Vinod Kumar vs Rajasthan Public Service Commission & Ors.

By way of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for a direction to the respondents to permit him to participate afresh in the Physical Efficiency Test (PET) for the post of Sub-Inspector/Platoon Commander, with reference to the Circular dated 17.02.1989 (Annexure-6) issued by the Home Department.

The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the record, are that the respondents issued an advertisement dated 17.07.2025 (Annexure-1) inviting online applications for recruitment to 1015 posts of Sub-Inspector/Platoon Commander for the Home Department. The petitioner applied for the said post under the OBC (Non-Creamy Layer) category. He successfully cleared the written examination and was thereafter called for the Physical Efficiency Test, his roll number being 1014226.

Pursuant thereto, an admit card was issued to the petitioner for the Physical Efficiency Test, which was scheduled to be conducted at the Central Reserve Police Force, Ajmer for the period from 03.08.2026 to 12.08.2026. The petitioner appeared at the designated examination centre on 03.08.2026. It is the case of the petitioner that on account of heavy rainfall, the running track and the field conditions were adversely affected and the physical activities were delayed for several hours.

The petitioner claims that the track remained wet and unsuitable and that the prevailing conditions adversely affected his performance in the running and long-jump events, resulting in his failure to achieve the prescribed minimum standard in the Physical Efficiency Test. He thereafter submitted representations dated 08.08.2026 and 10.08.2026 (Annexure-5) requesting that he be afforded another opportunity to participate in the Physical Efficiency Test.

The petitioner has also placed reliance upon the Circular dated 17.02.1989 (Annexure-6) issued by the Home Department concerning the Physical Efficiency Test, contending that three attempts are contemplated for the long-jump event. Aggrieved by the failure of the respondents to accede to his request for another opportunity, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the record, are that in the year 2025, the Rajasthan Public Service Commission issued an advertisement inviting applications for direct recruitment to the posts of Sub-Inspector/Platoon Commander. The petitioners, being eligible for consideration, submitted their online applications and thereafter appeared in the written examination conducted on 06.04.2026.

The petitioners were declared successful in the written examination and were thereafter issued an admit cards by the respondent No.4 for appearing in the Physical Efficiency Test, scheduled on 11/12.08.2026. On the said date, the petitioners participated in the running event and, having completed the same within the prescribed time, proceeded to participate in the long-jump event. It is stated that the Physical Efficiency Test was being videographed by the respondent No.4.

The petitioner – Girdhari Singh (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.20332/2026) claims that during the long-jump event, he performed a jump which, according to him, was of 13 feet, whereas the Supervisor conducting the event recorded the distance as less than 13 feet. The petitioner states that he raised an objection at the spot and requested that the jump be re-measured, but his request was not acceded to. He thereafter submitted a representation dated 12.08.2026 before the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Similarly, the petitioner – Jaswant Singh (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.20240/2026) claims that he was not given a second chance for long jump as he was awarded 0 marks in long jump for touching the foul line. The grievance of the petitioner – Gaffar Khan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.20527/2026) is that the respondent No.5 therein deliberately and arbitrarily awarded the petitioner disproportionately low marks and consequently disqualified the petitioner.

The petitioners have placed on record the response received from the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, whereby they were advised to submit his grievance before the concerned department. Aggrieved by the recording of the long-jump measurement and the consequential effect upon their candidature in the recruitment process, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the these writ petitions, inter alia seeking production and examination of the videography of their Physical Efficiency Test and re-examination of the long jump performed by them.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are candidates for recruitment to the post of Sub-Inspector/Platoon Commander pursuant to the advertisement dated 17.07.2025 and, having successfully cleared the written examination, appeared in the Physical Efficiency Test. It was submitted that the grievance in these connected writ petitions arises from the manner in which the Physical Efficiency Test, particularly the Long Jump event, was conducted. In one of the petitions, the petitioner was required to undertake the physical events during heavy rainfall and under adverse track conditions, which, according to learned counsel, materially affected his performance. In the remaining connected petitions, the grievance is principally with regard to the petitioners having been confined to a single attempt in the Long Jump and, in some cases, the measurement of the Long Jump having been disputed despite immediate objection being raised at the venue.

