Wireless Colony Co-Operative Housing Society vs Government Of Maharashtra And Ors

Ministry of Environment and Forest, hereinafter referred to "MoEF" for short (MoEF) granted Environmental Clearance (EC) to 2nd Respondent M/s. Chaitrali Builders/SumanshipP.Ltd, for proposed construction of I.T. park and commercial project at Survey No.169/1, Sector I and II in (Part), Aundh, Pune comprising construction of 3 basements and 8 floors, Mall, with 3 basements plus 5 floors and Hotel (with 412 rooms) with 2 basements and 18 floors on the plot area measuring 29500sq.m, total built-up area of 91000sq.m. by virtue of its order dated 7.12.2007 to be valid for five years i.e. 7.12.2012.

Second Respondent failed to complete the construction of project within the validity period but applied for revalidation of the EC dated 7.12.2007 under the EIA Notification, 2006 to the State Level Impact Assessment Authority, (for short 'SEIAA')state of Maharashtra the 1st Respondent.

SEIAA-the 1st Respondent considered the proposal for revalidation, which on the basis that it was sought within validity period, and granted extension of EC for further period of five years by its order dated 11.6.2014.

The Appellant herein which is a Co-operative Housing Society, nomenclatureas 'Wireless Colony Co-operative Housing Society' questioned the said grant of extension of EC in its Appeal No.28/2013, in this Tribunal. This Tribunal accepted grounds in the Appeal vide order dated 7.8.2015 and the order dated 11.6.2014 passed by 1st Respondent was kept in abeyance, directing to 1stRespondent to reconsider the Application, and pass speaking orders.

By order dated 7.8.2015. By virtue of this direction in the order dated 7.12.2015, the proposal of 2nd Respondent was reconsidered by 1st Respondent after securing a Report from Executive Engineer, Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC). It resulted in passing of second order on 24.9.2015, (impugned in the Appeal) granting extension of EC for further period of five years.

The Appellants have assailed said order dated 24. 9.2015, on several grounds.

The core contention of the Appellants is that 1st Respondent was directed by this Tribunal vide order dated 7.8.2015 in Appeal No.28/2014 to re-examine the proposal for extension/expansion of EC sought by 2nd Respondent within a period of ten weeks after meticulously examining feasibility of the project, its impact on the environment and in this behalf to conduct spot inspection obtain report from SEIAA. Those conditions, according to the Appellants have been floated by 1st Respondent in grant of extension of EC by the impugned order dated 24.9.2015.

This Appeal has been preferred in this Tribunal on 21. 12.2015 assailing order by 1st Respondent on 24.9.2015 beyond the period of thirty days but within ninety days. It is accompanied by the Application M.A.No.262/2015 seeking condonation of day.

On admission of this Appeal, Responding to the Notice, Respondents, 2ndRespondent has entered in serious contest, resisting grounds in the Appeal and more importantly questioning its maintainability on the ground of limitation. Initially, on 5.2.2015, this Court has considered request for grant of interim relief to the Appellants and after hearing learned Counsel for 2nd Respondent passed an order restraining further construction while permitting 2nd Respondent to carry out interior decorations and other civil works as suggested by them.

Be that as it may, 2nd Respondent questioned interim order in the Writ Petition. In those proceedings the Hon'ble High Court permitted 2nd Respondent to move this Tribunal to re-consider regarding interim order or to seek its modification.

In the Circumstances, we have taken up this Appeal to hear regarding its maintainability on question of limitation, keeping open other issues on which 2nd Respondent has questioned the Appeal action. For the purpose of decision on this preliminary point, we will be taking into consideration only grounds urged seeking condonation and the grounds against such relief. Other contentions of the Appellants and 2nd Respondent are kept open to be re-considered, subsequently, dependent on the result of M.A.No.262/2015.

Before we advert to all such material propositions urged on behalf of the Appellants and 2nd Respondent, a proof reference to factual matrix is necessary etc.

