Vinod Chandra vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Higher Education Govt. Lko. & Ors.

ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.: Heard Shri Anupam Mehrotra, learned counsel assisted by Shri Desh Deepak Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Savitra Vardhan Singh, learned counsel for respondent No.2, Shri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Akber Ahmad, Shri Gyanesh Bajpai, Shri Atul Dixit and Ms. Manjari, learned counsel for respondent No.4 and Shri Avdhesh Shukla, learned counsel for respondent No.3.

The present Special Appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 interdicting an order dated 17.12.2025, passed by a Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court in Writ-A No. 14662 of 2025 (Vinod Chandra versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others), whereby the claim of the Appellant (also the writ petitioner) relating to the legality of the determination of seniority of teachers and his appointment as the Principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, an affiliated college of the University of Lucknow, under the provisions of the First Statutes of the University of Lucknow, 1975 was dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of availability of alternate remedy.

The Appeal was heard on several occasions and during hearing on 23^rd of September, 2026, this Court passed the following order:

Shorn of unnecessary details, it emerges from the factual matrix of the present appeal that the appellant was appointed as a ‘Lecturer’ on 28.08.1991 on the recommendation of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission, Allahabad, and was subsequently promoted to the post of ‘Principal’ of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra Post Graduate College, Lucknow.

It emerges from the record that, during the intervening period of 1995-1998, 1998-1999 the appellant availed leave with pay for visiting abroad under the Commonwealth Academic Staff Scholarship Scheme for a total period of 3 years and 335 days. Further, during the period from 1999-2000, 2004-2006 and 2014, the appellant availed leave without pay for a total period of 3 years 338 days. Both these leaves according to the Appellant were duly sanctioned by the competent Authority.

In the interregnum, on 10.06.2020, the Principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, after inviting objections from stake holders, published a seniority list of teachers of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College. In the said seniority list, the name of the appellant was placed at Serial No. 6, whereas the name of the contesting private respondent No. 4 was placed at Serial No. 15. It is not in dispute that the contesting private respondent had been appointed as a ‘Lecturer’ on 21.06.1990 and that his services were regularized on 14.06.1992.

As per the Uttar Pradesh State University Act, 1973 applicable to the facts of the present case read along with the First Statutes of the University of Lucknow, an appeal against the determination of the aforesaid seniority list of teachers was required to be preferred before the Vice Chancellor within the prescribed period. It is an admitted position that no appeal was preferred by anyone, including the contesting private respondent No.4, against the aforesaid seniority list before the competent authority within the prescribed period.

Subsequently, a representation dated 14.03.2023 came to be submitted by the contesting private respondent No.4 before the Principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College. In the representation, the said respondent challenged the seniority determined of the appellant and one Anshumali Sharma on the ground that the leave availed by them was allegedly unauthorized and resulted in a break in their service. Thus, according to the said representation the seniority of the Appellant was wrongly decided.

Ostensibly, no order was passed by the Principal on the said representation. However, a seniority list dated 30.06.2023 was issued by the principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College and the same was submitted to the Vice Chancellor of the University of Lucknow because as per law the senior most teacher was to be appointed as the ‘Principal’ of the college. Even in the said seniority list, the appellant was placed at Serial No. 4, whereas the contesting private respondent No.4 was placed at Serial No. 8, thereby maintaining the inter se seniority between the parties as reflected in the earlier seniority list.

Accordingly, pursuant to the seniority list dated 30.06.2023, the appellant, being the senior-most teacher in the college, was appointed to the post of ‘Principal’ of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College on 01.07.2023 by an order dated 30.06.2023.

The contesting private respondent No.4, being aggrieved by the said appointment pursuant to the seniority list, preferred an appeal before the Vice Chancellor, University of Lucknow, challenging the seniority of the appellant, raising an issue regarding the continuity of service of the Appellant from the date of his substantive appointment and thereby challenging his seniority.

The appellant filed a reply to the said appeal in accordance with Rules 16.12 and 16.18 of the First Statutes of the University of Lucknow, stating that the leaves in question were duly authorized and, therefore, these leaves could not be treated as resulting in a break in service.

