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Judgment
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
CM APPL. 22839/2024
Exemption allowed subject to just exceptions. The application stands disposed of.
The instant petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 215 of the Constitution of India has been filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:
“a. Review the present Review Petition and set aside the Judgement and Order dated 15.03.2024 passed by this Hon‟ble Court in W. P. (C) No. 3360 of 2022.
b. Award cost of litigations in favour of the Petitioner and against Respondents.
c. Pass such other and further Order or Orders as this Hon‟ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstance of the Case.”
The petitioner had filed the captioned writ petition challenging the removal order Ref. No. ED(HR)/NTPC/DISC/04-2021 dated 13th April, 2021, appeal order Ref. No. 01:HR:DISC:CC/9791/Appeal dated 15th June, 2021 and review Ref. No. CMD Sectt:104 dated 23rd October, 2021 by virtue of which the petitioner was terminated from his services.
In the said writ petition, this Court had passed the judgment dated 15th March, 2024 (‘impugned judgment’ hereinafter), thereby, dismissing the petition, being devoid of any merit. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has preferred the instant review petition.
The petitioner, appearing in person, submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from errors apparent on the face of record which goes to the root of the matter, thereby, causing him grave injustice.
It is submitted that the impugned judgment is contrary to the governing rules of the respondent Company and also against the settled principles of service jurisprudence.
It is submitted that despite going to the root of the matter, this Court erred in not giving consideration to the fundamental foundational constituents of the lis.
It is submitted that this Court erred in not appreciating the settled law regarding interference in the Removal Order Ref. No. ED(HR)/NTPC/DISC/04-2021 dated 13th April, 2021 issued by the Appointing Authority/Respondent No. 5.
It is submitted that this Court failed to give any consideration to the fundamental propositions of the chargesheet and the inquiry report in the disciplinary proceedings, therefore, causing grave injustice to the petitioner
It is submitted that this Court erred in not providing reasoning in connection with the conclusion drawn at paragraph nos. 54, 62 and 69 in respect of the removal order, appeal order and review order.
It is submitted that this Court erred in not considering the fact that the respondents did not advert any conclusive evidence to substantiate the averments made in the disciplinary proceedings, whereas, the petitioner had duly supplemented the evidence to establish that the averments made in the disciplinary proceedings were right.
It is submitted that the conduct of the respondents in the disciplinary proceedings was in contravention to the orders of this Court passed in LPA No. 228/2020 and W.P. (C) No. 4322/2020, whereby, the respective Benches of this Court had directed the respondent Corporation to adhere to the principles of natural justice.
It is further submitted that this Court erred in considering or dealing with the crucial submissions made by the petitioner and therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be reviewed and set aside.
In view of the foregoing submission, the petitioner, appearing in person, submitted that the above said grounds make an appropriate case for review of the impugned judgment and therefore, the reliefs be granted as prayed.
Per Contra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 (‘respondent Corporation’ hereinafter) vehemently opposed the present petition submitting to the effect that the same being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed.
It is submitted that the impugned judgment has been passed after taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances and thus, as per the settled law, there is no case made out for the review of the same.
It is submitted that the petitioner has been unable to put forth any contentions in order to bring out the grounds for review of the impugned judgment.
It is submitted that the grounds taken by the petitioner cannot be taken at the stage of review, rather the same can be done by filing an appeal against the impugned judgment. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax officer (1) and ors., 2024 2 SCC 362 whereby, the Hon’ble Court reiterated the limited scope of powers conferred to the review Courts.
In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that the present petition being devoid of any merit, may be dismissed.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
Upon perusal of the impugned judgment, it is made out that after taking the relevant facts into account, this Court had categorically held that the petitioner failed to prove existence of any special circumstances for review of the dismissal order as well as the rejection of his appeal. Considering the same, this Court arrived at the conclusion that the case of petitioner did not meet the criteria for exercising its writ jurisdiction for interference in the orders impugned by the petitioner.