The MoEF granted EC to the Project Proponent i.e. 2nd Respondent vide its order dated 7.12.2007. The project conceived by the 2nd Respondent was to construct I.T park with 3 basements and 8 floors, Mall, with 3 basements plus 5 floors and hotel, 412 rooms and 2 basements and 18 floors at area measuring 29500sq.m and built-up area 91000sq.m. The contention of Appellant is that the project with its construction activity and other work will severely impact environment and resulted in air, water and noise pollution in the vicinity and other areas to larger distance from the project, exposing the Appellants in particular, and local population in general to adverse adversely situations.

At this juncture, we notice the Appellants had also filed Application No.48/2014 under Section 14 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, against the grant of ECbyMoEF to 2nd Respondent on 7.12.2007. This Tribunal accepted the Appeal and by its order dated 27.1.2015, directed 2nd Respondent and others to comply with conditions of the EC and further directed that the Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 shall pay costs of Rs.5 lakhs (Rs.five lakhs) for causing excessive noise pollution by its activities, which shall be deposited with Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), and shall be spent on environmental protection activities like plantation, awareness etc. in consultation with Applicant society. The said order dated 27.1.2015 is at Annexure A-7 of this Appeal. It is also on record that during pendency of Application No.48/2014, 3rd Respondent herein namely, Maharashtra Pollution Control Board for short, (MPCB) had called upon 2ndRespondent under Section 33 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, and under Section 31A of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, to comply with its directions to prevent pollution, but 2nd Respondent had failed to respond to the Notice, consequently, 3rdRespondent- MPCB considering nature of the project, its activity and the impact on environment, in its Meeting held on 27.6.2014, refused to consent to operate under Section 27 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. The said order of 3rd Respondent- MPCB is at annexure 8.

The 2ndRespondent had challenged that order at annexure 8, rejecting consent. The Appeal preferred by 2nd Respondent was rejected by the Appellate Authority by its order dated 1.11.2014. Elaborately discussing non-compliance of relevant provisions and directions by 2nd Respondent. However, it has granted three (3) months' time to meet the Noise Pollution Control Standards as stipulated under the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986. The order of Appellate Authority has not been further questioned by 2nd Respondent and has thus reached its finality.

On this ground, it is urged by the Appellants that there is no consent under provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 for the project of the 2nd Respondent. Consequently, there is violation of conditions of the EC originally granted on 7. 12.2007 and extended (subsequently).

At this juncture, it will suffice to record that the Appellantshave narrated these facts and elaborated the grounds to assail impugned order passed by 1st Respondent on 24.9.2015 to demonstrate it has very good case on merit to be considered on merit, lest, greater hardship will result if they are non-suited on at the initial stage on technical ground of limitation. They, thus, seek condonation of delay in filing of this Appeal, which is beyond thirty (30) days, but within ninety (90) days as adumbratedin Section 16(1) and proviso to Section 16 of the NGT Act, 2010.

To support their plea that the Appellants have bonafidepreferred this Appeal and there is no lapses on their part or deliberate negligence in preferring this Appeal, they have pleaded sufficient cause for delay.

In this regard, the averments in M.A.No.262/2015 gain relevance. According to the Appellants, Appellants learnt of EC by the MoEF when 2nd Respondent commenced implementation of its project by construction activity creating noise pollution, air and water pollution. They learnt they were granted EC on 7.12.2007, which was valid only upto 7.1.2.2012. Thus, they preferred Application before this Tribunal in M.A.No.51/2016, which was disposed of by this Tribunal on 30.3.2016. Subsequently, they learnt extension of EC was grant to them by 1st Respondent vide order dated 11.6.2014. Thus they questioned the said order before this Tribunal through their Application under Section 16 of the Act in Application No.48/2014. The Application was allowed by order dated 27.1.2015, keeping grant of extension of EC dated 11.6.2014 in abeyance and directing 1st Respondent to re-consider after taking into consideration all the aspects relating environment pollution. Filing of Application No.48/2014, was to question grant of extension of EC, invoking jurisdiction of this Tribunal under Section 16 of the NGT Act. Thus, they contend they were waiting for 1st Respondent to pass an order within period of ten (10) weeks as stipulated in the order of this Tribunal dated 7.8.2015. Since they had no knowledge of any proceedings before the 1st Respondent, or any order passed by it in pursuance to order of this Tribunal, they applied under the provisions of Right to Information Act, 2005 on 23.11.2015, seeking information from the 1st Respondent. According to them, a specific request was made to intimate them as to whether on reconsideration renewal/extension of EC, is granted to 2nd Respondent if so to furnish the copy.

