Vivek Parti, RP For Trading Engineers International Ltd. vs Uttrakhand Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr.

“The Chairman apprised the members of the CoC about the hearing held on 11.06.2025 before the Hon'ble NCLT, where the RP was represented through legal counsel. The first matter taken up was I.A. No. 2806 of 2025 and I.A. No. 4942 of 2024, relating to disconnection and restoration of electricity supply by UPCL. It was submitted before the Hon'ble Bench that the CD was making monthly payments towards electricity charges prior to the disconnection, although with some delays, and that UPCL had continued to raise composite bills including Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) and arrears for both pre-CIRP and CIRP periods, without bifurcation. All dues till July 2024 had been cleared by the RP. However, UPCL had insisted that electricity would only be restored upon payment of the full outstanding dues, including LPS and pre-CIRP arrears. The RP argued that electricity was essential to preserve the CD as a going concern and that a local party interested in taking Unit-II on lease had agreed to bear future electricity consumption costs. After hearing both sides, the Hon'ble Bench held that under Section 14 of the IBC, dues for the CIRP period were payable and directed that the CD shall pay the CIRP-period dues, including applicable delay charges, and that UPCL must restore the electricity supply immediately. The Bench further directed that future dues be paid on time. …..”

“That the order passed by the Adjudicating authority was pronounced in open court but attained finality only upon its uploading on 04.07.2025 on the NCLT portal. Proof of date of uploading of order 04.07.2025 being uploaded as so on 11.06.2025 is annexed as ANNEXURE 2”

“24.

In Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd., this Court had an occasion to deal with the case where an application was heard by NCLT on 17-5-2023 but no order was pronounced. The order came to be uploaded by the Registry on 30-4-2023 directly carrying the date of the order as 17-5-2023. The appellant applied for the certified copy on 30-5-2023 which was received on 1-6-2023 and the appeal was filed in NCLAT on 10-7-2023 along with the application for condonation of delay. The issue which was dealt by this Court in this case was as to which date triggers limitation to commence when the matter is conclusively heard on one day and the order is directly uploaded on the website on another. It was held that the period to compute limitation to file an appeal under Section 61 IBC from the order of NCLT commences from the date of uploading of the Order by the Registry as the commencement of the period of limitation is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement.

25.

Therefore, the incident which triggers limitation to commence is the date of pronouncement of the order and in case of non-pronouncement of the order when the hearing concludes, the date on which the order is pronounced or uploaded on the website.

26.

However, where the judgment was pronounced in open court, the period of limitation starts running from that very day. The appellant is however entitled to seek relief under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act for excluding the period during which the certified copy was under preparation on an application preferred by that party.”

“16.

From the above discussion of law, it is clear that the date on which the limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement. The question that arises in the facts of the present case, therefore, is when is an order deemed to be pronounced. The National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 ("the NCLT Rules") provide guidance in this regard. Rule 89(1) of the NCLT Rules indicates that when NCLAT registry publishes its cause-list, a distinction is drawn between cases listed for pronouncement of orders and other cases. It states as follows:

"89. Preparation and publication of daily

cause-list.-(1) The Registry shall prepare and publish on the notice board of the Registry before the closing of working hours on each working day the cause-list for the next working day and subject to the directions of the President, listing of cases in the daily cause-list shall be in the following order of priority, unless otherwise ordered by the concerned Bench; namely-

(a)

cases for pronouncement of orders;

(b)

cases for clarification;

(c)

cases for admission;

(d)

cases for orders or directions;

(e)

part-heard cases, latest part-heard having precedence; and

(f)

cases posted as per numerical order or as directed by the Bench;" (emphasis supplied)”

“17.

Further, Part XIX of the NCLAT Rules governs the "disposal of cases and pronouncement of orders". The following rules are relevant:

"146.

Disposal of Cases.-On receipt of an application, petition, appeal, etc. the Tribunal, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit: Provided that the Tribunal, after considering an appeal, may summarily dismiss the same, for reasons to be recorded, if the Tribunal is of opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding therewith.

* * *

150.

Pronouncement of Order.-(1) The Tribunal, after hearing the applicant and respondent, shall make and pronounce an order either at once or, as soon as thereafter as may be practicable but not later than thirty days from the final hearing.

(2)

Every order of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed and dated by the President or Member or Members constituting the Bench which heard the case and pronounced the order.

(3)

A certified copy of every order passed by the Tribunal shall be given to the parties.

(4)

The Tribunal, may transmit order made by it to any court for enforcement, on application made by either of the parties to the order or suo motu.

(5)

Every order or judgment or notice shall bear the seal of the Tribunal.

151. Pronouncement of order by any one

member of the Bench.-(1) Any Member of the Bench may pronounce the order for and on behalf of the Bench.

