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Judgment
MARUTI Udyog Ltd. made this application on or about 24.11.1997 seeking a review of the order finally disposing of two Appeals A-640/96 filed by MARUTI Udyog Ltd. and A-633/96 filed by Vikas Motors Ltd. In order to appreciate the contentions put forward, a few facts may be noted. MARUTI Omni, in question, was cleared from the manufacturer''s factory on 13.3.1993. It was registered as a taxi on 19.4.1993. Mr. H.L. Mehta, who purchased the vehicle, submitted necessary papers in May, 1993 to claim refund of 7% excise duty. The case was contested both by the dealer as well as the manufacturer mainly on the ground that Mr. Mehta had failed to submit the papers within the time limit of three months to enable the manufacturer to claim refund of the excise duty from the Central Excise Authorities. The District Forum allowed the complaint of Mr. Mehta. Both the manufacturer and the dealer preferred two separate appeals before this Commission. Both the appeals were dismissed by order dated 14.10.1997. It was held that Mr. Mehta submitted the necessary papers within time and was entitled to the refund of 7% excise duty in terms of the notification issued by the Central Government. Accordingly, the manufacturer was directed to pay the amount together with costs to the complainant.
IN the present application, the ground for review taken by the applicant is that the Central notification has been struck down by the Delhi High Court in CWP 2325/97 decided on 28.10.1997. We have heard Mr. K.P. Sunder Rao, Advocate for the applicant and Mr. K.P. Gupta, Advocate for the respondent - Mr. H.L. Mehra. Mr. K.P. Gupta raised a preliminary objection that in the absence of any power of review having been conferred on the FORA constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, the power of review cannot be exercised. He placed reliance on Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Pradyuman Singh Ji Arjun Singh Ji, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1273, where it was laid-down that power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. He also replied on Rajasthan State Industrial Dev. & Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Premier Paints, II (1991) CPJ 599 (NC), where it was laid-down that the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums can grant only reliefs which are covered u-/Sec. 14 of the Act and had no power to grant a relief at a later stage which is not covered under S.R. 1. Reference has also been made to Usha Rani Gupta v. General Manager, II (1991) CPJ 87, in which the Delhi State Commission relying on Patel Narshi''s decision of the Supreme Court held that the FORA under the Consumer Protection Act did not have inherent power of review.
Mr. Rao, on the other hand, relied on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1996 (5) Supreme Court Cases 550. This was an appeal filed in the Supreme Court against the order of the National Commission. After a review of the case law, it was laid-down in para 23 of the report at page 563 as under : "Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order".
In para 32 at page 564 their Lordships further laid-down that the above principle will apply not only to Courts of Law but also to statutory Tribunals, which, like the Commission, are conferred power to record evidence by applying certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to enforce attendance of the witnesses and are also given the power to receive evidence on affidavits. On a consideration of the facts of that case it was held that the FORA should have recalled the order when a case of fraud having been practiced on it had been made out. In view of the decision in Indian Bank''s case (supra), there is no doubt that the FORA has inherent jurisdiction to recall an order passed where it has been misled by a party or FORA itself commits a mistake which is prejudicial to a party before it. The main question is whether such case has been made-out in the present case. On a careful consideration of the matter, we are clearly of the view that no such case for recalling the order dated 14.10.1997 passed in the two appeals has been made-out. The reliance of the applicant on the decision of Maruti Udyog Limited v. Union of India & Ors., CWP 2325/97 dated 28.10.1997 shows that what was challenged in that writ petition was a part of the notification occurring in Clause C on the ground that the same was unreasonable and arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The said part of the notification reads as under : "Or in a case had collected, has refunded to such person, group of persons and body or organization, the amount equivalent of such exemption of duty".
The Division Bench struck down the said provision in the notification. The striking down of the extracted portion of the notification does not affect the result reached by this Commission while disposing of the aforesaid appeals. Admittedly, the manufacturer had not pleaded that they had already refunded 7% excise duty to Mr. Mehta. On the contrary, the stand of the applicant in the aforesaid appeals was that as Mr. Mehta had failed to submit the relevant papers within three months from the date of clearance of the vehicle of the manufacturer''s factory, and, therefore he was not entitled to refund of 7% excise duty in terms of Part B of the notification of the Central Government. For the reasons set- out in the Commission''s order it was held that the purchaser of the vehicle had, in fact, submitted the papers well in time and he was not responsible for the delay which took place either at the level of the dealer or the manufacturer in claiming refund of excise duty from the Central Excise Authorities. It is plain that the merits of the above conclusion cannot possibly be subject matter of review. The proper remedy for the applicant is to prefer a revision before the National Commission. The limited question before us is whether a case for review properly so called has been made out and that too on the limited ground that any party to the proceedings had been guilty of fraud or the FORA itself fell into an error in reaching that conclusion. No such case has been made out. It may be high-lighted that even the decision of the Supreme Court striking down another part of the notification which has no application to the facts of the present case was rendered after the decision of the matter by this Commission after a gap of nearly two weeks on 28.10.1997. Assuming, therefore, that this Commission has power of review by recalling the order no case for review has been made-out. The application is, therefore, dismissed with further Rs. 500/- as costs. A copy of this order be furnished to the parties. To come up for further directions for payment in terms of the Bank guarantee furnished by the appellant on 3rd April, 1998. A copy of the order be conveyed to both the parties. Application dismissed with costs. ______________
