Vijayakumar K.R. vs The Kerala Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. & Ors.

Devan Ramachandran, J.

While the appellant was working as a “Custodian of Stock” in a “Maveli Store”, operated by the first respondent – Kerala Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (SUPPLYCO), he was served with Ext.P12 Charge Memo, dated 11.10.2022, directing him to show cause why disciplinary action, leading to imposition of major penalty, under the provisions of Rule 147 of the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Common Service Recruitment Rules, 2021 (for short 'Rules'), be not imposed against him, since the audit conducted for the period between 30.06.2019 and 18.11.2020 in the said shop had allegedly disclosed large scale violations and loss, amounting to nearly Rs.10,71,740.65.

The appellant answered the charge through Ext.P13 explanation; and followed it with Ext.P14 request that he be given an opportunity to prove his case and further that the charges against him be dropped.

The third respondent, who is the Disciplinary Authority, however, rejected the explanation of the appellant, leading to Ext.P15 order dated 26.09.2024, finding him guilty of having caused a loss of Rs.8,09,342.73; and thus directed him to remit the said amount within the time frame mentioned therein.

The appellant thereupon, filed statutory appeal against Ext.P15, through Ext.P16; and on the allegation that the same was not considered, approached this Court through WP(C) No.38147/2024, which led to a learned Judge of this Court directing the competent Appellate Authority to consider it. The appellant was thus given an opportunity of being heard by the first respondent - being the Appellate Authority; and it disposed of the appeal through Ext.P18 order, merely saying that his assertions are not credible, and that it found no reason to differ from the views of the Disciplinary Authority in the absence of any new information being offered by him.

The appellant, therefore, challenged Exts.P15 and P18 by filing the writ petition involved in this case; but which has now been dismissed by the learned Single Judge, thus constraining him to file this appeal.

Sri.Gyothish Chandran – learned counsel for the appellant, argued that Ext.P15 order has been issued by the Disciplinary Authority in blatant violation of all procedure known to law and by denying his client an opportunity of explaining his case, through proper means. He went on to explain that his client was, in fact, on leave from 05.10.2020 because, he was not well and was found infected by Covid – 19 on 05.10.2020 -immediately being moved into quarantine, thus incapacitating him from approaching the Authorities for leave, though he had made such an application with cogent documents. He alleged that, after 01.10.2020, the Depot Manager handed over the stock to two persons - whose names are mentioned in Ext.P13 explanation - who may have then manipulated it, to cause loss. He asserted that, when his client had made such allegations against specified persons, a conclusion against him, as made in Ext.P15, without him having been given an opportunity of a proper enquiry, was illegal and unlawful. He concluded his submissions, assailing Ext.P18 for the reason that it did not consider his client's contentions at all, but dismissed his appeal, citing the sole reason that it finds no cause to differ from the holdings of the Disciplinary Authority and because his client did not produce any further materials.

Sri.Gyothish Chandran predicated that the learned Single Judge did not consider the afore vital issues in its proper perspective; and prayed that this appeal be, consequently, allowed.

Smt.Molly Jacob – learned standing counsel for the first respondent – SUPPLYCO, countered the afore submissions, asserting that the findings against the appellant in Ext.P15 and Ext.P18 are with respect to the time when he was, admittedly, in charge of the store - namely between 30.06.2019 and 05.10.2020. She imputed that the appellant had taken leave without authority, and that his leave application had not been considered; thus constraining the Depot Manager to have handed over the stock to other competent persons, which is not merely illegal, but necessitated under the applicable Rules. She argued that, in such circumstances, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that he is not responsible for the loss, particularly when Audit Enquiry No.3, produced as Ext.P6, showed that the Goods Receipts (GRS) found as a liability against the appellant were from the time when he was actually on duty on 04.10.2020. She argued that, when the liability was found by the auditor, and since there is no verifiable or viable explanation from the side of the appellant, the Authorities were justified in having imposed punishment against him as mentioned in Ext.P15, to be confirmed through Ext.P18 order. She prayed that this appeal be, therefore, dismissed.

Smt.Molly Jacob relied upon the judgments in Union of India v. Indraj [2025 KHC 7610] and General Manager (P) Canara bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah [2025 KHC OnLine 6778], in support of her contention that Writ Courts should not enter into the merits of the evidence or materials in disciplinary action.

We assure Smt.Molly Jacob that we are in full confirmation with her contention qua the limits of jurisdiction of this Court, being bound by the afore precedents; but the declarations therein, in fact, would stand against the respondents themselves. This is because, in both the afore judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that the enquiry proceedings had been completed validly, with every opportunity during such being given to the delinquent; thus declaring that, in such scenario, Courts are not to sit as appellate forums, but only to verify if the processes had been properly adhered to.

