High CourtsDivision Bench(1989) 04 MAD CK 0036

Virudhunagar Co-operative Milk Supply Society Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax

Madras High Court · Decided on 17 April 1989 · Citation: (1989) 77 CTR 92 : (1990) 183 ITR 545

HON’BLE JUDGES
V. Ratnam, J · Bhakthavatsalam, J
CASE NUMBER
Tax Case No''s. 641 and 642 of 1979 and Reference No''s. 352 and 353 of 1979

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Judgment

84 paragraphs · 1,903 words

Ratnam, J.—These two references relating to the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 raise a common question of law. The assessee is

a co-operative society. Besides carrying on business in the supply of milk it runs a canteen and also raises grass for the use of cattle as part of

salvage farm, poultry dairy farm and livestock unit. In respect of the assessment years in question, a claim was made by the assessee for the loss

incurred by it in the salvage farm and this was allowed by the Income Tax Officer. Subsequently, while making the assessment for the assessment

year 1970-71, the Income Tax Officer came into possession of information that there was an underassessment of the total income of the assessee

for the two years in question. Thereupon, the Income Tax Officer initiated action u/s 147(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to

as ""the Act"" ), and brought to tax the loss allowed under salvage farm, after holding that u/s 10(27) of the Act, the income derived by the assessee

from the salvage farm, poultry dairy farm and livestock until carried on by the assessee was exempt from tax and that consequently the losses

incurred in the salvage farm operation should not have been allowed. On appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the assessee, it

was contended that all facts relating to the salvage farm operations carried on by the assessee had been placed before the Income Tax Officer,

who made the original assessment and only after consideration thereof, the loss was allowed in the original assessment and, therefore, it was not

open to the successor-officer, on a mere change of opinion, to initiate proceedings for reassessment. It was also contended that section 10(27) of

the Act would not apply, as the assessee was not running a dairy farm. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the reopening of the

assessment on the ground that the Income Tax Officer, who made the original assessment, was unaware of the fact that the assessee was

maintaining stud bulls and such expenditure had been debited to the profit and loss account and that only in the course of the assessment

proceedings for the subsequent year, the successor-officer found that the assessee''s activity included livestock breeding and dairy farming and

maintenance of bulls and the income therefrom was exempt u/s 10(27) of the Act and under these circumstances, the loss under this business

should not have been allowed. On further appeal by the assessee before the Tribunal, reiterating its objection that there was only a mere change of

opinion and that section 10(27) of the Act would not apply, the Tribunal, relying upon (1976) 102 ITR 287 (SC) , held that the reopening of the

assessment for the assessment years in question was justified and that on the other question of applicability or otherwise of section 10(27) of the

Act, the matter had to be remitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for going into that question, giving liberty to the assessee to produce

whatever evidence it wanted in support of that contention.

2.

At the instance of the assessee, u/s 256(2) of the Act, the following common question of law for the two assessment years in question, has been

referred to this court for its opinion:

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income Tax Officer acted properly in

invoking the provisions of section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act?

3.

Learned counsel for the assessee strenuously contended that the reassessment proceedings had been initiated merely on the basis of the change

of opinion on the part of the successor-officer and that that would not in any manner justify the reopening of the assessment. Reference in this

connection was also made to several decisions holding that a mere change of opinion on the part of the officer concerned would not justify the

reopening of the assessment already completed. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Revenue, inviting attention to (1976) 102 ITR 287

(SC) , Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, New Delhi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, and United India Fire and General

Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, , submitted that in this case, from the assessment records the officer obtained information on

an investigation of the materials that the claim for the loss made by the assessee had been wrongly allowed, as the income from the salvage farm,

livestock breeding unit, poultry and dairy farms carried on by the assessee was exempt from tax and consequently losses should not have been

allowed and it was, therefore, not a mere change of opinion on the part of the successor-officer which made him to resort to the reopening of the

assessment.

4.