Since the learned senior counsel for the respondent Corporation and the counsel appearing for the other respondents raised the contention regarding grounds for review, this Court deems it appropriate to briefly discuss the scope of powers conferred to this Court under review jurisdiction.
It is a well settled principle that the power of review is exercised in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record and in such an event the order or judgment can be corrected. A Court cannot act as an appellate Court for its own judgments, nor can it allow the petitions for review based only on the claim that one of the parties believes the judgment proven bane for them. If the matters that the Court has already adjudicated upon could be reopened and reheard, the same would be detrimental to the public interest.
In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Hon’ble Supreme Court carved out the essential principles qua review and held as under:
“14.Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India [1980 Supp SCC 562 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 381] held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12)
“12.A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1)
„1. … A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.‟”
15.An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)
“7.It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372] this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11)
„11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an “error apparent on the face of the record”. The fact that on the earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an “error apparent on the face of the record”, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.‟
8.Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9.Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be „reheard and corrected‟. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be „an appeal in disguise‟.”
16.Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54, 56 & 58)
“54.Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
„1.Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—
(a)by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b)by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c)by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.‟ Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter. ***
56.It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. ***
58.Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words „any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC‟ must mean „a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule‟ as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] . Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [AIR 1954 SC 440] , this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC 233] , it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23)
„23. … [I]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in—Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality [ILR 1953 Bom 191 : AIR 1953 Bom 133] , that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.‟
Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 569] . The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.”
In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 651] held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10)
“10.… In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.”
Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501] , held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12)
“11.So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12.When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of „second innings‟ which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”
Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute
When the review will be maintainable:
Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
When the review will not be maintainable:
A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.
Upon perusal of the above cited paragraphs, it is crystal clear that while dealing with the issue of review of their own judgment, the Court cannot set aside the same until and unless there is an error apparent on the face of record.
Perusal of paragraph 20.2 of the above said judgment also makes it evident that the review of its own judgment cannot be permissible only as one of the parties to the dispute is dissatisfied with the reasoning provided by the Court in the judgment impugned.
With regard to the facts of the instant case, the petitioner has argued that this Court failed to substantiate any reasoning for the conclusions arrived at in paragraph nos. 54, 62 and 69. The said paragraphs of the impugned judgment are reproduced herein:
“54.In view of the foregoing discussion and the reasons as detailed in the impugned order, this Court is of the view that the impugned order has been passed after taking into account the representation of the petitioner and in accordance with the statutory rules. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid order does not suffer from any illegality. ***
62.In view of the foregoing discussions and the reasons as detailed in the impugned appeal order, it is observed that the order was passed after taking into account the representations of the petitioner and in accordance W.P.(C) 3360/2022 Page 41 of 47 with the statutory rules. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid order also does not suffer from any illegality. ***
69.In view of the foregoing discussions and the reasons as detailed in the impugned review order, this Court is of the considered view that the said order has been passed after taking into account the representation of the petitioner and in accordance with the statutory rules. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid order does not suffer from any illegality.”
Adverting to paragraph no. 54, it is observed that this Court had affirmed the reasoning of the enquiry on the premise that the representation of the petitioner was duly taken into account by the respondents and therefore, this Court did not find any infirmity with the removal order.
The perusal of the paragraphs preceding to paragraph no. 54 of the impugned judgment, i.e. paragraph nos. 49-53 makes it clear that this Court had duly perused the removal order assailed in the captioned writ petition and provided the reasoning for upholding the same.
In paragraph no. 50, this Court had recorded the charges leveled against the petitioner where the said allegations amounted to violation of the code of conduct of the respondent Corporation. In the subsequent paragraph, i.e. paragraph no. 51, this Court had also recorded that the petitioner acceded to the writing of malicious letters to various authorities without any power to do so. This Court had also recorded the fact that the petitioner exceeded his authority by writing unsubstantiated complaints to the official dignitaries of this Country without any basis for such complaints, therefore, violating the code of conduct of the respondent Corporation.
