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Judgment
(RAJESH SEKHRI-J)
The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/accused against order dated 23.05.2026 passed by learned Special Judge, NIA Cases, Jammu, [for short, “the trial Court”] whereby his application for interim bail for attending the marriage ceremony of his sister came to be rejected.
Appellant is an undertrial prisoner in connection with RC No. 06/2024/NIA/JMU, arising out of allegations for commission of offences punishable under Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, [for short, “the UA(P) Act”], Sections 7/25 of the Arms Act, 1959 and 2 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Appellant is facing prosecution for the allegations involving serious offences having a bearing on national security and public order.
Appellant approached the trial Court for interim bail for seven days on the ground that marriage ceremony of his real sister was scheduled for 14th and 15th August, 2026 for which his presence was socially, morally and religiously significant. He undertook to abide by any condition that may be imposed by the Court.
The interim bail plea of the appellant was opposed by the respondent/NIA on the ground that he is facing trial for offences of serious nature affecting national security and public order. It was submitted that provisions of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act impose stringent restrictions regarding grant of bail in such matters. NIA also placed reliance upon various communications received from the jail authorities regarding alleged acts of indiscipline and misconduct committed by the appellant while in judicial custody.
Learned trial Court, after hearing the parties and considering the material placed on record, rejected the bail plea primarily on the ground that conduct of the appellant during custody was not satisfactory and that seriousness of the charge, concerns of security and public order outweighed the personal circumstance projected by the appellant.
Having heard the rival sides, we have gone through the record.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has assailed the impugned order by submitting that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that the appellant was not seeking regular bail or release on merits but only temporary release for a few days to attend an important family function because marriage of appellant's real sister constitutes an exceptional circumstance and that his presence cannot be substituted merely because another family member may be available. Learned counsel has also submitted that the jail reports, relied upon by the prosecution, are only administrative communications and cannot be treated as conclusive proof of misconduct. It has been urged that any apprehension of misuse of liberty could have been addressed by imposing strict conditions.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/NIA has defended the order passed by learned trial Court and submitted that no interference is warranted. It has been contended that appellant is facing trial under stringent provisions of law and that Court is required to keep in mind the object and purpose of the provisions contained in the UA(P) Act. It has further been submitted that the material placed on record regarding the conduct of the appellant inside the jail demonstrates that his temporary release may create security concerns and that learned trial Court has rightly exercised discretion in rejecting the prayer.
The nature of the present proceedings requires examination of whether the discretion exercised by learned trial Court suffers from any illegality, arbitrariness or perversity warranting interference by this Court.
We are conscious of the fact that appellant has sought interim bail for attending the marriage ceremony of his sister and such an occasion has emotional and social significance. However, while considering a request for temporary release, Court is required to balance the personal circumstance against the nature of accusations, the statutory framework applicable to the case and overall circumstances reflected from the record.
It is not in dispute that appellant is facing trial for serious offences under UA(P) Act and other special statutes. The allegations involved are of serious nature and relate to matters having wider ramifications concerning public order and security. The legislature, while dealing with offences under UA(P)A, has incorporated stringent provisions regarding grant of bail keeping in view the nature and gravity of such offences.
The contention of the appellant that jail reports relied by the prosecution, being administrative communications only cannot be considered is not tenable because at the stage of deciding an application for interim bail, Court is not required to conduct a detailed enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of such reports. Court is required only to examine whether the material placed before it raises legitimate security concerns or not.
Various communications addressed by the jail authorities dated 08.09.2025, 27.02.2026 and 10.03.2026 refer to allegations against the appellant regarding acts of indiscipline, misconduct, disobedience of instructions, disturbance within the jail premises on the part of the appellant and his improper conduct towards the jail officials. These communications may not by themselves amount to proof of guilt, but they are certainly relevant circumstances which cannot be ignored while considering temporary release of an undertrial prisoner facing serious allegations.
The submission that no criminal case or disciplinary proceedings have been initiated on the basis of these reports cannot, by itself render the said material irrelevant. The responsibility of the prison authorities is to maintain discipline and security within the jail premises, and reports regarding the conduct of inmates form part of the circumstances which Court is entitled to consider while exercising discretion in bail matters.
We also find substance in the submission of the respondent/NIA that the concerns expressed are not limited mere to the possibility of the appellant absconding but relate to his overall conduct and the possibility of misuse of liberty. The apprehension of the prosecution, in the backdrop of the material placed on record, cannot be termed as wholly unfounded or imaginary. The Court is required to adopt a cautious approach while dealing with matters involving offences of such serious nature.
It is a settled principle that ordinarily appellate Court would not substitute its own view for the discretion exercised by the trial Court unless the order under challenge suffers from manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity. On careful consideration of the impugned order and the material available on record, this Court finds that learned trial Court has considered the relevant factors and has passed a reasoned order.
The impugned order reflects due consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction arbitrarily, ignored any relevant consideration, or taken into account any extraneous factor. The view taken by learned trial Court is a plausible view based upon the material available and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court in the present appellate proceedings. Hence, present appeal is dismissed and impugned order is upheld.
It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are confined only to the adjudication of the present appeal relating to interim bail and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.