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Judgment
Hon'Ble Karunesh Singh Pawar, J.
Heard Mr. Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Avinash Singh Vishen, learned counsel for the respondent.
The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated 27.05.2026 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow in Appeal No. 259 of 2025, whereby the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 02.11.2022 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar, was rejected and consequently the appeal itself stood dismissed.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the delay in filing the appeal was neither deliberate nor intentional, but occurred due to unavoidable circumstances and the prolonged administrative process involved in obtaining approvals at various levels within the appellant-authority. It is contended that sufficient cause for condonation of delay had been demonstrated and that the respondent had not opposed the application.
It is further submitted that the Tribunal adopted an unduly technical approach in rejecting the application instead of adopting a liberal and justice-oriented approach and affording an opportunity to the appellant to have the appeal decided on merits.
Learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant.
Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, the principal question which arises for consideration is whether the appellant has furnished a satisfactory and bona fide explanation constituting sufficient cause for the substantial delay in preferring the appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal.
The record of the Tribunal indicates that the order of the Regulatory Authority was uploaded on the portal on 23.11.2022 and the period of limitation for filing the appeal expired on 23.01.2023. However, the appeal came to be filed on 07.01.2025 along with an application seeking condonation of delay.
A perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay indicates that the dates and events have been explained in a casual and general manner. Even where certain dates have been mentioned, the intervening periods have not been satisfactorily accounted for. In paragraph 4, it has been stated that in the first week of December 2022, the file was sent to the Officer In-charge (ALO), who forwarded it to the Property Department. However, no specific date of such movement has been disclosed. A similar general explanation has also been furnished in paragraph 5.
In paragraph 6, the movement of the file to different authorities for approval has been stated without specifying the dates or the duration for which the file remained pending at each stage. Similarly, in paragraphs 7 and 8, after referring to December 2022, the next dates mentioned are May 2023 and August 2023, without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for the intervening period.
In paragraph 9, it has been stated that approval was sought from the Property Department, without disclosing the specific date on which such approval was sought. Paragraph 10 states that the file was handed over to the present counsel for drafting in the last week of October 2023. Here again, the intervening period has not been satisfactorily explained.
In paragraph 11, reference has been made to festivals without specifying the dates of such festivals or the actual period during which the concerned department remained closed. Similar general explanations have been furnished in paragraphs 13 to 17, without disclosing the specific dates or satisfactorily accounting for the periods of inactivity.
In paragraph 19, it has been stated that the relevant documents could not be traced in October 2024. The application, however, jumps from January 2024 directly to October 2024, without furnishing any explanation whatsoever for the intervening period of about eight months. The subsequent paragraphs, up to paragraph 23, also do not satisfactorily account for the delay, ultimately stating that the appeal was filed on 07.01.2025.
Thus, the application does not disclose a continuous, coherent or satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Tribunal has also examined this aspect in paragraph 9 of the impugned order, wherein it has observed as follows:
"the approach of the appellant-promoter in movement of the file is casual, flimsy and whimsical and no plausible reasons, whatsoever, has been given to condone the delay in institution of the appeal. The delay is solely attributable to the lethargic approach of the officials of the applicant organization. To condone the delay in given facts would tantamount to misuse of the process of law."
The principles governing condonation of delay, no doubt, require the Court to adopt a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach, rather than an unduly technical or pedantic one. However, such an approach does not dispense with the requirement of establishing sufficient cause. The expression "sufficient cause" has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case, keeping in view the conduct of the applicant and the bona fides of the explanation furnished.
In this regard, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, assumes significance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while reiterating the principles governing condonation of delay, has observed in paragraphs 261 and 262 that administrative lethargy and laxity cannot constitute sufficient cause and that State authorities and instrumentalities cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own administrative inefficiency. The Court has emphasised that a litigating State agency is equally bound by the discipline of limitation and must demonstrate bona fides and vigilance throughout the relevant period.
The aforesaid decision also reiterates that although a justice-oriented approach is required, the same cannot be extended to condone delay on the basis of frivolous, superficial or unsubstantiated explanations. The explanation must demonstrate that the applicant acted with reasonable diligence and that the delay occurred despite genuine efforts to pursue the remedy. The relevant consideration is not merely the length of delay but the acceptability of the explanation furnished for the same.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the appellant has sought to explain the delay primarily on the basis of internal movement of files, administrative approvals and procedural formalities. However, no specific particulars have been furnished to explain the prolonged periods during which the matter remained unattended. The application does not disclose any bona fide or unavoidable impediment which prevented the appellant from pursuing its statutory remedy within the prescribed period. Rather, the explanation reflects administrative inaction and lack of coordination amongst the officials of the appellant-authority. The mere fact that the appellant is a statutory Development Authority or an instrumentality of the State cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
The contention that the respondent had not filed any objection to the application for condonation of delay also does not advance the appellant's case. The burden to establish sufficient cause rests upon the applicant seeking condonation, and the absence of an objection by the opposite party does not dispense with such requirement. Equally, the contention that the substantive appeal raises important questions or that the award of interest may have adverse financial consequences cannot, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, constitute an independent ground for condonation. The merits of the underlying dispute cannot be used to substitute the statutory requirement of establishing sufficient cause.
The decisions relied upon by learned Senior Counsel, including Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 and N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, lay down the settled principles favouring a liberal approach in appropriate cases. However, the said principles do not confer an unfettered discretion to condone delay irrespective of the conduct of the applicant or the adequacy of the explanation. The decision in Shivamma (supra) also makes it clear that administrative inefficiency, without a satisfactory demonstration of bona fide efforts and due diligence, cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The facts of the present case, therefore, do not warrant the indulgence sought by the appellant.
It is further significant that the impugned order of the Tribunal has not adjudicated upon the substantive merits of the original dispute, as the appeal itself stood dismissed on account of rejection of the application for condonation of delay. The question before this Court is not whether the substantive dispute could have been adjudicated on merits, but whether the Tribunal committed any error of law in refusing to condone the delay. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any such error.
So far as the contention regarding contradictory orders passed by the Tribunal in other matters is concerned, no material has been brought on record to establish that the facts and circumstances of those cases were identical to the present case or that any binding legal principle was disregarded while passing the impugned order. A mere assertion of inconsistency, without demonstrating the factual and legal identity of the cases, does not furnish a ground for interference.
The present appeal has been preferred under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, which provides for an appeal to the High Court on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The jurisdiction of this Court is, therefore, confined to examining whether the impugned order gives rise to a substantial question of law. No such question arises in the present appeal, as the Tribunal has considered the explanation furnished by the appellant and rejected the application for condonation of delay on grounds supported by the material available on record.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the learned Appellate Tribunal has rightly rejected the application for condonation of delay upon due consideration of the explanation furnished by the appellant. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or error of law warranting interference by this Court. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal.
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed at the admission stage.