High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 BOM CK 1088

Vijay Kumar Takkar & Ors. vs Raymond Ltd.

Bombay High Court · Decided on 4 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
N. J. Jamadar, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
WRIT PETITION NO. 13459 OF 2025

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Judgment

72 paragraphs · 5,994 words
1.

Rule.

2.

Rule made returnable forthwith, and with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

3.

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, calls in question the legality, propriety and correctness of an order dated 10th September, 2025 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, in Summons for Judgment No. 29/2024 in Suit No. 4892/2010 whereby the learned Judge granted leave to the petitioners/defendants to defend the suit on the condition of the deposit of a sum of Rs. 87,15,250/- (Rupees Eighty Seven Lakhs Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty) in the Court.

4.

Shorn of superfluities, the background facts leading to this petition can be stated as under :-

4.1

A shop premises being Unit No. 001 on the ground floor admeasuring 2370 sq. feet in a building known as “Dev-Mahran” situated at Vile Parle (“the licenced premises”) was given on a licence by the petitioners/defendants to the respondent/plaintiff for commercial purpose, under a leave and licence agreement dated 01st April, 2008. The term of the licence was 16 months with a lock-in period of 12 months. The licence fee was Rs.4,65,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Sixty Five Thousand only) for the initial period of 36 months and Rs.5,34,750/-(Rupees Five Lakhs Thirty Four Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty) for the next 24 months. The licencee was to pay applicable service tax on the monthly licence fee. A sum of Rs.92,50,000/-(Rupees Ninety Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand) was kept as a security deposit by the licencee with the licensor as an interest fee refundable deposit.

4.2

Subsequently, another agreement was executed between the parties on 01st September, 2009 to modify the terms of the leave and licence agreement dated 01st April, 2008. After the modified lock-in period came to an end, there were negotiations between the parties and the plaintiff agreed to deliver possession of the licenced premises to the defendants by 22nd May, 2010. Incontrovertibly, the plaintiff delivered the possession of the licenced premises to the defendants on 22nd June, 2010.

4.3

In the intervening period, disputes arose between the parties over the payment of the service tax in accordance with terms of the leave and licence agreement. In the wake of proceedings that had ensued before this Court and the Supreme Court in regard to the liability to pay the service tax on the amount of licence fee, at the behest of the Retailers Association of India, certain orders were passed and the plaintiff claimed that, it had cleared the service tax liability and nothing remained to be paid. The plaintiff demanded the refund of the security deposit. Upon non-payment thereof, the plaintiff instituted Summary Suit No.4892/2010 for recovery of the security deposit and allied reliefs in this Court.

4.4

Eventually, in view of the enhancement in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the suit came to be transferred to the City Civil Court and renumbered as Summary Suit No. 4892/2010. In the said suit, after the defendants entered appearance, the plaintiff took out the summons for judgment. The defendants sought an unconditional leave to defend the suit on the ground inter alia that, the plaintiff had committed default in the making payment of licence fee and service tax. On account of the said default, the defendants were entitled to recover penalty at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per day in accordance with Clause 3.9 of the leave and licence agreement. The plaintiff had abruptly stopped the payment of the service tax. Thus, the defendants were entitled to recover a sum of Rs.128,71,79,129/- (Rupees One Hundred Twenty Eight Crores Seventy One Lakhs Seventy Nine Thousand One Hundred and Twenty Nine) from the plaintiff on the basis of the quantified damages. Therefore, as the defendants had raised substantial defences, they were entitled to an unconditional leave to defend the suit.

5.

The learned Judge, City Civil Court, after appraisal of the pleadings of the parties and the clauses in the leave and licence agreement, was persuaded to hold that, the defendants were entitled to leave to defend the suit subject to the deposit of the amount paid by the plaintiff to the defendants towards security deposit, minus one month’s licence fee. The learned Judge, City Civil Court, was of the view that, incontrovertibly the defendants were holding the refundable security deposit; the question whether the proposed recovery of the amount at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per day for the default in payment of the licence fee and service tax amounted to a reasonable recompense or constituted the penalty was required to be adjudicated at the trial. Thus, there was a doubt regarding the good faith of the defendants and the genuineness of the triable issues raised by the defendants. Therefore, the defendants were liable to make the deposit.

6.

Being aggrieved, the defendants have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

7.

I have heard Mr. Rohan Savant, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. Jehangir Jeejeebhoy, the learned Counsel for the respondent, at some length. With the assistance of learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the pleadings and material on record.

8.

