Worldfa Exports Private Limited vs PCIT(Central)

“2.

An information in the case of the assessee was received that M/s M.K. Traders and M/s Laxmi Agencies controlled by hawala operator Sh. Manish Gupta and he has admitted in his statement that he was providing accommodation entries by issuing non-genuine sales bills of goods and non-genuine purchase bills of goods as per needs of various beneficiaries. As per information, the assessee was involved in transactions of Rs. 1,06,13,740/- with M/s M K Traders and Rs. 1,77,11,209/- with M/s Luxmi Agencies during the year under consideration. On the basis of the information, order u/s 148A(d) was passed in the case of the assessee on 05.04.2022 with the prior approval of PCIT-07, Delhi wherein it was held that transaction amounting to Rs. 2,83,24,949/- has escaped assessment and it is a fit case for issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, the case of the assessee was reopened and a notice u/s 148 was issued to the assessee on 05.04.2022.

2.2

A search and seizure proceedings u/s 132 of the Act was carried out on the Alankit Group, Sh. Alok K Agarwal, his son Ankit Agarwal and some of the close associates and key employees of Sh. Alok K Agarwal on 18.10.2019. During the course of search and seizure operation carried out on 18.10.2019 at the premise of Sh. Alok Agarwal, Ankit Agarwal, Alankit Limited and Alankit Assignments Limited at 3584, Third Floor, Gali no. 4, Narang Colony, Trinagar, Delhi, some incriminating documents were found from the premises which are related to the assessee. Accordingly, the case of the assessee was also opened under Section 153C and the proceedings under Section 148 were abated. Further, notice dated 18.01.2023 u/s 153C was issued to the assessee, however, the assessee did not file ITR in response to the notice u/s 153C. As the proceeding u/s 153C was initiated in the case of the assessee, the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were abated.

2.3

The assessment proceedings under Section 153C for AY 2018-19 was completed on 13.02.2024 wherein the returned income of the assessee was accepted.”

“6.

We have heard rival submissions of the parties and perused the relevant materials on record. The objection raised by the Revenue that the validity of reassessment cannot be examined in proceedings arising from section 263 is devoid of merit. It is wellsettled that a jurisdictional defect strikes at the foundation of proceedings and can be examined at any stage. In the case proceedings u/s 148 of the Act was dropped by the Assessing Officer and therefore, there was no occasion for the assessee to challenge said proceedings before appellate authority and only opportunity got to challenge said proceedings u/s 148 in the present proceedings u/s 263 of the Act.

6.1

In the present case, it is undisputed that the notice under section 148 was issued on 19.04.2022, i.e., beyond three years from the end of assessment year 2018-19., Under section 151, as it stood at the relevant time, where more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, prior sanction was required from the PCCIT / CCIT. The assessee relied on the finding of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shabbir Taheri (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Vice President in his separate order has observed as under:

"4.

At this stage, it is necessary to examine the provisions contained u/s. 149 of the Act. Prior to its substitution by Finance Act, 2021 effective from 01.04.2021, sub section (1) of Section 149 of the Act provided that no notice u/s. 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. However, it further provided that in a case where the quantum of escaped income is Rs.1,00,000/- or more, instead of four years, six years limitation would be available. It further provided that if the escaped income relates to any asset located outside India, the limitation would get extended to sixteen years. The aforesaid provision was substituted by Finance Act 2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2021. As per section 149(1) of the Act under the new regime, no notice u/s. 148 of the Act shall be issued for the relevant assessment year if three years have elapsed for the relevant assessment year. However, in a case where the income escaping assessment is Rs.50,00,000/- or more then the limitation for issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act will get extended to ten years. The third proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act provided that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the time or extended time allowed to the assessee as per show cause notice issued u/s. 148A(b) of the Act or the period during which proceeding u/s. 148 is stayed by an order of injunction of any court shall be excluded. The fourth proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act provided that immediately after exclusion of period referred in third proviso, if the period of limitation available to the AO for passing an order under Section 148A(d) of the Act is less than seven days, such remaining period shall be extended to seven days and accordingly the period of limitation for issuance of notice u/s. 148 shall be deemed to have been extended.

5.

