Y. Rajeshwari vs Bombay Tyres International Limited

P.K. Bahri, J.

(1) The petitioner-landlady has filed the present petition seeking review of my judgment dated November 8, 1988, by which I had dismissed the civil revision brought u/s 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and had affirmed the order of the Rent Controller by which she had dismissed the eviction petition brought by the petitioner on the ground of eviction covered by clause (?) of subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

(2) I have held in my judgment that the petitioner did net bonafide require the demised premises for occupation as residence for herself inasmuch she had been actuated by a desire to increase the rent of the demised premises. Once a finding is given that the requirement of the premises by the petitioner is not bonafide, the petitioner obviously could net get the eviction of the tenant on the ground covered by clause (e). In the review petition it has been mentioned that the Delhi Rent Control Act has been since amended and Section 14-D has been inserted by which a right has been conferred on a widow to obtain the premises let out by her if the same are required by her for her own residence. This amendment appears to have come into force subsequent to the judgment delivered by me.

(3) The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that in order to mould the relief the subsequent events could always be taken note of. It is, no doubt, a settled principle of law that subsequent events could be taken note of in order to decide whether a particular ground of eviction already set out stands proved or not but those subsequent events which could be taken note of by the court must have happened before the final disposal of the case up to the appellate stage. No case has been brough. to my notice by the learned counsel for the petitioner where a subsequent event regarding a change in legislation could be taken note of in a review petition for deciding whether the judgment already delivered requires to be reviewed or not. Order Xlvii Rule 1 of the CPC reads as follows-

" APPLICATION for review of judgment- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence .Was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the fact of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the, decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order."

(4) The present review petition does not fall in any of the ingredients which must be pleaded in order to seek review of the judgment. In Gyanji Pomaji Marwadi Vs. Ningappa Marbasappa Arleshwar, . (1) A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had laid down that the subsequent legislation cannot be a basis for moving any review application. While following the observations made in Kotaghiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatarama Rao (1900) 24 Mad 1, (2) it was held that the rule does not authorize the review of a decree which was right when it was made, on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event. It was held that any other sufficient reason mentioned in the rule would be of the kind analogous to the other grounds of review that are specified in the rule. (1922) ILR 3 LAH 127 (Privy Council) was also relied upon for this proposition. In Dewilal Kukaji Sutar Vs. Ramotar Dwarkaprasad, , a learned Shigle Bench also laid down the same proposition of law that once. the decision on an issue is given the court cannot change it by reviewing it merely because subsequent to the decision, the law on the point has been changed either by statute or by a decision of a superior Court. In G.S. Gupta Vs. Basheer Ahamed and Others, also same principle was laid down that happening of a subsequent event is not a ground for review of judgment under Order Lxvii Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By amendment of the Delhi Rent Control Act, a fresh ground of eviction has been incorporated and the petitioner would be well advised to initiate fresh petition based on the ground of eviction covered by clause 14-D. I am afraid that it is not possible for this Court to take notice of the said subsequent change in the legislation and to make it a ground for review of my judgment.

(5) It has been also contended that subsequent events, which have been narrated by the petitioner in her application (C.M. 2675187), have not been maken notice of by this Court while deciding the case. The said application had been given, pray- ing for an early hearing in the main petition. The facts mentioned in that application have been noticed by me in paragraph 10 of the judgment. The facts, which have been given in the application, were not new facts. The petitioner wanted to show by giving those facts that the accommodation of two rooms available to her married daughter was not sufficient enough and thus, she being an old lady would like to live in her own flat. The claim of the petitioner had been negatived by me on the ground that she had set up this ground of bonafide requirement for some ulterior motive of putting pressure on the tenant to increase the rent. So, it cannot be said that this Court had not taken note of the facts mentioned in the aforesaid application while deciding the main petition,

(6) I, hence, do not find any fit ground for allowing this review application which f, hereby dismiss with no order as to costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 300.