Their grievance is the 1st Respondent did not respond to the Application dated 23.11.2015, consequent to which they requested their Advocate to verify. Their Advocate on verification informed them that the 1st Respondent had granted extension of EC to 2nd Respondent vide impugned order dated 24.9.2015. On further verification, they found it was uploaded on the website of the 1st Respondent. They, thus, downloaded impugned EC from the website on 11.12.2015.

Referring to chronology of these dates, it is contended they could not prefer Appeal within period of thirty (30) days from 24.9.2015 for want of knowledge and thereafter took steps diligently to obtain further information the website only on 11.12.2015. The period from 24.9.2015 till 11.12.2015 on which date this Appeal is filed is thus explained by them. However, admittedly the Appeal is belated by forty-eight (48) days, but is within ninety (90) days from date of passing of the impugned order.

In negation such plea, the facts and circumstances used by the Appellants, the 2nd Respondent has filed affidavit in which it is averred that statements in the Application are inconsistent and lack bonafide. It is alleged that the Appellants have resorted to Appeal action to harass the 2nd Respondent to achieve unlawful object. That, averments made are after thought and not bonafide. They have no valid grounds to urge against the impugned order and they virtually have no sufficient cause for delay caused in preferring the Appeal.

In this regard, 2nd Respondent's contention is that 2nd Respondent received belated extension of EC on 11. 6.2015, which was kept in abeyance by order in Application No.48/2014 dated 27.1.2015. Since Appeal-action was by the Appellants themselves, the Appellants were a conscience of the fact that the 1st Respondent would take up to their Application to reconsider the issue within stipulated period of ten (10) weeks. It was therefore, upto the appellants to pursue the proceedings before 1st Respondent, which they have failed to do.

Coming to the facts of this case, they contend that impugned order passed by 1st Respondent granting validity of extension of EC on 24.9.2015, was available online on Internet and it was in public domain. Since order impugned was in public domain on 24.9.2015 itself, it was directly accessible to public, which includes Appellants. Non-downloading of said order was at the peril of the Appellants and their inaction, speaks of lapses, lack of bonafide. They contend the Appellants have shown no reason why they did not download EC approach this Tribunal in time.

With regard to legal proposition, they contend the Appeal had to be filed within thirty (30) days from the impugned order on 24.9.2015. Non-filing of Appeal within that period had to be explained by the Appellants. The Appellants have failed to aver and prove they were prevented by sufficient cause in filing of the Application within thirty days. Filing of Application under request to Information Act, 2005 before the 1st Respondent was only a ruse to create ground for seeking condonation that the Application itself was filed beyond period of thirty (30) days. (Application No.262/2015) even otherwise, the Appellants cannot plead ignorance as the order impugned was in public domain and the Members of the Appellants are living in the same vicinity of the project, they thus aware of its activity.

We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellants and the 2nd Respondent in supplementary of their pleadings. Learned Counsel Sh.T.N.Subramanian for the 2nd Respondent was very assertive on the point that the Appellants had to explain, plead and prove sufficient cause with period of thirty (30) days within which Appeal had to be filed and any explanation showing sufficient cause subsequent to period of thirty (30) days prescribed for preferring of Appeal is of no avail. He gained external support to his contention relying upon the Judgment of Apex Court in case of Ajit Singh Thakkar Singh vs State of Gujarat, in which he contends law is laid that sufficient cause should be shown for not preferring an Appeal within period prescribed for preferring an Appeal and any amount of explanation or showing sufficient cause beyond that period is of no avail. Relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court is extracted below:

At the outset, it is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal, and the appeal been dismissed as barred by limitation. We have examined the fact carefully. It appears that initially the State Government took a decision not to file an appeal and it allowed the period of limitation to lapse. Subsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering a revision petition by Bhulabhai that it was a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the State Government in the matter, the appeal was filed. It was filed three months after limitation had expired. A faint attempt was made to show that when the initial decision was taken not to file an appeal all the papers had not been considered by the department concerned, but we are not impressed by that allegation. The truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court has observed - and that was long after limitation had expired - that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party to entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows imitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstances arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay.