Interestingly, sub section (2) to Section 149 of the Act provides that the limitation prescribed under sub section (1) of Section 149 of the Act for issuance of notice shall be subject to the provisions of Section 151 of the Act. The use of word 'shall' in sub section (2) of Section 149 of the Act makes it clear that the limitation prescribed u/s. 149 of the Act for issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act is subject to the timeline prescribed u's. 151 of the Act. In other words, the limitation prescribed u/s. 149(1) of the Act would not override the timeline prescribed for grant of approval by the specified authority u/s. 151 of the Act. Section 151 of the Act as it stood after substitution of earlier Section 151 of the Act by Finance Act, 2021 effective from 01.04.2021 and before its amendment by Finance Act, 2023 w.e.f. 01.04.2023 reads as under:

"151.

Specified authority for the purposes of section 148 and section 148A shall be,-

(1)

Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director, if three years or less than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year,

(if)

Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or 33[*] Chief Commissioner or Director General, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year:"

6.

As could be seen from the provision contained u/s. 151 of the Act reproduced above, as per clause (i). in a case where action u/s. 148 and Section 148A of the Act is initiated before expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the specified authority who can grant sanction/approval is the Principal Commissioner or Principal Director General or Commissioner or Director of Income Tax. However, as per clause (ii), if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, the specified authority, who can grant sanction is the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or where no Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General is available then Chief Commissioner or Director General of Income Tax. It is noteworthy, akin to third and fourth provisos, which were incorporated in Section 149(1) of the Act under the new regime effective from 01.04.2021, поcorresponding amendment was made to Section 151 of the Act. By virtue of Finance Act, 2023 effective from 01.04.2023, the following proviso was added to Section 151 of the Act.

"Provided that the period of three years for the purposes of Clause (i) shall be computed after taking into account, the period of limitation as excluded by the third, fourth and fifth provisos or extended by the sixth proviso to sub section (1) of Section 149 of the Act."

7.

Thus, as per Section 151 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Finance Act, 2023, the limitation prescribed under Clause (i) of Section 151 of the Act was prior to expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year and without benefit of further extension in terms with third, fourth or fifth proviso under sub section (1) of Section 149 of the Act.

8.

Therefore, keeping in view the provision contained under sub section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, which makes the limitation provided u/s. 149(1) of the Act subject to the timeline provided u/s. 151 of the Act, the limitation provided u/s. 149(1) of the Act including the provisos cannot get imported for the purpose of extending the limitation u/s. 151(i) of the Act prior to the amendment of section 151 of the Act by Finance Act, 2023. That being the case, the timeline for sanction by specified authority fixed u/s. 151 of the Act has to be scrupulously followed.

9.

At this stage, it is to be noted that the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the decisions referred to by my learned brother Accountant Member in his order has specifically held that the proviso inserted to Section 151 of the Act by Finance Act, 2023, effective from 01.04.2023 will not apply prior to its effective date. Pertinently the line of argument taken by the Department in the case of Albert Joseph Rozario v. ITO (supra) was not for the first time. Identical argument was advanced by the Department in following two cases dealt by the Coordinate Benches:

(i). Davos International Fund v. ACIT, Mumbai, ITA No. 1190/Mum/2024 dated 13.01.2025.

(ii). ACIT v. Asha P. Kedia [2025] 174 taxmann.com 99 (Mumbai-Trib.)

10.

While dealing with the contentions of learned Departmental Representative in case of Davos International Fund (supra), the Coordinate Bench has held as under:

"7.

We heard the parties and perused the material on record. In assessee's case the 148A notice for AY 2017-18 was issued on 12.03.2022 and the order disposing the objections of the assessee was passed on 04.04.2022 under section 148A(d) of the Act. The AO issued notice under section 148 dated 04.04.2022. On perusal of the order under section 148A(d) of the Act and 148 (page 42 to 46 and 47 of PB) we notice that the impugned notices are issued after obtaining the prior approval of CIT (IT), Mumbai-2. The case of the revenue is that the notice dated 04.04.2022 is issued w three years since as per the 5th proviso to section 149, the AO has got additional 9 days for iss to 31.03.2022 was given to the assessee. Therefore, it is argued by the revenue that notice issued on notice under section 148 i.e. upto 09.04.2022. since the extended time of 9 days 1.e. from 22.03.202 authority as specified in section 151(i) of the Act. The assessee is contending that the 5th proviso to has been correctly obtained section 149 under which the revenue is taking cover is inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2023 and therefore not applicable to assessee's case. In this regard, we notice that the Hon'ble Bombay High Court iln the case of Vodafone Idea Ltd (supra) has held that-

"1.