Mr. Rohan Savant, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that, the learned Judge, City Civil Court did not keep in view the principles that govern the grant of leave to defend the suit and has unjustifiably directed the petitioners-defendants to deposit the entire amount of the refundable deposit, minus the licence fee for one month only. In the process, Mr Savant would urge, the learned Judge, City Civil Court completely discarded the claims of the defendants arising out of the very terms of the leave and licence agreement. Taking the Court through the relevant clauses of the leave and licence agreement, Mr. Savant would urge that, there were reciprocal obligations on the parties. The plaintiff was under obligation to pay the licence fee alongwith service tax on or before due date and in the event of failure, the plainiff was liable to pay the defendants a penalty of Rs.20,000/- per day for the number of days such default in payment of the licence fee continued and till the time the licence fee was paid to the defendants. Banking upon Clause No. 3.9 of the leave and licence agreement, Mr. Savant would urge that since the defaults on the part of the licencee to pay the licence fee and, more importantly the service tax, was rather indisputable, the learned Judge, City Civil Court could not have imposed the condition of deposit of the entire refundable deposit when the defendants were entitled to recover the said amount of licence fee and the service taxes from the plaintiff alongwith the penalty quantified at Rs.20,000/- per day.

9.

Secondly, Mr. Savant would urge, the plaintiff abruptly stopped making the payment of service taxes to the defendants. There was thus clear breach of the terms and conditions of the leave and licence agreement. Mr. Savant would urge, the subsequent developments sought to be brought on record by way of an additional affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff were of no avail, especially in a summary suit. The rights of the parties are to be ordinarily decided on the basis of the facts as they stood on the date of the institution of the suit. Thus, the learned Judge, City Civil Court could not have taken into account the contentions on behalf of the plaintiff that they had cleared the service tax liability pursuant to the orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Savant placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Gupta Vs Ranbir B Goyal.1

10.

Mr. Savant further submitted that in the face of uncontroverted non-payment of service taxes to the defendants, the claim of the plaintiff cannot be said to be an undisputed claim. The default on the part of the plaintiff to pay the licence fee and the service tax, in accordance with the terms of the contract, gave rise to the liability to pay penalty as stipulated by the parties. Therefore, without adjusting the amount which the defendants are entitled to recover from the plaintiff, an order of deposit of the entire refundable deposit could not have been made. To buttress this submission, Mr. Savant placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs Saw Pipes Ltd.2

11.

Mr. Jehangir Jeejeebhoy, the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff countered the submissions on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. Jeejeebhoy would urge that the defences raised by the defendants cannot be said to be bona fide. Incontrovertibly, the plaintiff delivered possession of the licenced premises on 22nd June 2010. Under Clause 5.3 of the leave and licence agreement, the defendants were obligated to refund the security deposit simultaneous with the handing over of the vacant and peaceful possession of the licenced premises to them. Yet, the defendants have withheld the security deposit for over 15 years. Mr. Jeejeebhoy made a strenuous effort to drive home the point that there has never been any sustainable ground to withhold the security deposit.

12.

Mr. Jeejeebhoy submitted that the defence sought to be raised by the defendants that they are entitled to recover the amount of service tax and penalty is a mala fide and moonshine defence. At no point of time, till the delivery of possession of the licenced premises, the defendants professed to terminate the leave and licence agreement on the count of non-payment of service tax. Instead, the term of the licence came to be further extended.

13.

Mr. Jeejeebhoy further submitted that, the service tax, in the strict sense, does not form part of the licence fee. Attention of the Court was invited to Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the leave and licence agreement. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the licence fee has been defined separately in Clause 3.1, and the liability to pay the service tax forms part of Clause 3.2 of the leave and licence agreement. Mr. Jeejeebhoy would urge, the fact that the defence is sham one becomes evident from the conduct of the defendants, in as much as the defendants have not made any claim for recovery of the amount of service tax for over 16 years.

14.

In any event, Mr. Jeejeebhoy would urge, the amount of service taxes was to be paid to the Government. The defendants were in a sense a conduit through which the amount of service tax was to be credited to the State Exchequer. There is no iota of material to show that the defendants have paid the service tax to the Government. That shows the disingenuousness of the defendants defence. In these circumstances, the defendants did not deserve even a leave to defend the suit and the summons for judgment ought to have been made absolute, urged Mr. Jeejeebhoy.

15.

I have given careful consideration to the submissions canvassed across the bar. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material on record.

16.

To begin with few uncontroverted facts.

17.

