AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
(1) This appeal arises out of an ejectment suit which has been concurrently dismissed by the Courts below. The defendant had taken the house in
dispute on rent on 11th Jeth 2000 on a monthly rental of Rs. 15/. The plaintiff brought the present suit with the allegations that he required the
house for his personal use, and that he had served a six months' notice upon the defendant to vacate the house as required by the provisions of the
Rent Control Order. The defendant pleaded that the notice served upon him was not in order. The lower Court found in favour of the defendant
and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. This order was upheld by the Senior Subordinate Judge in appeal. The plaintiff has now come in second appeal to
this Court.
(2) Notice by the landlord plaintiff has been given on 6th Katik 2005, and by this notice the defendantrespondent was required to vacate the house
within six months, i.e., on or before 6th Baisakh 2006. Both the Courts below are concurrent in the finding that six months should have ended with
the end of, the month of tenancy, i.e., on 11th Jeth 2006 and not on 6th Baisakh 2006, as has been done in the present case. The argument in a
nutshell is that though ""a local law to the contrary"" has lengthened the period of notice, yet this period of notice must expire with the end of the
month of tenancy as is laid down in S. 106, T. P. Act. In support of this proposition, the respondent's learned counsel has referred me to 'Chuni
Lal v. Chuni Lal', AIR 1923 Lah 659 (A), in
which it has been held that :
Where there is no contract, S. 106 (T. P. Act) applies to such cases. Section 106 merely lays down in a codified form what in fact has always
been understood to be the general law on the subject. A condition in the lease that the landlord should give one month's notice if he wanted to have
the premises vacated does not mean that notice could be given at any time and that it was not to expire with the end of the month of tenancy as
required by S. 106"".
A similar view has been taken in some other judgments also Such as 'Baidyanath Basak v. Onkar Mill', AIR 1938 Cal 656 (B), and 'Utility
Articles Manufacturing Co. v. Motilal Bombay Mills Ltd', AIR 1943 'Bom 306 (C). Reference may in this behalf be made ""to S. 106 T. P. Act,
which runs as follows;
In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall
be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of
the tenancy; and a lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part
of either lessor or lessee, by 15 days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.
According to the rulings which have just now been referred to above, it is clear that even if there is a contract between a lessor & a lessee hat the
notice should be of a shorter or a longer period than the one provided by S. 106, T. P. Act, yet the notice must expire with the end of the year or
the month of tenancy as the case may be. In the case before me, there is nothing contrary to S. 106 in the contract of Lease, but then we have a
'local law to the contrary"" which increases the period of, notice from fifteen days to six months. I mean proviso to R. 7 of the House Rent Control
Order which lays down:
Provided that the Court shall make an order for the recovery of possession if the landlord satisfies the Court that six months' notice to quit or
notice of such period as may be required under the contract of tenancy, whichever be longer, has been served on the tenant.
(3) The question now before us is as to whether this proviso to R. 7 of the House Rent Control Order relieves a landlord from issuing a notice, the
period of which shall expire with the end of the month or year of tenancy, as required by S. 106, T. P. Act. We have just seen that according to
the Lahore and Bombay rulings referred to above, despite the fact that there is a contract to the contrary with regard to the period of a notice, yet
the notice should end with the month or year of the tenancy as the case may be. In this case there is no provision in the contract of lease
lengthening or shortening the period of notice, but there is ""a local law to the contrary"" which makes it necessary to give a six months' notice. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argues that the only obligation which a landlord is placed under is that he should give a six
months' notice according to the terms of the House Rent Control Order, and that the condition of a notice expiring with the end of a month of
tenancy as laid down by S. 106, T. P. Act, has been abrogated by R. 7 of the House Rent Control Order. I am afraid I cannot agree with him.
The House Rent Control Order does not abrogate S. 106, T. P. Act. It has only made provision for giving some relief to the tenants such as
lengthening the period of notice etc. Beyond this it does nothing, and for other purposes not dealt with in proviso to R. 7 it leaves S. 106, T. P.
Act,. unaffected. Therefore if ""the local law to the contrary"" provides six months' notice in place of 15 days' notice to be given by a landlord to a
tenant, for the latter's ejectment, it does not relieve the landlord from that condition which is provided by S. 106, T. P. Act and which is that the
notice must expire with the end of the month of tenancy. The result of the present notice is that the defendantrespondent was required to vacate the
house earlier than the law would otherwise entitle him to occupy it. This clearly makes the notice bad in law.
(4) I, therefore, do not find any force in this appeal which is rejected. In view of the fact that an important law point is involved in this case, I order
that the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court.
(5) B/V.S.B. Appeal dismissed.