Petitioner is impugning a notice dated 19th March 2022 issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act"), the order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act and the notice both dated 7th April 2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act. One of the grounds raised is that the sanction to pass the order under Section 148A(d) of the Act and issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act is invalid inasmuch as the sanction has been admittedly issued by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax ("PCIT") and not by the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT"). 2. Petitioner's request for a copy of the sanction has also been denied. Even in the affidavit in reply, the Department is refusing to give the sanction which makes us wonder what is the national secret involved in that, that Assessee is being refused what he is rightfully entitled to receive from the Department. In the affidavit in reply, the stand taken by the Revenue is it will be made available during the re- assessment proceeding. 3. The impugned order and the impugned notice both dated 7th April 2022 state that the Authority that has accorded the sanction is the PCIT, Mumbai 5. The matter pertains to Assessment Year ("AY") 2018-19 and since the impugned order as well as the notice are issued on 7th April 2022, both have been issued beyond a period of three years. Therefore, the sanctioning authority has to be the PCCIT as provided under Section 151 (ii) of the Act. The proviso to Section 151 has been inserted only with effect from 1" April 2023 and, therefore, shall not be applicable to the matter at hand. 4. In this circumstances, as held by this Court in Siemens Financial Services Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors., the sanction is invalid and consequently, the impugned order and impugned notice both dated 7th April 2022 under section 148A(d) and 148 of the Act are hereby quashed and set aside."

6.2

The Coordinate Bench (supra), while interpreting the statutory framework, has categorically held that (i) the time limits under section 149 cannot dilute or override the sanction requirements under section 151; (ii) sanction by an authority not prescribed under section 151 renders the notice invalid; and (iii) the proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2023 has no retrospective application.

6.3

Respectfully following the binding judicial precedents and the reasoning adopted therein, we hold that sanction obtained from the PCIT, instead of the PCCIT/CCIT, is not in conformity with section 151(ii). Consequently, the notice issued under section 148 is invalid in law.

6.4

Once the very initiation of reassessment proceedings is held to be void for want of proper jurisdictional sanction, the consequential revisionary proceedings under section 263 cannot survive. An order passed under section 263 cannot stand independently when the foundational proceeding itself is legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the impugned order passed under section 263 is set aside.

6.5

In view of the above conclusion, other grounds raised by the assessee become academic and do not require separate adjudication.

7.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.”

“6.

From the above, it could be seen that the Learned AO of the assessee herein had recorded Consolidated satisfaction note for assessment years 2011-12 to 2017- in one go instead of recording independent and individual satisfaction note for each assessment year which is the requirement of the law. The moot question that arises for our consideration is as to whether recording of consolidated satisfaction note for various assessment years and assuming jurisdiction under section 153C of the Act would be fatal to the very assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C of the Act or not ? This issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of DCIT vs Sunil Kumar Sharma reported in 159 taxmann.com 179 (Kar). The relevant operative portion of the said order is reproduced below:-

“53.

Further, satisfaction note is required to be recorded under section 153C of the IT Act for each Assessment Year and in the impugned proceedings, a consolidated satisfaction note has been recorded for different Assessment Years, which also vitiates the entire assessment proceedings. In view of all these findings, it is said that the appeals do not have any substance for seeking intervention as sought for by the appellant/Revenue.”

7.

It is pertinent to note that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) preferred by the revenue against this order had been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which is reported in 165 taxmann.com 846 (SC) by observing as under:-

“ORDER

1.

Delay condoned.

2.

Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants.

3.

We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No. 831/2022 (T-IT) dated 22-01-2024/ Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sunil Kumar Sharma [2024] 159 taxmann.com 179 (Karnataka) .

4.

The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

5.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

8.

The Learned DR before us vehemently relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Indian National Congress vs DCIT reported in 463 ITR 431 (Del) dated 22-03-2024 wherein it was held as under:-

24.

The provision only requires the AO to be satisfied that the material collated and handed over is likely to have an impact on the total income for the relevant AY or AYs'. While an assessment would necessarily have to be made in respect of each of the relevant AY or AYs', we find ourselves unable to read Section 153A or 153C as mandating separate Satisfaction Notes being drawn for each assessment year. Our conclusion in this respect stands fortified from the language of Section 153A(1)(a) which contemplates a notice being issued calling upon the person to furnish a return of income for each of the six AYs' or the relevant AY or AYs'. This too appears to suggest that while the notice could be composite and based on a common satisfaction note which encapsulates the incriminating material pertaining to the AYs' in question, it is only returns which must and mandatorily be filed separately.