It is the case of the appellant that he was informed vide a letter dated 29.05.2024, that a committee had been constituted by the Vice Chancellor, University of Lucknow, for disposal of the appeal preferred by the contesting private respondent No.4. The said committee granted time to the concerned parties to furnish relevant documents. Apparently, the Manager of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, Lucknow, supported the case of the appellant and stated that all the leaves availed by the appellant were in accordance with the First Statutes of the University of Lucknow and the same had been sanctioned by the Managing Committee. It was also stated that, since, the appellant was senior to the contesting private respondent No.4, the appellant was rightly appointed as Principal of the college.

It also emerges from the records that the committee initially constituted to decide the representation/appeal of the contesting private respondent was subsequently dissolved and thereafter, reconstituted to examine the issue of seniority.

It appears that certain issues were raised regarding the constitution of the committee and the integrity of its members. In any case, the contention of the Appellant relating to continuity of service did not find any favour with the committee. Thus, the reconstituted committee went on to submit a report dated 03.11.2025 recommending that the length of service of the Appellant was shorter than that of the contesting private respondent No.4 by 40 days and consequently, the said respondent No.4 was senior to the Appellant. The Vice Chancellor, relying on the findings and report of the reconstituted committee, passed the impugned order dated 14.11.2025 and held that the contesting private respondent no.4 was senior to the appellant.

Aggrieved by the report of the reconstituted committee dated 03.11.2025 as well as the impugned order dated 14.11.2025, the appellant raised objections, inter alia, on various grounds, including violation of the principles of natural justice, non-consideration of reply and not deciding the seniority issue in the correct perspective. The appellant also submitted a representation before the Manager of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, Lucknow objecting to the order passed by the Vice Chancellor. However, it is apparent from records that the Manager/Secretary of the college did not gave any relevance to the representation of the appellant and, by an order dated 15/16.11.2025, recommended amendment of the seniority list. Consequently, a notification was issued on 29.11.2025 modifying the seniority list dated 30.06.2023.

On the heels of the aforesaid notification, a meeting of the Managing Committee of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, Lucknow, was convened on 30.11.2025 and by a resolution passed on the same date, the contesting private respondent No.4 was declared senior to the appellant and was accordingly granted charge of the post of Principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, Lucknow.

The appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid acts and omissions of the Respondent-Authorities, preferred a writ petition before a Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court, challenging, inter alia, the impugned order dated 14.11.2025 passed by the Vice-Chancellor as well as the order passed by the Committee of Management dated 15/16.11.2025, amongst other reliefs. The appellant also sought a direction permitting the Appellant to continue on the post of Principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, Lucknow.

It emerges that the said writ petition came to be disposed of by the Hon’ble Single Judge without calling for a counter-affidavit from the respondents, primarily on the ground that an alternative statutory remedy of appeal was available under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973. The Hon’ble Single Judge, relying on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771; and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1; held that the appellant had failed to establish the existence of circumstances warranting exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the availability of an alternative remedy. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed on the ground of maintainability, because of the existence of statutory remedy available under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 vide the impugned order dated 17.12.2025, passed in Writ-A No. 14662 of 2025 (Vinod Chandra versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others).

It is this impugned order, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court Appeal.

Mr. Anupam Mehrotra, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the impugned order was legally unsustainable, as the same failed to take into consideration that the order dated 14.11.2025 passed by the Vice-Chancellor was vitiated by mala fides and had been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. According to the learned counsel the availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of self-restraint adopted by the High Courts and does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Learned counsel also drew the attention of this Court to the fact that the committee constituted initially was subsequently reconstituted, but the appellant was never informed about such reconstitution. It was submitted that no proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant before the reconstituted committee and that the entire exercise was undertaken in a mechanical manner, which vitiates the report. It was further submitted that the report of the reconstituted committee was neither fair nor legally sustainable and suffered from several infirmities, including violation of principles of natural justice. On this basis, it was contended that the impugned order passed by the Vice Chancellor, as well as the consequential decision of the Committee of Management, was liable to be set aside. It was further contended that the Vice Chancellor had no jurisdiction to determine whether the leave availed by the appellant resulted in a break in service, particularly when the said leave had already been duly sanctioned and approved by the competent authorities.

Learned counsel submitted that the contesting private respondent had never challenged the seniority list dated 10.06.2020 issued by the Principal within the prescribed period of 60 days under Statute 18.14 of the First Statutes of the University of Lucknow. According to the appellant, the contesting respondent had thereby failed to exercise the statutory remedy within the prescribed period and could not subsequently reopen the issue of seniority after an unexplained delay. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellant relied on various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including the judgments rendered in Dr. Bal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U.P., (1995) 1 SCC 614; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar and Others, (1993) 4 SCC 727; State of Uttar Pradesh, Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891; and Union of India and Others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588.

