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Judgment
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, prayer has been made by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.192 of 2022 dated 27.08.2022, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh under Section 306 of IPC as well as consequential proceedings i.e. Police complaint/challan No.4/2 of 2024, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus Vivek Sharma, pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh.
Quintessential facts, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties, are that FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, came to be lodged at the behest of complainant/respondent No. 2, Shri Mohammad Irfan Khan, who happens to be brother of deceased Maraya Khatun, alleging therein that, his younger sister, Maraya Khatun, aged 20 years, studying in B.A. 1st year, was in relationship with the petitioner Vivek Sharma, who used to reside on the 1st floor of their house. He alleged that petitioner Vivek Sharma maintained relation with his sister Maraya Khatun on the pretext of marriage, but after some time, he refused to solemnize marriage, as a result thereof, his sister named hereinabove was under great stress and tension. He alleged that on 26.8.2022, one telephonic call was received from mobile No. 82195-99870, thereby informing that girl named Maraya Khatun has come to their house. Complainant alleged that person who had called him disclosed his name as Amba Prasad Sharma. He alleged that he asked Amba Prasad that why his sister has come to Bilaspur. He also alleged that he himself disclosed to Amba Prasad that petitioner Vivek Sharma sexually assaulted his sister on the pretext of marriage, but now he is refusing to solemnize marriage. He alleged that he told Amba Prasad that he is coming to Bilaspur, but he said that he himself would come to Chandigarh in the morning. Complainant further alleged that his father gave telephonic call to Amba Prasad from his mobile phone at 10:30 P.M., who told his father that since they belong to different communities, marriage inter se his daughter and his son cannot be solemnized. Complainant alleged that at that time his sister Maraya Khatun also talked to them and she was sounding normal, but in the morning at 4:05 A.M., Amba Prasad gave telephonic call to his father that his daughter has committed suicide by hanging herself from fan. Complainant alleged that since Vivek Sharma sexually assaulted his sister on the pretext of marriage and now he is refusing to solemnize marriage, his sister has committed suicide and as such, appropriate action, in accordance with law, be taken against Vivek Sharma. In the aforesaid background, FIR, sought to be quashed, came to be instituted against the petitioner. Though after completion of investigation, police has already presented challan in the competent Court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end, petitioner approached this court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR on the ground that no case much less under Section 306 IPC is made out against him.
Precisely, the case of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in petition and further canvassed by Ms. Madhurika Sekhon, learned counsel for petitioner, is that bare perusal of suicide note recovered by the police clearly reveals that deceased Maraya Khatun proceeded to commit suicide after her having presumed that Vivek Sharma has solemnized marriage with some other person, whereas it is a matter of fact that till date Vivek Sharma has not solemnized marriage with anybody. Learned counsel representing the petitioner further argued that though petitioner and deceased Maraya Khatun were known to each other and they also wanted to solemnize marriage, but since on account of their being from different communities, families were not ready for the marriage, marriage inter se them could not be solemnized. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that mere refusal, if any, on the part of the petitioner to solemnize marriage would not be a ground for deceased to commit suicide. In support of her aforesaid contention, she placed reliance upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Yadwinder Singh alias Sunny vs. State of Punjab and another, Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 7309 of 2025, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that mere refusal to marry, even if true, by itself would not amount to instigation as defined under Section 107 of IPC. She also placed reliance upon judgment dated 31.03.2022 passed by this Court in Criminal Misc. Petition(Main) No. 728 of 2021, titled Ashish Kumar vs. State of HP and others.
To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, while justifying impugned action of lodging of FIR against the petitioner under Section 306 IPC, submitted that bare perusal of suicide note left behind by deceased prior to her having committed suicide, clearly reveals that she was under great stress and tension on account of refusal by petitioner to solemnize marriage. While making this Court peruse reply filed by respondent-State as well as final report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C, Mr. Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, contended that prior to alleged incident of suicide, petitioner herein not only sexually assaulted deceased repeatedly on the pretext of marriage, but he also extended threats. While referring to provisions contained under Section 306 of IPC, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that whoever abets the commission of such suicide shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to 10 years. He stated that since bare perusal of suicide note clearly suggests that deceased committed suicide after being badly harassed and tortured by the petitioner, no illegality can be said to have been committed by Investigative Agency, while registering case under Section 306 IPC against the petitioner. He further submitted that otherwise also, factum with regard to abetment, harassment and mental torture shall be proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and convincing evidence, but certainly such fact, if any, cannot be considered and decided in the instant proceedings.
Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, relying upon its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, reiterated that High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the proceedings against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, Court exercising such power must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. Besides above, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held that material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“22.The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30)
29.The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.
30.Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
30.1Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
30.3Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
30.4Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
30.5If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of BNSS) can proceed to quash the proceedings.
Mr. Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, contended that since Investigating Agency, after having completed investigation, has already filed challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C., in the competent Court of law, prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing FIR cannot be accepted at this stage. However, this Court is not inclined to accept the aforesaid submission made by learned Additional Advocate General for the reason that High Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of BNSS) can even proceed to quash charge, if it is satisfied that evidentiary material adduced on record does not prima facie connect the accused with crime, and if trial in such situation is allowed to continue, person arraigned as an accused would be unnecessarily put to ordeals of protracted trial on the basis of flippant and vague evidence.