25.

Regard must be had to the indubitable fact that the Satisfaction Note merely forms the foundation for initiation of action and which would enable us to evaluate whether an opinion has been validly formed. As long as it rests on incriminating material which pertains to the AYs' in question, the same would qualify the requirement of Section 153C. We deem it apposite to observe that while it would be imperative for the Satisfaction Note to refer to the material pertaining to the AYs' which are sought to be reopened, a consolidated Satisfaction Note clearly does not appear to be an anathema provided it rests on material which pertains to the AYs' which are sought to be reopened.

26.

We in this respect also bear in mind the lucid explanation of the procedure liable to be adopted under Sections 153A and 153C as came to be enunciated by the Court in CIT v. Kabul Chawla [2015] 61 taxmann.com 412/234 Taxman 300/[2016] 380 ITR 573 (Delhi)/2015 SCC OnLine Del 11555.

"37.

On a conspectus of section 153A(1) of the Act, read with the provisos thereto, and in the light of the law explained in the aforementioned decisions, the legal position that emerges is as under:

(i)

Once a search takes place under section 132 of the Act, notice under section 153A(1) will have to be mandatorily issued to the person searched requiring him to file returns for six assessment years immediately preceding the previous year relevant to the assessment year in which the search takes place.

(ii)

Assessments and reassessments pending on the date of the search shall abate. The total income for such assessment years will have to be computed by the Assessing Officers as a fresh exercise.

(iii)

The Assessing Officer will exercise normal assessment powers in respect of the six years previous to the relevant assessment year in which the search takes place. The Assessing Officer has the power to assess and reassess the "total income" of the aforementioned six years in separate assessment orders for each of the six years. In other words, there will be only one assessment order in respect of each of the six assessment years "in which both the disclosed and the undisclosed income would be brought to tax".

(iv)

Although section 153A does not say that additions should be strictly made on the basis of evidence found in the course of the search, or other post-search material or information available with the Assessing Officer which can be related to the evidence found, it does not mean that the assessment "can be arbitrary or made without any relevance or nexus with the seized material. Obviously, an assessment has to be made under this section only on the basis of the seized material."

(v)

In the absence of any incriminating material, the completed assessment can be reiterated and the abated assessment or reassessment can be made. The word "assess" in section 153A is relatable to abated proceedings (i.e., those pending on the date of search) and the word "reassess" to the completed assessment proceedings.

(vi)

In so far as the pending assessments are concerned, the jurisdiction to make the original assessment and the assessment under section 153A merges into one. Only one assessment shall be made separately for each assessment year on the basis of the findings of the search and any other material existing or brought on the record of the Assessing Officer.

(vii)

Completed assessments can be interfered with by the Assessing Officer while making the assessment under section 153A only on the basis of some incriminating material unearthed during the course of search or requisition of documents or undisclosed income or property discovered in the course of search which were not produced or not already disclosed or made known in the course of original assessment."

By placing reliance on the aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court, the Learned DR argued that recording of consolidated satisfaction note for various assessment years put together would not be fatal to the assumption of jurisdiction and framing of

assessment under section 153C of the Act. 9. But we find that the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Saksham Commodities Ltd vs ITO reported in 464 ITR 1 (Del) dated 09-04-2024 (judges of equal strength) had passed an order in favour of the assessee on the very same issue. The relevant operative portion of the said order is reproduced below:-

“50.

What we seek to emphasise is that merely because Section 153C confers jurisdiction upon the AO to commence an exercise of assessment or reassessment for the block of years which are mentioned in that provision, the same alone would not be sufficient to justify steps in that direction being taken, unless the incriminating material so found is likely to have an impact on the total income of a particular AY forming part of the six AYs' immediately preceding the AY pertaining to the search year or for the "relevant assessment year".

51.

Ultimately Section 153C is concerned with books, documents or articles seized in the course of a search and which are found to have the potential to impact or have a bearing on an assessment which may be undergoing or which may have been completed. The words "have a bearing on the determination of the total income of such other person" as appearing in Section 153C would necessarily have to be conferred pre-eminence. Therefore, and unless the AO is satisfied that the material gathered could potentially impact the determination of total income, it would be unjustified in mechanically reopening or assessing all over again all the ten AYs' that could possibly form part of the block of ten years.

53.