First, the jural relationship between the parties was not in dispute. Second, there was not much controversy over the execution of the leave and licence agreement and the material terms thereof. Third, it was not in dispute that the plaintiff had deposited a sum of Rs.92,50,000/-, by way of interest free security deposit. Fourth, the delivery of possession of the licenced premises by the plaintiff to the defendants on 22nd June 2010 is incontestable. Fifth, the defendants have not refunded the security deposit.

18.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid broad uncontroverted facts, it is necessary to note that it is a crystallised position in law that a claim for refund of security deposit is maintainable as a summary suit.

19.

The controversy between the parties revolves around the question, as to whether the learned Judge, City Civil Court was justified in granting leave to defend the suit on the condition of the deposit of the unpaid security deposit?

20.

The position in law regarding the grant of leave to defend is well settled. If the defendants make out a substantial defence, with an element of success therein, the defendants are entitled to an unconditional leave to defend. If the defendants disclose, prima facie, fair and a reasonable defence, ordinarily, the defendants are entitled to an unconditional leave. In contrast to this, if the defence raised by the defendants appear frivolous, false, or sham the leave to defend shall be refused, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. The controversy, however, arises in those matters where there is a doubt as to whether the defendants have raised a triable issue, and the nature of the conditions to be imposed, if the Court comes to the conclusion to grant conditional leave to defend.

21.

The principles have been restated by the Supreme Court in the case of B. L. Kashyap and Sons Ltd. vs. M/s. JMS Steels and Power Corporation and Another,3 wherein the tests to grant the leave to defend a summary suit, were reiterated as under:

“33.

It is at once clear that even though in the case of IDBI Trusteeship, this Court has observed that the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelec Engineers’ case shall stand superseded in the wake of amendment of Rule 3 of Order XXXVII but, on the core theme, the principles remain the same that grant of leave to defend (with or without conditions) is the ordinary rule; and denial of leave to defend is an exception. Putting it in other words, generally, the prayer for leave to defend is to be denied in such cases where the defendant has practically no defence and is unable to give out even a semblance of triable issues before the Court.

33.1

As noticed, if the defendant satisfies the Court that he has substantial defence, i.e., a defence which is likely to succeed, he is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. In the second eventuality, where the defendant raises triable issues indicating a fair or bonafide or reasonable defence, albeit not a positively good defence, he would be ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend. In the third eventuality, where the defendant raises triable issues, but it remains doubtful if the defendant is raising the same in good faith or about genuineness of the issues, the Trial Court is expected to balance the requirements of expeditious disposal of commercial causes on one hand and of not shutting out triable issues by unduly severe orders on the other. Therefore, the Trial Court may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial as well as payment into the Court or furnishing security. In the fourth eventuality, where the proposed defence appear to be plausible but improbable, heightened conditions may be imposed as to the time or mode of trial as also of payment into the Court or furnishing security or both, which may extend to the entire principal sum together with just and requisite interest.

33.2

Thus, it could be seen that in the case of substantial defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave; and even in the case of a triable issue on a fair and reasonable defence, the defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend. In case of doubts about the intent of the defendant or genuineness of the triable issues as also the probability of defence, the leave could yet be granted but while imposing conditions as to the time or mode of trial or payment or furnishing security. Thus, even in such cases of doubts or reservations, denial of leave to defend is not the rule; but appropriate conditions may be imposed while granting the leave. It is only in the case where the defendant is found to be having no substantial defence and/or raising no genuine triable issues coupled with the Court’s view that the defence is frivolous or vexatious that the leave to defend is to be refused and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith. Of course, in the case where any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant, leave to defend is not to be granted unless the amount so admitted is deposited by the defendant in the Court.

33.3

Therefore, while dealing with an application seeking leave to defend, it would not be a correct approach to proceed as if denying the leave is the rule or that the leave to defend is to be granted only in exceptional cases or only in cases where the defence would appear to be a meritorious one. Even in the case of raising of triable issues, with the defendant indicating his having a fair or reasonable defence, he is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend unless there be any strong reason to deny the leave. It gets perforce reiterated that even if there remains a reasonable doubt about the probability of defence, sterner or higher conditions as stated above could be imposed while granting leave but, denying the leave would be ordinarily countenanced only in such cases where the defendant fails to show any genuine triable issue and the Court finds the defence to be frivolous or vexatious.”

22.

On the aforesaid touchstone, readverting to the facts of the case, the thrust of the defence of the defendants was that on account of the default in payment of the licence fee for one month and the service tax, the plaintiffs were liable to pay the said amount alongwith a penalty of Rs.20,000/- per day. Thus, the entitlement of the defendants to recover the said amount alongwith penalty would give rise to a triable issue if not a substantial defence.