We have bestowed our concern to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and there can be no two opinion on the legal preposition laid therein. However, while applying the decision of the Constitutional Courts as binding precedent, it is well settled that we must understand the context in which such proposition laid analyzing the facts, the circumstances.Text of the Judgment reveals that the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a case relating belated Appeal preferred by the State against acquittal of accused in criminal prosecution. Hon'ble Apex Court noticed that the State Govt., in the first instance, had taken decision not to file Appeal against the Judgment of acquittal and allowed period of limitation to lapse. Subsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering Revision petition by a person called Bhulabhai that it was fit case where the State Govt. should file an Appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the State Govt. the State Govt. filed Appeal which was belated by three months after period of Appeal had expired. It is recorded that faint attempt was made to show that initially decision was taken not to file an Appeal without considering relevant papers by the department concerned. On such vague statement the State had sought condonation of delay. Obviously, Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that truth appears to be that the Appeal was not filed at the first instance because the State Govt. saw no case on merit and it was only because the High Court had questioned it. In this fact scenario and also taking into consideration all the facts that on merit there was no sufficient evidence on record to substantiate guilt of the accused and evidence on record was of legal proof to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and as most of the witnesses had turned hostile leaving nothing on record to be accepted as local evidence, the Hon'ble Apex Court took serious view that the Appeal of the State Govt. was not only belatedly filed but had no merit to succeed against the order questioned therein.

Besides the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in para-8 of the Judgment brings home the point that the plenitude of appellate powers of the High Court in criminal cases is imposed with restrictions to exercise that power against order of acquittal. It is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in para-9 of the Judgment that approach to be adopted by the High Court when exercising appellate powers in such case ( case against acquittal) should be as defined in long line of cases, particularly, case of Warren Ducane Smith Vs King, AIR 1974 PC 227. By this Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated that the High Court would be slow in entertaining the appeal against acquittal when it finds credibility of the witnesses was low and presumption of innocence in favour of accused was not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted.

Mr. Subramanian then placed reliance on Judgments of the National Green Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi. According to him Judgment of the Principal Bench in M.A. No.104/2012 arising out of Appeal No.39 of 2012 non-suits the Appellants. He would submit that second Respondent had established that 1st Respondent herein had uploaded the grant of extension of EC on its website soon after passing of the impugned order on 24.09.2015 with the relevant date to trigger commencing the period of limitation. He submits that firstly the impugned order is only granting extension by revalidating the original EC granted on 07.12.2007 with no new condition. Secondly, the extension of EC was after due consideration of the report of the Committee, spot inspection and other contained circumstances. The Appellants herein were fully aware of the proceedings before the 1st Respondent in pursuance to the order passed by this Tribunal in their own Appeal No.28 of 2015. Thus, the Appellants had full knowledge. Filing of RTI application by them on 23.11.2015 is an attempt to mislead this Tribunal to show that they had no knowledge but on the contrary it negates the case. Necessarily, we have take into consideration the decision of the Principal Bench relied upon by learned Counsel Mr. Subramanian. This issue has been considered by the Hon'ble Principal Bench of NGT at New Delhi in M.A.No.104/2012 arising out of Appeal No.39 of 2012. The observations of Principal Bench of NGT in para 17 and 19 are also relevant, which is extracted below:

The expression 'is communicated to him', thus, would invite strict construction. It is expected that the order which a person intends to challenge is communicated to him, if not in personam than in rem by placing it in the public domain.