Per contra, Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, learned Senior counsel appearing for the contesting private respondent submitted that the present intra-court appeal was not maintainable once the discretion had already been exercised by the writ-Court. According to him, an intra-court appeal could not be entertained merely because another view was possible. In support of the said submission, reliance was placed by the learned Senior counsel on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority and Others v. SCOPE Sales Limited and Another, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 112.

Learned senior counsel further submitted that no decision-making power had been delegated by the Vice Chancellor to the committee constituted for examining the dispute and that the committee's report was only recommendatory in nature. It was contended that the contesting private respondent had initially raised the dispute before the Principal and, upon being aggrieved by the decision of the Principal, had thereafter preferred an appeal under Statute 18.14 before the competent authority.

It was further submitted that the appellant ought to have raised the issue of jurisdiction before the competent authority at the first instance and could not subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of the committee after participating in the proceedings. Learned senior counsel submitted that the report submitted by the committee was merely recommendatory and that the final decision was taken by the competent authority. He also vehemently disputed the submission regarding violation of the principles of natural justice. It was submitted that adequate opportunity of hearing had been afforded to the appellant by the committee constituted for examining the dispute. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SBI v. Amit Iron (P) Ltd., reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 538.

Lastly, learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant had an equally efficacious alternative remedy under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973. It was argued that, without exhausting the statutory remedy available to the appellant, the appellant ought not to have invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed upon several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including Leelavathi N. v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2253.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and keeping in view the entirety of the facts, this Court vide order dated 23^rd of September, 2026 has already remanded the matter to the Hon’ble Singe Judge of this Court, with a request for early disposal of the writ petition, preferably within six weeks. Since, this Court has reserved this intra-court Appeal for detailed judgment, the additional grounds fortifying the remand order are herein below.

This intra-court appeal impugns the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.12.2025, whereby the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of maintainability, without calling for a counter-affidavit, solely on the availability of an alternative remedy under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973. The question is not whether another view was possible on a matter validly decided, but as to whether the writ Court could had dismissed the petition at the very threshold, as not maintainable, on a disputed record where the petitioner had pleaded specific, particularised violations of natural justice. According to this Court, that question must be answered in the first instance, since it conditions everything that follows.

Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, learned Senior counsel has submitted, while relying on the case of SCOPE Sales (supra), that an intra-court appeal cannot be entertained merely because another view is possible. There is no doubt about the said proposition of law propounded recently by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, it is equally forceful to understand that the said principle presupposes that the writ Court weighed the rival contentions on a complete record and exercised its discretion one way or the other. Admittedly, as far as the facts of the present case, the Hon’ble Single Judge did not test the natural-justice plea against any rebuttal, none was called for by way of counter-affidavit and unfortunately the writ Court went on to hold, on the strength of the petition alone, that the plea did not attract the recognised exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule. According to this Court, an intra-court appeal against that determination is not a request for a second opinion on a settled controversy. In our view, it is a challenge to a threshold finding reached without evidence from the other side. According the judgment of SCOPE Sales (supra) is distinguishable.

Further, the alternative-remedy rule, which is the epicentre of controversy in the present matter is merely a rule of discretion. It is a self-imposed restraint and not a statutory or a Constitutional bar. In our considered view, the existence of an alternative remedy does not strip away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We find that the Whirlpool Corporation case (supra), the foundation of the impugned order, itself holds that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is "plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution," and that the rule of alternative remedy is a "self-imposed" restriction, not a Constitutional or statutory ouster.

The hon’ble Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries case (supra), at paragraph 27, restates the principle of law in the following words:-

According to us, the usage of the word “ordinarily” in paragraph 27(iv) relating to availability of an alternative remedy signals a default posture relating to discretion and entertainability of a writ Court and not an absolute prohibition.

Similarly, a three-Judge Bench of hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd., reported in (2022) 16 SCC 447; in para 10 of the judgment held as follows:-

In the given facts of the present case, we find that although the learned Single Judge, has correctly set out the four recognised exceptions i.e. the enforcement of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, want of jurisdiction or challenge to vires, however, unfortunately it proceeded to hold that the appellant's case fell outside them, and dismissed the petition on the ground of maintainability. This according to us, inverts the sequence the authorities in Whirlpool Corporation case (supra) and Radha Krishan case (supra) themselves prescribe. Maintainability was never truly in issue; the only question was whether, on the facts pleaded, the Court ought to decline to exercise a jurisdiction it indisputably possessed. Framing the dismissal as one of maintainability suggests the writ petition was incompetent and a characterisation unsupported by either authority relied upon.

