Tribunals and CommissionsSingle Bench(2013) 05 DRAT CK 0003

Vikas Promoter (P) Ltd. vs Mahajan Promoter & Developers (P) Ltd. And Ors.

Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal · Decided on 28 May 2013 · Citation: (2013) 3 BC(DRAT) 87

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.N.H. Zaidi, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Interlocutory Application No. 714, 820 Of 2012

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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 964 words

S.N.H. Zaidi, J

1.

Heard parties' Counsel on application (I.A. No. 714/2012) filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. As per the office report, the appeal is time-barred by 15 days. Mr. Makheeja submits that the order impugned was passed by the Tribunal below on 24.8.2012 and since no copy of the order was furnished to the appellant in compliance of Section 19(21) of the RDDBFI Act and Rule 16 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, therefore, the appellant applied for the certified copy thereof on 11.9.2012, which was received on the same day and the appeal was filed on 8.11.2012, i.e., within the period of limitation and as such there is no delay in filing the appeal. It is further submitted by him that though the appellant was present before the Tribunal below on 24.8.2012, when the order impugned was made on the application I.A. No. 839/2012 filed by a third party for his impleadment, but since his Counsel was under the bona fide belief that only a notice on that application has been issued and the matter would be heard after the pleadings qua the said application are completed, but when on 10.9.2012 a communication dated 7.9.2012 was received from the Counsel of respondent Nos. I to 3 seeking the copy of the S.A. claiming themselves as impleaded in the S.A., then the appellant requested his Counsel to obtain a certified copy of the order impugned which was obtained on 11.9.2012 and then the appellant came to know about the contents of the order. Mr. Makheeja also submits that as per Section 19(21) of the RDDBFI Act and Rule 16 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal below to furnish a copy of the order impugned upon the applicant which was admittedly not sent to it. He further submits that the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a recent judgment rendered on 5.4.2013 in Surender Mahajan v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors., MANU/PH/0209/2013 has held that the Appellate Tribunal has power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

2.

Mr. Gupta, however, submits that the order impugned was made orally by the Tribunal below in the open Court in the presence of the appellant's Counsel whereby the impleadment application (I.A. No. 839/2012) filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 was allowed and as such the appellant/applicant had full knowledge of the order and if it was aggrieved with that order it could have filed the appeal within the limitation period, but the certified copy of the order was applied on 11.9.2012, which was delivered on that day itself and the appeal could have been filed upto 24.9.2012, but the same has been filed on 8.10.2012 after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is also submitted by him that the cause of delay shown in the application is not sufficient/acceptable.

3.

I have considered the submissions of the parties' Counsel and perused the record. It is correct to say that the parties are required to be furnished with the copy of the order passed by the Tribunal below as per the requirement of Section 19(21) of the RDDBFI Act and Rule 16 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 and the same is being complied with and the copy of the final order passed by the P.O. are being sent to the parties, but furnishing of the copy of each and every interim order, which is made during the course of proceedings is practically not possible. The ground taken by the appellant in this regard is, therefore, not acceptable.

4.

Perusal of the order impugned would show that Mr. Yogesh Pachauri, the Counsel for the S.A. applicant (appellant/applicant herein) was present before the Tribunal when a few line order was orally made/dictated by the P.O. allowing the impleadment application. It is hard to believe that when the P.O. was disposing of an application by making an order, how the Counsel of the appellant could believe that notice qua that application was issued. There is nothing on record to show that the applicant's Counsel had asked for any time/opportunity for filing the reply to that application, which was disposed of after hearing the parties' Counsel. The applicant has also failed to show any sufficient cause of delay from 24.8.2012, the date of the order impugned, upto 11.9.2012 when it had applied for and obtained the copy of that order. No reason has also been shown as to why the appeal could not be filed after receiving the certified copy of order impugned within the period of limitation, which was available to the appellant upto 24.9.2013. The cause of delay shown by the appellant, therefore, does not appear to be sufficient.

5.

So far as the power of this Tribunal in condoning the delay in filing the appeal is concerned, I agree with Mr. Makheeja that in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Surender Mahajan (supra), which has the binding effect, this Tribunal has power to condone the delay, subject to the satisfaction of the sufficiency of the ground of delay. The judgment in Housing Board Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association, I (1996) CLT 108 (SC) : III (1995) CPJ 28 (SC) : AIR 1996 SC 92, relied upon by Mr. Makheeja, being on different facts and circumstances does not apply to the present case.

In view of the above, the application I.A. No. 714/2012, being devoid of any force, is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.

Since the appeal has been filed beyond the period of limitation hence the same cannot be entertained and is dismissed as time-barred.