Vijay Kumar Sharma vs M P M K V V Com Ltd & Ors.

As per Justice Anand Singh Bahrawat:

By way of instant appeal, filed under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, challenge is made to the order dated 15.12.2025 passed in W.P.No.2397/2025; whereby, writ petition preferred by petitioner/appellant was dismissed claiming the benefit of full salary for the period from 25.1.2018 to 30.4.2021 during which he remained under suspension and praying for interest on the aforesaid amount.

In nut shell the facts giving to the instant appeal are that initially appellant was appointed on the post of Store Assistant in the Madhya Pradesh Vidhyut Mandal now know as Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidhyut Vitaran Company Ltd. (MPMKVV Com. Td) on 3.4.1982. At the relevant point of time he was working as Junior Engineer at Gwalior Division of the respondent/Company. During the service tenure, a criminal case was registered at Special Police Establishment (SPE), Gwalior against present appellant along with other co-accused persons namely Vikash Kesarwani, Ajay Nayak and Shashikan Parashar on 18.1.2018 bearing crime No.257/2016 under Section 7, 13(1) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and Section 120 of I.P.C. Thereafter, he was produced before the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, Datia wherein a case was registered bearing case No. SC LOK NO.01/2018. Thereafter, as per instructions issued by the General Administration Department, Bhopal vide letter No. F-11/58/98/1-10 Bhopal appellant was placed under suspension with immediate effect vide order dated 25.1.2018 and he was attached to the City Circle, Gwalior. After recording the statement of prosecution, learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 29.7.2022 was acquitted all the accused persons along with appellant. During the pendency of the case, appellant stood retired on 30.4.2021. Thereafter, appellant submitted a representation before the respondent authority for regularation of period his suspension. Accordingly, vide order 10.2.2023 the period of suspension from 25.1.2018 to 30.4.2021 has been treated to on duty for all purposes except for pay and allowances for said period. The said order was challenged in writ petition which was dismissed by impugned order dated 15.12.2025, hence the present appeal.

Learned counsel for appellant submits that the suspension of appellant is totally unjustified because he was suspended on account of criminal case in which he was subsequently acquitted and the reasons, account of which he was placed under suspension, now does exist, therefore, he is entitled for full pay and allowances for the period in which he was placed under suspension. It was argued that by counsel for appellant that learned Single Judge has erred in law as well as on facts in holding that appellant is not entitled to full salary for the period of suspension, despite the fact that the appellant was acquitted in the criminal proceedings. As the appellant was falsely implicated in the crime in which he was acquitted, therefore, as per Fundametal Rule 54-B (3) he is entitled to get full pay and allowances for the intervening period.

Learned counsel for respondents supported the impugned order passed by learned writ Court and stated that appellant was involved in criminal case because of his own acts and Department was not instrumental in his prosecution, therefore, suspension on account of the same, cannot be said to be unjustified. Under F.R.54-B, it is for the Competent Authority to form an opinion whether the suspension of employee is justified or not and if the authority comes on conclusion that suspension is totally unjustified, then only employee is held to be entitled for pay and allowances for intervening period. In the present case, the order of suspension cannot be said as unjustified, therefore, appellant is not entitled for any pay and allowances for the period in which he was placed under suspension.

Heard the counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to quote the following provisions of Rules:-

Rule 9 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred as 'Rules 1966')

As per F.R.54-B, on reinstatement of employee on revocation of suspension if competent authority formed an opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, then only the employee become entitled for full pay and allowances for the period in which he was placed under suspension. For full pay and allowances for intervening period, suspension order has to be wholly unjustified in the opinion of the Competent Authority.

Rule 9 (1) of Rules 1966, confers discretion to the Appointing / Disciplinary/ Competent Authority to place any employee under suspension on condition stipulated in Rule 9 (1) (a) and (b) of Rules 1966. Suspension under Rule 9 (1) (a) and (b) is dependent upon discretion of the authority on the condition prescribed therein except the proviso of Rule 9(1) (b) of Rules 1966 which is mandatory in nature. The relevant proviso is reproduced as under for ready reference and convenience:

The appellant was placed under suspension. The said suspension on account of when a challan for a criminal case involving corruption or moral turpitude is filed against him, the authority had no other option but to place employee under suspension under the deeming clause of Rule 9 of Rules 1966. Therefore, the said suspension cannot be treated as unjustified even in case of acquittal also, because at the time of suspension it was justified under priviso of Rule 9 (1) (b) of Rules 1966.