'Communication' would, thus, contemplate complete knowledge of the ingredients and grounds required under law for enabling that person to challenge the order. 'Intimation' must not be understood to be communication. 'Communication' is an expression of definite connotation and meaning and it requires the authority passing the order to put the same in the public domain by using proper means of communication. Such Communication will be complete when the order is received by him in one form or the other to enable him to appropriately challenge the correctness of the order passed.

The limitation as prescribed under Section 16 of the NGT Act, shall commence from the date the order is communicated. As already noticed, communication of the order has to be by putting it in the public domain for the benefit of the public at large. The day of the MoEF shall put the complete order of Environmental Clearance on its website and when the same can be downloaded without any hindrance or impediments and also put the order on its public notice board, the limitation be reckoned from that date. The limitation may also trigger from the date when the Project Proponent uploads the Environmental Clearance order with its environmental conditions and safeguards upon its website as well as publishes the same in the newspapers as prescribed under Regulation 10 of the Environmental Clearance Regulations, 2006. It is made clear that such obligation of uploading the order on the website by the Project Proponent shall be complete only when it can simultaneously be downloaded without delay and impediments. The limitation could also commence when the Environmental Clearance order is displayed by the local bodies, Panchayats and Municipal Bodies along with the concerned departments of the State Government displaying the same in the manner afore-indicated. Out of the three points, from which the limitation could commence and be computed, the earliest in point of time shall be the relevant date and it will have to be determined with reference to the facts of each case. The applicant must be able to download or know from the public notice the factum of the order as well as its content in regard to environmental conditions and safeguards imposed in the order of Environmental Clearance. Mere knowledge or deemed knowledge or order cannot form the basis for reckoning the period of limitation.

We have extracted above paragraphs Nos.17 and 19 of the Judgment for the reason that the Principal Bench has clearly spelt out the prescription of Regulation 10 of the Environmental Clearance Regulations, 2006 shall be complied by MoEF and the Project Proponent. It is well stated in the Judgment that it is not merely act of uploading by MoEF but the obligation of Project Proponent to upload the EC on the website and to publish in local newspaper as mandatory. The Appellant must be able to download and know from the factum of the order as well as its contents in regard to environmental conditions and safeguard.

Very relevant and important proposition is in paragraph No.19. There is clear assertion by the Principal Bench that mere knowledge or deemed knowledge of the order cannot form the basis for reckoning the period of limitation. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Subramanian that trigger point for limitation in this case should be treated as 24.09.2015, the date on which EC was uploaded. The Principal Bench of NGT in its Judgment referred to above has also dealt with interpretation of the word "Communication" appearing in Section 16 of the Act as seen from the observations in Paragraph Nos.14, 15 and 16 of the Judgment.

It is for this reason to understand when the communication is complete, we must refer to paragraph No.17 of the Judgment extracted above.

Conjoint reading of paragraph Nos.17 and 19 (extracted above) leaves no scope for doubt that there must be sufficient proof of knowledge of the impugned order to the Appellants before we accept objections to their application.

It is well settled to our mind when a party pleads certain facts to state that he had no knowledge of the impugned order consequent to which they could not file the appeal in time and urge it as sufficient cause then want of knowledge becomes the core contention. The cause shown for delay will then to be considered on this basis.

When a party pleads it has sufficient cause for delay "knowledge" will be an important attribute to constitute sufficient cause.

In the instant case, it is not in dispute that even though 1 st Respondent had published the impugned EC with conditions on 24.09.2015, the Project Proponent 2nd Respondent did not publish it in its website nor in local newspaper. Therefore, we cannot impute knowledge of the impugned order.

We have already referred to the fact that mere knowledge or deemed knowledge cannot form the basis of reckoning the period of limitation unless the statutory Authorities like 1st Respondent - SEIAA, MoEF publishes by uploading the impugned order easily accessible in public domain and then to be notified it in local bodies like Village Panchayat etc. and also the Project Proponent uploads it into its website and publishes in the local newspaper. The words used are "also". This is very significant.

In the instant case, it is admitted and not disputed that 2nd Respondent -PP has not published the order of EC dated 24.9.2015 on its website and has not published it in the local newspapers, nor the order has been published by the MoEF in notice Boards of local bodies and Panchayats.

