Vincent Panikulangara vs Prof. N. Purushothaman and Others

Kochu Thommen, J.—The petitioner is an advocate of this Court. He is also the General Secretary of the Public Interest Law Service Society. He contends that, as a member of the public and as a citizen, he is deeply interested in "academic autonomy and the correct functioning of the 4th Respondent", the University of Calicut. He challenges Exts. P-1 and P-2.

Ext. P-1, dated 25th October 1982 reads:

The Chancellor is pleased to allow Professor N. Purushothaman to continue as Pro Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calicut in order to avoid dislocation of work in the University till a regular appointment of a person as Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University is made under Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Calicut University Act 1975 (Act 5 of 1975).

The continuance of Professor N. Purushothaman as Pro Vice-Chancellor will not give any right to him for reappointment.

Ext. P-2 dated 21st January 1983 reads:

In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 11 of the Calicut University Act, 1975, (Act 5 of 1975), the Chancellor of the University of Calicut is pleased to appoint Prof. N. Purushothaman, Presently Pro Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calicut as the Pro Vice-Chancel for of the said University for a further period of 4 years.

Ext. P-1 is in the nature of an interim order. It has been superseded by Ext. P-2. The crucial question therefore is whether Ext. P-2 which is the final order of appointment of the 1st Respondent as the Pro Vice-Chancellor of the 4th Respondent Calicut University for a further period of 4 years has been properly made.

u/s 7 of the Calicut University Act, 1975, the Governor of Kerala is the Chancellor of the University. Section 11 provides for appointment of a Pro Vice-Chancellor. It reads:

The Pro Vice-Chancellor.--{1) The Chancellor may, if he considers it necessary, appoint a Pro Vice-Chancellor in consultation with the Vice-Chancellor.

(emphasis supplied)

The question is whether Ext. P-2 was made in compliance with Section 11. According to the petitioner, and also the 5th Respondent who was the Vice-Chancellor of the University until he resigned on 27 the January 1983, Ext. P-2 was not made in consultation with the Vice-Chancellor. The Chancellor has not sworn an affidavit on this crucial question. The Secretary to the Governor/Chancellor has sworn an affidavit stating that the Chancellor had consulted the Vice-Chancellor before he made Ext. P-2. This fact is affirmed by the 1st Respondent in his affidavit.

The Advocate-General appearing for the Chancellor, the 2nd Respondent has placed before me the relevant file. The file contains the original order signed by the Chancellor dated 21st January 1983 (Ext. P-2). It shows that before making Exts. P-1 and P-2, the Chancellor had consulted the Vice-Chancellor. On 18th January 1983 the Chancellor had a discussion with the Vice-Chancellor concerning the reappointment of the 1st Respondent for another period. It was subsequent to that discussion that Ext. P-2 was made. The file further shows that three letters had been addressed to the Chancellor by the Vice-Chancellor expressing strong views against the reappointment of the 1st Respondent for another term as Pro Vice-Chancellor. These are the letters of 15th October 1982, 2nd November 1982 and 10th January 1983. The Chancellor was thus well aware of the Vice-Chancellor''s objections even before their discussion on 18th January 1983. On 21st January 1983 the Chancellor made Ext. P-2.

Section 11 only speaks of consultation. Consultation can be either by correspondence or by personal discussion at a meeting or over the telephone. Consultation can be at various stages, all forming part of the process of consultation. The file shows that the process had commenced as early as 15th October 1982 when the Vice-Chancellor addressed his letter to the Chancellor. All his letters on the subject followed by his discussion with the Chancellor on 18th January 1983 thus constituted the consultation. It cannot be said that in the present case the consultation was ineffective.

The Petitioner contends that the Chancellor did not make Ext. P-2 independently of the advice rendered to him by the Ministers. According to the petitioner, the Chancellor is not expected to consult any person other than the Vice-Chancellor who alone is mentioned u/s 11. An order of appointment u/s 11 is in my view, purely administrative in character. It has none of the fetters associated with a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is open to the Chancellor to gather information concerning the candidate from any source available to him. The Chancellor is free to discuss the matter with any person in whom he has trust. All that the Act requires is that the Chancellor should not make an appointment until he has had an effective consultation with the Vice-Chancellor. The section does not say effective, but I would presume that that was the intent of the legislature. So long as the Chancellor has had an effective consultation with the Vice-Chancellor, as required by the section, the fact that he had also taken into account the views of other persons in whom he had faith would not vitiate an order made by him u/s 11 after consultation with the Vice-Chancellor.

The Petitioner further contends that the Chancellor was wrongly under the impression that the advice rendered to him by the Ministers on the appointment of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor was binding on him. There is nothing in the file which indicates that it was so. There is no evidence to show that the Chancellor assumed that the advice which he received on this question from the Ministers, if any such advice was received, was rendered to him in terms of Article 163 of the Constitution or that he was bound by such advice. In fact the Advocate-General points out that there is nothing in the file to indicate that the Chancellor had consulted the Ministers before he made Ext. P-2. The file, he says, does not show that any of the papers relating to Ext. P-2 had been forwarded to the Ministers or to any officer of the Government until Ext. P-2 was made.

In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the impugned orders are vitiated for any of the reasons stated by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider the question whether or not the Petitioner has the necessary locus standi or sufficient interest to challenge Exts. P-1 and P-2.

The Original Petition is dismissed for the reasons stated above. No costs.