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Judgment
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Bail petitioner namely Vinay Kumar, who is behind bars since 05.10.2023, has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail in case FIR No. 320 of 2023, dated 05.10.2023, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 302, 323, 504 & 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of Arms Act.
Pursuant to directions issued by this Court, respondent/State has filed status report and HC Tirath Ram has also come present with the record.
Close scrutiny of status report/record reveals that on 5.10.2023, bail-petitioner Vinay Kumar gave telephonic information through his mobile phone bearing number 7018876433 to Police Station Sadar, Una, that some quarrel was taking place at Badhala on account of land dispute. He alleged that competent court of law had already granted a stay in respect of the disputed land. On the basis of aforesaid information, police reached at the spot and recorded the statement of Girdhari Lal, who while claiming himself to be a senior citizen, stated that on 05.10.2023, at 6:30 p.m., when he reached near the house of Ranjot, the work of laying concrete over water-supply pipe was being carried out there. He alleged that 6 to 7 labourers were working on the spot and at that time, Pramod, son of Sukhdev i.e. deceased, was also present there. He alleged that Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh, and his son Vinay Kumar alias Lucky i.e. accused, came out of their house and started threatening that they would shoot everyone and thereafter, fired one gunshot in air. He alleged that Pramod, son of Sukhdev i.e. deceased attempted to flee from the spot, but in the meantime, Vinay Kumar, son of Pramod Singh, fired a gunshot, which hit the head of Pramod, son of Sukhdev, as a result thereof, he fell on the ground. He alleged that many persons gathered on the spot and few of them took Pramod to the hospital. He alleged that Manoj Kumar, son of deceased Pramod Singh also reached the spot, but he was also given beatings by the accused Pramod, Vinay and younger son of Pramod, Sunil, as a consequence thereof, he also fell on the ground. In the aforesaid background, FIR under Sections 302, 323, 504 & 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of Arms Act came to be registered against Pramod, son of Chuhar Singh, Vinay Kumar, and Sunil Kumar. However, subsequently, since Pramod Kumar, son of Sukhdev Singh, at whom gunshot was fired, died at PGIMER, Chandigarh, Section 307 IPC was dropped, and case under Sections 302, 323, 504 & 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of Arms Act was registered against Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh, and his son Vinay. One of the co-accused, namely Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh, stands enlarged on bail on medical grounds vide order dated 07.01.2026 passed by this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 2515 of 2025, whereas present bail petitioner, Vinay Kumar, is behind bars.
Since challan stands filed in competent court of law, and nothing remains to be recovered from the petitioner, he has approached this Court in instant proceedings for grant of regular bail.
Ms. Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that no case much less under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner, and as such, he is entitled to be enlarged on bail. To substantiate her aforesaid plea, she referred to statements of some material prosecution witnesses recorded before the learned trial court. She stated that heavy reliance has been placed upon statement made by PW-14, Girdhari Lal, by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the bail petitioner, Vinay, but if version put-forth by this witness is perused in its entirety, it creates serious doubt with regard to involvement of the present bail-petitioner. She specifically referred to the statement of Investigating Officer, SI Maan Singh, wherein he stated that he, after having reached the spot at 7:50 p.m., prepared spot map (Ext. P-40/PW-22) at the instance of Girdhari Lal. She further referred to the statement made by this witness to the effect that, "I have also not depicted in the site plan as to where accused were standing and which of the accused fired the shot. I have also not depicted in the site plan as to where Girdhari Lal was standing." She stated that as per admission made by aforesaid witness, large number of persons were present on spot at the time of alleged incident, but yet Investigating Officer failed to associate any one of them, rather proceeded to record the statement of Girdhari Lal, who can be said to have some prior animosity with the accused named in FIR including present bail-petitioner on account of some civil litigation pending in the competent court of law.
Ms. Vyas, learned counsel for petitioner, further invited attention of this Court to the statement of PW-23, Sanjeev Kumar, who at relevant time was working as Deputy Director, RFSL, Mandi, HP, to state that no gun residue was found on the person as well as clothes of Vinay Kumar and as such, there is no concrete evidence to connect the present bail-petitioner with the gunshot allegedly fired at deceased Pramod, son of Sukhdev. She argued that residue of gunshot was found on the person as well as clothes of co-accused Pramod, son of Chuhar Singh, who already stands enlarged on bail. While again referring to the statement of SI Maan Singh, PW-22, Ms. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, attempted to argue that factum with regard to gunshot allegedly fired by the accused Pramod and Vinay never came to be mentioned in the rukka prepared by SI Maan Singh, as has been admitted by him in his cross-examination, which itself falsifies the story of the prosecution in its entirety. Ms. Vyas, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that petitioner is behind bars for the last three years, and till date, prosecution has not been able to record the statements of all material prosecution witnesses and as such, petitioner is otherwise entitled to be enlarged on bail on the ground of inordinate delay in conclusion of trial.