Pursuant to the same, this Court had duly recorded the opportunities provided to the petitioner for rebutting the said allegations during the inquiry proceedings, therefore, arriving at the conclusion that the inquiry proceedings were conducted in a free and fair manner.
The paragraphs proceeding to paragraph nos. 62 and 69 make it clear that the Court had duly considered the contentions of both the parties and had recorded the denial of cross examination by the petitioner himself, therefore reaching the conclusion in the above mentioned paragraphs.
In order to arrive at such findings, this Court had duly reproduced the order dated 15th June 2021 passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the review order dated 23rd October 2021 etc. to determine whether the authorities conformed to the rule of law or not.
The perusal of paragraph nos. 49-68 makes it evident that due regard was given to the claims made by the petitioner and the impugned judgment was passed only after considering the representation of the petitioner.
As far as the contention regarding non-providing of the reasons for arriving at the conclusion is concerned, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for review as the contentions advanced by him were duly recorded and analyzed by this Court in the impugned judgment and the paragraphs preceding to the paragraph no. 54, 62 and 69 make it abundantly clear that due reasoning was provided for arriving at the said conclusions.
Now, coming to the other contentions raised by the petitioner, i.e. non-appreciation of the settled position of law regarding interference with the orders impugned by the petitioner in the captioned petition, with regard to the same, this Court is of the opinion that the arguments and contentions advanced by him clearly seem to be the grounds for appeal and the said contentions cannot be entertained under the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer, (2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles regarding the review of a judgment and drew a distinction with the grounds of appeal. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein:
“8.Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, let us regurgitate the well-settled law on the scope of review as contemplated in Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47CPC.
9.In the words of Krishna Iyer J., (as his Lordship then was) “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result. A review in the counsel's mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.” [Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 2 SCC 167]
10.It is also well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. [Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 25 : AIR 1965 SC 845]
11.In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715] , this Court made very pivotal observations : (SCC p. 719, para 9)
“9.Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.”
12.Again, in Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB [Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB, (2020) 2 SCC 677 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 788] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715] dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat [Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, (2021) 13 SCC 1 : (2023) 2 SCC (Civ) 686] , this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order 47CPC
In Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. [Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd., (2023) 8 SCC 11 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 123] , this Court reiterated the law and held that : (SCC p. 21, para 35)
“35.From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”
It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar Review-5 J.) [Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar Review-5 J.), (2021) 3 SCC 1] , held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of coordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
The gist of the aforestated decisions is that:
A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4.In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”.
16.5.A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.
16.6.Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
16.7.An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
16.8.Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
The perusal of the above said paragraphs make it evident that the position of law regarding the limited scope of review of a judgment has been reiterated by the Constitutional Courts of this country time and again, where, the parties are not permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions already addressed and decided in the original petition.
This Court is of the considered view that the petitioner by way of the present review petition seems to repeat his old and overruled arguments which is not enough to re-open a concluded case. There is neither any discovery of new evidence nor there is any error apparent on the face of the record. The factual errors as contended on behalf of the petitioner are also absent and any argument thereto is baseless.
Furthermore, even if it is presumed that there is any error in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be considered hereunder given the limited scope of intervention imposed upon this Court under its review jurisdiction and in light of the settled law, review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
The present review petition is an appeal in disguise, whereby, the petitioner is attempting to make out a case for rehearing of the issues raised by him in the captioned writ petition which already stands decided and therefore, the present review petition is liable to be dismissed.
In view of the foregoing discussions of facts and law, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned judgment dated 15th March, 2024, passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 3360 of 2022 does not suffer from any error and therefore, does not invite interference of this Court under its review jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the instant review petition along with the pending applications, if any, stands dismissed.
The Order be uploaded on the website forthwith.