Sinhgad Technical Education Society also constitutes a binding precedent in respect of the aforesaid proposition as would be evident from the Supreme Court noticing that the material disclosed pertained only to AY 2004-05 or thereafter and that consequently the Section 153C action initiated for AYs' 2000-01 to 2003-04 would not sustain. It was this position in law as enunciated in that decision which came to be reiterated by our Court in Index Securities.

55.

Take for instance a case where the material gathered in the search is contemplated to have an adverse impact on the declarations and disclosures made by an assessee pertaining only to AYs' 2016-17 and 2017-18. What we seek to emphasise is that pending assessments for those two years could validly form subject matter of action under Section 153C and pending assessments in that respect would surely abate. However, that by itself would not be sufficient to either reopen or issue notices in respect of AYs' prior to or those falling after those two AYs' and which may otherwise fall within the maximum block period of ten years merely because the statute empowers the AO to do so. Unless the material gathered and recovered is found to have relevancy to the AY which is sought to be subjected to action under Section 153C, it would be legally impermissible for the respondents to invoke those provisions. Consequently, the AO would be bound to ascertain and identify the year to which the material recovered relates. The years which could be then subjected to action under Section 153C would have to necessarily be those in respect of which the assessment is likely to be influenced or impacted by the material discovered. Section 153C neither mandates nor envisages a mechanical or an enblanc exercise of power, or to put it differently, one which is uninformed by a consideration of the factors indicated above.

56.

We also bear in mind the pertinent observations made in RRJ Securities when the Court held that merely because an article or thing may have been recovered in the course of a search would not mean that concluded assessments have to "necessarily" be reopened under Section 153C and that those assessments are not liable to be revised unless the material obtained have a bearing on the determination of the total income. This aspect was again emphasised in para 38 of RRJ Securities with the Court laying stress on the existence of material that may be reflective of undisclosed income being of vital importance. All the aforenoted judgments thus reinforce the requirement of incriminating material having an ineradicable link to the estimation of income for a particular AY.

57.

It becomes pertinent to note that both Sections 153A and 153C require the assessee upon being placed on notice to furnish ROIs' for the six AYs' or the "relevant assessment year". All that the two provisions mandate is that notwithstanding the submission of those ROIs', the AO would frame one assessment order in respect of each of the years which were made subject matter of the notice and which would deal with both disclosed and undisclosed income. This too reinforces our view that Section 153C would apply only to such AYs' where the jurisdictional AO is satisfied and has incriminating material for those AYs' and which may be concerned with disclosed and undisclosed income.

60.

Before concluding, we also deem it imperative to briefly notice certain aspects which emerge from a reading of the Satisfaction Notes themselves. As is manifest from a reading of the Satisfaction Note drawn by the jurisdictional AO of the assessee in W.P. (C) 1459/2024, after noticing the material which was recovered during the search and related to FYs' 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 [corresponding AYs' thus being AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13], it has proceeded to observe that the assessments which were liable to abate or be reopened would be AYs' 2010-11 to 2020-21. A similar note appears in W.P. (C)1117/2024. Here again, after referring to the material pertaining to FY 2009-10 [and thus relating to AY 2010-11], the AO proceeded to seek approval for initiating action under Section 153C in respect of AYs' 2010-11 up to 2020-21.

61.

A reading of the aforesaid Satisfaction Notes would establish that jurisdictional AOs' appear to have proceeded on the premise that the moment incriminating material is unearthed in respect of a particular AY, they would have the jurisdiction and authority to invoke Section 153C in respect of all the assessment years which could otherwise form part of the "relevant assessment year" as defined in Section 153A. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid understanding of Section 153C is clearly erroneous and unsustainable. As explained hereinabove, the discovery of material likely to implicate the assessee and impact the assessment of total income for a particular AY is not intended to set off a chain reaction or have a waterfall effect on all AYs' which could form part of the "relevant assessment year". This, more so since none of the Satisfaction Notes record any reasons of how that material is likely to materially influence the computation of income for those AYs'.

62.

Hypothetically speaking, it may be possible for the material recovered in the course of a search having the potential or the probability of constituting incriminating material for more than one assessment year. However, even if such a situation were assumed to arise, it would be incumbent upon the AO to duly record reasons in support of such a conclusion. The Satisfaction Notes would thus have to evidence a formation of opinion that the material is likely to be incriminating for more than a singular assessment year and thus warranting the drawl of Section 153C proceedings for years in addition to those to which the material may be directly relatable.

G. CONCLUSIONS

63.