Lastly, Ms. Vyas submitted that High Court while granting bail, must exercise its discretion judiciously and in accordance with settled principles, including the gravity of the offence, likelihood of absconding, influencing witnesses, repetition of the offence, and obstruction of justice. In this regard, she placed reliance upon judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar Alias Polia and Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 118 (para 13) and Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and Anr., (2010) 14 SCC 496 (para 9).
Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, while fairly admitting factum with regard to filing of the challan in the competent court of law, stated that though nothing remains to be recovered from the bail-petitioner, but keeping in view the gravity of offence alleged to have been committed by him, he does not deserve any leniency, rather needs to be dealt with severely. Mr. Kahol further stated that there is overwhelming evidence adduced on record by the prosecution to prove the guilt of present bail-petitioner, who not only fired gunshot at deceased Pramod, son of Sukhdev, but also gave beatings to his son, Manoj. He submitted that evidence adduced on record clearly reveals that land, over which concrete was being laid, belongs to State of Himachal Pradesh, and no stay, if any, qua the same was granted by the competent court of law. He further submitted that all the material prosecution witnesses have categorically stated before court below that at first instance, one gunshot was fired in air by Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar, who happens to be father of the present bail-petitioner, Vinay Kumar, and thereafter, second gunshot was fired by the present bail-petitioner, which hit the head of the deceased Pramod, son of Sukhdev. While refuting the contention raised by Ms. Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, that scientific evidence adduced on record nowhere proves the case of prosecution, Mr. Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that though bare perusal of statement made by PW-23 clearly proves the case of the prosecution that gunshot was fired from the licensed gun of co-accused Pramod Singh by the present bail-petitioner, Vinay, but question otherwise attempted to be raised in these proceedings cannot be looked into in the instant proceedings initiated for grant of bail. He further submitted that since Investigating Officer (PW-22) had reached the spot after the alleged incident, and thereafter, entire incident was reported to him by PW-14, Girdhari Lal, who is an eye-witness, minor omission, if any, in recording some facts in the rukka may not be fatal to the case of prosecution, rather same would be decided by the competent court of law in totality of evidence collected on record by prosecution. He further submitted that FIR is registered on the basis of rukka, and complete facts with regard to incident stand narrated in the FIR, which have been now further substantiated by the material prosecution witnesses, while getting their statements recorded before the learned trial court.
Dr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel representing the complainant, specifically referred to the FSL report to state that bullet recovered from the body of deceased Pramod Singh was fired from the gun recovered from the present bail-petitioner, which itself suggests that bail-petitioner was responsible for the killing of deceased Pramod Singh, son of Sukhdev.
Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that on the date of alleged incident, some dispute arose inter se deceased Pramod, son of Sukhdev, and accused, namely Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh, and his son Vinay, present bail-petitioner, qua the use of land for laying concrete by the labour of contractor, who was given work by the IPH. Since accused named in the FIR including present bail-petitioner proclaimed that land, over which concrete was being laid was disputed, and competent court of law has already granted stay qua same, they, with a view to stop the work, firstly attempted to terrorize the labourers by firing a gunshot in the air, and thereafter, present bail-petitioner, after his having snatched revolver from his father, fired a gunshot at deceased Pramod, son of Sukhdev. As per prosecution story, person, namely Girdhari Lal (PW-14), who at relevant time was passing through the spot, witnessed Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh, firing gunshot in the air, whereafter his son Vinay Kumar, present bail-petitioner, allegedly snatched revolver from his father and fired gunshot at deceased Pramod, who ultimately succumbed to his injuries. Besides above, prosecution has also recorded the statement of Mr. Manoj Rana (PW-20), who also reached the spot after hearing news of firing gunshot at his father. If the statement made by aforesaid witness is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he corroborates the version put-forth by PW-14, Girdhari Lal, who apparently was present on the spot at the time of alleged incident. Besides above, PW-2, Ajay Kumar has also supported the story of the prosecution. No doubt, as per cross-examination of PW-22, Maan Singh, i.e. Investigating Officer, he had not depicted the alleged blood spots in the site plan Ext. P-40/PW22, and he had also not depicted in the site plan as to where accused were standing and which of the accused fired the gunshot, but such omissions, if any, may not be sufficient to conclude innocence of the present bail-petitioner against whom there is overwhelming evidence suggestive of the fact that he fired gunshot at deceased Pramod Singh, son of Sukhdev. Similarly, this Court is not impressed with submission of Ms. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, that PW-23, Sanjeev Kumar, Deputy Director, RFSL, had admitted that no residue of gunshot was traced on the person as well as clothes of Vinay Kumar, rather same was found on the person and clothes of co-accused Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh. If the report submitted by RFSL is perused in its entirety, it nowhere suggests that clothes of Vinay Kumar were taken into possession. Moreover, it is not in dispute that two gunshots were fired. One gunshot was fired in the air by the father of the present bail-petitioner, on whose clothes residue of gunshot was found, and another gunshot was fired by the present bail-petitioner, which hit the head of the deceased Pramod, son of Sukhdev. As per story of the prosecution, present bail-petitioner, after having fired gunshot, immediately fled away from the spot. As per FSL report, gunshot was fired from the gun, which was recovered from the possession of present bail-petitioner. Since there is overwhelming evidence adduced on record by the prosecution suggestive of the fact that deceased Pramod Singh, son of Sukhdev, died on account of his being hit by gunshot fired by the present bail-petitioner, this Court is not persuaded to agree with Ms. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, that petitioner has been falsely implicated.
