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Judgment
K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—The Writ Petitions No.8425 of 2003 and 9318 of 2004 are filed against the same order passed by the first
respondent, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tindivanam dated 14.09.2001. Writ Petition No.8425 of 2003 is filed against that
portion of the order denying the monetary benefit for the particular period. The Co-operative Society filed the other writ petition in W.P. No.9318
of 2004 challenging the entirety of the order passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tindivanam. In writ petition No.8425 of
2003 pending writ petition an interim order was granted by the Writ Court by order dated 25.09.2003 in WPMP No. 10792 of 2003 wherein
and whereby an interim direction has been given to the Villupuram District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., to pay the difference of pay for the
period between 01.04.1996 to 31.12.1999 within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. The correctness of the said interim order is
challenged in writ appeal No.3684 of 2004 by the Co-operative Society. The writ petitions and the writ appeal are clubbed together at the request
of the parties and they are before us for consideration. As already stated, the two writ petitions - one by the erstwhile employee and the other by
the Co-operative Society are against the very same order of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tindivanam dated 14.09.2001.
We will take up Writ Petition No.8425 of 2003 for narration of facts. The petitioner/employee joined in the South Arcot District Central Co-
operate Bank Limited, Cuddalore on 25.07.1960 as a Supervisor. Later on, he was promoted as Manager, Grade II and posted as Agent on
25.07.1971. On 09.06.1988, he was promoted as Manager, Grade-I. The promotion was made just prior to his annual increment, which fell due
on 01.07.1988. The petitioner''s Junior one S.Thangasamy who joined as Manager Grade II on 25.11.1973 i.e., two years and four months after
the petitioner, was promoted as Manager, Grade I on 17.10.1989 immediately after he got his annual increment on 01.10.1989. Because of this,
the petitioner was drawing a lower pay than his junior. The petitioner represented to the Society by his letter dated 19.12.1990 pointing out the
said anomaly, but of no avail. While so, in the year 1993, South Arcot District was bifurcated into two districts - Cuddalore and Villupuram
Districts. The South Arcot Central Co-operate Bank was also bifurcated as Cuddalore District Central Co-operative Bank Limited and
Villupuram District Central Co-operative Bank Limited. The petitioner was posted, at his option, at Villupuram Bank on 01.04.1996. Again he
made a representation to the Villupuram Bank, which by its letter dated 25.11.1999 requested the Cuddalore Bank to take steps. However, the
Cuddalore Bank rejected the request of the petitioner by stating that his junior''s pay was fixed based on the order of Deputy Registrar,
Cuddalore. The petitioner, in the meanwhile, retired from service on 31.12.1999. The petitioner, being left with no other remedy, filed a dispute to
the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tindivanam, during the year 2000, which is taken on file as Na.Ka. No.521/2000. The Joint
Registrar, by the order dated 14.09.2001 impugned in the writ petitions, granted the relief in favour of the petitioner, but restricted the same only
for the period the petitioner worked in the Villupuram Bank and the period prior to bifurcation of the bank has not been granted.
The Villupuram District Central Cooperative Bank filed writ petition No.9318 of 2004 challenging the order of the Deputy Registrar in entirety,
on the ground that the dispute agitated by the petitioner before the Deputy Registrar cannot be regarded as a dispute u/s 90 of the Co-operative
Societies Act, 1983. The Deputy Registrar has exercised the power not vested in him under the Act. Hence, any order passed by him is without
jurisdiction and nullity in law.
Mr.N.C.R.Prasad, learned counsel for the employee very strenuously contended that the benefit for the period for which the petitioner worked
in the South Arcot Co-operative Central bank prior to bifurcation has to be granted to the petitioner on the same line of reasoning based on which
the benefit has been granted in respect of the period for which the petitioner worked in the Villupuram bank. He argued elaborately on merits also.
