Wairokpam Sagorchandra Singh and Others vs State of Manipur and Others

H.K. Sema, J.—These two Civil Rule raises common question of facts and law and as such they are being disposed by this common judgment.

In both the Civil Rules the notification dated 5th August, 1997 has been assailed. It reads:

No. 38/4/97-R: The Governor of Manipur is pleased to notify u/s 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that the lands described in the schedule appended herewith as Annexure-''A'' are likely to be needed for development of National Games Village at Meitei Langol.

Further, the Governor of Manipur being of the opinion that the said land are urgently needed for the said public purpose is pleased to direct u/s 17 of the Act that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act will not apply.

By orders and in the names of Governor, Sd/�(P Bharat Singh) Secy.(Revenue), Govt. of Manipur.

Civil Rule No. 950 of l997 has been filed by 11 Petitioners. Civil Rule No. 1011 of 1997 has been filed by one petitioner. They are stated to be the land owners at Meitei Langol area covered by the aforesaid notification.

I have heard Mr. H.N.K. Singh leaned counsel for the Petitioners in Civil Rule No. 950 of 1997. Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh learned Counsel for the Petitioner in C.R. No. 1011 of 1997, and Mr. Ashok Potsangbam, leaned Advocate General, Manipur on behalf of the Respondents Government assisted by Mr. L Shyamkishore Singh, learned Sr. Govt. Advocate in all the Civil Rules.

Undisputed facts leading to the filing of the present writ petitions may be recited briefly. The State of Manipur is hosting Fifth National games to be held some time in the month of May/June, 1998. The following facilities are required to be provided before the commencement of the National Games:

(i) Synthetic 8-lane 400 metre Track;

(ii) Synthetic Hockey Field:

(iii) Indoor Stadium with a plying area of 50m X 30m;

(iv) Swimming Pool 50m;

(v) Play field covered halls/cycling veledrom etc.;

(vi) Residential accommodation for participants and officials;

(vii) Financial support.

It is stated that all the other facilities as mentioned in Clause (i) to (v) have been completed. However, with regard to the residential accommodation for participants and officials are yet to be completed. It is also stated that the State is expecting about six thousand participants and officials to be accommodated in the residential houses. For the purpose of construction of the residential accommodation for the participants and officials the land under notification has been acquired for public purposes. The said notification as quoted above has been assailed the land owners in various writ petitions, except petitioner in C.R.No. 1011/97, which have been dismissed on merit, yet they again assail the same notification in this writ petition.

Before I proceed further to deal with the writ petitions on merit, I may, at this stage, constrain to observe that the same Subject matter has been dealt with by this Court in earlier Civil Rules filed some of the writ petitioners herein, which have been dismissed both by the Division Bench and the Single Bench of this Court, and therefore, strictly speaking no cause survives for fresh adjudication because of the following reasons;

(a) The present Petitioner Nos-4, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 filed Civil Rules No. 295/97 challenging the notification as quoted above. It was dismissed on 17.4.97 on withdrawal with liberty to file to a fresh application.

(b) They filed another writ petition registered as Civil Rule No. 420/97 and this Court dismissed the writ petition on merit on 7.5.97. In the said writ petition the present writ Petitioner No. 4 sworn the affidavit on behalf of the petitioners.

(c) Civil Rule (PIL) No. 139/97 has been filed challenging notification on behalf of all the land owners. The Division Bench of this Court after hearing the parties at length dismissed the writ petition(PIL) by its judgment and order dated 21.3.97.

In view of the aforesaid, writ petitions in seriatim dismissed by this Court challenging the same cause of action again in these two writ petitions, no cause survives in the present writ petitions and accordingly they are not maintainable in the present form and on this score only these two writ petitions could have been dismissed in limine at the threshold. At best, it can be termed as cantankerous litigants with a design to stall the process of the matter of public importance. Undoubtedly, the hosting of 5th National Games by the State is a matter of utmost public importance.

As would appear from the notification dated 5th Aug. 1997 the land was urgently required for public purposes and Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the Act) was attracted.

By now the law on the point is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and in this connection the learned Advocate General places a reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court:

(a) In Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, herein the Apex Court held at para 2520 of the judgment as under:

When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to making of the award u/s 11 and the thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 11(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions u/s 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner,

(b) In State of Haryana Through G.P. Duggal and others Vs. Sukhdev and others, it was held by the Apex Court st page 1256 that once a declaration u/s 6 of the Act was published, acquisition in respect of that land has become final and therefore it must be deemed that it is valid acquisition and interference of the High Court in respect of this land is illegal.

Despite the aforesaid settled position of law in the present writ petitions following contention have been raised by Mr. H.N.K. Singh, Id. counsel for the Petitioners in Civil Rule No. 950 of l997:

(a) that the land has been acquired by the Planning and Development Authority (PDA) and therefore procedures prescribed under Sections 29, 48, 49, 50 and 51 of the Manipur Town and Country Planning Act, 1975 (hereinafter the Act) has not been followed and therefore the notification dated 5th August, 1997 is null and void.