Learned counsel submitted that the Physical Efficiency Test is required to be conducted in a fair, transparent and reasonable manner and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the competent authority. It was contended that neither the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1989’), nor the Standing Order dated 07.07.2025 prescribing the events, distances and marks for the Physical Efficiency Test, nor the recruitment advertisement, prescribes that only one attempt would be available to a candidate in the Long Jump. On the contrary, reliance was placed upon the communication dated 17.02.1989 issued from the office of the Director General of Police, wherein, while clarifying the doubt as to the number of chances in Long Jump, it was specifically directed that each candidate is to be given three chances. Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid clarification has neither been withdrawn nor superseded and, therefore, continues to hold the field.

It was further submitted that Rule 21(2)(5) of the Rules of 1989 itself leaves the Physical Efficiency Test to be conducted as laid down by the Director General of Police and does not prescribe the number of attempts in the Long Jump. The subsequent Standing Order dated 07.07.2025 also remains silent on this aspect and merely prescribes the events, distances and marks. According to learned counsel, therefore, there is no inconsistency between the Standing Order and the communication dated 17.02.1989, the former prescribing the standard and the latter prescribing the manner in which the Long Jump is to be attempted. It was submitted that no order withdrawing, rescinding or superseding the communication dated 17.02.1989 has been placed on record by the respondents and an unwritten practice adopted at the venue cannot override the specific instruction issued by the Director General of Police.

Learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Narayan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3047/1987, decided on 26.09.1989, wherein, on the strength of the very communication dated 17.02.1989, the candidate was directed to be afforded two further chances in the Long Jump and the result was directed to be re-tabulated. It was submitted that the said judgment was rendered after the Rules of 1989 had come into force and has attained finality. Learned counsel submitted that the respondents cannot, without any subsequent order or instruction, adopt a procedure contrary to the aforesaid clarification and that the petitioners are entitled to the same treatment in the present recruitment also.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Long Jump carries 30 marks out of the total 100 marks in the Physical Efficiency Test and the result thereof has a direct bearing upon the eligibility and further participation of the candidates in the recruitment process. It was contended that where a candidate is confined to a single attempt, particularly when the event is affected by circumstances such as a foul (in case of petitioner – Jaswant Singh) or adverse weather conditions (in case of petitioner – Vinod Kumar), the result may not reflect his/their actual physical efficiency. In this regard, learned counsel submitted that in the case of the petitioner who appeared during heavy rainfall, the wet and slippery condition of the track materially affected the running and Long Jump performance and warranted an appropriate opportunity to participate again. It was also submitted that where the measurement of a candidate's Long Jump was disputed at the spot, the respondents, having videographed the Physical Efficiency Test, ought to have examined the relevant recording or afforded an opportunity of re-measurement rather than mechanically proceeding on the basis of the disputed measurement.

Learned counsel for the petitioners, while referring to the advertisements/notifications issued by various recruiting agencies, also submitted that affording three attempts in the Long Jump is not an isolated or unusual practice but is a consistently followed standard in recruitment involving Physical Efficiency Tests. It was submitted that the Staff Selection Commission, in recruitments for Central Armed Police Forces, as also the Central Industrial Security Force, prescribes three chances for the Long Jump. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that when three attempts are ordinarily contemplated in such physical efficiency tests, denial of the same in the present recruitment, particularly when the communication dated 17.02.1989 specifically contemplated three chances, renders the procedure adopted by the respondents wholly unreasonable. It was further submitted that the petitioners cannot be made to suffer on account of a procedure which departs from the practice followed by other recruiting agencies in similarly situated physical efficiency tests.

Learned counsel submitted that the respondents cannot rely upon the plea that the same procedure was uniformly applied to all candidates, since equality under Article 14 does not require perpetuation of an allegedly erroneous procedure. It was further submitted that the candidates were neither informed through the advertisement nor through their admit cards that only one attempt would be permitted in the Long Jump, and an unwritten restriction introduced at the venue could not alter the rules governing the recruitment process. It was also contended that the technical concept of a foul cannot be selectively applied while denying the corresponding opportunity of multiple attempts contemplated for the Long Jump.

Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the action of the respondents in confining the petitioners to a single attempt, or in treating their performance recorded under the aforesaid circumstances as final without affording the opportunity contemplated under the applicable instructions, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was prayed that the petitioners be permitted to undertake the Long Jump afresh, with the prescribed three attempts, or at least the remaining attempts as contemplated by the earlier decision of this Court, under proper supervision and videography; that their Physical Efficiency Test results be re-tabulated and, if they qualify, they be permitted to participate in the subsequent stages of the recruitment process in accordance with their merit.

Learned counsel, in support of the aforesaid submissions, relied upon Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910; Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 INSC 847 : (2024) 12 SCR 28; Narayan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3047/1987, decided by this Court on 26.09.1989; and the judgments rendered by Delhi High Court in Nidhi v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No.8853/2023, decided on 03.09.2025; and in CT/GD Prajakta Wakchaure v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No.16178/2025, decided on 12.03.2026.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the recruitment pursuant to the advertisement dated 17.07.2025 is being conducted strictly in accordance with the Rules of 1989 and the instructions issued by the competent authority governing the present Physical Efficiency Test. The petitioners having participated in the PET in accordance with the procedure uniformly adopted for all the candidates, cannot claim a fresh or additional opportunity merely because they are dissatisfied with the result recorded in the Long Jump or with the circumstances in which they participated in the test.

Learned counsel submitted that Rule 21 of the Rules of 1989 specifically governs the conduct of the competitive examination and the Physical Efficiency Test. Sub-rule (2) provides that the syllabus for the examination and the Physical Efficiency Test shall be such as may be prescribed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police from time to time, whereas sub-rule (5) requires every successful candidate to appear before the Physical Efficiency Board and provides that the Physical Efficiency Test would be vigorous as laid down by the Director General of Police for adjudging the suitability of the candidate. It was contended that the aforesaid statutory scheme does not confer upon a candidate any right to seek a second test, re-test or additional opportunity after the PET has been conducted and the result recorded in accordance with the procedure prescribed for the recruitment.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Director General of Police, in exercise of the authority contemplated under Rule 21(2) and Rule 21(5), issued Standing Order dated 07.07.2025 prescribing the events, distances and marks for the PET in the present recruitment. The said Standing Order constitutes the governing prescription for the present selection and, while prescribing the Long Jump as one of the events and specifying the corresponding distances and marks, does not provide for any right of re-test or a fresh opportunity to a candidate whose performance has been recorded. It was submitted that neither the advertisement dated 17.07.2025 nor the admit card issued to the petitioners contains any stipulation conferring a right to a second PET or permitting an individual candidate to seek re-measurement, re-test or re-conduct of the event on the ground of an unsuccessful performance. The fact that the PET was conducted in the same manner for all candidates, according to the respondents, itself demonstrates uniformity in the selection process.

With regard to the communication dated 17.02.1989 relied upon by the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the same cannot confer any enforceable right upon the petitioners in the recruitment held pursuant to the present advertisement. It was contended that the communication preceded the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989, which came into force upon their publication in the Rajasthan Gazette on 14.08.1989, and that the present recruitment is governed by the statutory Rules of 1989 and the subsequent instructions issued thereunder. According to learned counsel, the communication dated 17.02.1989 cannot be read independently of the statutory framework which came into force thereafter, particularly when the Rules themselves do not prescribe three attempts in the Long Jump. The reliance placed upon the said communication, therefore, cannot be treated as creating a continuing or vested right in favour of the petitioners to demand three attempts in the present recruitment.

