Y. Venkatarami Reddy vs Regional Transport Authority and Others

Subhashan Reddy, J.—The Writ Petitioner is a Transport Operator and seeks for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings dated 1-7-1992 of the Regional Transport Authority, Guntur the first respondent herein, rejecting the application for the grant of variation of the route seeking extension of the existing town service route of Guntur-Nallapadu to Perecherla junction as illegal and void. From a perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the existing permit for the route covering 7 kilometres from Guntur-Nallapadu was granted to the Petitioner on 19-6-1990 and the variation sought for was 5 kilometres making the total distance to 12 kilometres. But the said request is negatived on the ground that even though the original sanctioned route is 7 kilometres, by clubbing the distance in the variation sought, the total route becomes 12 kilometres and that the same is hit by the scheme framed under G.O.Ms.No. 363, Transport, Roads and Buildings (Tr.IV) Department, dated 30-5-1991, and that as such, the variation cannot be granted. Before the 1st respondent, Objections were filed by the impleaded respondents 3 to 6 in W.P.M.P. No. 12160/92 to the effect that the; petitioner cannot be granted with the variation of the route sought for, in view of not only G.O.Ms.No. 363,butalso earlier G.Os.,bearingG.O.Ms.Nos. 317 and 318 containing the same schemes covering the route in question. Both the above G.Os.317 and 318 were issued on the same date viz., 28-6-1990, while it is pertinent to mention that the petitioner was granted the pucca permit for the town service route Guntur to Nallapadu on 19-6-1990. So, the concluded fact is that the petitioner was holding pucca permit before the issuance of any of the notifications under G.O.Ms.No. 317,318 or 363.

Mr.K.R.K. Varaprasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, makes two- fold submission, namely, (I) that the variation sought for ought to be granted and by not granting the same, the first respondent has acted illegally and arbitrarily as the point for (sic) 5 kilometres is the last place of the existing permit i.e., the limits of Nallapadu and construing and computing so, the petitioner was entitled to have variation upto a maximum limit of 5 kilometres as sought for by him and the same is permissible even under the above notifications issued in the above Government Orders being 317,318 or for that reason 363; (2) that in any event, the rejection of the request on the ground that the notifications prohibit the same on the basis of a cut-off date even though the said benefit is available to 13 existing operators, results in invidious discrimination infracting the equality clause enunciated under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Mr. R. Venugopal Reddy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for Mr. K.N. Jwala, for the impleaded respondents led the arguments, while the counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C. and the Government have adopted the same. It is the contention of Mr. R. Venugopal Reddy, that the distance of 5 kilometres under the variation sought for should be computed not from the last place of the existing permit, but right from the first place of the existing permit and so reckoned, the variation sought for cannot be granted as it exceeds 5 kilometres because of the distance of the existing route being 7 kilometres and that there is no violation of equality clause as the existing permit holders for the route from Guntur to Perecherla are a class by themselves distinguishing from other persons like petitioner who are seeking to have permit for the said extended route from Nallapadu to Perecherla. He further contends that fixing a cut-off date for tine purpose of making a distinction does not tantamount to invidious discrimination and that such a classification is rational and reasonable.

It is needless to mention that if the Ist point is answered in favour of the petitioner, the 2nd point need not be adverted to. I shall now deal with the first contention and should the need arises for dealing with the second contention, I will deal with the same, otherwise not.

It is true, as contended by Mr. R. Venugopal Reddy, that when the scheme is valid and a notification has been issued for nationalisation of the route, the said notifications operate as law; the same will be unassailable as there will be no infraction of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution of India. He further contends that when the notifications are valid, the imposition and curtailment under the said notifications are per se valid and that there is absolutely no ground to invalidate the same. He cited the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, . In the said case if was held Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act seeks to classify A.P.S.R.T.C. separately than the other operators. The Supreme Court also held that the provisions of the scheme do not make any distinction between individuals operating a transport service and private transport undertakings and that they are all treated as one Class and the classification was only made between the State Transport Undertaking and Private Transport Undertaking, whether the business is carried on by individuals, firms or companies. The Supreme Court further held as follows:-

"The State, compared with individuals, is in a better position to achieve the object, namely, to prove the road transport service in all its diverse aspects. In such a situation, when the legislature, which must be presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of its own people, makes a classification between a State Transport Undertaking and others carrying on the business of transport services, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable basis for such a classification."

As such, it is clear that there is no approval by the Supreme Court to the contention that the classification can be made even among individual operators and the private transport undertakings. Only one classification is recognised by the Supreme Court and that is State Transport Undertaking on one side and the private operators, be it individuals or Companies, on the other. Applying the ration of the said decision. I cannot accept the contention that even among the private operators, there can be distinct class.