Though case against the present bail-petitioner would be decided by the trial court in totality of evidence collected on record by the prosecution, but having noticed aforesaid glaring aspects of matter, this Court is not persuaded to accept the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for grant of bail, especially taking into account the fact that he is accused of heinous crime punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Similarly, this Court is not persuaded to consider the prayer made on behalf of petitioner for grant of bail on ground of inordinate delay in conclusion of trial. In the case at hand, evidence has already commenced. Out of the 42 prosecution witnesses, 24 have already been examined and the court below has now fixed the matter for recording the statements of the remaining witnesses on 07.09.2026. If the statements of the remaining witnesses are recorded on the next date of hearing fixed by the court below, the trial shall be concluded within the next two to three months.
At this stage, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted hereinbelow:-
(i)Broad principles for the grant of bail
56.In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7.It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.
8.Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9.Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57.In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8.The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58.This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3.Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59.In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60.In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9.… It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii)nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii)severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv)danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v)character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi)likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii)reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”
(emphasis supplied)
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62.One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of cases has held that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted herein below:-
“6.Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”
7.It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.”
Similarly, Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, held that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under:
“2.The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
Reliance is also placed upon judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3539 held that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. Relevant paras of the afore judgment are extracted herein below:-
“14.Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim.
16.We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.”
In yet another case, Hon’ble Apex Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129, held that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. Relevant para of the afore judgment is extracted herein below:-
“24.As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”
At this stage, this Court also finds it apt to take note of the fact that during pendency of trial, two complaints came to be lodged against the accused named in FIR by the prosecution witnesses, wherein they specifically alleged that they were being terrorized and threatened by the accused, namely Pramod Singh, son of Chuhar Singh, and present bail-petitioner. It is also pertinent to note that the bail granted to co-accused Pramod Singh by this Court, in the first instance, was subsequently cancelled on account of his having jumped bail. He allegedly terrorized the prosecution witnesses, but yet this Court, taking note of his medical condition as well as advanced age, enlarged him on bail, subject to the condition that he would not attempt to influence and tamper with the prosecution witnesses. During pendency of the case, learned counsel representing the complainant made available one complaint addressed to SHO, Police Station Mehatpur, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, alleging therein that complainant is being constantly harassed and terrorized by the co-accused Pramod, who otherwise happens to be his father of the present bail-petitioner.
Though as per instructions imparted to Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, by the police official present in court, aforesaid complaint is being investigated, but this Court, having taken note of the conduct of the bail-petitioner, has reason to presume and believe that in the event of his being enlarged on bail, he may cause harm to the prosecution witnesses and as such, it would not be in the interest of justice to enlarge him on bail till the conclusion of the trial.
Though learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Mahipal and Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) to state that her client is entitled to bail, but aforesaid law has been elaborately dealt by Hon’ble Apex Court in Pinki (supra) and held that while considering an application for bail, court cannot lose sight of serious nature of accusation and facts having bearing on the case giving due consideration to the facts of present case. In view of serious nature of offence, this Court is of the considered view that the law relied upon by the petitioner does not benefit his case and is thus not applicable here.
Consequently, in view of detailed discussion as well as law taken into consideration, this court finds no merit in the present petition, and accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, before parting, this court wishes to observe that since bail-petitioner is behind bars for the last three years, coupled with the fact that statements of majority of prosecution witnesses have already been recorded, this court hopes and trusts that court below would make all-out efforts to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from today.
Otherwise also, this Court, on administrative and judicial sides, has been issuing directions to the trial Courts to decide the cases of under-trials on priority basis, so that the freedom of such persons, is not curtailed for an indefinite period.
Registry to apprise the learned Court below with regard to passing of instant order, enabling it to do the needful well within stipulated time.