Learned counsel also submitted that Narayan Lal (supra) does not assist the petitioners in the facts of the present case. It was contended that the said decision arose out of an earlier recruitment and cannot be treated as incorporating a requirement of three attempts into the Rules of 1989, particularly when no such provision finds place in the statutory Rules or in the Standing Order governing the present recruitment. It was further submitted that the fact that every candidate participating in the present PET was afforded the same opportunity and no candidate was permitted a second attempt is a material circumstance against the grant of individual relief, as permitting the petitioners to undertake the Long Jump afresh at a subsequent stage would place them on a different footing from thousands of candidates who participated in the PET in accordance with the notified schedule.

Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that permitting a re-test or additional opportunity to the petitioners on account of an alleged foul, disputed measurement, adverse weather conditions or dissatisfaction with the result would amount to introducing a different yardstick in an ongoing selection process. It was contended that the conditions prevailing on the date of a fresh test would necessarily be different and the petitioners would thereby obtain an advantage not available to the other candidates. Such individual relaxation, according to the respondents, would itself offend the requirement of equality and uniformity in public recruitment. It was thus prayed that the writ petitions be dismissed, as no statutory or enforceable right to a second opportunity in the Long Jump or to a fresh PET has been demonstrated by the petitioners.

Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material available on record and the relevant statutory scheme.

The controversy in the present matters essentially revolves around the manner in which the Long Jump event was required to be conducted in the Physical Efficiency Test and, more particularly, as to whether the petitioners were entitled to three attempts in the said event on the strength of the communication dated 17.02.1989. The petitioners have also raised individual grievances regarding the conditions prevailing at the time of the PET and the measurement of their respective Long Jump performances. The aforesaid contentions, therefore, have to be examined in the backdrop of the statutory scheme governing the recruitment and the instructions issued for the present selection process.

Rule 21 of the Rules of 1989 provides the scheme for the written examination and the Physical Efficiency Test. Sub-rule (2) thereof provides:

It is a settled proposition that executive instructions cannot override or amend statutory rules. At the same time, where the statutory rules are silent on a particular aspect, the competent authority may issue instructions to fill up the gap, so long as such instructions remain consistent with the statutory scheme. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147, reiterating the principle laid down in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910, has held that instructions may supplement the statutory rules, but cannot supplant them and must remain subservient to the statutory provisions.

The distinction is important here. The communication dated 17.02.1989 was issued before the Rules of 1989 came into force. Thereafter, the Rules provided the statutory framework for recruitment and, under Rule 21, specifically entrusted the Director General of Police with the authority to prescribe the Physical Efficiency Test from time to time. For the recruitment in question, that power has been exercised by issuance of the Standing Order dated 07.07.2025, which prescribes the events, standards and marks for the PET, including the Long Jump event.

The Standing Order, however, does not prescribe three attempts in the Long Jump as a right of every candidate. Nor does it provide for a second PET, re-conduct of the event or a fresh opportunity on the ground that the candidate was unable to achieve the prescribed standard. The advertisement dated 17.07.2025 and the admit card issued to the petitioners also do not contain any such stipulation.

This Court finds that merely because the Standing Order does not specifically state the number of attempts, it cannot follow that the communication dated 17.02.1989 must necessarily be treated as continuing to confer an enforceable right to three attempts in every subsequent recruitment. Such an interpretation would, in effect, introduce an additional condition into the present selection process which has not been prescribed either by the Rules or by the instructions governing the present recruitment. In the opinion of this Court, an earlier executive instruction cannot be treated as an independent and perpetual source of a substantive right once the statutory framework has intervened and the competent authority has subsequently prescribed the procedure for the recruitment in question.

The reliance placed by the petitioners upon Narayan Lal (supra) is also of no assistance. The said judgment was rendered in the facts of the recruitment then under consideration, to which the Rules of 1989 were not applicable. The said decision, therefore, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case, where the recruitment is governed by the Rules of 1989 and the instructions issued thereunder. This Court, therefore, finds no merit in the reliance placed upon the said judgment.