23.

To appreciate the aforesaid contentions, it may be apposite to consider few relevant clauses of the leave and licence agreement.

24.

Clausese 3.1 and 3.2 define the licence fee and the liability to pay the service tax. They read as under:

“3.1

It is hereby agreed that the Licensors shall charge and the Licensee shall pay to the Licensors, a fixed Lumpsum Monthly Fee of Rs.4,65,000/- (Rupees Four Lacs Sixty Five Thousand Only) (hereinafter referred to as the said “LICENSEE FEE”) per month for an initial period of 36 (Thirty Six) months from the Commencement Date and Rs.5,34,750/- (Rupees Five Lacs Thirty Four Thousand Seven Hundred And Fifty Only) from the 37 month onwards to the 60 month, on or before 7 day of each calender month in advance (hereinafter referred to as the said “Due Date”. The monthly License Fee so payable by Licensee to the Licensors, shall be subject only to applicable income tax deductions at source i.e. Income Tax “TDS”.

3.2

In addition to the monthly License Fee, the Licensee shall also pay to the Licensors, monthly Service Tax @ 12.6% as currently applicable, or at whatever rates as applicable in future as per the applicable Government law and norms. It is clarified that no Income Tax TDS is applicable on the payments of Service Tax by the Licensee to the Licensors.”

25.

Clause 3.9, on the import of which the learned Counsel for the parties were at loggerheads, reads as under:

“3.9

The Licensee has agreed to diligently and sincerely pay to the Licensors the above mentioned License Fees along with Service Tax on or before the Due Date. In case the Licensee neglects or fails to pay to the Licensors the monthly License Fees and Service Tax dues on/or before the Due Date and/or if any of the said Cheques are returned unpaid by the Bankers of the Licensee, then in such case the Licensors shall intimate to the Licensors about such breach of the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to make amends in respect of the same within one week from the Due Date and if for any reason such breach committed by the Licensee is not corrected/amended, the same shall be considered as a default and upon the Licensee committing any two such defaults the Licensors shall be at liberty to forthwith terminate this Agreement without any notice to the Licensee as the Licensee confirms to waiver of notice in case of such two defaults and further without prejudice to any of the rights and remedies available to the Licensors under law. The Licensee shall further also be liable to pay to the Licensors a penalty quantified @ Rs.20,000/-(Rupees Twenty Thousand Only) per day for the number of days such default in the payment of License fee continues and the same shall be counted from the Due Date till the time it is paid/credited into the account of the Licensors.”

26.

The liability of the licensor to refund the security deposit is governed by Clauses 5.3 (i) and 5.3(ii). They read as under:

“5.3

(i) The said Security Deposit shall be refunded by the Licensors to the Licensee without interest (after deducting the dues, if any) and subject to the provisions herein contained, upon the expiry, or termminatio, or sonner or earlier determnation of this License subject to the Licensee simultaneously handing over the quiet, vacant and peaceful possession of the said Licensed Premises to the Licensors.

(ii)

In the event the Licensors fail or neglect to refund the Security Deposit to the Licensee on the expiry, or termination, or sonner or earlier determination of this License, the Licensee being ready and willing to deliver the quiet, vacant and peaceful possession of the said Licensed Premies to the Licnesors in accordane with the terms and conditions of these presents, subject to deductions of all outstandings/dues if any, on account of License Fees, electricity charges, water charges, other utility charges, maintenance charges, taxes as agreed herein to be paid by the Licensee etc, then automatically, without prejudce to the other rights and remedies as specifically agreed herein, the Licensee shall contine to use the said Licensed Premises upon payment of Rs.1/-(Rupee One Only) per month to the Licensors and this postiion shall continue until such time the Licensors hae refuned to the Licensee the entire Security Deposit (after deducting the dues if any) together with simple interest thereon @ 18% (Eighteen) percent per annum calculated from the date of the expiry, or termination, or sooner or earlier determination of this License till the Licensors have handed over to the Licensee the Bank Draft/Pay Order for refund of the said Security Deposit. It is also agreed that immediately on receiving this refund as mentioned in this Clause, the Licensee shall forthwith unconditionally vacate the Licensed Premises and forthwith handover the possession of the Licensed Premises to the Licensors without any delay or demur whatsoever and the Licensee shall have no claim/right of any kind whatsoever on the Licensed Premises or against the Licensors.”

27.