Before proceedings u/s 147(b) of the Act can be taken, the Income Tax Officer must have information in his possession and he must also have

reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. No doubt such information must have come into the possession of the

officer after the assessment. In this case, it is seen that the Income Tax Officer became aware of the disallowability of the losses claimed by the

assessee for the assessment years in question while making the assessment for the assessment year 1970-71, when the loss claimed by the

assessee in respect of the salvage farm was disallowed and that assessment order had also been accepted by the assessee. It is thus seen that

information had been obtained in this case from the assessment year 1970-71. We are therefore, unable to accept the contention of learned

counsel for the assessee that purely prompted by a change of opinion, reassessment proceedings had been resorted to. Though a number of

decisions were referred to by learned counsel for the assessee, we are of the view that there is no need for making any detailed reference to all of

them, excepting Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, New Delhi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, , as it was also relied on by

learned counsel for the Revenue, though for a different purpose. In this connection, we may first refer to (1976) 102 ITR 287 (SC) , where the

Supreme Court, with reference to section 34(1) (b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, comparable to section 147(b) of the Act, dealt with the

applicability of that provision to certain categories of cases. The Supreme Court enumerated the following categories of cases as covered by

section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (headnote):

(1) Where the information is as to the true and correct state of the law derived from relevant judicial decisions;

(2) where in the original assessment the income liable to tax has escaped assessment due to oversight, inadvertence or a mistake committed by the

Income Tax Officer;

(3) where the information is derived from an external source of any kind; such external source would include discovery of new and important

matters or knowledge of fresh facts which were not present at the time of original assessment; and

(4) where the information may be obtained even from the record of the original assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record or

the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law.

5.

The case of the assessee would fall within category (4) enumerated above, in that, the information had been obtained by the officer from the

record of the assessment proceedings in connection with the assessment year 1970-71. We may now notice Indian and Eastern Newspaper

Society, New Delhi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, , where the Supreme Court has pointed out at page 1004, referring to (1976)

102 ITR 287 (SC) , that the categorisation in that decision under category (2) thereof, i.e., that income liable to tax has escaped assessment due to

oversight, inadvertence or mistake would also fall within section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, has been stated rather too widely

and broadly and goes even further beyond what is warranted by the statute and that an error discovered, would not give the officer the power to

resort to a reopening u/s 147(b) or the Act. Though Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, New Delhi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, New

Delhi, has taken the view that oversight, inadvertence or mistake, would not fall within section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922,

nothing has been said by way of disapproval of the other categories enumerated in (1976) 102 ITR 287 (SC) , particularly with category (4),

within which the present case would fall. We are, therefore, of the view that the case of the assessee would fall within category (4) as per the

decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Nav Bharat Automobiles, , and that that would justify the reopening of the assessment. We may also

in this connection refer to United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, , where the court considered the

propriety of the reopening of an assessment in a case where the Income Tax Officer, at the time of the completion of the assessment, was unaware

of the fact that the shares held by the assessee were such that some of them yielded dividends, while others did not yield dividends and that fact

came to his knowledge only in the course of the assessment for another assessment year. Referring to Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. Vs.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , to the effect that by looking into the records, the officer informs himself and that record would be a

source of information, if that information lead to the discovery of an escapement of assessment or underassessment, it was pointed out that is is not

necessary that such information should be from an outside source, but that it may be found in the assessment records themselves. In this case, the

assessment records, in the process of finalisation of the assessment for the assessment year 1970-71 gave information to the officer that losses

claimed by the assessee in respect of the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70, which should have been disallowed, had been countenanced,

and it was on the basis of this information, that the officer proceeded to reopen the assessment by resorting to section 147(b) of the Act. We are,

therefore, of the view that the reopening of the assessment was not the outcome of a mere change of opinion on the part of the successor-officer,

but owing to his having come into possession of information with reference to the erroneous allowance of the losses claimed by the assessee during

the assessment years in question while finalising the assessment for the year 1970-71. The question whether section 10(27) of the Act would apply

or not, has been remitted for on investigation and the assessee has also been given an opportunity of placing such evidence as it may have in

support of its stand. We, therefore, hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, section 147(b) of the Act was properly invoked and

the Tribunal was which in the view in took on that question. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the

assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel''s fee Rs. 500 (one set).