However, Mr.Arumugam, learned counsel appearing for the bank contended that the dispute relating to the terms of employment, working
condition and disciplinary action would not come within ''any dispute'' u/s 90 of the Tamilnadu Co-operative Societies Act and any dispute
provided for therein is restricted in its scope to a dispute of civil nature, which is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominees and
does not take within itself an industrial dispute between the society and its workmen which under the Industrial Disputes Act is triable by the
Labour Court or Tribunal. The Industrial Disputes Act is a special law dealing with special subject. The Industrial dispute which in their nature are
essentially different from the ordinary civil dispute between the employer and his employee governed by a law of contract. The Industrial Disputes
Act provides for special machinery for adjudication of industrial dispute. As against this, the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act is a general
enactment and it must yield to the Industrial disputes act. Further, he contended that the expression ""any dispute"" touching the business of the
society occurring in section 90 of the Co-operative Societies Act is limited to disputes directly relating to actual trading and commercial activity of
the society. The expression does not take in the dispute between a society and its employees relating to conditions of employment, such as
seniority, revision of scale of pay, revision of dearness allowance, disciplinary action, etc. In order to support his contention he relied on the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 10.06.2008 made in a batch of writ petitions viz., W.P. No.17802 of 1994, etc., since
reported in Easwaramoorthy & others v. RJB Leoraj & others 2008-4-L.W. 883 (D.B.).
We heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. On going through the judgment of the Division Bench
above referred to with reference to the dispute involved in these writ petitions, we are of the view that the Division bench judgment squarely covers
the issue under consideration in these writ petitions.
Undisputably, the order impugned in both the writ petitions are one passed by the first respondent, the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative
Societies u/s 90 of the Tamilnadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. As stated in the summation of facts, the grievance of the employee is for
fixation of his scale of pay, which according to him, is wrongly fixed lower than the one fixed to his immediate junior.
The Division Bench took upon the issue by way of reference by a learned single Judge. The learned single Judge framed two questions for
consideration by larger Bench. They are: In matters relating to service conditions of employees of Cooperative Societies, whether the Industrial
Disputes Act (Special Law) or the Cooperative Societies Act (General Law) is applicable?
Whether an employee of a Cooperative Society can invoke the provisions of Section 90 and/or Section 152/153 (Appeal/Revision) for
redressal of his service grievances?
The reason for reference was on apparent conflict between two decisions rendered by this Court - one in the case of Somasundaram v. Liyakat
Ali [1997 (1) CTC 4], and the other in the case of K. Radhakrishnan v. Additional Registrar [2000 (II) CTC 147]. In the case of Somasundaram,
the learned single Judge held that the orders regarding inter-se seniority between employees of Co-operative Societies is not an order passed
under the Co-operative Societies Act, such seniority cannot be decided and the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court u/s 156 is not attracted in matters
relating to determination of inter-se seniority of employees of Co-operative Societies and no remedy is available under the Industrial Act. As such,
Civil Suit is maintainable. In Radhakrishnan''s case, another learned single Judge of this Court (P.Sathasivam, J., as he then was) held that the
seniority is part of service conditions of employees which may be construed as an action under special bye-laws of the Union and a revision u/s
153 of the Co-operative Societies Act is maintainable and in another judgment in the case of Management of Madras Atomic Power Project
Employees'' Consumers (Co-operative Stores Limited, Kalpakkam rep. by its Special Officer v. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeal)
Madras, [2000 (III) CTC 738 = 2006 Writ L.R. 286 = 2001-2-L.W. 46 S.N.], the learned single Judge (P.Sathasivam, J. as he then was) has
held that disciplinary action against paid servant of society is not a dispute u/s 90 or not one ""touching business"" of the society.
While resolving the question referred to in view of the conflict of views, the Division Bench has taken into consideration section 73 of the
Tamilnadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (old Act) and section 90 of the New Act, 1983 and also the ratio decidendi of the Full Bench
decision of this Court in the case of N.S. Madhava Rao and others v. D. V.K. Surya Rao and others [AIR 1954 Madras 103], South Arcot Co-
operative Motor Transport Society Ltd. (for ex-servicemen) Devanam-Pattinam, Cuddalore v. Syed Batcha and others [AIR 1961 Madras 217 =
(1960) 73 L.W. 708], and that of the Supreme Court in the cases of Deccan Merchants Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain [1969 (1) SCR
887], Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal [1969 (2) SCC 43], Gujarat State Coop. Land Development Bank v. P.R.