The aforesaid clauses if read in conjunction with the each other and the other Clauses of the leave and licence agreement as a whole, would indicate that the parties had defined what constituted the licence fee for a particular period with a provision for enhancement therein after the expiry of 36 months.

28.

In addition to the monthly licence fee, the licencee was liable to pay monthly service tax @12.36%, as was then applicable, or as may become applicable thereafter. In the event of default in payment of the licence fee alongwith service tax on or before due date, the licencee was to make amends within one week from the due date and failure to do so would constitute a default. That would give a right to the licensor to terminate the agreement. In addition, the licencee was liable to pay the licensor a penalty of Rs.20,000/- per day till the default continued.

29.

Likewise, the licensor agreed to refund the security deposit simultaneous with the quiet and vacant delivery of possession of the licensed premises. In the event of default, the licencee was entitled to use and occupy the licenced premises, upon payment of Rs.1/- only, until the licensor refunded the security deposit, after deducting the dues, if any, together with simple interest @18% per annum.

30.

If the controversy is appreciated in light of the aforesaid terms of the contract, it becomes evident that out of the two counts of the alleged defaults on the part of the plaintiff, the first one, namely, the default in payment of licence fee for one month, does not present much difficulty. Incontrovertibly, the default in the payment of licence fee was for one month only. The letter dated 18th June, 2010 makes it abundantly clear that without prejudice to the claim of the plaintiff, it had agreed to pay the rent and amenity charges for the period 22nd May, 2010 to 22nd June, 2010, upon the defendants refunding entire security deposit to the plaintiff. It was reiterated therein that the plaintiff was ready and willing to hand over possession of the licensed premises to the defendants on 22nd June, 2010, subject to simultaneous refund of the entire security deposit amounting to Rs.92,50,000/-.

31.

In the light of the aforesaid communication, once the possession of the licensed premises was handed over to the defendants, prima facie the liability to refund the security deposit under Clause 5.3(ii) of the Leave and Licence Agreement arose, albeit subject to deductions of the dues. Thus, the defendants could have refunded the security deposit after deducting the licence fee for the one month. Once, the possession of the licensed premises was handed over, prima faice, the clause empowering the licenser to impose penalty on unpaid licence fee ceased to operate as the simultaneous liability to refund the security deposit kicked in.

32.

The second count on which the defendants professed to withhold the security deposit was the alleged default on the part of the plaintiff to pay the service tax in accordance with Clause 3.2 of the Leave and Licence Agreement (extracted above). The controversy arose on account of a general challenge to the validity of the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994, as amended by the Finance Act, 2007, providing for levy of service tax on letting out of immovable property. In the year 2007, the Retailers Association of India filed a writ petition before this Court and, on 30th July, 2008, a Division Bench of this Court passed an interim order, staying the recovery of service tax in respect of the premises of the members of the Retailers Association of India, upon furnishing of an undertaking.

33.

While the proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court, pursuant to an order dated 14th October, 2011, the plaintiff claimed to have deposited 50% of the service tax arrears. Eventually, Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, was introduced by the Ministry of Finance and the benefit of the said scheme was extended to the lessees who were parties to the Supreme Court proceedings, by Circular No.1073-06-2019 dated 29th October, 2019. The plaintiff relies upon a discharge certificate dated 10th May, 2022, issued in favour of the respondent under the aforesaid scheme.

34.

Thus, the substance of the claim of the plaintiff is that it has fully discharged the service tax liability. The payment of 50% of the service tax arrears has been made against the service tax registration number of the defendants. No notice of demand is made or recovery proceeding has ever been initiated by the authorities against the defendants in relation to the alleged service tax liability. In contrast, the defendants contend that, whether the plaintiff has paid the service tax is a contentious issue.

35.

In the aforesaid context, Mr. Savant submitted that the subsequent events in relation to the payment of the service tax could not have been taken into account, and question of grant of leave ought to have been determined on the basis of the facts as they stood on the date of institution of the suit. In the case of Om Prakash Gupta (supra), on which reliance was placed by Mr. Savant, the Supreme Court enunciated that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the suit. However, the Court has the power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, subject to the following conditions:

“(i)

that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted;

(ii)

that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties;

(iii)

that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise.”

36.

