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Judgment
Lawrence Jenkins, K.C.I.E., C.J.—This case comes before us by way of revision under our general jurisdiction from a decision of a Mamlatdar who is said to have committed a material error in procedure in that he disregarded provisions of Section 11 of the Indian Oaths Act 1873.
The principal question at issue in the suit was what he the plaintiff or the defendant was in possession.
It has been decided by a Full Bench decision of the High Court in Calcutta in Maniram Deb v. Debi Charan Deb (1869) 4 B. L.R. 97 that " a statement by a witness that a party is in possession is in point of law, admissible evidence of the fact that such party was in possession "; and if it is evidence of the fact, then under s" 11 of the Oaths Act it is conclusive proof of the matters stated.
What the meaning of "conclusive proof" is for the purpose of the Evidence Act is laid down in Section 4 of that Act, where it is said : " When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it." That no doubt refers in terms only to the Evidence Act but the definition there given may, we think, properly be applied to the expression " conclusive proof " in the Oaths Act. Applying then that test, it is clear that the Mamlatdar was wrong in going into and giving the preference to other evidence in this case. His suggestion that the Oaths Act does not apply by reason of the absence of writing from the plaintiff is, in our opinion, erroneous, for there is nothing in the Act that requires any written statement.
The result is that we must make the rule absolute; set aside the decree of the Mamlatdar and dismiss the suit with costs throughout.