High CourtsSingle Bench(2018) 10 RAJ CK 0048

Virendra Pal Singh @APPELLANT@Hash Sharankirat Singh

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 8 October 2018

HON’BLE JUDGES
Dinesh Mehata, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ No. 14899 of 2018

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Judgment

40 paragraphs · 890 words

The present writ petition has been preferred against the order dated 13.09.2018, passed by learned Additional District Judge No.2, Sriganganagar

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial court’). The facts appertain to the present writ petition are that the petitioner’s grand father Gurcharan

Singh entered into an agreement on 06.07.2010, agreeing to sell his agriculture land to Sharankirat Singh (respondent No.1 herein).

Upon non-execution of requisite sale deed, qua the disputed land, Sharankirat Singh (respondent No. 1 herein) filed a suit for specific performance on

19.11.2010, impleading sons and daughters of said Gurcharan Singh namely Bhajan Kaur, Amar Jeet Singh, Inder Jeet Singh and Karam Jeet Kaur.

During the pendency the said suit, the petitioner filed an application dated 21.08.2018, seeking his impleadment in the suit proceedings, indicating

therein that for the properties belonging to Gurcharna Singh, he had filed a suit for partition on 29.10.2009, which has been decreed on 16.08.2018.

On the basis of said decree of partition, the petitioner contended that he is a necessary party having 1/8th share in the property. Learned trial court

rejected the aforesaid application filed by the petitioner inter alia observing that in the suit for specific performance, the petitioner â€" applicant is not a

necessary party as his interest is being watched by his father, who is already present in the form of defendant No.2 (respondent No.3 herein). Trial

court has also observed that the purported defence sought to be put forth by the applicant is already there on record, in the form of two separate

written statements filed by different defendants.

Assailing the order dated 13.09.2018, passed by the trial court, Mr. Dhera learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the trial court

has erred in rejecting petitioner’s application, seeking impleadment. He urged that the petitioner has 1/8th share in the property in dispute, per

force the decree of partition dated 16.08.2018 and as such he was a necessary party. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner

relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumati Bai Vs. Paras Finance, reported in AIR 2007 SC 3166 and contended

that on the basis of principle enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioner being co-owner is also a necessary party.

Mr. Bhandari, learned counsel for the respondents, per contra supporting the order passed by the Court below submitted that the order passed by the

Trial Court does not warrant any interference, inasmuch as the entire parcel of rights in relation to the disputed land were being watched by the sons

and daughters of late Gurcharan Singh. Their share naturally includes 1/8th share belonging to the petitioner also and the petitioner does not and

possibly cannot have any thing new to say.

He argued that if the petitioner is permitted to implead in the present suit, the nature of the suit would change and a simple suit for specific

performance would be converted into a suit for title and respective rights of the defendants. It would thus lead to multiplicity of litigation. In support of

his submissions, Mr. Bhandari relied upon judgment of this Court in the matter of Narayani D/o Late Kishandasji Vs. Nandram Das S/o Kishandas,

reported in (2017) 0 Supreme (Raj) 895 / (2017) 2 WLN 522. In rejoinder, Mr. Dhera frankly conceded that though the petitioner may not have a new

defence and his defence would continue to remain the same, yet his presence is necessary in the suit proceedings, as his rights have been crystallized

after passing of the decree of partition.

Having considered the submissions of rival counsels and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that in

the present suit for specific performance wherein the subject matter of the dispute is as to whether the agreement to sell in question was executed

and/or as to whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of specific performance, the presence of present petitioner notwithstanding the fact that he may

be entitled for 1/8 share, is not at all necessary.

It is true that his right as far as his share is concerned have been crystallized pursuant to the decree of partition, nevertheless the same shall as a

matter of fact, fructify and shall be dependent upon the fate of the present suit of the specific performance. In case the suit for specific performance

is allowed his decree of partition will be a futility and the suit fails, he shall definitely be entitled for the fruits of the decree of partition.

The petitioner may be interested in the suit proceeding and thus interested party but not a necessary party. A necessary party is one, whose presence

is warranted for complete and proper adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. Petitioners’ presence is not at all warranted in the subject

proceedings. That apart the plaintiff is a dominus litis of his case. He cannot be compelled to sue someone. A party can be impleaded only if his

right(s) are likely to be adversely affected.

This Court does not find any jurisdictional error in the order impugned. The rejection of his impleadment will not in any manner prejudice the rights and

cause of the petitioner. As an upshot of the above discussion, I do not find any force in the petition. The writ petition thus, fails.