There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law. However, I am afraid, the aforesaid pronouncement advances the cause of submission on behalf of the defendants. The reason is not for to seek. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the liability was to pay the service tax as applicable. As noticed above, there were orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court pursuant to which the recovery of service tax was stayed, upon depositing of certain amount and undertakings. Eventually, pursuant to the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, the plaintiff claimed to have settled the dispute and a discharge certificate came to be issued on 10th May, 2022. The defendants may dispute the factum and co-relation of the said payment and discharge certificate to the liability to pay the service tax in respect of the licensed premises. However, what is of critical salience is the fact that, prima facice, no material could be placed on record to demonstrate that the authorities have issued any notice or demand in relation to the service tax qua the subject licensed premises to the defendants, much less any recovery proceedings has been initiated.

37.

The defendants cannot be heard to urge that de hors their liability to pay the service tax, the plaintiffs should have continued to pay the service tax to the defendants for the plain reason that the liability was to pay the service tax as applicable. The licence fee was not inclusive of service tax. The liability to pay service tax was in addition to the licence fee. Such liability would arise provided the service tax was exigible. At any rate, it was to be paid to the Government.

38.

Even otherwise, in the absence of prima facie material to show that the defendants were called upon to pay the service tax by the authorities in respect of the licensed premises for the period the plaintiff was in occupation thereof, the defendants could not enforced the said payment. This factor significantly bears upon the purported right of the licenser to recover the penalty at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per day. Undoubtedly, it could be urged that the said stipulation was a measure of damages for the breach of the contract, which the parties provided for. Yet, it is trite, in the event of breach of the contract, a party is entitled to compensation for any loss which naturally arises in the usual course of things from such breach. In a given case, the parties are free to provide for the compensation which, in their estimation, is the loss which would be occasioned on account of breach of contract.

39.

The policy of law, as enshrined in Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is that a party who is entitled to the compensation for the breach of contract ought to receive a reasonable compensation, even where a sum is named in the contract to be payable in the event of breach of contract, if the Court finds that the said amount is in the nature of a penalty. Where the parties have named a sum, the Court is competent to award a reasonable compensation in case of breach, even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of breach of contract.

40.

In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court culled out the propositions which govern the award of damages. They read as under :

“68.

From the aforesaid discussions, it can be held that :

(1)

Terms of the contract are required to be taken into consideration before arriving at the conclusion whether the party claiming damages is entitled to the same;

(2)

If the terms are clear and unambiguous stipulating the liquidated damages in case of the breach of the contract unless it is held that such estimate of damages/ compensation is unreasonable or is by way of penalty, party who has committed the breach is required to pay such compensation and that is what is provided in Section 73 of the Contract Act.

(3)

Section 74 is to be read along with Section 73 and, therefore, in every case of breach of contract, the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree. The Court is competent to award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequences of the breach of a contract.

(4)

In some contracts, it would be impossible for the Court to assess the compensation arising from breach and if the compensation contemplated is not by way of penalty or unreasonable, Court can award the same if it is genuine pre-estimate by the parties as the measure of reasonable compensation.”

41.

The aforesaid being the position in law, whether the stipulation to pay a penalty at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per day, even if one were to assume that the plaintiff was liable to pay the service tax, (though the recovery of the service tax was initially stayed and subsequently compounded and discharged), was in terrorem or a reasonable pre-estimate of damages would warrant adjudication at the trial.

42.

In the totality of the circumstances, however, in the face of the indisputable withholding of the security deposit, the defence of recovery of the unpaid amount of one month's licence fee and service tax, alongwith the penalty at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per day, appears to be a tenuous and, thus, constituted a defence which appeared to be plausible but improbable. The trial court was justified in holding that there was doubt about the genuiness and bona fide of the defence set up by the defendants. In such a situation, the trial court would have been justified in imposing a condition to deposit the entire principal sum, even together with interest at a just rate, especially in view of Clause 5.3(ii) of the Leave and Licence Agreement, which provides for payment of interest at the rate of 18% per annum.

43.

Thus, viewed through the aforesaid prism, the learned Judge, City Civil Court, cannot be said to have committed any error in law in granting leave to defend the suit, subject to deposit of the undisputed security deposit amount minus one month's licence fee. The discretion to impose the condition of deposit of amount cannot be said to have been exercised in an unreasonable or capricious manner.

44.

Resultantly, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, no interference is warranted with the impugned order. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

45.

Hence, the following order:

: O R D E R :

(i)

Petition stands dismissed.

(ii)

Rule discharged.

No costs.

Time granted to the petitioners-defendants to deposit the amount in terms of the order passed by the trial Court is extended by four weeks from today.

Footnotes

  1. 1.(2002) 2 SCC 256.
  2. 2.(2003) 5 SCC 705.
  3. 3.(2022) 3 SCC 294.