Mr. K.R.K. Varaprasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no scope to construe the distance sought for under variation as a part of the distance of the existing route and that the very notifications permit the variation of 5 kilometres and that existing route of 7 kilometres is permissible to extend by 5 kilometres more.

In answer, Mr. R. Venugopal Reddy, cited a judgment of Division Bench of this Court dt.4-7-1984 rendered in W.A.No. 382/84 asserting that the matter in question is no more res integra and that it has been authoritatively laid down by the above Division Bench of this court that no variation can be granted in excess of 5 kilometres and that the distance under variation should be reckoned and computed from the starting place of the existing pucca permit. But I am at a loss to find such a principle being laid down by the above Division Bench. In fact, the question as in the instant case did not arise for consideration in the above case, as the facts in the above case are totally different from the one oh hand. In the case dealt with by the above Division Bench, the permit for the first time was granted in the year 1982 to ply stage carriage on the route Srikakulam to Pathapatnam, while the notification nationalising the said route was issued under G.O.Ms.No. 584, dated 30-12-1978. When the variation was sought for, for extension of the distance of the said route which fell beyond the permissible limit of 8 kilometres, the same was rejected and the said order or rejection was confirmed, both by the learned single Judge and then by the judgment of the Division Bench referred to supra. In the above case, the petitioner-operator having obtained a permit for the first time later to the notification on the route Srikakulam to Pathapatnam has again sought for variation from Pathapatnam to Kurigam. A contention was raised for the said petitioner therein that what was sought for was merely a variation of the conditions of the permit and that granting of variation of conditions of permit does not amount to granting of a permit and that, therefore, the transport authorities erred in rejecting the application seeking plying of the stage carriage from Pathapatnam to Kurigam. Dealing with the said contention, the Division Bench held as follows:-

"In terms of the (sic) G.O., it cannot be denied that the petitioner is a future stage carriage permit holder. It must also be admitted that the total length of the route for which he seeks to ply his stage carriage exceeds 8 kms. Prima facie, therefore, it should be held that he is hit by condition No. 3 of the Note. But what the learned Counsel for the petitioner says is that although he may not be able to traverse the notified route for more than a distance of 8 kms., by obtaining a stage carriage permit, he may do so by obtaining the variation of the conditions of the existing permit. This argument has to be stated only to be rejected. What a future stage carriage permit holder cannot be permitted to do indirectly. Strictly speaking the language of the Note speaks of the holders of future stage carriage permit holder and not of any variation."

The Bench while distinguishing the Supreme Court Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore Vs. B.A. Jayaram and Others, which dealt with the case of an existing permit holder as on the date of nationalisation, has further held as follows:-

"In our opinion, that case has no application to the facts of our case, because the language implied in our scheme prohibiting the future stage carriage permit holders from overlapping the notified route is different."

But in the instant case, the facts are totally different. The existing permit of the petitioner is anterior to the date of notifications under G.O.Ms.No. 317,318 and 363 and for the first time after the said notifications, variation was sought for by the petitioner within the permissible limits upto 5 kilometres. Reading the notes appended to the above notifications, it is clear that the existing permits are excepted from the notifications and further a one time concession is granted for extension of the said existing permitted route by 5 more kilometres. Mr. R. Venugopal Reddy, wants me to read the distance under the variation sought for as a part of the existing route. But I am afraid, I cannot accede to his contention as all existing routes under the permits which were subsisting as on the date of the above notifications were automatically exempted with a further right of having extension of that route by way of variation upto a maximum permissible limit of 5 kilometres. Any other construction will lead to absurdities and this Court always upholds a construction of a statute, provision of law or a notification which leads to harmony and not absurdity or anomaly. Reading clauses 2 and 3 of the Notes under G.Os.317 and 318 as also clauses 2 and 3 of Notes under G.O.Ms.No. 363, the irresistable conclusion is that while the existing permit covering the route is untouched by the notifications, the said route can be stretched further upto a maximum limit of 5 kilometres by way of variation which amounts to extension of the route in addition to the distance covered by the existing route.

In view of what is stated supra, the impugned order dated 1-7-1992 passed by the first respondent in his Proceedings Re. No. 10725/ A2/91, is set aside and declare that the petitioner is entitled for the variation sought for from R.T.C. Bus Stand Guntur to Perecherla via Nallapadu and the first respondent shall accordingly issue a pucca permit for the same within a reasonable time, but not later than 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

The Writ Petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.