In this case, as noticed above, no process worth mentioning has been even initiated by the respondents; but the Disciplinary Authority, though terming it a disciplinary action, proceeded to issue Ext.P15, finding the appellant guilty, based on documents which were never made available to him and without causing any enquiry whatsoever. Their justification before us that such an enquiry was not necessary because, the punishment is minor. This limpidly establishes their intent that they never wanted to conduct an enquiry, but to find the appellant guilty, notwithstanding this.

We start with the established doctrine that, when administrative orders are assessed, courts generally do not evaluate the decision, but only the decision-making process.

As perspicuous from the afore narrative, the imputation against the appellant is that he had caused loss to the sum mentioned in Ext.P15, on account of certain “GRS” not being produced before the Auditor. It is pertinent that, even the respondents admit that the appellant was not on duty from 05.10.2020 – whether it was authorised or unauthorised, being another issue – and that the audit conducted covered the period from 30.06.2019 to 18.11.2020.

The appellant's specific defence against Ext.P12 Charge Memo against him is that there was no mistake in the stock until 05.10.2020, and that it happened after that date till 18.11.2020, when it was given in temporary charge to two people, whom he specifically mentions therein. He made the same assertion in Ext.P14 - which looks like an argument note, preferred - seeking his exoneration.

Pertinently, however, when one examines Ext.P15 – as is also expressly admitted by Smt.Molly jacob – no disciplinary enquiry was conducted by the Authorities, but they proceeded to find against the appellant based on the internal report of the Audit Manager dated 16.11.2023, which is referred to as item No.4 in Ext.P15. The Disciplinary Authorities, in fact, find -which is disclosed by a reading of Ext.P15 - that the taking of leave by the appellant from 05.10.2020 is unauthorised; and then to hold that he is, therefore, responsible for the deficiencies in stock, or the non-availability of GRS, until 05.10.2020.

It must be specifically borne in mind that Ext.P12 called upon the appellant to show cause against charges, which the Disciplinary Authority referred to as being very grave; and intimated to him that action under Section 147 of the “Rules” would be taken, namely for violations that would entail major penalties.

It is conceded before us by Smt.Molly Jacob that, in the case of major penalties, domestic enquiry is imperative; but, her argument is that what has been imposed is not such a penalty, but only the recovery of loss, which can only be considered to be a minor penalty.

We have gone through the 'Rules', which have been made available across the Bar by Smt.Molly Jacob; and understand that she edifices her afore submissions on rules 143 and 144 thereof, which enumerate minor penalties and major penalties respectively. When it comes to minor penalties, the 'Rules' describe them to be censure, fine, withholding of increments at the maximum of three, withholding of promotion etc; while, as regards major penalties, 'rule 144 defines them to be withholding of more than three increments with or without cumulative effect, reduction to a lower post, reduction to a lower rank, compulsory retirement, removal from service and dismissal from service.

It does not require us to say specifically that neither rule 143 nor 144 provides for recovery of loss as a penalty; and, to that extent, the submissions of Smt.Molly Jacob that the punishment imposed in Ext.P15 can only be construed to be a minor penalty cannot find forensic favour.

We do not have to labor more on this issue because, as said above, Ext.P12 notifies the appellant of a procedure that will lead to a major penalty; and obviously, under the ambit of rule 147 of the “Rules”, a delinquent employee who makes an explanation, ought to have been given an opportunity of personal hearing, followed by a proper enquiry.

The stand of the respondents is that the appellant has been given a personal enquiry before Ext.P15 has been issued; but in our view, this would not suffice since he had made out a defence – whether it be right or wrong, to be decided only in enquiry – that he was not responsible for the loss, but two other people - whose names he had specifically mentioned in Ext.P13 explanation – being so.

Coming to Ext.P18 appellate order, no reasonable mind can find favour with it because it records that no new information has been brought to the appellate Authority by the appellant to warrant interference; and further, in a cursory manner, states that the said Authority is in conformity with the holdings of the Disciplinary Authority. It is well settled, without requirement for expatiation, that the Appellate Authorities are expected to go through the materials incisively to verify whether the contentions of the delinquent merit interference or otherwise. Ext.P18, from that yardstick, certainly falls foul of the legal requisites.

That leaves us with the thought as to what is the course that this Court should adopt in such circumstances.

The allegations against the appellant – clarifying that we have not found either in his favour or against – are certainly grave, because it involves loss to a substantial extent of more than Rs.8 lakhs. The respondents ought to have conducted a proper enquiry under the 'Rules'; before they could have found the appellant guilty; and it is the absence of this alone, which persuades us to allow this appeal. Obviously, therefore, it would be fully justified for us to allow the respondents to continue proceedings, as permitted under the 'Rules'; from the stage of Ext.P13, namely the explanation given by the appellant to Ext.P12 Charge Memo, notwithstanding the fact that he has subsequently superannuated from service.

In the afore circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as also Exts.P15 and P18; but leaving liberty to the respondents to continue the proceedings from the stage of Ext.P12 and P13 – being the Charge Memo and the explanation as per the 'Rules' – thus culminating in proper orders in terms of the statutory scheme.