) No. 961/1996 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mavelikkara is set aside. The O.P. (M.V.). is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of the claim on merits without reference to the delay. The Tribunal shall pass fresh award, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within three months. The learned Standing Counsel for the insurance company submits that even if the Tribunal awards compensation, the insurance company should not be saddled with the liability to pay interest for the period of delay. It would be open to the insurance company to raise such a contention also before the Tribunal, which shall be considered by the Tribunal in accordance with law.

The M.A.C.A. is disposed of as above.