Hon’ble Apex Court in case tilted Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210, has held that abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation and as such, the abuse of law or miscarriage of justice can be rectified by the court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC. The relevant paras of the judgment are as under:
Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 SCC 608, has elaborated the scope of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, the relevant para whereof reads as under:-
“7.Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case through investigation and evidence. These principles have been consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal5, this Court observed.
“23.This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:
i to give effect to an order under the Code;
ii to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
24.Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”
8.Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court’s extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court’s hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal6 conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted that quashing may be appropriate where, (2007) 12 SCC 1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
“102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). …….… (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCCOnLine SC3100 (“Dhruvaram Sonar”) :
“13.It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.”
Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavour to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case.
No doubt, perusal of suicide note (available at page No. 35 of the paper book) reveals that deceased Maraya Khatun and petitioner were in relationship and they had been meeting and talking to each other for quite long. It also emerges from the suicide note that deceased wanted to solemnize marriage with petitioner, who allegedly refused for the same. It also emerges from the final report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C., that prior to her having committed suicide, deceased herself went to the parental house of Vivek Sharma at Bilaspur, where she met his father and other members of the family. After her having reached Bilaspur, father of Vivek Sharma, namely Shri Amba Prasad, himself telephonically informed parents of deceased that their daughter had come to Bilaspur and next morning he would himself come to drop her. It also emerges from the record that father of Vivek Sharma telephonically informed father of the deceased that marriage inter se deceased Maraya Khatun and petitioner Vivek is not possible on account of difference in cultural belief.
It has come in the statement of the complainant that his sister also talked to his family members and at that time she was sounding normal. Careful perusal of suicide note reveals that deceased, during her stay in the room at first floor, found certain articles from where she got suspicious that petitioner Vivek Sharma has solemnized marriage with someone else. After being convinced that petitioner Vivek Sharma, with whom she wanted to solemnize marriage, has already solemnized marriage with some other person, she took drastic step of finishing her life by hanging herself. However, it is not in dispute that till date, petitioner Vivek Sharma has not solemnized marriage. As per post-mortem report, deceased, Maraya Khatun, died on account of hanging leading to asphyxia.
Question, which needs to be decided in the instant case, is that whether refusal, if any, by the petitioner to solemnize marriage with the deceased would be sufficient to constitute offence, if any, punishable under Section 306 of IPC or not. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 306 IPC, which reads as under:
“306.Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
Abetment is defined under Section 107 of IPC, which reads as under :-
“107.Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Explanation 2.—Whoever either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”
The dictionary meaning of the word ‘instigate’ is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2001 9 SCC 618 has defined the word ‘instigate’ as “instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act.”
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of S.S.Cheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Anr. (2010) 12 SCC 190 has dealt with scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its co-relation with Section 306 IPC. Relevant pars of the aforesaid judgment read as under:
“Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.”
In the case of M. Arjunan Vs. State, Represented by its Inspector of Police (2019) 3 SCC 315, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ude Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana, 2019 17 SCC 301, has held that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is quite apparent from the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court that act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide, rather there should be evidence suggestive of the fact that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. However, in the case at hand, as has been discussed hereinabove, there is no evidence at all available against the petitioner that he insulted the deceased by using abusive language, that too with an intention to instigate her to commit suicide and as such, no case, if any, under Section 306 IPC is otherwise made out against him. Contents of FIR and final report filed under Section 173, if taken to be correct on their face value, do not prima facie constitute the offence against the accused. Apart from above, neither FIR nor final Challan under Section 173 Cr.P.C. disclose offence, if any, punishable under Section 306 of IPC against the petitioner. Leaving everything aside, there is no sufficient evidence available on record to connect the petitioner with the offence alleged to have been committed by him.
No doubt, material collected on record suggests that for quite some time, deceased Maraya Khatun and petitioner Vivek Sharma were known to each other and allegedly petitioner maintained physical relation with the deceased on the pretext of marriage. But careful perusal of suicide note left behind by the deceased, if perused in its entirety, clearly reveals that she proceeded to commit suicide after suspecting that Vivek Sharma had solemnized marriage. She has categorically stated in her suicide note that Vivek has not solemnized marriage with her, but is living happy married life with some other person. She stated in the suicide note that father of Vivek Sharma had concealed the fact that Vivek had solemnized marriage, whereas bangles and clothes of “Shagun” were lying in the room belonging to Vivek Sharma. She has further recorded in the suicide note that father of Vivek Sharma told her that marriage of his son is not possible with her and as such, she has no option, but to commit suicide.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in a case (Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan and Anr, 2021 (4) RCR (Criminal) 361) where student committed suicide after being reprimanded by the teacher/administration categorically held that reprimanding student would not amount to investigation to commit suicide. Relevant para of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
It is a solemn duty of a teacher to instil discipline in the students. It is not uncommon that teachers reprimand a student for not being attentive or not being upto the mark in studies or for bunking classes or not attending the school. The disciplinary measures adopted by a teacher or other authorities of a school, reprimanding a student for his indiscipline, in our considered opinion, would not tantamount to provoking a student to commit suicide, unless there are repeated specific allegations of harassment and insult deliberately without any justifiable cause or reason. A simple act of reprimand of a student for his behaviour or indiscipline by a teacher, who is under moral obligations to inculcate the good qualities of a human being in a student would definitely not amount to instigation or intentionally aid to the commission of a suicide by a student.