Mankad [1979 (3) SCC 123], U.P. Coop. Cane Union Federation Ltd. v. Liladhar [1980 Supp SCC 437], Allahabad District Cooperative Ltd.
v. Hanuman Dutt Tewari [1981 (4) SCC 431], R.C. Tiwari v. M.P. State Coop. Marketing Federation Ltd. [1997 (5) SCC 125], Yogendra
Prasad v. Additional Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar and others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 720], Shahabad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Special Secretary to Government of Haryana Corporation [2006 (12) SCC 404], Dharappa v. Bijapur Co-operative Milk Producers Societies
Union Ltd. [2007 (9) SCC 109], and has summarized its proposition as follows :
In the light of the above legal journey through various decisions of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court, the following propositions will
emerge:-
Section 90 of the 1983 Act providing for settlement of disputes will not include a dispute between a servant of a Co-operative Society and its
Management. Therefore, no dispute can be referred to the Registrar or his nominee u/s 90 and consequently, no appeal will lie to the Tribunal u/s
152.
(b) Section 153 of 1983 Act is a departure from Section 97 of the 1961 Act and it is wider in nature. Power has been specifically conferred on the
revisional authority u/s 153 to call for and examine the record of any proceeding under the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws of any officer
subordinate to the Registrar or of the Board of Director or any officer of a registered society or of the competent authority constituted u/s 75(3) of
the 1983 Act. Therefore, the employees of a Co-operative Society can approach the Registrar or any competent authority u/s 153 to revise any
order passed by the Co-operative Society relating to disciplinary action taken against him or denial of promotion or wrong fixation of seniority, etc.
(c) There is no implied ouster of the jurisdiction of the power of the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal to deal with similar matters if disputes are
raised before them by workmen or employees covered by those provisions. Both remedies are available.
(d) The decision in Somasundaram v. Liyakat Ali [1997 (1) CTC 4 = 1998 (2) LLJ 719] may not be a good law. The employees therein filed a
Civil Suit regarding promotion issue. As remedy for the aggrieved parties in that case are available either u/s 153 or by an industrial dispute u/s
2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they could not have gone before the Civil Court. Therefore, the bar u/s 156 of the Co-operative
Societies Act as well as the implied ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court by the provisions of the I.D. Act will directly apply and the suit is
barred.
(e) The decision of P. Sathasivam, J. (as he then was) in K. Radhakrishnan v. Additional Registrar [2000 (ii) CTC 147] upholding the right of
revision u/s 153 has laid the correct position of law. Likewise, the judgment of P.Sathasivam, J. (as he then was) in The Management of Madras
Atomic Power Project Employees'' Consumers (Co-operative Stores Limited. Kalpakkam rep. by its Special Officer v. The Deputy
Commissioner of Labour (Appeal) Madras [2000 (III) CTC 738 = 2000 (2) LLJ 1451] holding that Section 90 of the 1983 Act is not available
for employees of Co-operative Societies against the orders of termination has been correctly decided.
The proposition (a) extracted above squarely covers the issue on hand against the employee.
The judgments in the cases of A. Jitendernath v. Jubilee Hills Co-op. House Building Society, (2006) 10 SCC 96 and North Arcot District
Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2007 (1) LLN 369 have been pressed into service. The facts of the case of Jitendranath are as follows : The
society was registered under the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964. The father of one ''S'' and the mother of the appellant, ''J''
were members of the said Society. The mother of ''J'' expired on 15.08.1977, but it was not notified to the Society. Subsequently, one plot ''X''
was allotted in her favour on a provisional basis by the Society. She was called upon to pay a particular sum within one month from the date of
receipt of the notice. The said sum was not paid because in the meantime she had expired. On the other hand, ''S'' was admitted as a member of
the society on 06.08.1983 in the place of his father. On 16.09.1983 plot ''X'' was allotted in his favour. The society admitted ''J'' as a member on
28.04.1986 in the place of his deceased mother and he made a claim in respect of the plot ''X'', which was allotted to ''S''. Questioning the non
allotment of plot in his favour, he filed an application before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The Registrar directed the society to allot the
said plot to T. ''S'' filed a civil suit. During the pendency of the suit, he transferred his right to the second respondent before the Supreme Court and
the civil Court granted a decree in favour of the second respondent. As against the decree granted, an appeal was filed by the society which was
allowed on the ground that when the Registrar passed an order in favour of ''J'', sale deed has not been executed in favour of ''S''. That order, in
appeal, has been reversed by the High Court on the ground that the date of registration of document relates back to the date of document. In those
facts, the matter has been taken to the supreme Court. The Supreme Court confirmed the order of the High Court, however granted certain
benefits to ''J'' in view of the deplorable conduct of the society. In that case, ''J'' moved the Registrar and the Registrar passed an order in respect
of business of society, which is allotting plots to the members and not relating to a dispute touching upon the service conditions of an employee of
the society. Hence, reference to this judgment is not furthering the case of the society.