As per observations of Hon'ble Principal Bench of NGT referred to above period of limitation can be triggered by any of these event whichever is earlier. In the instant case, the 1st Respondent claims it has uploaded the order of EC dated 24.9.2015 when it was passed. Accepting that proposition also we must examine whether it was in public domain. What is 'communication' as required under Section 16 of the NGT Act, has also been dealt with by the Hon'ble Principal Bench of NGT in the order referred to above. The communication must be complete. Mere dispatching and downloading is not sufficient. It should be capable of downloading without hindrance and fills purpose of the person to whom or person to whom such information is required to be communicated must have knowledge of communication. Therefore, knowledge that such order is published is starting point to determine whether the person against whom communication could have downloaded. In the instant case, the Appellants contention is they were not aware of such publication though MoEF claims it was uploaded. They have applied under R.T.I on 23.11.2015, but they were not informed about it. So only on 11.12.2015 they learnt of it and downloaded it on 21.12.2015. Be that may as it, the appreciation of facts it has to be done in the prudent manner and should not be hyper technical of the case. Law governing exercise of discretion to condone delay in time barred Appeals is well settled. Following dictums aptly apply to the case at hand. Clear proposition has been enunciated in N. Balakrishna v. M. Krishnamurthy2008 (228) ELT 162 (SC),is relevant. Same is extracted below:

It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, accepting of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court.

The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice... Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly.

A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.

It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, and then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.

Secondly, decision of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katijiand Others1987 (2) SCC 12 is also relevant, wherein following principles are laid down, which is extracted below:

"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

"Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every 10 hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common-sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account for mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

We have bestowed our serious concern to the decision cited at Bar and apply it to the legal issues and facts and circumstances of this case. What manifests from various laws is that law of limitation is a deterrent to erring litigant but it is not intended to destroy valuable rights of an honest litigant. It is well settled by catena of decisions that litigant will not at his or her peril delay approaching the court for remedy. There is always a general presumption that ordinarily litigant does not stand to benefit by urging the appeal late. No doubt he has to plead and prove that circumstances cited as a cause were beyond his control. He or she could not prefer appeal within the prescribed period. Appreciation of facts pleaded by the applicant to seek condonation of delay cannot be weighed in a trademan's scale like a precision scale of goldsmith. The Court always lean towards accepting the cause shown as sufficient cause. The doctrine of strict proof beyond reasonable doubt will sometimes destroy a meritorious appeal action.

However, the conduct of the parties is very important and the nature of lis is very relevant.

If legal action is in personam then right is spitted against only another, whereas in a case of public interest litigations like action under provisions of various enactments relating to protection of environment, it is a legal action in rem for the benefit of the society. Therefore, Courts will lean in favour of condoning the delay, lest, it will impact right of several.

However, we have also examined whether there is prima facie ground in the Appeal on merit. We have examined this aspect also and are satisfied that grounds urged in the Appeal raise question not only against the extension of EC by impugned order but highlights contravention and breach of conditions of the EC granted to 2nd Respondent.

As regards, conduct of the Appellant is concerned, it is well established that they were in constant legal pursuit against the project of 2nd Respondent highlighting that severe environmental damage will be caused affecting Appellants in particular and local population in general.

For the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that Appellants have substantiated they had no knowledge of the impugned order till 11th December, 2015 which constitutes sufficient cause for the Appeal. We are also satisfied that no prejudice will be caused to 2nd Respondent if the Appeal is heard on merits whereas if delay is not condoned, the Appellant would be deprived of valuable right. Hence, we accept grounds in M.A. No.262/2015 as constituting sufficient cause and condone the delay in filing the Appeal.

M.A. No.262/2015 stands allowed and disposed of by this Order.

Appeal No.96/2015 will be heard on merits.

By order dated 30th March, 2016 we had recalled the interim order dated 5th February, 2016 and reserved right to the Appellants to urge it subject result of M.A. No.262/2015. Hence, list this case for hearing of interim relief.