In support of his contention the learned Counsel referred to the letter dated 28.6.97 (Annexure-A/2) written by the Secretary, Planning and Development Authority, Manipur addressed to the Collector L.A. Imphal District (West). According to the learned Counsel since the letter proposes to acquire the land has been written by the P.D.A., the land has been acquired for the purpose of P.D.A scheme. This submission is based on misreading of the letter dated 28.6.97. This submission is bellied the striking words stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the letter as under:

No. 4/118/97-PDA

Imphal, the 28th June,''97.

To,

The Collector, Land Acquisition Imphal District (West) Imphal.

Subject:- Acquisition of Land for Development of National Games Village.

Sir,

I am to state that the V National Games is to be held in Imphal, Manipur some were in 1998.

The number of sports-person including sports official and others expected during the National Games is about 6000. The State is to arrange necessary accommodation for above by constructing National Games Village.

The Planning and Development Authority is taking up the construction of National Games Village at Meitei Lanqoi as per the direction of State Govrnment.

The development work of National Games Village is to be taken immediately so that we may be able to provide necessary accommodation before March, 1998.

In view of the above, I am to request you to kindly arrange to acquire the land given in Schedule enclosed as Annexure-A under the urgency clause of the Land Acquisition Act. Necessary fund required for payment of Compensation for proposed land to be acquired is available with PDA and we are ready to deposit the compensation amount as and when asked to do so .(emphasis supplied)

The National Games Village is a massive project and time bound work. Your personal attention is the matter if highly solicited

The matter may be treated as ''TOP PRIORITY.''

Enclosed: As above.

List of Pattadars

A Trace Map.

Yours faithfully, Sd/-(Dr. Rajeshkumar) Secy. Planning and Devl. Authority, Manipur.

A reading of contents of letter particularly paragraphs 1 and 2 in juxtaposition would clearly appear that the land is needed by the State for public purposes. And a reading of the contents of the entire letter would clearly show that the land would be acquired by the State for the public purposes and the construction has to be made though the nodal agency, like P.D.A. This apart, the impugned notification dt. 5.8.97 has been issued by the Secretary (Revenue) Govt, of Manipur, and therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be held that the land has been acquired by the P.D.A.

The contentions of Mr. H.N.K. Singh that the procedures prescribed u/s 29 (i) and (iii) and Sects - 48, 49, 50 and 51 have not been followed and therefore the impugned notification dt. 5.8.97 is illegal, has no substance. Even if assuming the 1975 Act is applicable in the instant case, the general power of the State Government for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 was not ousted. This has been clearly stated in Section 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1975. In this connection learned Advocate General has placed reliance of the judgment of the Apex Court in Chanda and Ors. Appellants v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., Respondents ( AIR 196 SC 1296 ) wherein the Apex Court, while dealing with the similar question, held in paragraph 16 of its judgment as under:

The effect of this is that even if there is no scheme prepared or finalised, under a Housing Board or Urban Improvement Act, acquisition could be validly are under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for a public purpose or under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act for the purpose of improvement or for any other purpose under the Act. The decision relating to the Rajasthan Act is directly on the point. The other decision under the Tamil Nadu Act does not, therefore, require any further discussion.

Therefore, even if assuming the Act did apply which I held not, the general power vested in the State Govt., to acquire land under the L.A. Act for public purpose was not ousted.

Next it is contended by Mr. H.N.K. Singh that the Petitioners are poor people and if their lands are taken away they will be land-less. This has been denied by the Respondents in their counter that many of them are either retired Govt., servants or holding important posts in the Govt. Departments or Contractor and influential persons. Even otherwise, this is a case where individual interest is pitted against public interest. When the public interest is writ large, individual interest has no place. The only way open to the Petitioners is to claim compensation and the same is paid. Submission has also been made by Mr. H.N.K.. Singh that if the lands are acquired they may not get adequate compensation. This argument can be taken care of by resorting to filing a reference to the L.A. Judge under the Land Acquisition Act.

Lastly it is contended by Mr. H.N.K. Singh that the Petitioners could Hot have been deprived of property save by authority of law as visualised under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Land Acquisition Act is one of such authorities prescribed by law.

I may mention herein that Mr. L. Nandakumar Singh, Id. counsel for the petitioner in Civil Rule No. 1011 of 1997 adopted the argument of Mr. H.N.K. Singh. Petitioner in Civil Rule No. 1011 of 1997 was not a party to the proceeding the same earlier Civil Rules, but he has challenged the same notification dt. 5.8.97 and the land of the Petitioners is covered by the area "Meitei Langol" and therefore the findings recorded in other Civil Rule also applicable m the case of Petitioner in Civil Rule No. 1011 of 1997.

For the reasons aforesaid there is no merit in these writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed as meritless. Interim, order passed on 29.9.97 stands vacated. No costs.