Vinod Kumar Tandon vs State of Chhattisgarh and Others

Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J.—By this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner assails the legality and validity of the action of the respondents in retiring the petitioner at the age of 60 years. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Hari Datt Sharma, the relevant facts of the case in hand, have to be stated in brief.

The petitioner was initially appointed as Superintendent in Blind School, Raipur vide order dated 5th August, 1977 (Annexure PAS). From 1977 to 1990 the petitioner remained posted as Superintendent in Blind School, Raipur and thereafter he was transferred to Blind School Jagdalpur. Thereafter, he was again sent back to Raipur in the year 1992, where he remained posted till his promotion on the post of Deputy Director, Panchayat and Social Welfare Department, Raipur in November, 1999.

The petitioner claims that in view of the explanation appended to Rule 56 of The Fundamental Rules, amended vide the Chhattisgarh Shaskiya Sevak (Adhivarshiki-Ayu) Adhiniyam, 1967, he is entitled to the status of a Teacher'' because he was appointed for the post of Teacher, he actually worked as Teacher and taught classes. According to him, the nature of duties assigned to a Superintendent, as indicated in the advertisement (Annexure P/4), clearly makes out that the nature of duties of Superintendent is akin to that of a Teacher. Therefore, the petitioner., who had completed 20 years of teaching in his capacity as Superintendent, was entitled to be treated as Teacher'' for the benefit of age of retirement prescribed for the Teacher'', under the Act of 1967. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the terms of advertisement, which reads as under:

Duties:--

(i) Organising and maintaining institute for education, training and rehabilitation of blind persons.

(ii) Evolving modern methods of training of blind persons.

(iii) Undertaking means of employment/rehabilitation of such persons.

(iv) Administrative duties.

The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the nature of duties assigned and attached to the post of Superintendent have been clearly stated in Clause 9 of the advertisement (Annexure P/4) under which the petitioner was appointed. In his submission these duties have been treated as that of a Teacher, throughout, which is reflected from the fact that the petitioner was engaged as Teacher in various institutions till he was appointed as Deputy Director in the year 1999.

In support of his contention learned counsel relied on a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in the case of A.N. Singh v. State of M.P. & another, decided on 20th February, 1987 (W.P. No. 3829/1986).

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that the issue raised in this petition is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Hari Datt Sharma, wherein identical issue came up for consideration and after examining the duties, nature and function of the post of Superintendent of Deaf, Mute and Blind School, the Supreme Court held that the duties of Superintendent are supervisory in nature and not of Teacher, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief.

In order to claim the status of a Teacher, as defined under explanation appended to Section 56 of the Act, 1967, the petitioner is required to demonstrate that he was appointed for the purpose of teaching in an educational institution run by the Government including technical or medical education institutions in accordance with the Rules applicable for such appointment. In order to substantiate his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the terms of the advertisement which lays down the duties of the post of Superintendent, which are quoted above.

The claim of the petitioner is mainly founded on the Division Bench judgment of M.P. High Court which relied on similar terms of the advertisement to hold that the duties of the Superintendent were essentially that of the Teacher.

However, the Supreme Court has set the dispute at rest in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Hari Datt Sharma, . In that case the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the duties of the Superintendent of Deaf, Mute and Blind School which were as under:

Duties.-- (i) To undertake planning and organization of the institution for education, vocational training, rehabilitation and recreation of children, (ii) To undertake case-wise in respect of every child of the institution with a view to ascertaining the personality make-up, aptitudes and interest, socio-economic background and intelligence, (iii) to apply educational tests, prepare syllabus, organize specialized methods of education and vocational training of children and to organize examination, (iv) To take steps for the after care and rehabilitation of children, (v) To supervise the general maintenance of the children including the general health, recreation, discipline etc. and to meet the special needs of the children, (vi) To supervise and control staff and undertake other administrative duties and (vii) Any other work that may be assigned to him by Government or his superior officers.

If the duties assigned to the post of Superintendent, as relied by the counsel for the petitioner, mentioned in clause 9 of the advertisement (Annexure P/4) are examined in juxtaposition to the duties, as indicated in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Hari Datt Sharma, , who was also a Superintendent of Deaf, Mute and Blind School, it follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court is squarely applicable in the present case. In that case the Supreme Court has authoritatively held after examining the duties of the post of Superintendent that they are of supervisory in nature. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner is liable to be rejected.

In view of the above, I do not find any force in this petition, which deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. No cost.