(2)

When an order is pronounced under this rule, the Court Master shall make a note in the order sheet, that the order of the Bench consisting of President and Members was pronounced in open court on behalf of the Bench." (emphasis supplied)”

“19.

In the present case, the cause-list for 17-5-2023 placed on record by the appellant indicates that the case was listed for admission and not for pronouncement. Further, on a specific query of the Court, it is not in dispute between the counsel for the appellant and the respondent, that no substantive order was passed on 17-5-2023 by NCLT. In these circumstances, limitation would not begin to run on 17-5-2023 which was the date on which hearings concluded. As no order was passed before 30-5-2023, there was no occasion for the appellant to lodge an application for a certified copy on 17-5-2023. Time for filing an appeal would commence only when the order appealed from was uploaded since prior to that date no order was pronounced.”

“31.

The import of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and its Explanation is to assign the responsibility of applying for a certified copy of the order on a party. A person wishing to file an appeal is expected to file an application for a certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period, upon which the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy is to be excluded. However, the time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded. If no application for a certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. In fact, the Explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position that the time which is taken by the court to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said that the right to receive a free copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act obviated the obligation on the appellant to seek a certified copy through an application. The appellant has urged that Rule 1420 of the NCLAT Rules empowers NCLAT to exempt parties from compliance with the requirement of any of the rules in the interests of substantial justice, which has been typically exercised in favour of allowing a downloaded copy in lieu of a certified copy. While it may well be true that waivers on filing an appeal with a certified copy are often granted for the purposes of judicial determination, they do not confer an automatic right on an applicant to dispense with compliance and render Rule 22 (2) of the NCLAT Rules nugatory. The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. In a similar factual scenario, NCLAT had dismissed an appeal as time-barred under Section 61(2) IBC since the appellant therein was present in court, and yet chose to file for a certified copy after five months of the pronouncement of the order.

32.

The appellant had argued that the order of NCLAT notes that NCLT Registry had objected to the appeal in regard to limitation, to which the appellant had filed a reply stating that the limitation period would begin from the date of the uploading of the order, which was 12-3-2020. The appellant submitted that the suo motu order of this Court dated 23-3-2020, taking retrospective effect from 15-3-2020, made under Article 142 of the Constitution, extended the limitation until further orders, which renders the appeal filed on 8-6-2020 within limitation. However it is important to note that this Court had only extended the period of limitation applicable in the proceedings, only in cases where such period had not ended before 15-3-2020. In this case, owing to the specific language of Sections 61(1) and 61(2), it is evident that limitation commenced once the order was pronounced and the time taken by the court to provide the appellant with a certified copy would have been excluded, as clarified in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, if the appellant had applied for a certified copy within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) IBC. The construction of the law does not import the absurdity the appellant alleges of an impossible act of filing an appeal against an order which was uploaded on 12-3-2020. However, the mandate of the law is to impose an obligation on the appellant to apply for a certified copy once the order was pronounced by NCLT on 31 -12-20193, by virtue of Section 61(2) IBC read with Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. In the event the appellant was correct in his assertion that a correct copy of the order was not available until 20-3-2020, the appellant would not have received a certified copy in spite of the application till such date and accordingly received the benefit of the suo motu order of this Court which came into effect on 15-3-2020. However, in the absence of an application for a certified copy, the appeal was barred by limitation much prior to the suo motu direction of this Court, even after factoring in a permissible fifteen days of condonation under Section 61(2). The Court is not empowered to condone delays beyond statutory prescriptions in special statutes containing a provision for limitation²².

“D. Conclusion

33.

The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgment-(i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to NCLAT against an order passed under IBC must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the "order is made available to the aggrieved party", in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act. Owing to the special nature of IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail, in consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for an exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed against. It is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT Rules and prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a construction will upset the timely framework of IBC. The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation.

“26.

In the present case, Respondent 1 was neither a party to the proceedings before NCLT nor privy to the CoC deliberations, and became aware of the order only upon its subsequent disclosure. However, it is evident that the Company Secretary of the corporate debtor duly informed the listing departments of both NSE and BSE about NCLT order dated 7-4-20222 within 30 minutes of its pronouncement. Hence, the limitation period for filing the appeal commenced on 7-4-2022 and expired on 7-5-2022. Notably, 7-5-2022 fell on the first Saturday of the month, which is a working day for the Registry of NCLAT. Even otherwise, the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be granted, as Respondent 1 filed the appeal beyond not only the prescribed period of 30 days but also the condonable period of 15 days i.e. on 24-5-2022. In view of the same reason, Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 has also no application to the facts of the present case. Thus, applying the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that Respondent 1 filed the appeal beyond the statutory maximum period of 45 days prescribed under Section 61(2) IBC. Accordingly, the first issue is answered by us.”