The other judgment is in the case of North Arcot District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2007 (1) LLN 369 in which the second respondent
who was working as the Secretary of Co-operative bank was charged with 16 misconduct and on that basis he was dismissed from service. He
filed an appeal before the Joint Registrar and revision before the Government, in vain. On a review filed by the petitioner to the Government, the
Government referred the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication as to the non employment of the second respondent. The labour Court found
that the order of dismissal was illegal and consequently passed an award of reinstatement. Questioning the said award, the society filed a writ
petition. The learned single Judge, while partly allowing the writ petition confirmed the award of reinstatement, but restricted the backwages only at
50%. The said order was carried on appeal before the Division Bench. A new point which has not been raised either before the authorities or
before the lower Court has been raised by contending that the second respondent was working as a Secretary and he was not a workman and the
award passed by the Labour Court cannot be legally sustained. The Division Bench refused to go into the question on the premise that the Labour
Court has adjudicated the dispute only on a reference made by the State Government. The appellant has not questioned the reference so far and
has submitted itself to the adjudication. Further, the said contention was not at all raised before the Labour Court and there was no adjudication on
that issue even before the learned single Judge no ground has been raised. Even in the grounds of appeal before the Division Bench this point has
not been raised, only by way of arguments at the time of final disposal the point has been raised. As the society submitted its jurisdiction to the
Labour Court, it cannot wriggle out and contend otherwise before the Division Bench. We are of the view that the issue in the case on hand is
different. In this case, by way of filing writ petition, the Society has questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar to resolve a dispute, which is
touching upon the service conditions of the employee. Hence, this judgment also does not further the case of the employee.
When a Division Bench decides a case on a specific question of law, that decision is binding on the other Division Bench. There is no
Constitutional or statutory prescription in this issue and the point is governed entirely by practice in the Indian Courts sanctified by repeated
affirmation over a century of time. It is, in order to guard against the possibility of inconsistent decisions on points of law by different Division
Benches that the rule has been evolved, in order to promote consistency and certainty in the development of the law and its contemporary status,
that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. This principle
has been followed by several generations of Judges. Hence, a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division
Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges. (See: Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1985) 1 SCC 582 = (1985)
93 L.W.697; Bhagh Singh v. U.T. Of Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737 = (1985) 98 L.W.725 and Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989
SC 1933=1989-1-L.W.414) The Supreme Court, in the case of Chandra Prakash (Dr) v. State of U.P., (2002) 10 SCC 710, has held that
upsetting of the principles laid down and introducing uncertainty in an already chaotic situation, particularly in a matter relating to the service
conditions of Government employees improper. In a case pertaining to cooperative society also maintainability of a writ petition before a Court
was in a chaotic situation for more than two decades. Judicial discipline demands that one Division Bench of a High Court should, ordinarily, follow
the judgment of another Division Bench of that High Court. (See also : CIT v. Devaki Ammal, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 39). For the foregoing reasons
and in the light of the Division Bench judgment cited supra, we are of the view that the Deputy Registrar would not have entertained the dispute
raised by the petitioner which is outside the purview of section 90 of the Act. Writ Petition No.8425 of 2003 is dismissed. Writ Petition No.9318
of 2004 is allowed. In view of the dismissal of the Writ Petition No.8425 of 2003, the interim order passed in that writ petition, which is the
subject matter of writ appeal No.3684 of 2004 merges with the order of dismissal. Hence, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. The connected
miscellaneous petition is dismissed.