The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that three attempts in Long Jump are ordinarily provided by various recruiting agencies also does not advance their case. This is for the reason that a perusal of the very advertisements relied upon by the petitioners shows that the provision for three chances is expressly incorporated in the applicable recruitment notification itself. In other words, the entitlement flows from the specific rules, instructions or advertisement governing those particular selections. The position in the present recruitment is materially different. Neither the Rules of 1989, nor the Standing Order dated 07.07.2025, nor the advertisement dated 17.07.2025 contains any stipulation that a candidate shall be afforded three attempts in the Long Jump. This Court finds that the procedure adopted by another recruiting agency cannot, merely because it is more liberal or is followed as a matter of practice elsewhere, be imported into a recruitment process governed by its own statutory rules and instructions. The standard prescribed for one selection cannot become the governing standard for another selection in the absence of any statutory or other binding provision to that effect. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the fact that three attempts are specifically provided in other recruitments cannot, by itself, confer a corresponding right upon the petitioners in the present selection.

In the opinion of this Court, a Physical Efficiency Test (PET) cannot be equated with an ordinary written examination where a mistake in evaluation can be corrected without altering the circumstances in which the examination was conducted. Once a candidate has participated in the PET under the procedure prescribed for the selection, a direction for another attempt necessarily means that the candidate would be assessed afresh under different circumstances. Such a course, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be adopted merely because the candidate was unsuccessful.

The grievance of the petitioner – Vinod Kumar regarding rainfall and the condition of the track or field has to be considered in this very background. The conditions prevailing at the venue were not conditions faced by him alone. Other candidates participating in the PET at the same venue and during the same period were also required to perform under the prevailing weather and ground conditions. The petitioner cannot, after having participated in the test, seek to have their performance assessed afresh merely on the ground that the conditions were not conducive to achieving their best performance.

The Division Bench of this Court in Shravan Kumar Choudhary Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.; D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No.154/2019, decided on 22.05.2019, considered a similar grievance arising out of a Police PET conducted during rainy conditions. The Court noticed that candidates had participated in the test under the prevailing conditions and observed that permitting some of them to take a fresh test would give them a second opportunity under different and possibly more favourable conditions. The Court observed:

The aforesaid observations, in the opinion of this Court, squarely answer the grievance raised by the petitioner regarding the weather conditions. It is not the case that the petitioner alone was required to undertake the PET in adverse conditions while other candidates were provided a favourable opportunity. All candidates appearing in the concerned PET were subjected to the conditions prevailing at the venue. Some candidates may perform better and some may perform poorly under the same conditions; that, by itself, cannot be a ground for reopening the test for those who failed to achieve the prescribed standard. This Court, therefore, finds no justification to direct a fresh Long Jump merely on the ground of rainfall or the condition of the ground.

So far as the grievance regarding measurement is concerned, the petitioner – Girdhari Singh essentially disputes the distance recorded by the officials conducting the Long Jump. The assertion that a candidate had in fact crossed the prescribed distance is a disputed question of fact. The PET was conducted and videographed by the designated authorities and the result was recorded in the course of the selection. This Court, vide order dated 23.09.2026, directed the learned AAG to produce and display the relevant portions of the videography pertaining to physical events tracks before this Court. Upon perusal of the same, this Court finds no error apparent in recording of the marks or departure from the prescribed procedure in recording marks of the candidates by the respondents. In the opinion of this Court, unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate a clear departure from the prescribed procedure or some patent error or mala fide action in the manner of measurement, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the Physical Efficiency Board. In the present matters, this Court finds no such patent irregularity established from the material placed on record.

The grievance regarding foul also does not persuade this Court to interfere. The Court is required to examine the procedure actually prescribed for the recruitment and not to introduce, at this stage, a separate set of technical standards unless the same form part of the governing instructions. Once the Long Jump was conducted as part of the PET and the performance was recorded by the officials entrusted with the task, a fresh attempt cannot be directed merely because the candidate disputes the result.

In view of the above, this Court finds that the petitioners have failed to establish any violation of the Rules of 1989 or the Standing Order dated 07.07.2025. The communication dated 17.02.1989 does not confer any enforceable right to three attempts in the present recruitment, nor do the grievances regarding weather conditions, measurement or alleged foul warrant reopening of the PET.

This Court, therefore, finds no ground to interfere with the selection process at this stage. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

No order as to costs.