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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for regular bail in Crime No. 52 of 2022, dated 21.7.2022, registered with the Narcotic Control Bureau, Sub Zone, Mandi, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 8, 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS).
It has been asserted that the petitioner, Rakesh Kumar and Parveen Kumar, were travelling in the car bearing registration No. PB-07Y-2385 on 22.07.2022. The petitioner was arrested by the Intelligence Officer of the Narcotic Control Bureau (NCB) Sub Zone Mandi at Mandi-Pathankot Highway opposite to Police Station Shahpur, District Kangra, HP for the possession of 1.950 kg of charas. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court on 13.01.2023. The prosecution has cited 12 witnesses, out of whom statements of 3 witnesses have been recorded. Four accused were released on bail by the competent Court of law. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2839 of 2025 and was dismissed on 16.03.2026. The petitioner is a paralytic patient, and his lower body is not working. The learned Trial Court had granted interim bail for three months for his treatment. The respondent approached this Court for cancellation of the bail by moving Cr. MP(M) No. 2291 of 2025, and the Court had cancelled the bail granted by the learned Trial Court. The NCB has failed to complete the evidence despite the lapse of 17 months from the incarceration of the petitioner. There is a substantial change in the circumstances. The petitioner is suffering from a severe and debilitating medical condition and is a paralytic patient. The petitioner had not violated the terms and conditions of the bail earlier granted to him. The other co-accused have been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the NCB received secret information regarding the transportation of a huge quantity of charas in a car bearing registration No. PB-07Y-2385 on 21.7.2022. The information was passed to the Assistant Director, NCB, Amritsar. A team was constituted, and the vehicle was intercepted. Recovery of 1.950 kilograms of charas was made from the possession of Vivek Sharma, Rakesh Kumar and Parveen Kumari. Voluntary statements of the accused persons were recorded, and they were arrested. Petitioner Vivek Sharma made a statement under Section 67 that he had brought 2.00 kilograms of charas from Taj Mohammad. Rakesh Kumar also made a voluntary statement under Section 67 and admitted his guilt. The petitioner was in touch with Rakesh Sharma. The charge sheet was filed before the Court. The NCB had found 42 telephonic interactions between the petitioner and supplier Taj Mohd, including 8 calls on the date of interception and 58 telephonic interactions between the petitioner and co-accused Rakesh Kumar. The NCB had recovered 1.950 kg of charas, which is a commercial quantity. The petitioner is also facing trial in FIR No. 30 of 2021 dated 11.03.2021. The petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused, as the recovery was effected from the petitioner and not the co-accused. The NCB has examined four witnesses out of the 11 cited by the prosecution. The matter was listed on 25.09.2026 for prosecution evidence. The trial is likely to conclude soon. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed.
I have heard M/s Panku Chaudhary and Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Devraj, learned counsel for the respondent/NCB.
Mr Panku Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence despite the lapse of more than 3 years. The order sheet of the Court shows that the learned Presiding Officer has been transferred. Therefore, the trial is not likely to conclude soon. The petitioner cannot be kept behind bars indefinitely. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
Mr Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent/NCB, submitted that the petitioner was on bail and his bail was cancelled by this Court. Therefore, he cannot count the period when he was on bail. The transfer of a Presiding Officer is beyond the control of any person, and the petitioner should not take advantage of this fact. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2839 of 2025 and was dismissed on 16.03.2026. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the NCB that a subsequent bail petition lies only when there is a change in the circumstances. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:
“11.In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9.When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:
30.Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:
7.It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstances has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking, resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue, and there would be wastage of the Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstances as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
The Court had earlier found that the petitioner was prima facie in possession of commercial quantity of charas. The rigours of Section 37 of NDPS applied to him, and he had failed to satisfy the rigours of Section 37 of NDPS. These considerations have not changed.
It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had not concluded the trial and this violates the petitioner's right to a speedy trial. An emphasis was placed on the fact that, as per the order dated 25.09.2026, the learned Presiding Officer was transferred, and no progress could be made in the case.
The petitioner was taken into custody after his bail was cancelled by the Court on 20.06.2025. The petitioner was earlier on bail. Therefore, the petitioner can only count the period with effect from 20.06.2025 for seeking bail. It is undisputed that the statements of four witnesses have been recorded. It has been submitted on behalf of the NCB that the trial would be concluded soon. The trial is not progressing because of the transfer of the learned Presiding Officer. The apprehension expressed by the petitioner that the trial will not progress because of the transfer can be removed by transferring the matter to some other Presiding Officer, and is not sufficient to grant bail. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025: INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: -
“17.The High Court then, on the strength of those premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance.
18.This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19.In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated 22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not refer to the allegation regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the present complaint, nor do they engage with the prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section 37(1)(b).”
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, wherein it was observed:
“11.In the present case, this Court finds that though the Respondent-accused was in custody for one year and four months, and charges have not been framed, yet the allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband.
12.Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”
This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671, wherein it was observed:
9.It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during the pendency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a mandatory precondition, the non-observance of which vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has held in no uncertain terms that the recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).
The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b) (ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that ‘the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of a commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37, has, in this Court's view, committed an error.
The position of law on the grant of bail in matters involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act is well settled. Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is cast in mandatory terms. Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application, the Court can enlarge an accused on bail only upon recording its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions: first, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence; and second, that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has held, in plain terms, that the non-recording of the twin satisfaction, being mandatory in nature, renders an order granting bail unsustainable. A similar view has been expressed in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).
When the impugned order is tested against that settled position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the impugned order, which carries the weight of the reasoning, does not contain a finding on either of the twin conditions prescribed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. What the High Court has, instead, proceeded on is the proposition that “the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial”. The right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as the NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right has to be read alongside, and not in displacement of, the mandate of Section 37. The omission to record the twin satisfaction prescribed by the statute, it appears, may have escaped the attention of the High Court.
Considering that the learned Presiding Officer has been transferred, learned Sessions Judge Kangra at Dharamshala is requested to transfer the trial to some other Court at Dharamshala. Further, the learned Sessions Judge is requested to transfer the cases of all the under-trial prisoners pending before the learned Special Judge-II Kangra at Dharamshala to some other court, keeping in view the pendency before each court, so that the under-trial prisoners may not languish in jail for want of progress in the trial.
In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
A copy of this order is sent to the learned Sessions Judge, Dharamshala, H.P.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