‘Spare the rod and spoil the child’ an old saying may have lost its relevance in present days and Corporal punishment to the child is not recognised by law but that does not mean that a teacher or school authorities have to shut their eyes to any indiscipline act of a student. It is not only a moral duty of a teacher but one of the legally assigned duty under Section 24 (e) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 to hold regular meetings with the parents and guardians and apprise them about the regularity in attendance, ability to learn, progress made in learning and any other act or relevant information about the child.
……………………….
Considering the facts that the appellant holds a post of a teacher and any act done in discharge of his moral or legal duty without their being any circumstances to even remotely indicate that there was any intention on his part to abet the commission of suicide by one of his own pupil, no mens rea can be attributed. Thus, the very element of abetment is conspicuously missing from the allegations levelled in the FIR. In the absence of the element of abetment missing from the allegations, the essential ingredients of offence under section 306 IPC do not exist. ………………………………….
In the absence of any material on record even, prima-facie, in the FIR or statement of the complainant, pointing out any such circumstances showing any such act or intention that he intended to bring about the suicide of his student, it would be absurd to even think that the appellant had any intention to place the deceased in such circumstances that there was no option available to him except to commit suicide.
Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Yadwinder Singh’s case(supra), taking note of its earlier judgment passed in case titled Nipun Aneja and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4091, proceeded to reiterate the principles of law governing abetment. Relevant paras of the judgment are as under:-
“16.This Court in the case of “Nipun Aneja and Others Versus State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in SCC OnLine SC 4091 has succinctly explained the Principles of law governing abetment. We quote the relevant observations as under:-
“13.The law governing Section 306 of the IPC is well settled. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:—
“306.Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
14.Thus, the basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Abetment of a thing is defined under Section 107 of the IPC as under:—
“107.Abetment of a thing.— A person abets the doing of a thing, who—
First. — Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.— Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.— Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.— A person who by willful misrepresentation, or by willful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Explanation 2.— Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”
17.This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144, after considering the provisions of Section 306 of the IPC along with the definition of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, has observed as under:—
“14.Section 306 of IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same.
15.The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘instigate’ is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, has defined the word ‘instigate’ as under:
“20.Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”.
16.The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its co-relation with Section 306 IPC has been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In the case of S.S. Cheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190, it was observed as under:—
“25.Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.Thus, the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC would stand fulfilled if the suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming encouragement/incitement by the accused leaving no option but to commit suicide. The act of instigation as alleged must be with the intention to push the deceased into such a situation that she is left with no other option but to commit suicide.
18.In the case on hand, even if we believe that the appellant due to opposition and pressure from his family declined to get married with the deceased, it could not be said that he led to a situation by which the deceased was left with no other option but to commit the suicide. The appellant could not be said to have intended the consequences of his act namely suicide. It is very sad to note that a young girl took the extreme step of ending her life. It is possible that she might have felt hurt. One sensitive moment took away the life of a young girl. However, as judges we should not allow our minds get boggled with such thoughts. We are obliged to decide the matter on the basis of the evidence on record. In other words whether the allegations levelled constitute any offence. Mere refusal to marry even if true by itself would not amount to instigation as explained under Section 107 of the IPC.
19.We are of the view that putting the accused to trial on the basis of the evidence on record would be nothing short of travesty of justice. Trial would be an empty formality.”
In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that to constitute offence under Section 306 IPC, prosecution is under obligation to prove that suicide committed by the deceased was due to direct and alarming encouragement/incitement by the accused, leaving no option but to commit suicide. The act of instigation as alleged must be with the intention to push the deceased into such a situation that she is left with no other option but to commit suicide. Most importantly, in the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that mere refusal to marry even if true by itself would not amount to instigation as explained under Section 107 of IPC.
Having scanned material produced on record, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that evidentiary material on record, if accepted, would not reasonably connect the petitioner with the crime. This Court, having perused the material adduced on record, finds that chances of conviction of petitioner are very remote and bleak and in case, FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent Court of law are allowed to continue, petitioner would be unnecessarily put to ordeal of a protracted trial, which ultimately may lead to acquittal of the accused.
Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, present petition is allowed and FIR No.192 of 2022 dated 27.08.2022, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh under Section 306 of IPC as well as consequential proceedings i.e. complaint/challan No.4/2 of 2024, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus Vivek Sharma, pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, are quashed and set-aside. Petitioner is acquitted from the commission of offence under Section 306 of IPC.
The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all pending applications.