Once it is held that suspension of employee was not wholly unjustified, he cannot be held entitled to pay allowances for the period of suspension. As at the time of suspension, there was no other option but to suspend the appellant on account of his custody in a criminal case. Merely because he was acquitted, the said suspension of petitioner which was under the statutory rules cannot be treated as wholly unjustified.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain v. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 809 where it has clearly been held that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in comparison to an employee facing a departmental inquiry and further that an employee involved in a crime disables himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail and subsequent acquittal by an Appellate Court would not entitle him to claim back wages.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corpn. v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155 has held, in the light of Rules governing the conditions of service of the employee therein, that the relevant rule vests power on the competent authority to order reinstatement and to form an opinion whether suspension of the government servant was wholly unjustified and if in his opinion suspension is found to be wholly unjustified, such government servant would be paid full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended.

Referring to the judgment of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman (1991) 4 SCC 109, Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Prabhakar Rao (supra) has also observed that in cases where criminal conviction results in acquittal with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence, the authority concerned must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves such benefit.

It has also been observed in Jankiraman (supra) that to lay down a rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary proceedings he shall be entitled to all salary for the intervening period, is to undermine discipline in the administration that shall jeopardise public interest.

Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed in M. Prabhakar Rao (supra), relying on Jankiraman (supra) that even in cases where acquittal in criminal proceedings is on account of non-availability of evidence, the authority concerned must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and further that such a power is vested in the competent authority with the view to ensure that discipline in administration is not undermined and public interest is not jeopardised.

It has also been observed by the Apex Court in M. Prabhakar Rao (supra) that in every such case where an employee is exonerated in disciplinary or criminal proceedings, whether or not he shall be entitled to all salary during the period of suspension, such a decision has to be taken by the competent authority on the facts and circumstances of each case. Paragraphs 8 to 10 of M. Prabhakar Rao (supra) are extracted herein below:

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541 has clearly held that as per the regulation applicable in the said case, the employer has to have exclusive power to decide whether to treat the period of suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise and that the power, thus, vested cannot be validly challenged. The Court further observed that in such a situation the employee is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the employer is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties and therefore, the employer cannot be saddled with the liability to pay the employee his salary and allowances for that period as the same would be against the principle of ‘no work no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. The Court further held that the employer’s power in that behalf is unassailable. Paragraph 15 of the judgment in Bhopal Singh Panchal (supra) is apposite to be quoted here which reads as under:

In Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if an employee or public servant got involved in a criminal case and his prosecution which ultimately resulted in his acquittal was not at the behest of or by the department itself, the department, in any manner, cannot be faulted with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. The relevant observations can be found in paragraph no.4 in Jaipal Singh (supra), which is extracted here in below:

Regard may be had in this respect to yet another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukhdarshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 14 SCC 531 where Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in terms of the rules applicable therein, where there is an order of dismissal and thereafter, the employee concerned is reinstated, the authority concerned is to pass an order as to whether the period from the date of suspension or from the date of dismissal till reinstatement of the employee, is to be treated as the period spent on duty for any purpose. Hon’ble Supreme Court further holds that in a situation where Appellate Authority finds termination of services of an employee to be illegal, it would not ipso facto inevitably follow that employee will become entitled to claim the salary for the entire period, consequent upon his being found to be entitled to be reinstatement and that this is a matter for the authority to decide. Paragraph 24 of Sukhdarshan Singh (supra) is extracted herein below:

On a careful reading of the judgments referred to herein above, the principle of law which can be deduced is that in case order of reinstatement of an employee is passed on his acquittal in the criminal case by the Appellate Court, such an employee will not ipso facto be entitled for salary or any other benefit for the period he was placed under suspension or for the period he was out of employment on account of his dismissal for the reason of his conviction by the Trial Court.

Accordingly, the reasons of the respondent having been kept out of employment are not attributable to the appellant and therefore, in terms of the law, as discussed above, he was not entitled to the salary for the period in question.

In the judgments which have already been quoted above, Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the rationale for vesting such a power with the competent authority of the employer. In the instant case, the competent authority of the respondent has exercised such discretion, which in our opinion, is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. In such a situation, in our opinion, once the competent authority of the appellant exercised its discretion denying the benefit of the period in question any interference by the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be uncalled for. The discretion exercised by the competent authority of the appellant, in this case, is based on relevant facts, and therefore, for this reason as well, interference in such a discretionary decision of the appellant is unwarranted.

In view of discussion made above, this Court is of the considered opinion that impugned order passed by writ Court is justified and does not warrant any interference. Accordingly, order passed by learned writ Court is hereby affirmed and Writ Appeal is hereby dismissed.