In any case, this Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that, a disputed plea of breach of principles of natural justice cannot be resolved by assuming it away, as has been sought to be done in the impugned order. According to us, the appellant did not invoke vitiation of principles of "natural justice" as a bare incantation to avoid the alternative remedy. Evidently, he pleaded specific facts: (a) the committee originally constituted by the Chancellor was dissolved and reconstituted without notice to him; (b) the reconstituted committee recomputed his length of service without addressing the State Government's approval, dated 13.03.2012, of the very leave now treated as a break in service; and (c) the Vice Chancellor acted on the reconstituted committee's report without him having had an opportunity to meet its altered premise and most importantly even the integrity of the memebrs of the Committee has also been sought to be challenegd. As to whether these facts are true or not or had any basis was never tested by the Hon’ble Single Judge, because no counter-affidavit was called for. Therefore, a finding that a case does not fall within the natural-justice exception is itself a finding of fact, as it presupposes an answer to whether a violation in fact occurred. Such a finding cannot be returned on the strength of the pleading made in the writ petition alone, and cannot then be used as the ground for holding the petition not maintainable, on the ground that it does not fall within any of the exceptions carved out in the Whirlpool Corporation case (supra). According to this Court, the said ground has to be necessarily decided after hearing the other-side of the story. In view thereof, we have no hesitation in concluding that in the present facts and circumstances, which has come on record, the correct sequence would be as: call for counter affidavits, then test the plea on the rival versions and then determine whether the exception is attracted and lastly decide whether discretion should be exercised in favour of relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy. According to us, the impugned order collapsed this sequence into a single unrebutted assertion, and dismissed the petition at a stage prior to the one at which the alternative-remedy question could properly arise. Thus, it is concluded that the facts of the present case attract applicabillityof at least two contengencies, that is (i) violation of principles of natural justice; (ii) enforcement of fundamental rights, as has been carved out in the exceptions of Whirlpool Corporation case (supra).

We also find that the hon’ble Supreme Court while faced with the similar questions realting to the maintainbility of a writ petition in the case of an availability of alternate remedy, it has held in the case of M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. The Excise And Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority and Ors., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95; as follows:-

The learned Senior Counsel’s ancillary contentions do not cure this defect. His argument that the committee's report was merely recommendatory and that the appellant, having participated before the original committee and he could not question the reconstituted committee's process, or that the respondent had himself properly pursued Statute 18.14 is of no avail. Each of these is a matter requiring factual determination and participation before one body is not participation before, or waiver as to, a differently constituted one; whether a report is recommendatory does not answer whether the material it relied upon was ever put to the affected party. These are precisely the issues a counter-affidavit exists to resolve, and precisely why summary dismissal foreclosed inquiry rather than answered it.

As a sequel to our discussion, the alternative-remedy doctrine could, at most, have permitted the learned Single Judge to weigh only after the natural-justice plea was tested on affidavits and found wanting and then it ought to have been examined as to whether the appellant should nonetheless be relegated to the stage of Section 68 of the University Act or not. The authorities relied upon by the Hon’ble Single Judge do not support, dismissal at the threshold, styled as a question of maintainability, before the plea was actually tested at all.

For all the aforesaid reasons, the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge dated 17.12.2025, dismissing the writ petition on the ground of maintainability, is hereby quashed and set aside. The petition being Writ-A No. 14662 of 2025 (Vinod Chandra versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others), is restored to its original number and remitted to the learned Single Judge for fresh consideration on merits, in accordance with law.

As already directed vide our order dated 23^rd of September, 2026, the respondents shall ensure filing their counter-affidavit(s) within ten days; the appellant shall be at liberty to file a rejoinder within three days thereafter.

Needless to say, all contentions on merits, including the question of breach of natural justice are left entirely open for determination by the learned Single Judge, uninfluenced by any observation made herein, which is confined solely to the propriety of dismissal of the writ petition, at the threshold.

The intra-court appeal is accordingly, allowed in the above terms.

There shall be no order as to cost(s).