On an overall consideration of the structure of Sections 153A and 153C, we thus find that a reopening or abatement would be triggered only upon the discovery of material which is likely to "have a bearing on the determination of the total income" and would have to be examined bearing in mind the AYs' which are likely to be impacted. It would thus be incorrect to either interpret or construe Section 153C as envisaging incriminating material pertaining to a particular AY having a cascading effect and which would warrant a mechanical and inevitable assessment or reassessment for the entire block of the "relevant assessment year".

64.

In our considered view, abatement of the six AYs' or the "relevant assessment year" under Section 153C would follow the formation of opinion and satisfaction being reached that the material received is likely to impact the computation of income for a particular AY or AYs' that may form part of the block of ten AYs'. Abatement would be triggered by the formation of that opinion rather than the other way around. This, in light of the discernibly distinguishable statutory regime underlying Sections 153A and 153C as explained above. While in the case of the former, a notice would inevitably be issued the moment a search is undertaken or documents requisitioned, whereas in the case of the latter, the proceedings would be liable to be commenced only upon the AO having formed the opinion that the material gathered is likely to inculpate the assessee. While in the case of a Section 153A assessment, the issue of whether additions are liable to be made based upon the material recovered is an aspect which would merit consideration in the course of the assessment proceedings, under Section 153C, the AO would have to be prima facie satisfied that the documents, data or asset recovered is likely to "have a bearing on the determination of the total income". It is only once an opinion in that regard is formed that the AO would be legally justified in issuing a notice under that provision and which in turn would culminate in the abatement of pending assessments or reassessments as the case may be.

65.

We would thus recognize the flow of events contemplated under Section 153C being firstly the receipt of books, accounts, documents or assets by the jurisdictional AO, an evaluation and examination of their contents and an assessment of the potential impact that they may have on the total income for the six AYs' immediately preceding the AY pertaining to the year of search and the "relevant assessment year". It is only once the AO of the non-searched entity is satisfied that the material coming into its possession is likely to "have a bearing on the determination of the total income" that a notice under Section 153C would be issued. Abatement would thus be a necessary corollary of that notice. However, both the issuance of notice as well as abatement would have to necessarily be preceded by the satisfaction spoken of above being reached by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched entity.

66.

Therefore, and in our opinion, abatement of the six AYs' or the "relevant assessment year" would follow the formation of that opinion and satisfaction in that respect being reached.

H. OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

69.

When tested in light of the aforesaid principles, we find that except for a few exceptions which were noticed in the introductory parts of this judgment, the writ petitions forming part of this batch, impugn the invocation of Section 153C in respect of AYs' for which no incriminating material had been gathered or obtained. The Satisfaction Notes also fail to record any reasons as to how the material discovered and pertaining to a particular AY is likely to "have a bearing on the determination of the total income" for the year which is sought to be abated or reopened in terms of the impugned notices. The respondents have erroneously proceeded on the assumption that the moment any material is recovered in the course of a search or on the basis of a requisition made, they become empowered in law to assess or reassess all the six AYs' years immediately preceding the assessment correlatable to the search year or the "relevant assessment year" as defined in terms of Explanation 1 of Section 153A. The said approach is clearly unsustainable and contrary to the consistent line struck by the precedents noticed above.”

10.

Hence respectfully applying the construction that is favourable to the assessee by taking shield from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vegetable Products reported in 88 ITR 192 (SC), we would like to follow the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court supra in the case of Saksham Commodities Ltd reported in 464 ITR 1 (Del) and the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Sharma supra and hold that recording of consolidated satisfaction note for various assessment years by the Learned AO would become fatal to the very assumption of jurisdiction and consequential framing of assessment under section 153C of the Act for the assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17 in the instant case. Accordingly, the assessments framed under section 153C of the Act for the assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17 are hereby quashed.

11.

Since the entire assessments are quashed, the other grounds raised by the assessee need not be gone into and they are left open”.

8.

It is relevant to mention that the Judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Shaksham Commodities Ltd. (supra) has been rendered subsequent to the Judgment in the case of Indian National Congress (supra). Further, as against the Judgment of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Shaksham Commodities Ltd. (supra), the Revenue filed SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which has been dismissed along with other connected matters on 16/06/2025, reported in [2025] 175 taxmann.com 849 (S.C). Thus, by respectfully following the aforesaid judicial precedents, we hold that the consolidate satisfaction note recorded by the AO for various assessment years to assume the jurisdiction is invalid. Accordingly, the respective assessments framed u/s 153C of the Act for the years under consideration are hereby quashed.”