Vikram Bhargav vs Ashish Pal Khatri

H.S. Bedi, J. (Oral)

By this judgment, I propose to dispose of Crl. Misc. Nos. 3077M of 1994 and 3074M of 1994. The facts of the case have been taken from Crl. Misc. No. 3077M of 1994.

The Petitioner, Vikram Bhargav, who is stated to be residing in Delhi, on demand of loan of Rs. 1 lac by the respondent, issued two cheques for Rs. 50,000/ each at Delhi, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Assandh Road, Panipat. The case of the petitioner is that these two cheques were issued not towards discharging any admitted liability but only as a loan on the request of the respondent. It appears that on finding that something was amiss and that the loan advanced to the petitioner was not likely to be refunded, the respondent stopped the payment of these cheques by issuing a letter to the bank. The respondent thereafter issued a legal notice under section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short the ''Act'') Annexure P3 and on the failure of the petitioner to pay the amount in question, the respondent filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Annexure P5). The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat, after recording the preliminary evidence, summoned the petitioner vide order dated 18.12.1993 (Annexure P6). Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the complaint as also the summoning order.

On notice to the respondent, a reply has been filed and the broad facts mentioned in the petition have been denied. It has been asserted that the cheques in question were given by way of discharging an admitted liability and the cheques having been dishonoured despite the legal notice served upon the petitioner, the offence under section 38 of the Act was made out.

Mr. Harsh Aggarwal learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has urged two points before me, firstly, it has been argued that the amounts made out by cheques were not in the nature of an admitted liability but, in fact, were advanced as loan to the respondent on his request and, secondly, that as the cheques had been issued from Delhi and the legal notice served on the petitioner at Delhi, the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In support of his second argument, Mr. Aggarwal has relied on Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan Dhondu Joglekar and another, 1993(2) RCR 210 .

After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in the present petition. The question as to whether the amounts due on the cheque were an admitted liability or were in the nature of loans advanced to the respondent, is a question that will have to be gone into after recording the evidence of the parties. The second argument of Mr. Aggarwal is equally without merit. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the forum for trial and provides that every offence shall be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 Cr.P.C. inter alia provides that where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, either of the two courts can inquire into the matter. Even assuming for a moment that the cheques were issued from Delhi but the fact does remain that they were dishonoured in Panipat. The judgment cited by the learned counsel also does not help his case as it pertained to an entirely different set of facts. There is accordingly no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed.

As far as the second petition, that is, Crl. Misc. No. 3074M of 1994 is concerned Mr. Aggarwal has in addition argued that the cheques in question had been handed over in Delhi and the mere fact that they were dishonoured by the Panipat Bank, the Court at Panipat had no jurisdiction to entertain the compliant. As against this, Mr. Narula, appearing for the respondent, has placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in Tarsem Lal v. Prem Nath Palta, 1994(2) RCR 288 to the effect that the court at Panipat has the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

In Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal''s case (supra) it has been observed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court that the anatomy of section 138 comprises certain necessary components before the offence can be said to be complete, the last of them being the act of nonpayment in spite of 15 days having elapsed after receipt of the final notice. It was observed "it is true that the cheques may have been issued by the accused at his place of residence or business but the Bank on which it is drawn being often located at a second spot and inevitably the complainant or the payee has his place of residence or business at yet another location.... In our considered view, where undoubtedly each of the components constitute a stage in the commission of the offence, the final nonpayment being the ultimate one, section 178, Cr.P.C. would clearly apply to an offence of this type. It would be perfectly valid and reasonable to hold, therefore, that the aggrieved party viz. the complainant is fully justified in approaching the local Court having jurisdiction over the area where the payment was to be made to him in the final instance." Admittedly the legal notice was issued from Panipat and the amount due to the respondent was also liable to be paid to him at Panipat. The Panipat Court was, therefore, competent to entertain the complaint.

For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 13th December, 1994.